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Foreword

The content of this issue has been derived from a speech, Colonel Hans-Jürgen Kasselmann (DIR

CIMIC in a Maritime Environment

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Changing Environment

The world itself, and so us, is changing fast. NATO has just seen the birth of a new strategic concept. In this concept the new dimensions of future threats, as well as future chances and challenges, have been outlined.

In this new strategic concept a new way of cooperation has been mentioned – and in an even more prominent position than in the AJP-01 which has just finalized its ratification process.

Even though we are talking high level political strategy we would like to take you with us on a journey where we might prove how important those developments are and what kind of influence they might have on CIMIC in general, and CIMIC in a maritime environment in special.

Structural Analysis

Let’s analyze the situation we find ourselves in. This is easiest done by taking a look of what is already there and finding out what we would need in addition to be prepared for the challenges ahead.

The newly issued NATO Strategic Concept talks a lot about comprehensiveness – and this is what we all have to aim for if we want to stabilize and pacify. Those two task-factors are predominant in any imaginable mission scenario of the Alliance and can be found in all different phases of any kind of operation. One ground truth appears to be valid in future – and is also a lesson learned the hard way from previous missions: If we do not keep on pacifying during stabilization we have to face a deteriorating general situation.

Thinking about the maritime environment comprehensiveness, as well as stabilization and pacifying an area, demands for other solutions than the land-based approach, simply due to the nature we find ourselves in and the character of sea-based military power. However, let us start at the top end of the situation.

The outstretch of the AJP9 as a top-layer doctrinal document has implications for the political level, which results in objectives for the strategic level. These objectives will be transformed into directives for the operational level in case of operations. These necessities are mainly covered by the AJP9. They are in the central focus of it.

Resulting from that only the highest tactical level, which is still Joint level, is directly addressed by AJP 9.

No mission specifics or service-related questions can be covered.

Having this mainframe in mind we have to ask ourselves how the tactical level, may it be a joined one or not, get’s the guidance in need? Therefore we should take a look at the broader picture and leave the military-centric view behind us.

In order to come up with answers that have the character of validity and sustainability we have to analyze thoroughly the interaction patterns of the respective levels of the Alliance as well as the Civil Actors.

In comparison with Civil Actors we easily understand that the Alliance covers all four levels with structures, personnel, necessary processes and infrastructure.

To make those differences visible we would like to use the picture of the human body, transporting the different levels of NATO into it to make visible who is doing what in it.

The political level, mainly consisting of the North Atlantic Council, the different planning groups, the international staff, the international military staff and a multitude of directly subordinate advisory boards and agencies, is THE brain of the Alliance. Here national interests are transformed into a multinational will.

This will is then transported to the heart - the strategic level, consisting of the Allied Command for Transformation, settled in Norfolk, USA, and the Allied Command for Operations, to be found in Mons, Belgium.

The outstretch of AJP9

![Diagram of the outstretch of AJP9]

- Political Level
- Strategic Level
- Operational Level
- Tactical Level
These two hearts are pumping the blood through the body of the Alliance – the operational level, therefore enabling it to be really and utterly alive.

This blood, mainly in the form of processes, is flowing through the venal system and all the different organs needed to provide the body with all services and resources that it needs in order to function perfectly and friction free. These are the Joint Force Commands, being the facilitators for all operations, with the COPD as main instrument for this.

The tactical level is to be found in the form of the arms and legs. These are the do-ers of the work at hand.

If we now mirror that to the civil actors, with whom we have to cooperate to accomplish any of our mission tasks, we find a bit of a shortfall in structure, processes, infrastructure and personnel.

Those civil entities, might they be NGO’s, GO’s, INGO’s or IO’s, lack in the overwhelming majority the strategic and operational level. To remain into our body picture: Their hearts are outside their bodies, and also their organs are not to be found inside their structure. Those functionalities are substituted by outside influence and support. It results into a multitude of influences on them, leading to a, for military personnel, sometimes puzzling diversity in many forms. The hands and arms of the body we do find in our area of operation. Miraculously they also follow the commands of its brain, which is widely not understood by us militaries.

So far the structural analysis.

Comprehensive Approach

Now we are left with a very tricky revelation. If we are in the need to interact to be successful, how do we do that if the two mid-levels are missing out? That has, most likely, direct and vast consequences on the style, the manner, the character and the techniques of interaction on the topmost level and the men and women in the field.

To summarize that: How do we interact?

What do we need to accomplish?

By what means do we accomplish it?

To put up an answer to those urgent questions the Alliance developed something that you never linked so far to domain of the maritime environment.

We need to achieve all this by using “a comprehensive approach”.

It is perfectly understandable that most of you would think something like “Okay, another part of buzzword bingo about to vanish within two years like “effect-based” or “asymmetric”...”.

This opinion has our full understanding and sympathy, but is nevertheless heading into the wrong direction.

We already explained how the Alliance works it’s operation within its own organization. We also deducted from the organizational analysis of our civil partners that important interaction hook-up-points are missing most of the time.

This idea of comprehensiveness will enable the Alliance to establish friction-free civil-military interaction throughout military and civil structures not only within its own structures from top to bottom and vice versa, but also to talk to the equivalent entities we have to cooperate with.

It is not limited to the level-equivalent, but by using tools and information mechanisms that ensure the full spectrum of information to be available at all levels, also from a lower military level to a higher – to take just one example – civil level in order to achieve mission success for the military as well as project success for the civil side.

The character of comprehensiveness will not be restricted to information. We will have to do much more in future. We have to agree on what to do in those mission areas upfront of deployment. Has it been a challenge to achieve that within the Alliance in the past – this challenge will be even a bigger one with our civil partners. We have to agree on a plan as well as on measures of effectiveness, project conducts, commitment of resources and many more issues.

These tasks cannot be limited to higher staff personnel sitting somewhere at the political level in Brussels, at the strategic level in Norfolk or Mons or at a Joint Forces Command. They will be a topic at hand for all personnel deployed or working on a specific mission.

That has a direct impact on the doctrine, as this function of comprehensiveness is not achievable by CIMIC-personnel alone. Now we can deduct that qualifications in areas formerly belonging to the function of CIMIC alone will be demanded from former J3-personnel as well as former J4, J5, J6 or any staff member, as we also evolved our staff- and HQ-structures to an integrated set-up.

It has been very easy and simple for higher headquarters so far to not go beyond the frontier of the operational level, fearing that the analysis would lead to conclusions that ask for the design of a catalogue of requirements for the tactical level that has never been seen in this area of civil-military relations.

The analysis of this problem by Strike Forces NATO under the lead of the Allied Command for Transformation has been brilliant in this point, but came up with the inconvenient answer: Yes, we need that catalogue for the maritime environment. Our maritime operations, therefore our CIMIC approach, are different - and our interaction needs to achieve mission success are different.

Why did we forget so far about this seemingly obvious question?

Well, the key to this question lies in our way of focusing on operations.

The Alliance has been very successful in reforming its staff structures on the strategic and operational level. Everything on these levels thinks joint, plans joint and conducts in a joint manner.

This has produced a lot of synergy, but also one critical caveat.

We neglected that the environment of operation in comes with specific limits to our tactical capabilities as well as de-
manding specific actions from us.

As everything is joint and has joint thoughts at the superior levels, nobody has been really interested in the needs of the tactical level. This, so the assumption and expectation, will be taken care of by the tactical commander.

That worked very well so far for land-based operations, and no critical mistakes have occurred in the air or maritime environment as tactical commanders there have been clever and creative enough to avoid them.

However, if we can avoid them by design and guidance we no longer need to raise the stress level of tactical commanders in these non-land-centric domains.

A precondition for this is to analyze the needs of the tactical commander. Followed by that we shall raise awareness about those needs and demands at the operational, strategic and political level.

This has to cover necessarily all questions linked to comprehensiveness, cohesive planning, being compatible with our civil partners throughout the spectrum of civil-military interaction.

The range is vast, as we have to come up with detailed solutions for each single phase of an operation, as well as many different types of operation. What might be the distinct differences between a transition phase at the maritime tactical level during a relief operation like HAITI compared to a transition phase on an operation like ATALANTA?

In a nutshell our expectation has been that jointness would provide for all environments the same set of tools. That, so far, is still correct. What has proven a wrong assumption is that those tools could be used all the time by everybody in the same fashion.

Role of CCOE

The CCOE is the custodian of the AJP9.

Resulting from that it is not only our obligation to keep it as updated as possible, it is also our responsibility to come up with creative ideas about what is missing in there.

The maritime environment has proven to be underrepre-
sented so far in order to issue needed guidance for maritime commanders of the tactical level.

We are in direct communication with all four levels of NATO. It enables us to talk to the right people in order to achieve the right decisions as well as to initiate developments that otherwise would not have been started.

Added to that the CCOE is a facilitator for comprehensiveness, as we have a peer-group of experts working directly on that topic in closest cooperation with ACT and numerous other entities to make it happen.

Create Comprehensiveness

So, which questions do we need to answer if we have to create comprehensiveness in this area of operation?

The first one, “Joint operations means joint CIMIC procedures”, has been answered with a “Yes, but that is by far not all”. Joint operations demand for joint procedures wherever they are applicable. For the maritime environment they are not completely applicable, due to restrictions of the operation environment, challenges of the operators onboard and different interaction patterns. This does not mean that CIMIC has a different aim. This simply means it has to be performed differently.

The result is that we have to come up with the needed answers and guidance for maritime commanders.

The second question is a bit of a teaser for higher command levels.

The instinctive answer of those commands could be: “Yes, for sure! Who could issue guidance if not us?”. In reality the situation looks a bit different. Recognizing the lessons learned of the HAITI relief operations it is per jure the case that the Joint level is in command, but delegates that authority to the Naval Commander in the area. If that is the case different planning and different interaction matrices have to be in stock for this maritime commander.

A statement like “any maritime task force is conducting CIMIC”, is addressing all the open questions we have discovered so far. It comes as well in the form of caveats like anti-piracy-operations and CIMIC as in the necessity for Standard Operating Procedures [SOPs] and TTPs for naval units and operators. This is a huge amount of work.

These processes and procedures are exactly what is missing at the moment.

Here we do find the answers to these questions. We highlighted the most important ones here, as you can easily imagine that there are much more answers and much more detailed information linked to that.

The first answer should speak about the differences. Here we need to be specific in detail and very descriptive of what is really different between land-centered and maritime-centered CIMIC. By doing so we enable the creation of understanding at the joint level as well as the tactical level. We will be able to assess which level has to perform what action in order to facilitate success. This needs to be a multidirec-
tional pipeline-system, not only working in both directions of the military chain of command, but also in all the directions of our civil partners.

Comprehensiveness

The second caveat addresses the needs of the operations directorate of a JFC as well as the needs of the tactical commander. Having in mind a former statement [according the shortcomings in structure of our civil partners] we have to be very careful how to construct and design these civil-military-interaction-functions, as civil partners most of the time do not possess an operational level.

The third revelation is not surprising at all. We have to create operator knowledge – what processes need to be done - in maritime forces. As the doing is different in naval forces we have to adjust our practices, our infrastructure, our staff-settings and our manning onboard of ships to that reality. Making all of this possible we have to start a “Training Needs analysis” focused on maritime forces.

Demands of Maritime Specific Operations

In direct pursuit of all the conclusions before we have to analyze thoroughly what demands are created by maritime specific operations.

As already outlined before we need a maritime document to embellish the messages of the AJP9 and make them transparent and understood in the maritime community and the joint level as well as the strategic and political level.

It is evident that we need to transport some joint aspects into this domain, reshape them and thereby make them usable by naval commanders.

This doctrinal document would cover the lower operational level as well as the tactical.

The same comes into consideration when we think about TTPs. The TTPs already existing are land-focused, which does not make them invalid, but of lesser usability for the maritime community. These need to be adapted.

Our American friends as well as other nations have learned a lot from the HAITI relief operations. We are well counseled to take these lessons and implement them directly at the tactical and operational level.

This implementation leads directly to the development of a Standard Operator Profile for on-board personnel when it comes to CIMIC and comprehensiveness. It is by far more demanded than just the supply officer talking to the ships agent. It has to be designed by somebody, but understood by everybody within the maritime community as well as, even more important, at the joint level of headquarters.

As we found out what these Operator Profiles are we will be able to train and educate them. These profiles are the precondition to design and run tailor-made courses for the maritime community here at the CCOE.

Training and education, tailor-made, for the tactical level is one question that automatically raises another. We are faced on how to educate and train their superior level, in this case the operational level. It is too early to be sure if we are in need of a Standard Operators Profile there, as those functions are fully joined. Nevertheless, we have to address the specifics that the maritime tactical level needs from them. This is, so far, not part of our courses. It will be the focus of a training analysis if it should be better addressed in a separate module or an integrated one.

As the envisioned ATP, as subordinate document for the AJP, is more theoretical in nature we also should develop something “ready-to-use” for the maritime community. The CCOE published successfully two editions of the CIMIC field-handbook. As the title already explains we might need to adjust this product not only title-wise, but also cover the real needs defined by the analysis of the operator profile in a maritime environment: “The CIMIC operator sea-handbook”.

These challenges the CCOE will tackle in the soonest of all futures – for the benefit of all CIMICs!
Any comments or suggestions to this information leaflet?
Please contact us!