



Civil-Military
Co-operation
Centre of
Excellence

NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams

ISAF PRT operations in Afghanistan
and the implications and consequences
for civil-military relations.

29-30 September 2005



List of Speakers

PRT Operations in an academic perspective – Dr. Myriame Bollen, Associate Professor Royal Netherlands Defence Academy (RNDA)

PRTs and humanitarian – military relations in Afghanistan. Summary of research findings of “Save the Children” (UK, Sep 2004) – Mr. Paul Meijs; Former director of Care NLD, Former chairman of VOICE

Paradigm shift in Human security – Mr. Paul Meijs; Former director of Care NLD, Former chairman of VOICE

Military coordination officer: to establish and sustain a clear and effective political authority – Mr. Diego Osorio; Civil Military Affairs Coordinator UNAMA

Afghan Civil Society Response to the PRT Operations – Mr. Sayed Fazlulla Wahidi; Chairman of the Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau (ANCB)

Editorial

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Preface

The Director of the Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence

The seminar “NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams” was the first event of its kind at the Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence (CCOE). Open for a worldwide public it was the first visible step by which the CCOE showed its transformation into a NATO accredited Civil-Military Co-operation body for NATO, EU, UN and CIMIC players.

The CCOE expects that the seminar findings will be used as valuable and valid inputs for the development of future policies and doctrines. These results will ensure that CIMIC is incorporated in these documents in the appropriate way – this provided the seminar participants the unique opportunity to contribute to future/ enhanced CIMIC. As a major result Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Command Transformation has invited CCOE to join the Atlantic Council Working Group in order to assist in the development of a study titled “Transforming for Stabilization Operations and Reconstruction Efforts within NATO.” In particular, CCOE will contribute with a PRT Field Study to be conducted presumably in June 2006. Furthermore, CCOE intends to use the findings in its own CIMIC courses and exercises and for the integration of CIMIC in the full range of NATO operations and planning for operations on all levels.

As the CCOE’s director I would like to thank our speakers Ms. Birgitte Juul (keynote), Dr. Myriame Bollen, Mr. Sayed Fazlulla Wahidi, Mr. Diego Osorio and especially to Mr. Paul Meijs, who not only gave two lectures but also moderated the whole seminar. Our briefers and participants ensured, that this seminar was a success.

The CCOE will continue to fulfil its role as a multinational contribution to NATO’s transformation efforts, and is offered for NATO accreditation by using its academic freedom in determining the subjects of its seminars, lectures and finding relevant speakers. Therefore, seminars, conferences and workshops will be embedded in our activity calendar – we are looking forward for any external approach for future events. By this CCOE will promote new ideas and findings among relevant institutions and individuals, and emphasise the value of mutual understanding through a continued debate.



Jürgen Witzig
Colonel DEU A
Director CCOE





Content

List of Speakers	II
Editorial	II
Preface	III
Content	V
Abbreviations	VII
Executive summary	IX
1 Vital political priorities within International Peace Keeping	1
1.1 Briefing	1
1.2 Discussion	2
2 PRT Operations in an academic perspective	5
2.1 Briefing	5
2.1.1 Summary about PRTs	5
2.1.2 Operational styles, roles and activities	5
2.1.3 PRTs and security	5
2.1.4 PRTs and effectiveness.....	6
2.2 Direct Response to the briefing.....	8
3 Workgroup No. 1: The civil- military “Grey Zone”	9
Shared values and overlapping civil – military areas of interest	9
3.1 Intro for workgroup session 1.....	9
3.2 Questions.....	9
4 PRTs and humanitarian – military relations in Afghanistan	13
4.1 Briefing	13
4.2 Discussion	13
4.3 Workgroup No. 2: how to handle the coordination in the “grey zone”	14
4.3.1 Intro for workgroup session 2	14
4.3.2 Questions	14
5 Paradigm shift in Human security	17
6 Summary of seminar day 1	19



- 7 Civil-military Coordination officer 21**
 - 7.1 Briefing..... 21
 - 7.1.1 Civil-military relations in Afghanistan 21
 - 7.1.2 PRTs..... 21
 - 7.2 Discussion 23
- 8 Afghan civil society response to the PRT operations..... 25**
 - 8.1 Briefing..... 25
 - 8.2 Discussion 26
 - 8.3 Workgroup No. 3: Major Seminar findings and recommendations for the way ahead 27
- 9 Conclusions and recommendations 29**
- Annexes XI**
- Seminar Agenda..... XII**
- Annex 2: Literature list..... XIV**



Abbreviations

ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
ACO	Allied Command Operations
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANCB	Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau
CC	Coordinating Committee
CGN HQ	CIMIC Group North
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIC	Concepts, Interoperability and Capabilities Branch in CCOE
CMCOORD	Civil-Military Coordination (UN term)
CMR	Civil-Military Relations
CPA	Concerted Planning and Action
CSO	Crisis Support Operations (a non-NATO term)
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EU	European Union
FS	Functional Specialist
GO	Governmental Organisation
IC	International Community
ICRC	International Committee for the Red Cross and Red Crescent
ICT (EC)	Integrated Capabilities Team (Enhanced CIMIC)
IMS	International Military Staff
IO	International Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JALLC	Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre
JFC HQ	Joint Force Command Headquarters
MC	Military Committee
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCS	NATO Command Structure
NGHA	Non Governmental Humanitarian Agency
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom



OPORDERS	Operational Orders (military term)
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PRT ESC	PRT Executive Steering Committee
(S)ACT	(Supreme) Allied Command Transformation
SCR	Senior Civil Representative (NATO's highest civil rep in ISAF)
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SO	Staff Officer
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TCN	Troop Contributing Nations
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNSRSG	United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General

Executive summary

Since the establishment of the first PRTs in connection to the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, there has been an ongoing debate on the roles of the PRTs and on the military role within the reconstruction-, rehabilitation- and stabilisation areas. The possible interface between military deployed units and the actions of humanitarian organisations is a crucial part of this debate.

The following points summarises the main findings of the seminar. The reader should notice that all comments are made in a (informal) seminar setting and do not represent any official standpoint or position from any of the participating parties.

For easy navigation, the findings are grouped in three distinguishing areas; preparation, domain and communication.

Preparation

NATO planning has a clear focus on effects and end-states and thereby on “exit-strategy”. The special nature of the PRT operations focusing on stabilisation and reconstruction, also provide the necessity to have a clear vision on all aspects that will immediately face the PRT when arriving in its designated area of operations. Rebuilding, reconstruction and interface to humanitarian/development organisations will additionally require the existence of a very well defined “entry-strategy”.

The nature of the PRT operations will require concerted (military and civilian) planning. In order to clarify possible interfaces to other organisations, it is of crucial importance that these planning aspects are dealt with and sorted before deployment.

National and international coordination is a must. Representatives of the beneficiaries should be involved; this needs determination, monitoring and evaluation. All actors are accountable to the beneficiaries.

Again, the special nature of the PRT operations will require both more pre-mission- and specialised training. Ideally, the training should be partly executed together with possible civilian humanitarian/development organisations working in the same area.


All PRTs are deployed either by a single nation or by a lead nation with partner(s). Various operational concepts therefore exist. When some PRT nations has focus on infrastructure reconstruction others focuses on physical safety and security. NATO has up to now not developed methods and standards for this operation and therefore different nations have different focuses and approaches to the problems. There is a need for an “aligned” and clear PRT concept. We need a general (integrating) PRT concept, which must be understandable for decision makers and must cross boundaries in order to change the attitude in the disciplines of security, law & order, reconstruction and rebuilding, to achieve a common desired end-state.

Domain

PRTs should not take over the role of NGOs and GOs. The PRTs primary roles are laying in the security area and in the assistance to humanitarian- and development organisations.

Pure humanitarian relief activities are preferably being lead by humanitarian organisations. If PRTs are involved in such activities, it is only as a last resort, when there is a desperate humanitarian situation or in cases of life saving.

There will always be necessary to be able to measure effects of operations. This goes as well in relation to the PRT operations. A reliable set of measurable standards, legitimised by the Afghan Government, is a absolute requirement. It would benefit both the PRTs and the ISAF operation if NATO advanced on this matter.



A workable interface between the various actors in a PRT operations area is clearly dependent on good information sharing. The possibility of Information sharing between the actors working in the PRT area and between the different PRTs is absolutely required.

On the issue of human values the seminar found that there is a basic overlap of values shared between the military and Non Governmental Humanitarian Agencies. Despite this, it is observed that Humanitarian Agencies hold a clear tendency to focus on the humanitarian situation while Military forces tends to prioritise effort within the security area.

Coordination, (structured, with a lead agency and with relevant involvement of local authorities) through a joint board with civil and military participants with legitimacy and with obligations to the beneficiaries and their governments is required. NGOs should establish coordination mechanisms among themselves. There might even be a 'partnership' between the actors involved in the PRTs.

All activities of both Military and Humanitarian/Development organisations should be based on sound evaluations and assessments of the factual situation as it develops in the Area of Operations. Here there is a huge room for "playing-each other-better". The main obstacles in this respect are the possibility of a lack of common standards, goals and objectives. In the benefit of structured positive development, one should strive for all possible measures to enable common assessments, based on common standards to be used in a joint way;

Communication

Professional, transparent and factual communication between all parties involved in a PRT operation is of adamant importance. Therefore, there is a need to improve the

interface between the military and the NGO world and the interaction between all relevant actors to become as effective as possible.

In order to facilitate a best possible conduct of missions, the NATO nations, NATO HQ as well as the Humanitarian/Development Agencies strategic levels should jointly strive to improve the PRT mission statement. Transparency of the actors is key in this respect.

On top of this, there is a need for effective communication also to bring the different levels (strategic, operational and tactical) closer to each other.



1 Vital political priorities within International Peace Keeping

1.1 Briefing

Today, threats to our societies are often created far from our national borders. The globalisation of the world results in conflicts and disturbances from remote parts of the world moving quickly towards direct and considerable consequences for all nations. On the international political scene, failed states and weakened states have become the prime concern of international security today. These states may contain many of the supposed factors that would seem to result in the creation of terrorism. The result of this focus with the added impact of 9/11 and later March 11th in Madrid, as well as the more recent tragic London bombings, has been a whole new paradigm for early and robust military intervention coupled with efforts at consequent nation building.


New experience has been gained in recent years in humanitarian aid and reconstruction aid in connection with the resolution of conflicts. In the west Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, humanitarian aid has been more or less based on particular cooperation between the humanitarian organisations and the military in the form of, for example, logistic support and the removal of landmines, but also in rebuilding security structures of these societies and societies based on the rule of law.

A common denominator for these situations has been that they have involved extensive destruction of local structures - social as well as those of security. International crisis management operations are therefore not only a military task. For the civilian population, improving their social and economic situation and improving the security situation are directly interrelated.

The overall purpose in a conflict area is to stabilise and normalise the situation. Water, electricity, transport, police, basic administration and a functioning business sector are all basic prerequisites for achieving this goal. This has generated a need to involve many organisations in resolving the conflict and has blurred the lines between military and civilian efforts. We should not take over the role of the NGOs. We have our core skills and the NGOs have theirs. As a rule, civilian organisations should conduct the humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. However, at the same time we need to be realistic. The security situation can mean that NGOs do not have the possibility to operate in a crisis area. This is where the military force may have to give some specific temporary means of support to the local population.

By coordination between military and civilian efforts we need to establish a common ground and rules of play for the cooperation. This coordination must take place on both national and international scale. NATO has an important part to play. NATO must be made ready for its new set of challenges. Joint planning of civilian and military efforts is very much an aspect of transformation. Not only transformation of the Alliance, but also as a tool in the current process of transformation of the nature of conflicts and the way those conflicts are handled.

Denmark hosted a seminar in Copenhagen in June. In general, the seminar demonstrated a broad interest in “Concerted Planning and Action” or CPA. What we need is a common understanding and a more systematic approach, while taking into account – and respecting – the different roles, mandates and principles of the actors involved. Concerted planning and action needs some form of interoperability if it is to become an integrated part of future multinational operations. A prime example of this need for interoperability is the PRTs operating in Afghanistan.



To tackle the challenges in Afghanistan with purely military measures would be insane. On the contrary, the development of PRTs in Afghanistan shows NATO's ability to continue to be a viable military alliance today. The PRTs also show that we are willing and able to work with local authorities and other actors in the field and help bring about a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. As an answer to this reality, the PRTs seem to do the job. But are they streamlined? Do we have one concept? The fact is, that we have as many different PRT "concepts" as we have nations. They all have their own distinct style of doing business. They are different. They have different approaches. Other actors also perceive the PRTs very differently. Some PRTs have a good reputation for working with and respecting the other actors in the mission area. Others have more problematic relationships and are not perceived as favourably by other actors.

Do we need a unified PRT concept to alleviate the demands posed by the political scene?

PRTs can never be a "one size fits all" solution to future operations and demands. While it is clear that some approaches perform better than others in the present conditions, it seems to me that any unified PRT concept must be very flexible and mutable in order to fit with its political and physical reality.

Perhaps the first step forward is a common understanding of some basic factors that need to be looked at when dealing with the development of PRTs:

The relationship between the military effort and the civilian effort must be clarified in terms of overall balance. The relationship with the civilian side must be addressed in a proper manner. Local authorities must be involved within the PRTs activities. Our troops must have an understanding of and respect for the task they are solving. We normally

speaking about C3: Command, Control and Communication. We might as well start talking about C4: Command, Control, Communication and Coordination. It takes two to tango – and the civilian side is our dancing partner. You cannot get love by order – so let's try with respect!


1.2 Discussion

Resulting from this lead-in, the following topics were raised and discussed:

International Peace Keeping is not a one-side solution. How can a shift from C3 (Command, Control and Communication) to C4 (+ Coordination), as proposed by the keynote speaker, take place if PRTs are guided by national politics? The military are already used to coordinate with their counterparts abroad and their national Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Aid. These ministries however should also coordinate with their respective counterparts abroad.

National governments are the main players in the various PRT operations. Intentionally or unintentionally, this leads to a situation where too many important development aspects are related to national goals instead of a common international and e.g. include UN involvement and approach? To solve this problem will be a step-by-step approach that requires close dialog between NATO, PRT contributing nations, UN and contributing agencies. People in the field have already found solutions. It must be brought up to a higher level. The central government in Kabul must play a more dominant role and should be leading the development of their country.

The issue concerning standards was put forward, as there are different needs in the PRTs. There should be some kind of standardization (common approach within the PRTs) but input for this issue must come from both civil and military side. But what must this look like from the military side? To be more successful we have to move beyond the



conference rooms. PRTs are now reflecting the national interests of contributing countries. We should look first at what the PRTs *should* do (consensus on basic operations of a PRT) and focus on the regions and the country as a whole. The PRT Kunduz for example must be linked with Kabul.

According to the Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau (ANCB) representative it is about what the people in Afghanistan want. There is a lack of good coordination and there are too many differences between the national NGOs and the international NGOs. If coordination is not efficient enough a “partnership” could be implemented. This implicates a need for a unique coordination structure between all actors to come to such a partnership. It is common knowledge that the Afghans need help in reconstruction, but they are not very satisfied with the UN system (regarding spending the funds in which almost half goes to administration purposes). As the NGOs are not decision makers, the ANCB representative recommended “partnership” between the NGOs and decision makers.

A military representative mentioned the problems about trust, language and confidence. The military activity is based on a mission they have to fulfil to support the Afghan Government. This mission cannot be discussed at the working floor; this is done on the highest level (Brussels). In the PRTs he considered the functionalities operating to be of importance.

Another question from the audience was if coordination was the only solution to solve the Afghan problems. We have the Bonn agreement in which tasks for the nations are given (including national caveats), but does this imply a common approach? The keynote speaker agreed and said that there must be coordination with the central government. The question is shifting from “how to do the job” to “with whom to coordinate”.

On the question on how UNAMA see this coordinating role. the UNAMA representative stated that, as the situation evolved from humanitarian assistance to reconstruction, the UN is to assist the Afghan government in its role as leader of the reconstruction effort. The advocating role in linking the PRTs to the central government is also a task, albeit not exclusive, for the UN, but is not 100% successful. There will not be a unified structure per PRT, so there is no fixed blueprint, the structure is situation depending, PRTs must be flexible.





2 PRT Operations in an academic perspective

2.1 Briefing

2.1.1 Summary about PRTs

Different stakeholders have written a report about the concept of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) operating in Afghanistan. Based on these reports Dr. Bollen gives an overview of the different perspectives of PRTs.

Since the end of 2004, 19 PRTs are in operation throughout Afghanistan, five of which are under NATO (ISAF) command. ISAF-led PRTs come under the umbrella of the UN-mandated force and are authorized to expand beyond Kabul, whereas the coalition PRTs are operating at the invitation of the Afghan government without a UN mandate.

To date, the overall idea concerning PRTs is to use small civil-military teams (50-300 personnel) operating at the provincial level throughout Afghanistan to expand the legitimacy of the central government to the regions, to enhance security, and to facilitate reconstruction processes. In addition, under circumstances, PRTs undertake activities in the areas of limited relief operations (so-called hearts and minds and quick impact operations). Stakeholders are radically opposed in their views on the concept of PRTs.


Analyses of the above mentioned reports show three main issues concerning PRTs, namely: (1) their operational styles, roles and activities, (2) their impact on security, and (3) the effectiveness of PRTs in their main areas of operation.

2.1.2 Operational styles, roles and activities

There is a lack of clarity and coordination of activities among the actors involved with PRTs. There is a lack of clear understanding between the assistance community and the Coalition on the particular focus of PRT activities. Also the coordination between the different combatant components of the coalition force and the PRTs remain unclear. There seems to be little agreement amongst the military on how to undertake their roles, to what degree PRTs should engage in other activities such as intelligence gathering, and actively engage in relief operations on their own initiative. While there is general agreement on three broad areas of activity: reconstruction, central government support and stability, PRTs seems to hold different views on the relative importance of these foci. PRTs operate in different ways, adopting a different balance between security and assistance activities, reflecting the local security environment, available resources, and the political priorities of troop contributing countries. Whereas the diversity of approach has the advantage of flexibility, it makes a lack of a homogeneous vision of what PRTs should be doing, or clear mandate to guide their activities. The lack of a common approach stems from the large number of countries involved in PRTs, the presence of two separate military operations and commands in Afghanistan with different objectives and different approaches to civil-military activities. The complexity is compounded by the absence of an overall lead agency or lead nation.

2.1.3 PRTs and security

There is a lack of military strength to address insecurity caused by Taliban, Al Qaida, armed militia and warlords (the so-called opposing forces). PRTs could make the greatest contribution by focusing on support to Security Sector Reform (SSR). Specifically,



PRTs could play an essential role in the accountability of the weapons collection component of a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process, supporting and guiding additional deployment of Afghan National Army (ANA) units and supporting and training the local police. However the PRTs lack sufficient military strength to address insecurity caused by armed militias and conflicts between warlords, and has not yet engaged in counter-narcotics activities. It is expected that PRT activities in support of SSR also will be beneficial in expanding the reach of the central government and in reducing lawlessness and banditry. So far strengthening the government's authority is undertaken in an ad-hoc manner. Governmental planning for the provinces seems absent. PRTs' relief operations are being confused with humanitarian assistance. This endangers perceived independence of aid-workers and puts their security at risk.

2.1.4 PRTs and effectiveness.

In trying to answer the question whether PRTs are effective in their four main areas of operations, the opinions from the differing perspectives are polarized to the extreme. However, these opinions aren't based on objective criteria needed to assess whether the stated goals have been achieved. The lack of objective criteria accounts for the often-impressionistic views on PRTs. It is not possible to assess the extent to which PRTs have met these objectives, since the PRT concept is still evolving and the approach and activities of each PRT vary according to the lead nations' operational styles and the specific security situation. Also information on PRT activities and their impact in the field is limited and no systematic monitoring of PRTs seems to take place. Generally agreed criteria for success are lacking, and different lead nations employ their own measures of success. The engagement in assistance activities (limited relief operations) has led PRTs into areas where they do not have a


comparative advantage. However there is a lack of objective measures of effectiveness required to assess the impact of PRTs in the field. An agreed upon generic concept of PRTs in Afghanistan is absent, which accounts for a lack of clarity on the activities and roles of PRTs. This absence of clarity does not only affect civil-military relations, but also reflects on inter military relations. Differing stakeholders hold differing expectations as to the ways in which PRTs should deal with security and to the priority security issues should hold. There is a general agreement that PRTs are not able to address the underlying causes of insecurity in Afghanistan.

Comparing civil-military relations during humanitarian operations to the PRTs' engagement in relief operations.

In spite of some positive results, civil-military cooperation has been controversial from the onset. Throughout the years, the appropriateness of military contributions to deliver humanitarian assistance has been commented upon both from the military as well as from the civilian perspective¹. Seven potential problem-fields are identified that may thwart civil-military cooperation in the field during humanitarian operations.

First, relations suffer whenever military humanitarian assistance is seen to *supplant rather than to supplement* civilian humanitarian assistance. In case of perceived "supplanting", the military are viewed to be

¹ Seiple C. *The US Military/ NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions*, Peacekeeping Institute, Centre for strategic Leadership, US Army War College, 1996. Weiss T.G. *Military-Civilian Interaction. Intervening in Humanitarian Crises*. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland, 1999. Witzig Davidson L. Daly Haynes M. and Landon J.J. *Humanitarian and Peace Operations: NGO/ Interagency Interface*. Workshop on Humanitarian and Peace Operations, April 1996. Minear L. and Guillot P. *Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda*. Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1996.



unfair competitors. Secondly, the military as well as humanitarian organisations doubt the so-called “*humanitarian expertise of the military*”. By this, both parties mean that although the military may command the necessary resources to extend humanitarian aid, this doesn’t mean they know how to use these resources appropriately. Third, from a civilian humanitarian side there has appeared to be a fair amount of distrust about the *military’s motives* to engage in humanitarian assistance. Fourth, civil-military relations with regards to humanitarian assistance should be demand-driven. This means that cooperation is temporary, depending on the needs for specific assistance and the swiftness of adjusting the military means to changing humanitarian demands. Fifth, civil-military cooperation has been prone to *opportunistic behaviour* concerning the use of resources and the purposes to co-operate. Sixth, at the strategic level, the attitude has seemed rather reactive. A shared comprehensive civil-military vision and approach to the complex humanitarian problems in war-torn societies has been developing at a slow pace. There appears to be *little monitoring or process evaluation* with regard to civil-military collaboration. Lessons are learned independently and hardly institutionalised. The exchange of information and feedback are administered by dribbles between the various organisations and disciplines. Last, civil-military cooperation between unfamiliar and widely diverging partners has been hindered by *visions on collaboration that were perceived to have developed unilaterally by one of the organisations*. When the potential partners have not participated in the development of cooperation policies, chances are they will reject any forms of cooperation resulting from this process.

The concerns of the international aid community about the concept of PRTs can be summed up as followed: (1) the increasing politicisation of aid is alarming because core

principles of humanitarianism: independence, impartiality and neutrality are eroded, (2) military movement into the humanitarian space raises issues on the intrinsic differences between military and humanitarian core aims and principles, (3) military involvement blurs the lines of distinction between combatants and aid-workers, putting humanitarian security at risk, (4) PRT operations are both cost-ineffective and a duplication of effort for services already provided by the aid community, (5) the military’s lack of development expertise in providing aid and relief can hinder long-term development efforts, and (six) doing both development and security distracts the military from its primary responsibility of providing security.

Comparing these concerns to the above-mentioned problem fields identified through research on civil-military cooperation during humanitarian operations, the similarities leap to the eye. Furthermore, the concerns focus primarily on PRTs performing in the field of relief operations, which is regarded as trespassing onto the traditional humanitarian domain while lacking the expertise to do so.

The perspectives on PRTs are mostly based on feelings and opinions not on hard facts, as there is a lack of neutral academic research on this topic and common agreed upon criteria for evaluation. More research is therefore necessary.

To conclude some questions / dilemma’s that arise:

- The international community – both military and civilian – appears to be running the show in Afghanistan. Does the debate on PRTs run the risk of being “internationalised”?
- What do the Afghan beneficiaries feel about PRTs? How can they contribute to the debate on PRT-evolution?

- PRTs operate at the provincial level. How can “provincial-level” beneficiaries be involved in assessing PRTs’ effectiveness?
- (Comparative) research into PRTs is only possible in close cooperation with Afghan beneficiaries.
- Should the internationals develop measures of effectiveness regarding their own services, or should the Afghans take the lead?

2.2 Direct Response to the briefing

The ANCB representative responded to the stated dilemmas by stating that the PRTs have a positive effect for providing proper access into the area for organisations to work in, and for local authorities to present the central government. In provinces without PRTs, humanitarian organisations have no access to the Afghan beneficiaries. There is also a misunderstanding that has to be solved about ‘who-is-who’ and ‘who-does-what’. This however only is applicable for the situation in Afghanistan as long as there are two operations (ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom) present at the same time. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) representative confirmed that his organisation would not be able to work without a PRT, as they take care of the security situation and allow other organisations to focus attention on other jobs to be done in the area.

At this moment there is a failure to measure the effectiveness of the PRTs. There are no baselines, there are duplications of effort and all depends on the amount of Non Governmental Humanitarian Agencies (NGHA) present. The situations differ in each PRT area in whole Afghanistan.

A military representative remarked that we should train and educate our military commanders in missions in building and maintaining relationships. This is not a problem at field level but it is a problem at

commander’s level. We have to start at the highest (NATO/ political) level. A structural problem is that most PRTs are undermanned. Dr. Bollen agreed on the education and ‘level’ problem and added that the civilian aspect is part of the education programme at the Dutch military academy. Now it is too much an national problem (of the Troop Contributing Nations – TCN). We should start with ‘Entry-Strategies’ instead of talking only about ‘Exit-Strategies’. In this approach there must be more focus on the country itself.

The representative of the Danish Ministry of Defence stated that the military do humanitarian relief jobs because nobody else is doing it. Soldiers are not by origin trained to do this kind of work, we train them more and more for supporting and assisting relief workers. Although it’s not a soldier’s job, they are the only ones able to fulfil it, as soldiers are trained to create things with little means. A military representative commented that CIMIC is part of the military mission and linked to ‘national business’.

We have to question ourselves on what levels we have to focus (strategic, operational and tactical)? What can we influence? We need a clear strategy and are not supposed to end up on a cloud. A CCOE representative responded by telling that CCOE contributes to Allied Command Transformation Enhanced CIMIC team (ACT EC), to influence the process in EC and the ACT facing the future.² The CCOE is also using this kind of input in the training and education branch for training and education purposes.

² SACT Norfolk currently is producing a concept concerning NATO Future Operations (named CAFJO = Concept for Alliance Future Joint Operations).

3 Workgroup No. 1: The civil-military “Grey Zone”

Shared values and overlapping civil – military areas of interest.

3.1 Intro for workgroup session 1

- *What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people? Without a political goal, guerrilla war must fail, as it must fail if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained...because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can not flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation’: **Mao Tse Toeng***
- *‘...the shooting side of the business is only 25 percent of the trouble and the other 75 percent lies in getting the people of this country behind us.’ **Sir Gerard Templer***
- *“The war will be won by humanitarian workers and not soldiers because they, the humanitarian workers, address the root causes of the conflict.’ **Senior USAID Officer***

Also humanitarians enter in the struggle for the people when they work in insurgencies and counter-insurgencies. All three groups make claims about the moral ends they regard as right for the people. Insurgents usually define their moral ends as liberation into a new and just society. Counter-insurgency authorities often talk of pacification, stability and the inevitable progress of the status quo. Humanitarian agencies argue for people’s protection, assistance and development.

Do humanitarian agencies and military forces, for example in Afghanistan, share some of

the same moral goals and do they employ similar means to these ends? This is a serious question that has been forced upon humanitarians by each of the warring parties who both describe UN agencies and NGOs as ‘collaborators’ - albeit with rather different meanings. Military authorities have welcomed humanitarians positively as partners while resistance groups have killed humanitarians as treacherous agents of the enemy.


NGOs and other humanitarian commentators are in an interesting form of denial about the morality they have in common with the military forces. They seem to find the idea of having shared values with the military forces somewhat distasteful in a way, which they have not always done with other insurgents and counter-insurgents with whom they have found a shared morality in previous wars.

Multi-mandate agencies have a vision of the good society, either nationally or globally and are not the same as a humanitarian agency like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) whose concern is with people in war and not with the creation of the good society. This makes ICRC different from CARE, Oxfam, Action Contra Le Faim, Caritas, IRC, Save the Children, UNICEF, UNDP and many others.

3.2 Questions

- Do the military forces and (especially) the NGO’s with a broad mandate have shared values? Which ones? (One example: “freedom of religion”)
- Question 2: What are overlapping fields of interest between humanitarians and military forces?

The discussion regarding question 1 initially focussed on naming NGOs as a group and to distinguish them by national or international origin. Implementation of what should be done must be communicated with the local population, who should be in the lead. Furthermore, it was remarked that from the



military side it is difficult to identify shared values. Some values already differ within the military as such. It is more a problem of cultures and methods, national caveats included. We also have to identify which 'military forces' are meant in question 1, who are they, where do they come from? It was concluded that these forces are NATO forces coming from NATO countries. There is a link between basic standards and shared values, e.g. is this the case in countries belonging to the UN?

The final answer on question 1: Yes they have shared values but methods, interests, ideology and culture differ. The shared values are mostly based on Humanitarian Law and International Law (Geneva Conventions). The problem lays in communication between policy makers and the people in the field; there is no common picture.

Note: in the discussion there was no further specification of what the 'shared values' really were.

The answer on question 2 showed the following: create security, sustainable development (rebuilding, reconstruction), law & order, a stable functioning society and conducting relief operations. These items form the common fields to reach a desired end-state. Only the way we deal with this and the prioritising is different. The military for instance are likely to give security a number one priority. Humanitarian organisations are likely to make humanitarian relief their top priority.

Communication and understanding are very important. The military are framed in what they are and what they do, but so are the humanitarian Organisations (e.g. ICRC). There is a need for knowledge on these frames so there can be a better identification of common grounds and common obstacles.

Some questions embedded in this issue have to be solved.

There was agreement on security as a shared value, but different definitions will be met. Minimum stabilisation and positive change can also be considered as values, although the first will face the national caveats.

The moderator launched the question if shared values refer to International Human Rights and to Humanitarian Law (basic principles)? It can be the basis for communication but still there will be some sceptics.

It was agreed upon that there are shared values, but not that many. They are considered to be only about 10% of being successful within the PRTs; the other 90% is based on acceptance by the local population. Does the local population accept the mentioned shared values? The acceptance of shared values will start with good cooperation at strategic level, which will be difficult to reach. Concerning the NGOs we have to distinguish between Humanitarian Agency NGOs and broad mandated NGOs.

A question to the NATO International Military Staff (IMS) representative was if he could take issues on PRTs (from this seminar) back to his staff to use it in the planned conference on PRTs in November this year. The answer was that the nations direct the IMS, nations can debate issues, but the IMS cannot direct the nations.

A comment was that PRTs should work according "Lines of Activity", but how to use the measurements of effectiveness? These could be mentioned in the military operational orders (so-called OPORDERS).

The UNAMA representative added that the translation of the overall plans of the Afghan Government into standards at provincial level goes in accordance with the National Development Plans. To implement the right indicators for use in the PRTs, we need political approval from the Afghan government. Although there was discussion on different situations surrounding the PRTs,



most of the participants agreed on having some standards to work with.

A question was raised if we can use the PRT-concept elsewhere or if it is only related to Afghanistan? There was no clear answer found on this question but the UNAMA representative commented that we are writing the manual while using the concept, internationalisation is going to happen.





4 PRTs and humanitarian – military relations in Afghanistan

Summary of research findings of Save the Children (UK, Sep 2004)

4.1 Briefing

Focus of the research conducted by Save the Children UK was the contribution of PRTs to enhance security and how these teams impact on humanitarian security in particular as precursor to humanitarian access. The study was placed in the context of deteriorating security and actors in the humanitarian space.

Results of the research were that PRT activities in their core mission areas have positive effects on humanitarian security. However negative consequences arise from PRT's engagements in relief operations. There are differences between PRTs and NGOs in the delivery of humanitarian aid. NGOs act according the humanitarian standards, which means humanitarian imperative comes first, the provision of aid is impartial and humanitarian aid is independent. Military do not act according to these standards and provide relief. Guidelines of coordination already exist, but the guidelines do not take into consideration that not all actors might respect humanitarian principles. Also guidelines are not sufficiently explicit in complex situation where military have to engage in ambiguous range of mission like relief. The guidelines do not address the grey zone of rehabilitation either. There are 4 modes of engagement for NGOs and PRTs. First, there is the principled non-engagement. Secondly, interaction is at arm's-length. Thirdly, there is the proactive, pragmatic, principled engagement. And the fourth mode is an active, direct engagement and cooperation.

PRTs' challenges are military strength, pre-deployment consultation with NGOs, involvement of local stakeholders in activities, a clearly defined role, institutional learning and not to compromise the role of humanitarian agencies. Recommendations for civil military teams are therefore to concentrate on security, to be strong enough to do the security job, to have a clear mandate, to have proper training of their personnel, to prioritise the local actors in the rehabilitation phase, to have an exit strategy and to preserve boundaries between NGOs and PRTs.

To conclude, mutual clarification of roles between NGOs and PRTs is necessary. Also PRTs should engage in humanitarian relief only as a last resort.

4.2 Discussion

In comparing the rehabilitation phase with capacity building, the role of NGOs was stressed. The NGOs work is led by governmental guidance and direction. In practice this kind of guidance and direction is not working. In the discussion that followed it was mentioned that there are differences in what NGOs do (according the concept) and what the Afghan government wants them to do. NGOs do not necessarily have to work for the local government (legitimacy of local government issue). In the reconstruction phase there is a different need for NGOs as it is not humanitarian relief anymore. The IOM representative remarked that NGOs in Afghanistan are now shifting to reconstruction. A military questioned what relief is and what rehabilitation is in the different areas in this transmission phase, and if people do work with standards? The question arises whether we are measuring the same things.

Note: an answer to these questions is still open, as it was not clarified during the discussion



4.3 Workgroup No. 2: how to handle the coordination in the “grey zone”

4.3.1 Intro for workgroup session 2

There are overlapping fields of interest between military forces and multi mandate NGOs. Probably the best way to handle *moral* overlap is to admit the overlap and describe it accurately by showing where it exists and where it does not. Without such precision military and NGO relations will remain confusingly confrontational while their objectives often sound strangely similar. Three things could help with such a clarification of positions:

- **Admit** the shared values and admit that multi mandate work is not the same as humanitarian work.
- **NGOs are permitted to challenge** the military forces about the means the military use and vice versa. The differences over the (morality of) means are better discussed in a context that recognizes overlap around moral ends. Most liberal agencies are both with and against military policy and might sound more coherent, and perhaps have more influence, if they described themselves as such.
- **Avoid double standards.** One of the particular problems is that our own people and governments sometimes are blurring the human rights issue.

There is agreement on the terms that a ‘joint board’ for consultation, coordination and info sharing was essential in the overlapping fields, shared by both the military and civilians. Afghans must be involved in such a coordination board, as coordination is not authority by one over the other. It is crucial to urge the Afghan government to legitimise standards to work with. For the formation of

such a board it is important to contact the ‘right’ people to get the ‘right’ results.

It is understandable that independent NGO should not want to be regarded as ‘military agencies’. They are not! But is it wise to pretend that such agencies have nothing in common with the military objectives and method in its counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan? Being precise about where one agrees and where one differs is likely to make for better coordination and more influential discussion than trying to obscure any common morality by draping oneself in an apparently value-free humanitarian cloak.

4.3.2 Questions

- **Do you agree with the before mentioned three recommendation? Why/why not?**
- **Give examples of methods on which NGOs and military forces might not agree/might agree.**
- **Explore how military forces and NGOs could be a stronger force in achieving their (shared) ends**

It was stated that a clarification on the word “coordination” is needed as both military and civilians have a different understanding. Coordination must not be institutionalised but should be issued on case-by-case basis.

There could be a role for a lead agency to emphasize on key issues like impartiality, transparency, and mutual interest.

Local authorities and UN should cover coordination in a structure where all players are represented; talking about the same issues, and focus on the same aims with local authorities in lead.

The military exit-strategy will be based on the ‘end-state’, which could implicate a minimum of military presence. A comparison was made with Cyprus: if soldiers leave Cyprus, the



country will fall apart. The UN exit-strategy is combined with the ISAF presence.

Important is the transparency between the actors in the field. The structure of a joint board must have a top-down mechanism with main players (UNAMA as lead agency) and Afghan authorities present and primarily in the lead.

From coordination we could change more to 'collaboration'. We need to make *common assessments* to avoid duplications in which the aim of the military will still be to work towards the end-state mentioned in their mission statement. A comment was that the civil side is already working together in assessments and conducting activities. It is important to do pre-training for the military before deployment into PRTs. A military remarked that it is to be sorted out what the common standards for assessments are before using it in a 'joint' way.

Another comment was that the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (UNSRSG) should start a top-down approach to create such a joint board and engage NGOs in order to make it happen. The UN rep replied that what is established is more or less an ad-hoc solution, depending on people, regions and security. The question is how to ensure that local authorities take their responsibilities (involvement). For this we have to use this board and find tools how to involve the local population.





5 Paradigm shift in Human security

Within the humanitarian community there are a few commonly agreed basic concepts and principles, namely: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence and humanitarianism. According to the principle, humanitarian assistance should be brought without discrimination and should prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Impartiality excludes discrimination as to nationality, race religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors only to relieve suffering, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress. To be neutral one may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature, in order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all. NGOs must always maintain their autonomy, their independence. The humanitarian view of life is that human suffering has to be prevented and alleviated. Also human security has to be guaranteed. The promotion of human rights has to be taken care of while the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence are respected.

The military community can't work according to these concepts. When the military do relief operations they conduct according to the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) definition, which is: "The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between military commanders and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies".

Several international agreements based, on humanitarian principles, have been signed. There are the chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter, there is the International Humanitarian Law, the Human Rights Law, the Refugee Law and the Red Cross code of conduct. There are several examples, however, of not acting according to these

agreements. The Security Council for instance did not sanction the Iraq war. Terrorists have murdered humanitarian aid workers in Afghanistan. NGOs have accepted money from belligerent governments. Prisoners in Guantanamo Bay have been maltreated. In West Africa NGOs misused their power for sexual favours, etc.

Several organisations, like the UN, the EU, NATO, the US, the Red Cross, the Barcelona working group and SGUN, have been searching for ways to improve human security. This resulted in doctrines like the Bush Doctrine, the Solana Doctrine, the Human Security Doctrine, the CIMIC Doctrine, etc., but also in a revised Red Cross code of conduct, an international customary humanitarian Law and PRTs.

Starting from the point of view that people have a right of protection and that security, rehabilitation and human rights need each other, there are three challenging hypotheses. First of all, in and after conflict people need NGOs for humanitarian aid and rehabilitation and military forces for security. Secondly, principles on when and how international security intervention should take place have to be accepted. Finally, principles have to be developed on how NGOs and military forces coordinate



6 Summary of seminar day 1

Mr. Paul Meijs gave the summary of the first day:

- PRTs should not take over the role of NGOs.
- PRTs primary role is security *and relief only as a last resort*.
- There is a need for a unified and clear PRT concept.
- Concerted planning is needed. *A paradigm shift makes it possible.*
- National and international coordination is a must.
- Representatives of the beneficiaries should be involved (*needs determination, monitoring, evaluation*).
- Actors are accountable to beneficiaries.
- Measurable (success) criteria are needed. (*NATO should advance this*).
- There are shared values between militaries and Crisis Support Operations (CSO) organisations, *but...there are differences to be solved.*
- NGOs should establish coordination mechanisms among themselves.
- There are overlapping fields:
 - Transparency of the actors .
 - Information sharing.
 - Coordination through a
 - Joint board with civil and military participants with legitimacy to the beneficiaries and their governments.
 - Structure with a lead agency.

○ Common assessments.

After this highlight presentation it was remarked that the PRT concept is what the PRT is doing, not how it is organised and how they do it. Furthermore, it was agreed on that we couldn't isolate PRTs. The concept must be seen from a broader perspective, it is a model for a certain end state. It is part of a post crisis/conflict operation concept.





7 Civil-military Coordination officer

“To establish and sustain a clear and effective political authority.”

7.1 Briefing

7.1.1 Civil-military relations in Afghanistan

These relations take place in the context established by a well-established process of reconstruction, under the authority of a sovereign government, the presence of a national, central and Afghan led reconstruction strategy and in the middle of a coexistence between reconstruction and humanitarian situations: there is a need to strike a balance between them.

Several actors play a role in post-conflict reconstruction. There are military forces, humanitarian actors, and development actors like NGOs, profit contractors, government and donors. In that context, we can observe that the spectrum of NGO-Military society relations' ranges from:

- The desire to avoid all type of contact with the military, based on institutional and policy reasons, which proves to be an untenable position;
- Those who advocate for separation and the respect for the humanitarian agenda, but without providing alternative mechanisms to sustain a minimum of a communication flow;
- Finally, those who carry on what we could term a “pragmatic engagement” where there is room for CIMIC coordination, enlightened between the options of “damage control” and “constructive engagement”.


The structure of civil-military governance in Afghanistan can be compared with a pyramid divided in three parts.

The PRT steering committee occupies the top layer, which concerns policy. The second layer, operations, consists of the PRT working group, UN focal points and the NGO working group. The last layer is a regional level structure mirroring headquarters structures. Within this civil-military governance, we have a set of “soft tools” which allows the gradual institutionalisation of the relations. Among those we have informal discussion groups, a PRT working group charter, a NGO civil-military working group charter, UNAMA civil-military affairs coordination office, the NGO advocacy and policy officers, a soon-to-be PRT secretariat, e-mail groups and a PRT ESC charter. We already have clear civil-military guidelines for natural disaster- and complex emergency situations approved by the international community. However, within the context of civil-military guidelines for post-conflict reconstruction situations? The short-answer is no. In the case of Afghanistan, we are breaking new ground and we need to “think outside the box”, and this is a key imperative for both civil and military actors.

As the reconstruction phase is unfolding the concept of PRTs needs to be re-evaluated in light of its effects, both positive and negative, on the key elements of post-conflict reconstruction process. Among those, the development of sustainable good governance, particularly at the provincial level has to be considered.

7.1.2 PRTs

A good analogy for PRTs is the concept of franchise A key concept is implemented by different countries, adapting it to local conditions. However, as in a franchise, its success depends on proper coordination,



reaching an economy of scale and delivering a coherent “product” throughout the country. The questions are:

- What is the product? Small CIMIC projects? Security provision? Counter-narcotics? Hearts and minds projects? Security sector support? Counter-terrorism?
- Has the product been defined well? What measures have been taken to ensure sustainability of whatever the PRT will deliver? Are those outputs designed to provide the greater benefit to recipients or to promote the deliverer? How can we ensure that the short-term involvement does not undermine the conditions for a long-term impact and undeniably linked to any possible exit strategy?
- Are the coordination mechanisms effective? Are PRTs delivering a coherent product throughout the country? Can PRTs act as the much needed platforms for provincial reconstruction in the right measure? Lack of coherence suggests that this is not the case; position makes PRTs successful or a failure?

PRTs as a delivery and projection mechanism for reconstruction at the provincial level act might prove a good solution, but it emerged as a second best option. At the same time, the concept has been implemented without full clarity on how to measure its effects, how to coordinate its elements, etc....In a way, the concept is being put in place while the manual is being written simultaneously. As a mix of civil and military elements this “intended” hybrid demands institutional flexibility from all sides (civil and military). For instance, the Lead agency should be the government of Afghanistan. However there’s a gap between this notion and the tangible authority.


In the present situation the national caveats and national interpretation of the concepts means

fragmented support to governance. There is an ambiguous franchise which includes the product and the process, but who are the customers and the beneficiaries? Who are the shareholders? There is a gap between the strategic and the operational levels. Questions arise whether there is management by consensus and if this is the best result. Also, is it sustainable?

However, in the current conditions, trying to harmonise the concept through normative proposals or solutions is not an effective solution at this point. A formal agreement might prove elusive, but this does not rule out the possibility of reaching coherence by inducement or by seeking common areas of operation. One thing that we have to keep into mind is that the political imperative is key on any type of tactical or strategic consideration and this will determine the type of coordination structures and joint objectives that will mark the work of PRTs. It is clear that these political considerations might reflect national perspectives and this is something the Afghan leadership has come to terms with.

What to do? We should focus on effects. It is necessary to bridge the gap between Afghan authorities and development actors before your deployment. One should not forget that the wheel is invented already and there is no need to re-invent development plans or coordination mechanisms. Instead, proper support must be given to the structures in place.

At the same time, good training and the pursuit of common standards can do a lot of good for proper results. Elements such as the mission rehearsal exercises for PRTs should be established to ensure a minimum of a harmonised approach (see for example the Stavanger exercises for ISAF HQ). The task of reconstruction demands a re-definition of roles for both



the military and the civilian actors. There is a need to go beyond the CJ9! Seeking to act within institutional channels will ensure a sustainable impact. The real implications of Afghan leadership should be seized. In this there should be readiness to assume the political and operational costs of such a policy. Within the restrictions of national caveats, policy considerations, and different local circumstances, horizontal channels of cross communications should be identified and used. The centre of gravity for planning and operations is not the PRT, but the effect that the PRTs have on the long-term reconstruction: institutional, social, security, economic, civil society.

7.2 Discussion

It was asked what 'beyond CJ9' means? It means that to face the new realities of post-conflict reconstruction where the military are asked to play a bigger role, there is a big need for serious rethinking of military structures. J9 doctrine is not well prepared to address the challenges of a situation where the clear notion of support to civilian actors is now giving way to the notion of making the military one actor among the few with direct responsibilities in a reconstruction effort.

A military remarked that within the reconstruction phase Afghanistan is facing now, the Senior Civil Representative from NATO (SCR) could include Functional Specialists (FS) into his staff to influence NATO's political level. They could be used with a focus on governance. The UNAMA representative commented that this was not necessary within the ISAF mission, if they were intended to provide a new group of planning on development issues. However, if these specialists are devoted to link up the comparative advantage of the military with the reconstruction and development plans, that is certainly another matter. At the same time the focus of the military components must stay on stability. This does not preclude a better role in the planning of certain operations where the

military possess specific skills as e.g. disaster planning (concerted planning).

More explanation was asked regarding the 'gap between tangible authorities and other civil actors'. The briefer said that this refers to the gap between the normative leadership on the reconstruction plans, which all actors agree rests in the hands of the Government of Afghanistan, and the tangible elements of decision making which are clearly determined by national interests. There are still differences between the Afghan needs and what is implemented. The question remains how to increase the Afghan authorities' involvement to bridge the gap between the needs and what is delivered.

The ANCB representative questioned the mechanisms UNAMA uses to link the Afghan government to the people (civil society). The response was that UNAMA helps with advice and promoting e.g. on human rights. He furthermore commented that we could agree on the highlights presented by the moderator, as useful for the longer term, but realistic is what is happening now.



8 Afghan civil society response to the PRT operations.

8.1 Briefing

The experience of Afghanistan with NGOs dates from 1980, a year after the Soviet Union evaded the country. Since then international and foreign NGOs have been in Afghanistan, providing humanitarian assistance to needy Afghans without any conditionality and discrimination. Also Afghan NGOs were established, with the help of international NGOs. The NGOs commenced activities at large scale inside Afghanistan. In 1991 the Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau (ANCB) was established, with the aim of providing better services to Afghan communities. The ANCB has two main activities:

1. To coordinate and promote the work and activity of member NGO's, cooperate with the government in economic, social and cultural programs for the growth and development of the country. Secure relations with the international organisations and donor agencies for the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan in accordance with Afghan and international principles.
2. Capacity building of its member NGOs through establishing training courses and field training.

In 1996, when the Taliban came to power, foreign NGOs were compelled from Afghanistan. Only those NGOs or international NGOs who employed Afghan people stayed. During that period, severe drought hit Afghanistan for some years. In the mean while, the NGO community initiated several programs from different channels to provide drinking water and other assistance to the people of Afghanistan.

After the event of 9/11, the overall conditions of Afghanistan changed, the Bonn agreement was signed, transitional government was set up and

humanitarian assistance increased for Afghanistan. Large numbers of refugees returned to their home. There was a need for greater reconstruction and rehabilitation activities and also for new partners. Humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan increased, many NGOs arrived from abroad and also the number of Afghan NGOs increased, thus the coordinated activities of reconstruction and development started at large scale. One of the many challenges of a better implementation of humanitarian activity is security.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), who is in Afghanistan since 2001, supports the Afghan interim authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas.

We witness that ISAF is doing a good job, they also support small projects, specially supporting schools (children and women) with their CIMIC teams. For a better implementation ISAF launched information sharing meetings for which they always invite ANCB and the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) as coordinating bodies of NGOs.

Afghanistan is now moving towards development to secure relationship and confidence among the Afghan people. This development made the government of Afghanistan, together with the NGO community, launch the 'code of conduct'.

They announced to their member organisations to follow the next eight elements of this code:

1. Legal registration: a copy of the NGOs legal registration with the Afghan government.
2. Operational experience: a signed statement on official stationary affirming that the NGO has been operational for at least one year.



3. Coordination body membership: a letter affirming the NGOs current membership in one or more of the coordinating bodies (e.g. ANCB and ACBAR).
4. Governance documentation: a copy of the NGOs written constitution or recent memorandum of association that clearly defines the NGOs mission, objectives and organisation structure.
5. Financial documentation: a copy of an audited financial report for its most recent fiscal year.
6. Operational documents: a copy of its annual report for its most recent years of operations. For international NGOs, a copy of the global annual report will be sufficient.
7. Completed survey of accomplishments: allowing the secretariat to monitor and to communicate the combined accomplishments of NGOs.
8. Mandatory government reports: copies of semi annual reports required by the Ministry of Economy.

Most of our member NGOs signed this code of conduct.

On the other side, the Islamic republic of Afghanistan launched the new law for NGOs. This new law makes re-registration for NGOs, in particular the Afghan NGOs, more difficult and limits the amount of NGOs and their activities. Despite these limitations, it will have an optimistic effect on the relation among the government and NGOs, and it will make the collaboration stronger.

NGOs in Afghanistan are working in a complex environment. The priority for this country is of course humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation. But we also have to think about a long-term strategy and development of the Afghans.

Support of ISAF for providing security and conducting small projects is appreciated,

because in many areas the Afghan people still need quick impact projects.


Humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation is a priority for Afghanistan. ISAF peacekeeping and PRT monitoring is welcome in Afghanistan in which they assess and contribute to the military, political and civil situation within the country. They also influence and mediate with local authorities, units and the NGO community. Furthermore, ISAF facilitates reconstruction efforts of other members of the international community and promotes extension of the influence of the Afghan government. The PRTs do not conduct humanitarian assistance on their own, but provide assistance to IOs/ NGOs within their means and capabilities.

8.2 Discussion

It was made clear again that the focus of the Afghan NGOs is on capacity building. The coordination in the civil society is facilitating to achieve this aim. Security is the first priority for the people, especially in villages, where it is not present yet. It was remarked that the Afghan authorities couldn't work without the PRTs present in the areas.

Furthermore, there is a lot to improve within the NGOs like language, reporting, financial overview, book holding and program planning. Note: "how to improve" was not discussed within this seminar.

Somebody questioned if the new NGO law and registration of NGOs has a positive or negative effect? This is mostly experienced as negative because the government must give permission to conduct projects and activities. They make use of the 'open economy' without having a good picture of the people's needs in the communities. For a better understanding ACBAR and ANCB launched their 'code of conduct'.



A CCOE representative asked if Afghan NGOs provide assistance and/or training to local authorities in the regions; this was confirmed. ACBAR and ANCB related NGOs give advice and assistance to local authorities on regional (provincial) level. How do they keep in touch with the central government in Kabul? The (Afghan) NGOs are not allowed to work without permission of the appropriate ministries (e.g. education for building schools). These permits come from decision makers and donors and are not decided by implementers.

Were the NGOs involved in making the “map” together with the decision makers? There are different groups (e.g. woman affairs), working under the coordinating bodies in line with the ministries.

Another comment was whether the UN is monitoring the political situation properly, which is not a specific task for NATO. The ANCB representative responded by telling that this is an area where the UN is not allowed to mingle in, the so-called ‘risky areas’. The UNAMA representative remarked that there is difference in monitoring and reporting on which the ANCB representative replied that we need more knowledge about the mechanism on this ‘monitoring’.

8.3 Workgroup No. 3: Major Seminar findings and recommendations for the way ahead

Questions:

- **How to involve beneficiaries in a “Joint board for coordination” in order to ensure that their requirements are met?**
- **Which recommendations would you like to make to the way ahead?**

As this workgroup session paved the path for the next paragraph, the result will be shown there.

After some discussion the idea was raised to talk about a kind of ‘blue print’ (PRT-concept), balanced, flexible, in which the boundaries are not fixed, based on interests, trust and knowing each other.

The chairman of the seminar said that a ‘blue print’ for PRTs could be dangerous; as it would entail less creativity. A reaction on this was that the ‘blue print’ is nothing more than a broad idea; the involved countries do not have the exact knowledge to execute it. A comment on this was that it has to be more concrete than only based on a thought. In addition to this, it was said that not UNAMA but the Afghan government is in the lead. They must be involved to identify the local needs and the ‘blue print’. Therefore the International Community (IC) must empower the Afghan government so **they** can make **their** (PRT)-concept.



9 Conclusions and recommendations

The overall conclusions are:


- The question is if ISAF PRTs are a model for the future? The focus in this question is the word 'model' in which lead agencies and lead nations (with their national caveats) play an important role. Although the present PRT concept is not the ideal one, it is the only one available at this moment. The seminar audience recognised that PRTs are and will be different all over Afghanistan. They are not perfect, but they are all we have and they are partly successful.
- Although this remark was made concerning partly being successful, there are no clear criteria for success and no indicators to measure the effectiveness of PRTs. We can talk about success, but it is not based on hard evidence (facts).
- We need a general (integrating) PRT-concept (overarching architecture), which must be understandable for decision makers and must be able to cross borders / boundaries in order to change the attitude in the disciplines of e.g. security, Law & Order, rebuilding/reconstruction to achieve a common desired end state. There is a need for concerted planning and pre-training prior to deployment, if possible shared with civil actors, working in the same areas.
- We must not compete with each other e.g. NATO Military, IOs, NGOs, and Afghan authorities. PRTs should not take over the role of NGOs, but maybe there are new roles for NGOs and the military to consider.

- We must create a balance between the Afghan population (including local authorities), the International Community (IOs, GOs, NGOs) and the NATO military. National and international coordination is a must. This can be accomplished through a joint board with civil and military participants with legitimacy to the Afghan beneficiaries and the Afghan government. Another instrument to coordinate is a structure with a lead agency, covered by local authorities.

- The NATO strategic level can work on a better PRT Mission Statement. They must conduct self-analysis and self-criticism. NATO also must focus on both an entry- and exit strategy.
- There must be follow-on discussions between the NATO ISAF TCN, the civil organisations and the local population. In these discussions transparency must be shown and the interface between the military and the NGOs must be improved. Effective communication in these discussions is a must to bring the different levels closer to each other.
- There must be more focus on what the local population really needs.
- We must use common assessments, based on common standards to be used in a joint way.
- There are shared values between militaries and Non Governmental Humanitarian Agency (NGHA) organisations, but there are differences to be solved.

The recommendations are:

(A proposal on who could be in the lead or take initiative to further action is put between brackets)

- 
- To develop criteria for success and indicators to measure the effectiveness of PRTs (ACT?).
 - To develop a general integrated PRT concept as an overarching architecture (NATO headquarters, Brussels?).
 - To develop an idea for concerted planning and pre-training, shared with civil actors working in the same areas. (Allied Command Operations – ACO?)
 - To identify new roles for the NGOs and the military in the PRTs (ACO/ACT?).
 - To create a joint board with civil and military participants with legitimacy to the Afghan beneficiaries and the Afghan government. To create a structure with a lead agency covered by local authorities. Both instruments are meant to improve national and international coordination (ACO?).
 - To develop a better PRT Mission Statement on NATO strategic level, based on self-analysis and self-criticism. (NATO headquarters, Brussels?).
 - To develop both an entry- and exit strategy regarding PRTs. (NATO headquarters, Brussels?).
 - To develop follow-on discussions (including agenda with topics, priorities, timelines and milestones) between the NATO ISAF TCN, the civil organisations and the Afghan local population (including local authorities) (NATO headquarters, Brussels?).
 - To identify what the Afghan people (beneficiaries) really need (Government of Afghanistan?).
 - To use common assessments, based on common standards to be used in a joint way (ACO?).
- To support ACT in the above-mentioned development for what we need additional field studies (research) to gain hard facts to qualify the PRTs (CCOE).
 - To appoint a working group in which the necessary actors, related to PRTs, are incorporated to work on the 'way ahead' and develop the next steps (CCOE).



Annexes

Seminar Agenda



CIMIC Group North HQ

Facilitates the operational seminar

**NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT):
ISAF PRT operations in Afghanistan and its implications and consequences
for civil-military relations.
A model for the future?**

Weert, 29 and 30 September 2005

In close cooperation with
the Royal Netherlands Defence Academy (RNDA)

Agenda

Thursday 29 September 2005

- | | |
|---------------|--|
| 09.00 – 09.30 | Welcome by the chairman, Col H. Knoop
Programme and administrative briefing, LtC J. Solvang
Opening statements of participants |
| 09.30 – 10.10 | Keynote speaker on “Vital political priorities within international peace keeping”, by Ms. Birgitte Juul, DNK MoD. |
| 10.10 – 10.30 | Coffee Break |
| 10.30 – 11.30 | “PRT operations in an academic perspective”, by Dr. Myriame Bollen, RNDA. |



11.30 – 12.30	Workgroup session 1. Shared values and overlapping civil and military areas of interest (the 'grey zone').
12.30 – 13.45	Lunch break
13.45 – 14.15	Plenary discussion and presentations of WG session 1 findings.
14.30 – 15.15	"PRT's and humanitarian – military relations in Afghanistan"; a summary of research findings of Save the Children (UK, September 2004), by Mr. Paul Meijs (former chairman of VOICE and moderator of this Seminar).
15.35 – 16.15	Workgroup session 2. How to handle the coordination in the 'grey zone'? (Ref: Session 1).
16.15 – 16.45	Plenary discussion and presentations of WG session 2 findings.
17.00 – 18.00	"The paradigm shift and the need for coordination in the humanitarian space debate", by Mr. Paul Meijs.
18.00 – 21.00	Free programme.
21.00 – TBD	Social gathering in the hotel bar.

Friday 30 September 2005

09.00 – 10.10	"To establish and sustain a clear and effective political authority", by Mr. Diego Osorio, CMCOORD officer at UNAMA.
10.30 – 11.30	"Afghan civil society response to the PRT operations", by Mr. Sayed Fazlulla Wahidi, chairman of ANCB.
11.30 – 12.15	Workgroup session 3. Major seminar findings, recommendations to the way ahead.
12.15 – 13.00	Plenary discussion and presentations of WG session 3 findings. Participants closing statements / remarks.
13.00	Closing address by chairman, Col H. Knoop.



Annex 2: Literature list

Charter of the PRT Executive Steering Committee, 2 December 2004.

Humanitarian and Peace Operations: NGO/ Interagency Interface, (Workshop on Humanitarian and Peace Operations), Witzig Davidson L. Daly Haynes M. and Landon J.J., April 199six.

ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Backgrounder, December 17th), NATO, 2004.

Military-Civilian Interaction. Intervening in Humanitarian Crises. Weiss T.G., Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland, 1999.

Provincial reconstruction teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan, Save the Children, 2004.

PRT Consultation Process and Beyond, United Nations (2003), 21 August 2003.

PRTs in Afghanistan: Success but not sufficient, Jacobsen Peter Viggo, DIIS Report 2005:six.

Review of DfiD involvement in PRTs in Afghanistan (Work in process), King's College London, 2005.

Securing Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward, Government of Afghanistan Kabul, 17 March 2004.

Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda. Minear L. and Guillot P., Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 199six.

Terms of Reference for CFC and ISAF PRTs in Afghanistan, adapted, 27 January 2005.

The US Military/ NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions, Seiple C. Peacekeeping Institute, Centre for strategic Leadership, US Army War College, 199six.

PHD Studies

Rietjens S.J.H., *Civil-military cooperation in response to a complex emergency: Just another drill?* Enschede: University of Twente, PhD study, to be published in 2006.

Theses

Apon J.P. *Provincial Reconstruction Teams, a new opportunity for civil-military cooperation?* Thesis written for the Instituut Defensie Leergangen, The Hague, July 1 2005 (in Dutch).