**Speech on strategic developments and resilience relevant for the J9 community**

Thank you for that kind introduction

Excellencies, Generals, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is an honor and pleasure for me to represent SHAPE’s Command Group at this important meeting in the presence of the Albanian Defense minister and ChoD.

Today’s and tomorrow’s meetings will concentrate on resilience and civil preparedness as well as projecting stability from a J9 perspective. That is necessary and timely, and we have good line-up of speakers to present these topics.

But to improve our understanding better, I think it is good to, so to say, take a step back from the painting and examine the bigger picture. Without claiming to be complete, I will try in the next 15 to 20 minutes to give you an overview of how the thinking in the Alliance, and by individual Allies, is influenced by the changed security situation.

Bottom line up front: strategic thinking is back! It is now back in full force for all of us. It has never really been away for the nuclear weapon states, but for others, as my own country Norway, it was more in the background. It is no longer anymore.

At the latest NATO Summit in Brussels, Heads of State and Government established that

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“Russia’s aggressive actions challenge the Alliance and are undermining Euro-Atlantic security and the rules-based international order.  Instability and continuing crises across the Middle East and North Africa are fuelling terrorism.  They also contribute to irregular migration and human trafficking.”

unquote

Looking back at the attempts at resurgence, we can now see it has been a long time coming for Putin’s Russia. The withdrawal from the CFE Treaty in 2007 was a sign on the wall; the war with Georgia in 2008 was another much bigger one. In fact Russia has gradually stopped cooperation and started challenging the west and NATO since Putin rose to power in 2001. While NATO wants Russia to return to being a partner, it seems for now, that Russia sees itself rather as a competitor. To put weight to his rhetoric, Putin has been doubling Russia’s defense budget from 2001 to-2017.

Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea was a watershed moment–It represented the first time since the Second World War that one sovereign nation has forcibly taken territory from another within Europe. Russia has also fomented conflict in the Donbas which led to the shooting of a Malaysian airliner, resulting in 298 civilian deaths. Meanwhile, Russia’ has engaged in adventures in unsuspected places, such as the Central African Republic and Venezuela. The Russian State indiscriminately and recklessly used a military-grade nerve agent on the territory of an Ally. It supports the Assad regime, including when the regime deliberately ignored its obligation to stop using chemical weapons. Russia has also violated the national airspace of European countries and mounted a sustained campaign of cyber espionage and disruption, including meddling in elections.

I do not think Russian doctrine contains a single model for conflict with NATO; they use a multi-model approach utilizing conventional, unconventional and nuclear domains. A hybrid model that might involve not only little green men, but also big green tanks and where necessary, from the Kremlin’s viewpoint that is, huge green missiles. Hybrid warfare is not about limiting yourself to action short of war, it is anything and everything – conventional, non-conventional, technical, non-technical. Gerasimov believes that any conventional war must be finished quickly if it is to be successful. Russia exercises to escalate and speed up the tempo of operations. Their thinking is very flexible. Their General Staff is able to change, evolve, and learn lessons with agility. For example: they know that demography is not on their side, so they are developing capability that needs fewer men - for example missiles, drones and two man tanks.

They have also developed coherent concepts for equipment and training that are focused on our vulnerabilities, for example: our dependency on communications and IT; our lack of massed fires; and, perhaps, our lack of investment in air defence. They apply a ruthless focus on defeating their opponents – not seizing ground for the sake of it – but making sure that our vital ground is denied.

Their current influence and disinformation campaign is a form of ‘system’ warfare that seeks to de-legitimize the political and social system on which our military strength is based. This undermines our center of gravity which is our political cohesion – our daily habit of political consensus building and military cooperation

While the Euro-Atlantic security environment has become less stable and predictable as a result of Russia’s military posture and provocative military activities. Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, continues to pose a direct threat to the security of our populations, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly.

While the prospects of a Caliphate on the ground have been reportedly defeated, the threat from it and other –“broadly like-minded” groups will likely remain at a heightened level for the medium term. Moreover, terrorism has diversified and is more dispersed. We see the phenomenon that Da’esh represents emerging in other parts of the world, such as Libya and Afghanistan. Moreover, we’ve learned, sadly, that anyone can become a terrorist in our streets simply by renting a vehicle, buying a Kalashnikov on the dark web, or wielding a machete. The French Strategic Review calls Jihadist terrorism “the most immediate and significant threat France and its population faces”.

To come back to my bottom line up front, that strategic thinking is back, which the French Revue Strategique of 2017 calls the “return of military rivalry”

New military strategic thinking does not only acknowledge that we have to deal with both peer-state competitors and pervasive non-state instability adjacent to NATO. The biggest change is that we have to acknowledge there are no longer two clear and distinct states of ‘peace’ and ‘war’; we now have several forms. Indeed the character of war and peace is different for each of the contexts in which they are applied. And we risk if not defining this clearly, and acting accordingly, our ability to act, and losers of this competition.

The return of strategy is hard for most of us. After 75 years of peace for NATO and 30 years after the Cold War we have lost much of this thinking ability – a whole generation of officers nurtured in a world of crisis operations. The same is true for many of our politicians. Inter-state strategic competition is now the primary concern in U.S. national defense strategy. It mentions, as the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security, the re-emergence of long-term strategic competition from China and Russia. To be complete; it also mentions that not only are China and Russia full-spectrum actors, countries like the DPRK and Iran are investing in advanced weapon systems.

All of these states, big and small, have become masters at exploiting the seams between peace and war. What constitutes a weapon in this ‘grey’ area no longer has to go ‘bang’. Energy, cash - as bribes - corrupt business practices, cyber-attacks, assassination, fake news, propaganda and indeed military intimidation are all examples of the methods used to gain advantage in this era of ‘constant competition. This should be viewed a crisis, or series of crises, with which we face. Rather it is a ‘strategic challenge’.

Here the Strategic Defense and Security Revue by the UK is of interest. It emphasizes that security challenges have become more and more intertwined. They are, so to speak, not one ailment, but something doctors would call comorbidity – many physical shortcomings and diseases appearing at the same time and influencing each other negatively: terrorism, extremism and instability; state-based threats, wider state competition, but also the erosion of multilateralism and the rules-based international order. Moreover there is disruptive, new technology, which can be used both as an enabler for us and as a threat against us, especially in the cyber domain and wider technological developments.

This is happening while US defence spending as a percentage of global defence expenditures has started to shrink. This decrease is even much more pronounced for most European countries, which drastically reduced their military capacities during the 2000s, thus initiating a historic decline. Meanwhile NATO countries who spend less than 2 percent of GDP on defense, have pledged at the Wales Summit in 2014 “to move towards” 2 percent of their GDP in 2024. So five more years to go.

Military spending in NATO **will** go up. Without this hard security we cannot have sustainable soft security. As without soft security, security would not be complete. You as J9-ers know this better than anyone else. So we have international crime, corruption, climate change to name a few challenges. There are too many, and they are too diverse to elaborate here. A few words though, on mass migration.

Migration in itself is rather a good thing. It helps reallocate labor to where it is most wanted and helps give people better lives. The United States and Canada would not be in existance without it. But sometimes there can be too much of a good thing. Looking specifically at Africa; according to the United Nations, it is expected to account for more than half the world’s population growth between 2015 and 2050. Nearly all of this growth will be among the 49 countries of sub-Saharan Africa – some 2 billion people by 2045. By then more than half of Africans will be living in cities – and this group will be mostly young people connected through mobile devices. Without economic growth matching population growth it is inevitable that we will see more movement. From them to us that is! These developments are not really military, but they do influence the areas of interest and operation– so we need situational awareness for which your relationships with others within the J9 sphere and the rest of government and civil society are again indispensable.

So we see our security is challenged from many corners. We need all three core tasks of NATO to functional well, collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. But for all three to be successfully executed, we need to have far more resilience than we have ever thought before –for our partner countries as well as for ourselves.

More resilient countries – where the whole of government as well as the public and private sectors are involved in civil preparedness planning – results in less vulnerability to be used as leverage or be targeted. Resilience is therefore an important aspect of deterrence by denial: persuading not to attack by convincing that it will not achieve its intended objectives.

Since the Warsaw Summit in 2016 we know there are seven baseline requirements for resilience: Continuity of Government; Resilient Energy Supplies; Resilient Civil Communications Services; Resilient Food and Water Supply; Ability to Deal with Large Scale Population Movements; Ability to Deal with Mass Casualties; and Resilient Civilian Transportation Systems. I am sure following speakers will go into more detail on them.

Such resilience is needed across the spectrum of threats, from countering or responding to a terrorist attack, to potential collective defence scenarios. We need a more mutual and reciprocal relationship between the Armed Forces, the rest of government and civil society.

In my own country Norway we have been doing this historically - both because it is our inclination to do so and because we need to as a small population in a long stretched country with a sometimes challenging climate. We call this Total Defence. In the Cold War period, the concept of ‘Total Defence’ was the guiding doctrine, based on the mobilization of all national resources in support of an all-out military struggle.

Now the focus of “Total Defence” has changed. A new focus on societal security – called “homeland security” in the United States – redefined the old Cold War concept. The main direction of support changed from “civil resources in support of the military” to “military resources in support of civil society”. This redefined concept put into operational terms the ability to handle all major dimensions of security not only of the state, but also societal security.

All modern societies are highly complex with integrated and interdependent sectors and vital services. They rely on supporting critical infrastructure to function uninterrupted, but often tend to take for granted they will not face attempts of disruption. Moreover, the supply of goods and services is determined almost exclusively by market forces. Private sector is profit oriented. It has mainly focused on minimising their own costs given such a disruption, rather than preparing for larger-scale contingencies with cascading effects across sectors and society itself.

National authorities have legislative and regulatory powers. But in most NATO countries they have few direct controls to influence or steer supply in the private/commercial sector, other than in an emergency situation. As the system seems to work efficiently for now, there has been little incentive for national authorities to engage directly. For government, the focus has been on ensuring safety and quality levels of goods and services, particularly of food and other consumables.

The European Union (EU) plays a very important role in the public administration architecture for these sectors in many European countries EU directives and regulation have substantially shaped the planning by its member states, as well as by the commercial sector. Contingency planning, which seeks to ensure the functioning and maintenance of operations, has focused predominantly on the ability to deal with the most probable disruptive incidents in the short term.

The necessary mechanisms and procedures are designed mainly for extreme situations, such as war, and not for the grey area that would be caused by hybrid warfare or accompany an escalating geopolitical crisis short of outright armed conflict.

Few Allies have tested the functioning of these mechanisms and procedures recently to ensure they will stand the test of shock or surprise. The degree and impact of foreign direct investment in strategic sectors – such as China in airports, sea ports, energy production and distribution, or telecoms – in some Allied nations raises questions about whether access and control over such infrastructure can be maintained, particularly in crisis when it would be required to support the military. This issue requires further attention.

While civil preparedness is primarily a national responsibility, it is an important aspect of NATO’s security. Indeed, strengthening national resilience provides a better foundation for collective defence. National authorities have realised that the risks and vulnerabilities they face, amplified by the level of interdependence among the sectors, requires a whole-of-government effort as well as more direct cooperation with the private sector.

With the changed security environment, NATO’s defence planning efforts have been reinforced, including in the area of civil preparedness. Regular assessments are an essential aspect, helping to identify and measure areas of progress and challenges. The findings, based on data provided by Allies, helps to inform the direction for further national or collective action. The assessments cover both an aggregate report on the State of Civil Preparedness and, as part of the individual country reports, the state of civil preparedness of a given Ally.

Once again after the Cold War, civil preparedness is the subject of more active engagement together with capitals and civil ministries. An initial assessment in 2016 was followed by a report in 2018, which identified several shortfalls in areas, where further resources and effort to support national authorities are needed.

These assessments help ensure coherence between NATO’s efforts on resilience through civil preparedness with those on the military side. Over the longer term, they aim to promote greater civil-military cooperation in member states. This will require a more persistent effort to rebuild the structures, relationships and plans that facilitate civil-military cooperation contributing to NATO’s adapted deterrence and defence posture.

Sufficient flexibility is required to allow this capability development approach to suit the needs of a diverse Alliance of 29 nations, which retain the primary responsibility over their civil preparedness. At the same time, given the unpredictable nature of the security environment, Allies will be called upon to ensure that their national resilience bolsters NATO’s collective defence and security objectives.

One of the most important means available to address these imperatives is training and exercises, whether from a national, multinational or Alliance perspective. [Trident Juncture](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/157833.htm) 2018 – NATO’s most important military exercise since the end of the Cold War – enabled Norway to exercise and validate aspects of its [approach to resilience](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_160130.htm?selectedLocale=en) within its Total Defence concept. This exercise also provided other Allies with a good example of how more comprehensive and joint (civil/military) exercises can help prepare them for the full range of potential contingencies that they could face in light of the strategic environment.

So to conclude,

There are clear and present dangers to our security. They are not going away anytime soon, they are not thousands of miles away, but now on Europe’s doorstep. The character of warfare is making it much harder for us to recognize true intentions and thus distinguish between what is peace and what is war. They do require a strategic response, we cannot afford to sit back. NATO Allies have been working on their national strategies and NATO is now completing its work on a new military strategy. But as important as a strategy might be, we need to recognize that both projecting stability as well as credible deterrence must be underpinned by genuine capability –civil and military - and genuine commitment that earns the respect of potential opponent

For this we need you. **You** are part of that capability we need to achieve resilience in defence and deterrence as well as for projecting stability. **You** are the ones who reach out to partners, are the pathfinders for cooperation and interaction with military and civilian partners to provide that resilience. **You** as the CIMIC/CMI community can make the difference that matters. NATO counts on **you.**

I thank you for your attention

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