

Let us all Join in: Ukrainian Civil-Military Cooperation Analysis



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WAR IN EVERY CORNER:

Ukrainian Civil-Military Co-operation
Analysis





Ukrainian Civil-Military Co-operation Analysis Outline

- **Introduction and Statistics**
- **Coalition Warfare Theoretical Applications and Comparatives**
- **Historical Applications of Coalition Warfare**
- **The Whole-of-Government Approach to Warfare**
- **Historical, Global, Applications to Civil-Military Co-operation**
- **European Approaches to Civil-Military Co-operation**
- **Ukraine's Approaches to Civil-Military Co-operation**
- **The United Kingdom's to Civil-Military Co-operation**
- **Conclusion**

Ukrainian Civil-Military Co- operation Analysis

Introduction and Statistics



Estimated available manpower	69,002,197	18,187,531
Active soldiers	1,320,000	900,000
Reserve forces	2,000,000	1,200,000
Paramilitary units	250,000	100,000
Air force	-	-
Total aircraft	4,292	324
Total helicopters	1,651	136
Fighters	833	70
Dedicated attack	689	36
Attack helicopters	557	39
Trainers	611	73
Transport aircraft	456	24

The Ukrainian War statistics¹ indicate that there is a strong asymmetric nature to warfare. This indicates a strong need for military co-operation on the world stage.

Civil-Military Co- operation Analysis: Coalition Theories

- Definition of Coalition Warfare²
- Theory of Coalition Warfare³
- Historical Case Studies⁴



Comparatives of Coalitions and Alliances

ALLIANCES

- **Pre-existing agreements from prior decisions**
- **Institutional Alliance Structure**

COALITIONS

- **Purpose of Agreement**
- **Institutional Alliance Structure**
- **Multilateral Structure**

Historical Applications of Coalition Warfare

- **Manoeuvre Warfare**
- **Attrition Warfare**
- **Hybrid Warfare**
- **Special Forces Utilisation**
- **Civil-Military Co-operation Cases**





THE WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO WARFARE

- **Manoeuvre Warfare**
- **Attrition Warfare**
- **Hybrid Warfare**
- **Special Forces Utilisation**
- **Civil-Military Co-operation Cases**



Historical, Global Applications to Civil-Military Co-operation

- **Manoeuvre Warfare**
- **Attrition Warfare**
- **Hybrid Warfare**
- **Special Forces Utilisation**
- **Civil-Military Co-operation Cases**



European Approaches to Civil-Military Co-operation

- **Manoeuvre Warfare**
- **Attrition Warfare**
- **Hybrid Warfare**
- **Special Forces Utilisation**
- **Civil-Military Co-operation Cases**



Ukraine's Approaches to Civil-Military Co-operation

- **Manoeuvre Warfare**
- **Attrition Warfare**
- **Hybrid Warfare**
- **Special Forces Utilisation**
- **Civil-Military Co-operation Cases**



The United Kingdom's Civil-Military Co-operation

- **Manoeuvre Warfare**
- **Attrition Warfare**
- **Hybrid Warfare**
- **Special Forces Utilisation**
- **Civil-Military Co-operation Cases**



Conclusion

- **The Ripple Effect**
- **The Way Forward**

From Blue Helmets to Green Helmets: A New Role for the CAF in Canada and the World



Dr. Rémy-Claude Beaulieu

International Consultant specialised
in Program Evaluation

The Green Helmets Initiative (GHI)

CCOE, The Hague Conference, May 14-15, 2025

By Dr. Rémy-Claude Beaulieu

Ottawa area, Canada

What is this presentation about?

1. The emergence of the Green Helmets Initiative (GHI).
2. The increase of natural disasters in Canada and the World.
3. The Canadian responses to natural disasters.
4. The role of militaries (NATO) in response to natural disasters.
5. The GHI organizational and administrative issues.
6. The national and international context.
7. Next steps.
8. Bibliography.

1. The Emergence of the Green Helmets Concept

- ▶ **Green Helmets at the United Nations :** The Green Helmets concept was first proposed at the United Nations Security Council in 2011 to broaden the mandate of the Blue Helmets given the climate change context. Unfortunately, the idea was opposed by Russia and China.
- ▶ **African Union peace-keeping forces:** the concept was also used for the peace-keeping force sent by the African Union in Somalia between 2007 and 2024.
- ▶ **Green Helmets in Canada:** the concept re-emerge in Canada in 2021 following important flooding in the National Capital area; since then, various papers and articles were issued around the Green Helmets Initiative (GHI).
- ▶ **Educating children to climate changes:** a children book was issued in Quebec, where the “the Green Helmets” were called upon to protect the environment and educate children to climate change issues.

1. What is the Green Helmets Initiative?

- ▶ The **Green Helmets Initiative (GHI)** aims at generating a debate to broaden the traditional role of armed forces linked to the physical protection of citizens and borders in the context of armed conflicts, to include the protection of citizens and territories **in the case of natural disasters** exacerbated by climate change.
- ▶ Although the present Green Helmets Initiative focuses on establishing a coordination mechanism at the **international level**, it also implies that armed forces **at national level** in all countries of the world could assume the mandate of responding to natural disasters in collaboration with civil organizations in their own domestic context.
- ▶ This contribution intends to promote **a concept of collaboration** among the various partners that the CCOE pretends bringing together including military forces and numerous stakeholders.

1. Potential stakeholders for the GHI


- ▶ **A structure to be established at the UN or international level** to coordinate the efforts; and other multilateral institutions;
- ▶ **Authorities in assisting** (Central-Federal) **and assisted countries** (Central, district, local);
- ▶ **Research institutions** at the international and local levels involved in climate change analysis and prevention;
- ▶ **Military forces** of the assisting and assisted countries;
- ▶ **Civil resources** involved in natural disaster responses in assisted countries.
- ▶ **Justice and security institutions** (judges and local polices) in cases of litigations;
- ▶ **Civil society organizations** from the assisting and assisted countries;
- ▶ **Local communities** including religious groups.
- ▶ Special considerations should be given to the **gender** differentiated impact of natural disasters.

2. Climate Change and Disaster Risk Assessment

- ▶ Nowadays, the world is facing new challenges.
- ▶ The World Risk Report 2022 indicates that “ The consequences of climate change not only influences the **frequency and intensity of extreme natural events**, but it also affects their effects on populations.”
- ▶ After decades of efforts to assist countries in **preparedness**, now time has come **to invest in the response** to more frequent and natural disasters.
- ▶ A **new bold approach** is needed to respond to natural disasters in the context of climate changes.

2. Increased Frequency of Natural Disasters in Canada

CATASTROPHIC LOSSES IN CANADA IN \$000,000,000, 1994 TO 2024 AND TREND




2. Increased Frequency of Natural Disasters in the World

Number of recorded natural disaster events, 1900 to 2023

The number of global reported natural disaster events in any given year. Note that this largely reflects increases in data reporting, and should not be used to assess the total number of events.

Our World
in Data



Data source: EM-DAT, CRED / UCLouvain (2024) - [Learn more about this data](#)

Note: Data includes disasters recorded up to April 2024.

OurWorldinData.org/natural-disasters | CC BY

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2. The Consequences of Natural Disasters

- According to OXFAM, the evidence is overwhelming and the results devastating: the number of climate-related disasters **has tripled in the last 30 years**.
- All sources are saying: “Whatever we do in terms of prevention and protection, **the frequency and impact of natural disasters are increasing**”.
- It is unfortunately the **poorest and the most vulnerable which are most affected**. Decades of international assistance are often vanished in matters of days or weeks due to the increased frequency and impact of natural disasters in the context of climate change.
- **Women** often suffer multiple burdens having responsibilities related to housing, food, nutrition and health of the families.

3. Canada facing natural disasters at national level

- ▶ Canada does not have a major emergency management institutions like FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) in the USA with an important pool of resources.
- ▶ In Canada, **the responsibility** to address emergencies and natural disasters **is spread** over a number of municipal, provincial, territories and federal institutions.
- ▶ Canada has the DMAF (Disaster Mitigation and Adaptation Fund) with a budget of **200 MC\$ per year**.
- ▶ The Government of Canada Climate Change Adaptation Plan (GOAAP) committed 489 million over 10 years or **48.9 MD\$ per year**.
- ▶ While, according to the Insurance Bureau of Canada in 2024, for the first time in Canadian history, insured damages caused by severe weather events **surpassed \$8 billion**, based on the Catastrophe Indices and Quantification Inc. (CatIQ).

3. Canadian Experience at the International Level

- ▶ **Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)** : was a mechanism of collaboration between the Department of GAC and the Canadian Armed Forces to respond to international emergencies.
- ▶ DART has operated from 1998 to 2015, undertaking 8 different operations.
- ▶ An Evaluation undertaken by the Department of National Defense (DND) in 2013 concluded: “The DND program of response to natural disasters is well aligned with the role and responsibilities of the DND. The evaluation found the program performance to be **very effective** and well perceived by all partner organizations”.
- ▶ Unfortunately, **this experience was not pursued**. In the most recent Canadian responses to international disasters (last five years), the Canadian Armed Forces were not or barely involved.

3. Canadian Investments for defence and ODA

- ▶ **Military spendings:** Canada currently spends 37.7 billions C\$ (27.9 bUS\$) in military spendings corresponding to 1.37% of GDP.
- ▶ Canada is committed to reach the level of 2% of its GDP established by NATO.
- ▶ If Canada was to reach the NATO target now, it should increase its defense spendings by almost 17 bC\$.
- ▶ **Source:** NATO Press Release, Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2024), by the Public Diplomacy Division, 2024
- ▶ **Official Development Assistance:** Canada currently invests 16 bC\$ in international assistance corresponding to 0,37 % of its GDP.
- ▶ Canada committed itself to reach the OECD-DAC target of 0,7 % of its GDP for international assistance.
- ▶ If this target was to be reached, this would imply almost doubling Canadian ODA to 30 bC\$.
- ▶ Note: This calculation is based on a “whole of government approach” (WoGA). Source: STATISTICAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 2022-2023, GAC, 2023

4. The role of military in response to natural disasters

- ▶ **Rationale for Military Involvement in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief** : military use for assistance and relief is not a novel concept, but it has increased since the early 1990s with many governments choosing to provide greater number of forces and assets to assist domestically and internationally.
- ▶ “The **military** have **valuable expertise** in logistics, engineering and often has useful stand-by supplies.
- ▶ Logistics, including communications systems, air and road transport, are always needed during humanitarian emergencies”
- ▶ Source: The Role of military in Humanitarian Assistance, Oxford University, 1995

4. NATO countries defense spendings

- ▶ The good news is that the NATO definition includes humanitarian and disaster reliefs spendings in defense spendings:
- ▶ “If expenditures for operations, missions, engagements, and other activities are appropriated under the defense budget, they are included in the NATO definition. Expenditure for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, paid by the Ministry of Defense or other ministries, the destruction of weapons, equipment and ammunition, and the costs associated with inspection and control of equipment destruction are included in defense expenditure.”
- ▶ **Source:** NATO Press Release, Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2024), by the Public Diplomacy Division, 2024, p.16
- ▶ According to the NATO fact sheet on defense spendings, the European countries taken as a whole have reached in 2024 the target of 2 % of GDP with 380 b US\$.
- ▶ 8 NATO members including Canada have not reached the target.
- ▶ If these countries were reaching the NATO target in 2025, this would constitute an increased investment of 42.5 billion US\$.
- ▶ Should there be a new target set 2,5 % of GDP, including the support for humanitarian assistance in the case of natural disasters?
- ▶ **Source:** 5 NATO Press Release, Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2024), by the Public Diplomacy Division, 2024

4. NATO Natural Disaster Responses

- In June 2021, NATO adopted its **Climate Change and Security Action Plan (NATO-CCSAP)**.
- The Action Plan is based on the recognition that “Climate change is one of the defining challenges of our times. It is a threat multiplier that impacts Allied security, both in the Euro-Atlantic area and in the Alliance’s broader neighbourhood.”
- NATO Climate changes and Security Action Plan, June 2021, Brussels, 4 pages.
- **Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC)**.
- “Through the Clearing House Mechanism, EADRCC has successfully contributed to the international response in more than 100 emergencies around the globe”.
- “Requests for support through the EADRCC have increased throughout the years - from two in 1998 when the centre was set up, to 32 in 2022.”
- The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), NATO Fact Sheet, Brussels, November 2023

5. Organizational and Administrative issues (1)

- ▶ **Institutional setting:** eventually, the GHI should be positioned within the appropriate institution of the UN system to be determined, which would lead the initiative and coordinate the various stakeholders;
- ▶ **Defining the mandate:** further analysis could be undertaken to define the limits of the GHI mandate; Ex: should it include all natural disasters and man-made disasters?
- ▶ **Service providers:** providing assistance would be voluntary based on the capacity of response to specific disasters at national level and potential support at the international level based on historical relationships;
- ▶ **Beneficiary countries:** the World Risk Index identify the countries most at risk (based on frequency & scope of disasters) and the most vulnerable (based on an assessment of response capacity). Those coming on the top of both lists should come first.

5. Organizational and Administrative issues (2)

- ▶ **Coordination** : one of the key lessons learned over decades of humanitarian assistance in the context of natural disasters at the international level is the importance of coordination among stakeholders.
- ▶ **Regional centers of expertise (RCE)**: RCE could be positioned in key regional locations to be potential first respondents (Ex: Caribbean: hurricanes; Central America/Middle-East : earthquakes, South-East Asia: monsoons, tsunamis).
- ▶ **Training and Equipment**: such RCE could serve as training centers and be equipped with the most appropriate technologies (Canadair planes, motorboats, material to rebuild road and bridges, sandbag machinery, water filtering systems).
- ▶ **Information & Communication Technologies (ICT)**: the GHI headquarters and regional centers should be equipped with the most up to date ICT to ensure early warning and rapid responses.

5. Natural Disasters Litigations & Mediation

- ▶ In response to the litigations which could happen in the context of climate changes, the International Unit for Climate Mediations (IUCM) initiative was launched.
- ▶ The goal of such organization would be to provide:
 - ▶ Governance mediators to assist in climate mediations;
 - ▶ Field mediators assisted by scientists to help resolve conflicts generated by the displacement of people and populations following floods, cataclysms, and desertification;
- ▶ The IUCM could be hosted by the most appropriate United Nations organization while the Honorable Louise Otis could assist in carrying out the first steps necessary for the implementation of the IUCM.
- ▶ Source: Louise Otis: New: International Unit for Climate Mediation (IUCM), Canada, 2025

6. The Canadian and International context

- ▶ **What is different from 2011?**
- ▶ **Natural disasters increase:** The frequency and impact of natural disasters have increased in Canada (doubled) and the world.
- ▶ **New NATO expertise :** NATO has acquired new expertise in fighting natural disasters through **EADRCC**.
- ▶ **New Leader in Canada:** the election in Canada of a new leader who is a convinced environmentalist and dedicated person favoring justice and equity in the world, may constitute an opportunity.
- ▶ **In Europe,** the recent discussions aiming at strengthening it own defense could also constitute an opportunity.
- ▶ **On the negative side,** we may underscore the US withdrawal of international and humanitarian assistance.
- ▶ **China?** : China could take advantage of the US withdrawal to play a new role in world affairs.

7. Next Steps:

- ▶ **Institutional setting:** an academic, research or non-governmental organization could “host” the GHI to better design and promote it.
- ▶ **Collaboration GHI-IUCM:** although they are separate initiatives the GHI and IUCM could be put in place jointly or independently.
- ▶ **GHI Task Force:** Judge Louise Otis has accepted to be part of the Task Force responsible of the design and promotion of the initiative. Her experience with OECD and NATO would certainly be useful.
- ▶ **Task Force members:** We would hope that the Task Force could be complemented by key stakeholders from the military sector, climate change and humanitarian assistance experts and United Nations representative.
- ▶ **Complement of information:** In conclusion, may I invite the specialists in the various fields of expertise mentioned in this presentation to provide any useful information which could help in the design and promotion of this initiative to contact us at: remy.beaulieu@videotron.ca

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- ▶ Summer 2024 shatters records for severe weather damage: Over \$7 billion in insured losses from floods, fires and hailstorms, Insurance Bureau of Canada, September 24, 2024
- ▶ Number of recorded natural disasters: 2000-2023, Our World in Data.Org, 2024
- ▶ Comment le monde doit répondre aux crises humanitaires, OXFAM, décembre 2021.
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Securing CIMIC Operations Against Cyber Threats: Lessons From Modern Cyber Warfare



Mr. Riccardo Pastore
Independent Researcher



Is CIMIC ready for cyber warfare?

acaCIMICs 2025 – Academic Session IV Case Studies

Securing CIMIC Operations Against Cyber Threats

Modern hybrid risks and operational implications

may, 15th 2025 The Hague

NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCoE)

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A definition of...

Cyber Warfare

**The use of cyber operations by state or non-state actors
to cause strategic disruption or damage equivalent
to acts of force under international law (UN Charter Art. 2(4)).**

Today, most cyber operations:

1. Remain below the threshold of armed conflict
2. Cause hybrid and cognitive impacts on civilian and military systems
3. Threaten operational security and societal stability



Doctrinal Gap: Information Validation in CIMIC Operations

3

1.

CIMIC relies on civilian-derived information
(NGOs, authorities, local actors).

2.

NATO doctrine AJP-3.19
(*) clarifies: CIMIC is NOT
an intelligence collection
channel.

3.

Military Intelligence J2 (**) can support but does not control civilian data flows.

➔ No ownership of information validation at the tactical level and this is a critical gap hybrid threats exploit.

(*) AJP-3.19: Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), providing principles and guidance for CIMIC activities across NATO operations.

(**) J2: Staff branch responsible for military intelligence, providing information and analysis to support decision-making.



Question #2

4

Is CIMIC prepared to operate
without trusted information?



The Evolution of Cyber Threats: From symbolic defacement to AI-powered cognitive warfare

5

Operational Impact
/ Complexity

Critical

High

Medium

Low

1.

From Visibility to
Disruption
(1990s–2010)

2.

Weaponization
of Cyber Tools
(2010–2014)

3.

Operational
Disruption at
Scale
(2015–2017)

4.

Strategic
Targeting and
Cognitive
Manipulation
(2018–2022)

5.

Full-Spectrum
Hybrid Conflict
(2023–2025)

Timeline (1990s–2025)

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2025: Converging Threat Vectors and Info-Domain Saturation

6

Autonomous AI-powered malware and botnets:

(e.g., Real-time deepfake insertion during live briefings and negotiations)



Attacks exploiting shared civil-military digital infrastructure

(e.g., telecommunications, energy grids, logistics networks, water supply systems, and healthcare facilities)



Targeted disinformation against NGOs and civil protection actors:

Strategic erosion of trust through narrative manipulation on mainstream civilian platforms (e.g., Telegram, TikTok, WhatsApp)



➔ **Impact:** Cyber threats now converge on the entire civil-military decision cycle (the decision cycle itself is now a target!), creating **blended hybrid risks** that saturate the information environment, erode trust, and challenge operational resilience.



Why CIMIC Cannot Ignore the information environment

7


Modern CIMIC Operations

depend on **fragile digital infrastructures**

and **unverifiable information flows.**

Without validation, coordination and legitimacy collapse

The Growing Exposure of CIMIC to Cyber Threats



80–85% of cyber and space infrastructures are civilian-managed
(*CIMIC Handbook*, §2.1.2)

CIMIC depends on:

- Trust,
- Coordination,
- Access to information,
- Basic services

Cyber-attacks now directly affect:

- Civil-military liaison effectiveness
- Continuity of humanitarian support
- Perception of legitimacy in the AO (*)

(*) AO – Area of Operations



Cyber threats are not future risks— They are now!

9

Cyber and hybrid threats
are already *shaping* the *battlespace*.


***Resilience* depends on**

how fast we integrate awareness into action.

Lessons from Cyber Operations with CIMIC Implications






Cyber operations
escalate rapidly
from
digital disruption
to
operational failure.



eBook "Cyber Warfare:
Current Risks and
Future Threats"
© 2023 (2024) by
SOCINT Press

➔ **Key Insight:** Cyber operations now increasingly blend **digital disruption** with **kinetic, infrastructural, and societal impacts**, rapidly escalating toward operational failure in civil-military contexts.

Lessons from Cyber Operations with CIMIC Implications

Case Example	2015 - BlackEnergy	2017 - WannaCry	2020 - SolarWinds
Attack type	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Infrastructure attack 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ransomware attack 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supply chain attack 
Key Element			
Major Effects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SCADA systems (*) • Disruption of essential services (electricity, communication). • Humanitarian operations halted due to infrastructure collapse. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encryption-based attack • Global operational paralysis: hospitals, transport, logistics affected. • Data access and medical services compromised. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trusted software breach • Invisible compromise of trusted IT systems. • Loss of trust in official communication channels and networks.
Implications for CIMIC Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrate cybersecurity awareness into humanitarian and logistics coordination. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop contingency plans and resilience strategies to ensure humanitarian continuity. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Validate information sources and enhance cyber-awareness to secure operational communications.

(*) SCADA: Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is an architecture that enables industrial organizations to manage, monitor, and control processes, machines, and plants.

How Cyber Threats Target CIMIC Core Functions (*)

		Cyber Threat Vector	Operational Impact
Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)	➔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disinformation campaigns (e.g., targeting civil trust, public narratives) Deepfake impersonations (e.g., posing as local leaders or NGOs) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trust erosion (e.g., civilian confidence collapses) Liaison disruption (e.g., breakdown of civil-military dialogue)
Civil Factors Integration (CFI)	➔	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Manipulated OSINT sources (e.g., social media poisoning, false profiles) Infrastructure cyberattacks (e.g., energy, communications, ICS disruptions) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Flawed planning (e.g., decisions based on poisoned or missing data) Disrupted civil services (e.g., healthcare, logistics, emergency systems blocked)



These threats converge on CIMIC's ability to
Plan | Coordinate | Deliver.


(*) based on NATO AJP-3.19



From Quick Wins to Doctrine: A Roadmap for CIMIC Cyber Integration

13

Based on a technique of structured analysis (concurrent hypothesis)



(*) CUoE = CIMIC Unit of Expertise

(**) StratCom = Strategic Communications: coordination of communication efforts (Public Affairs, Information Operations, Psychological Operations) to influence perceptions and support mission objectives.

From Concept to Action (use cases)

Examples of how each strategic option could be tested or applied in real-world CIMIC scenarios.

1. Quick-Win Protocols

Prevent misinformation-based escalation in civil engagements
(CFI + CMI prevention).

3. CIMIC-Cyber Liaison Officer (CCLO) as a Pilot Role

Defend humanitarian narratives from targeted disinformation.

2. Embedded OSINT in Planning

Scan civilian information and digital indicators to secure humanitarian access.

4. Cyber-Aware CIMIC Function (CACF)

Shield civil-military cooperation from influence operations

1. DEPLOY

2. INTEGRATE

3. PILOT

4. DEVELOP

Each step increases digital resilience and mission legitimacy.



Key Takeaways for the Future of CIMIC in a Hybrid Environment

TRUST

- must be protected like a physical asset.
- Losing it undermines mission legitimacy.

DIGITAL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

- should be embedded in CIMIC planning
- OSINT is not immune – validation must become routine

RESILIENCE

- must be proactive, not reactive.
- is a design principle – not a reactive fix. It cannot be improvised.

➔ CIMIC operates not only among civilians,
but **within the information environment.**



Building Resilience: A Scalable Roadmap for CIMIC Cyber Awareness

16

Phase 1 – Immediate Actions (field-ready)

- Quick-Win Protocols: checklists, verified info channels
- Awareness micro-sessions for CIMIC teams

→ No doctrine change needed

Phase 2 – Tactical Integration

- Embedded OSINT validation during mission planning
- Risk scanning of civilian digital ecosystems

→ Pilotable during exercises

Phase 3 – Operational Bridging

- CIMIC–Cyber Liaison Officer (CCLO) pilot role
- Interface between J9, StratCom and Cyber Defense

→ Needs training + inter-branch coordination

Phase 4 – Doctrinal Development


- Cyber-Aware CIMIC Function (CACF)
- Cross-functional capability within CIMIC units

→ Requires doctrinal review + institutional support



A Call for Coordinated Action

**Cyber warfare
represents a complex
and ever-evolving
threat that demands a
multidisciplinary and
coordinated response
from all stakeholders
involved.**





...about cyber resilience

18

**Cyber resilience is not an isolated requirement
but must be seen as a core enabler
within NATO's comprehensive approach to complex crises**

...thank you!

Let's discuss — what could you test in your context?

Q&A

1. *Who, in your current mission structure, is responsible for **validating digital information** coming from civilian sources?*
2. *Considering your operational experience, which of these four options — quick protocols, embedded OSINT, cyber liaison officer, or doctrinal integration — do you see **as most immediately feasible or impactful** in your current missions?*
3. *How do you currently **measure the reliability** of what local partners or social media channels are telling you in the field?*
4. Have you ever formally **validated a civilian-derived information flow** before using it operationally?
If yes, how?
If not, how do you assess the operational risk associated with that flow?

About the Speaker: Strategic Intelligence & OSINT

Riccardo Pastore is a Senior Operations & Intelligence Analyst with expertise in **OSINT**, **cyber intelligence**, and **the protection of critical infrastructures**.

He is the author of **Cyber Warfare: Current Risks and Future Threats** (SOCINT Press, 2024) and contributes to academic and operational training programs for both military and civilian professionals.


His research focuses on the cognitive and operational impact of digital disruption in complex, interdependent environments.




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ANNEX



Join the mission: build resilience together

Are you already testing one of these approaches?

Do your teams need OSINT or digital awareness training?

Would you co-develop a pilot or tabletop exercise with us?

→ Let's explore practical, scalable ways to secure CIMIC operations.

Action Matrix for CIMIC Cyber Integration

	High Feasibility (<i>Immediate</i>)	Low Feasibility (<i>Structurally Demanding</i>)
High Operational Impact	Quick-Win Protocols (<i>checklists, awareness sessions</i>)	Cyber-Aware CIMIC Function (CACF)
Medium Operational Impact	Embedded OSINT validation in planning	CIMIC-Cyber Liaison Officer (CCLO)
Strategic Long-term Impact	Mapping digital actors and sources	Integration in CUoE and Doctrine Development

Legend:

- **Quick-Win Protocols:** Immediate tactical improvements, high impact and easy to implement.
- **Embedded OSINT Validation:** Moderate impact, feasible integration into existing procedures.
- **CIMIC-Cyber Liaison Officer (CCLO):** High coordination value but requires training and organizational adjustments.
- **Cyber-Aware CIMIC Function (CACF):** Strategic doctrinal impact, significant structural and institutional commitment.

Between Association and Dissociation: The Legitimacy Politics of CIMIC Experimentation



Mrs. Jule Brischar
Political Communication
&
Peacebuilding Specialist



Prof. Markus Bresinsky
Professor of International Relations
OTH

BETWEEN ASSOCIATION & DISSOCIATION:

THE LEGITIMACY POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY CO-CREATION

CONTENT

- Problem Statement
- Research Question
- Theoretical Framework
- Case Studies
- Implications for Co-Creation


NATO EXPERIMENTATION VS. CIMIC CO-CREATION

Concept Development & Experimentation

- Principal method for capability development
- Lab-style, tech-centred, low-risk

CIMIC Co-Creation

- CIMIC experimentation yet to be defined
- Relationship-centred, public signal





*When is CIMIC co-creation
feasible and desirable?*

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK



Image : E-International Relations, 2021

INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY

- 66 000 + IOs across 300 issue areas¹
- Geographical and functional overlap
- Networks of cooperation and competition
- In academia: Regime complex = “an array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions that govern a particular issue-area”²
- In policy: Comprehensive/integrated approach, HDP Nexus,...

“No single actor alone can thoroughly address the drivers of conflicts and insecurity.”³


¹ Yearbook of International Organisations

² Raustiala & Victor 2004, 279

³ UNSC Resolution S/2020/1090

RELATIONAL LEGITIMATION

- Legitimacy = currency for action⁴
- Acquired through input, throughput, output – or relationally⁵
- Relational legitimation = strategic positioning vis-à-vis one another




Association

Functional benefits of collaboration

Dissociation

Threat to organisational identity



LEGITIMACY SCALE




⁴ Suchman 1995

⁵ Heupel 2023, Saleh 2023, Haug 2024

CONTEXT DEPENDENCE

- Context adds weight to identity risks and/or functional gains from collaboration⁶
→ shifts balance




⁶ de Coning 2016

POLICY & PRACTICE




#1 STABILISATION

- Political source of conflict
- High levels of violence
- Humanitarian neutrality paramount
- **Identity risks outweigh functional gains → dissociation**
- Parallel, siloed innovation and transformation




#2 NATURAL DISASTERS

- Non-political; host-state invite
- Destroyed infrastructure, urgent lifesaving needs
- Neutrality cost low
- Legitimacy judged by relief delivered
- **Functional gains outweigh identity risks → association**
- Joint civil-military co-creation



#3 TERRITORIAL & COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

- Pre-Art V
- Cyber/disinformation targeting critical infrastructure
- Functional need is acute
- Legal status of civilian tech staff unclear; reputational stakes high
- **Ambiguous dynamic → selective association?**
- Technical, limited, quiet co-creation



SUMMARY

Context	Legitimacy scale position	Outcome
Stabilisation	Identity >> Function	Dissociation
Disaster relief	Function >> Identity	Routine association
Territorial defence	Function ≈ Identity	Selective, low-profile

IMPLICATIONS FOR CIMIC CO-CREATION

1. Run a **legitimacy scan** first
2. Match interface depth to context
3. Use **safe-to-fail pilots** & living labs
4. Embed **legitimacy reflection** in exercises
5. Leverage trust to ease **future cooperation**

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!

ANY QUESTIONS?

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