

NATO UNCLASSIFIED  
Releasable to EU/PfP



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION  
ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
HEADQUARTERS SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION  
7857 BLANDY ROAD, SUITE 100  
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA, 23551-2490



7300/TSC-FCL-0 150/TT-180439/Ser: NU0259

TO: See Distribution

SUBJECT: **COLLABORATIVE RESILIENCE CONCEPT WORKSHOP,  
20-22 MARCH 2018 – SUMMARY OF OUTCOMES**

DATE: 16 April 2018

REFERENCES: A. 'Interdependency in Resilience' Conference white paper, dated June 2017  
B. Collaborative Resilience two-page 'Strawman', dated November 2017.  
C. 7300/TSC-FCL-0150/TT-180146/Ser:NU0079 Invitation to support 1<sup>st</sup> Collaborative Resilience Concept Workshop, 20-22 Mar 18, The Hague – dated February 2018.

1. **Background.** The 1<sup>st</sup> Collaborative Resilience (CoRe) Workshop was held in The Hague 20-22 March 2018, generously hosted by CIMIC COE. The event was well received and attended by NCS, COEs and wider civil and private sector representatives, in total 31 participants from 15 nations and 11 different NATO bodies, and included key speakers from NLD MoD, IS-OPS Civ Prep and the private sector. The workshop was planned and conducted in such a way to maximise participation and ensure all perspectives were captured.

2. **Outcomes.** The workshop succeeded in effectively bringing together the principal military functional areas of expertise (JENG/J4/JMED/J9) with Nations' Public Sector representatives, NATO HQ IMS/CEPC & IS-Civil Preparedness and the private sector. Specifically,

a. The Concept proposal was well received and broadly accepted in its current form. More emphasis will be placed on the connection with NATO's Task Force Enablement work and an expansion of the Nations' pivotal role in Resilience, as well as references to Societal Resilience. The opportunities for leveraging and supporting ongoing initiatives, particularly within the EU, were also captured.

b. There was universal support for the CoRe concept to be expanded into a mechanism by which the military could better define the contribution by Nations' civilian capabilities (systems, processes and infrastructure) to support operations; whilst minimizing the adverse impact on societies.

Releasable to EU/PfP  
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

c. All five lines of efforts (LoEs) were validated as relevant and effective toward the achievement of a refined CoRe Vision<sup>1</sup> with the recommendation to prioritize the “Buy-In”, “Gaps” and “Goals” LoEs (see Enclosure 1).

3. **Way-ahead.** Planning for a follow-on workshop is already underway which will solidify the CoRe programme of work and take forward the LoEs. The CoRe team will publicize the date and location in due course. In addition, CoRe has linkages with several ongoing activities across the broader Resilience sector:

a. Consolidation of engagements with IS OPS/Civ Prep, ACT JFT/JETE and SHAPE J9 with the aim to assess Resilience TNA/TRA. CoRe concept injections are informing TRI in Civil Preparedness.

b. Ex VIGOROUS WARRIOR 2019 (MILMED COE/ROU hosted Ex) will exercise CoRe medical portion and could expand to investigate MASCAL cascade impacts on other baseline sectors.

c. Building on JWC engagement during the workshop, the CoRe team is working with ACT/JFT/TREX (supported by ACT/CEI/OPEX) to include CoRe experiments in NATO exercises in 2019, as well as injections in the base scenario regarding Civil Preparedness.

d. CoRe team conducted a successful meeting hosted by the NLD Ministry of Security and Justice (MoSJ) together with the NLD MOD, to support a NDL led wargame (date tbc) covering potential disruption and challenges to the provision of HNS and military mobility.

4. **Conclusion.** The CoRe concept has the potential to address some significant gaps in understanding and capabilities. The workshop highlighted a clear and present need to minimise some common misconceptions about Resilience, address potential HNS gaps and provide a clear framework for the civil (public and private) and military communities to collaborate more effectively, reduce ambiguity and help quantify collective risk.

5. **Points of contacts.** Should there be any questions, our points of contact are: OF-5 Deborah Porter, Tel. +1.757.747.3844, Email: [deborah.porter@act.nato.int](mailto:deborah.porter@act.nato.int) and OF-3 Enrico Cimaglia, Tel. +1.757.747.3799, Email: [enrico.cimaglia@act.nato.int](mailto:enrico.cimaglia@act.nato.int).

---

<sup>1</sup> “An Alliance able to sustain successful operations by preparing, absorbing, recovering and adapting to surprise or strategic shock, through harmonized and resilient structures, systems and processes, enabled by a persistent collaboration across civil, military and private stakeholders”.

6. All detailed material regarding the workshop have been uploaded to the CoRe portal on TRANSNET [<https://cde.transnet.act.nato.int/Work/CoRe>] which will be the repository for further updates and information on CoRe activity and upcoming events.

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION:



Önder ÇELEBİ  
Rear Admiral, TUR N  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Command and Control  
Deployability and Sustainability

ENCLOSURE:

1. CoRe Concept Proposal, dated 03 April 2018.

DISTRIBUTION:

External –

Action:

SHAPE DCOS Res  
SHAPE J4  
SHAPE J9  
SHAPE JENG  
SHAPE JMED

NATO HQ- IS OPS  
NATO HQ- IMS P&C  
NATO HQ- IMS O&P  
NATO HQ- IMS L&R

JFCBS  
JFCNP

CCOE  
CMDRCOE  
MILENG COE  
MILMED COE  
M&S COE

European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats Address - Helsinki, Finland  
(hybridcoe@hybridcoe.fi)

Information:

AIRCOM  
MARCOM  
LANDCOM  
NSHQ

NSPA  
NCIA

List III - NLRs  
List VI - PNLRs

Internal –

Action:

DCOS SPP  
ACOS C2DS  
ACOS CEI

Information:

COS  
DCOS CD  
DCOS SPP  
DCOS JFT  
JWC  
JALLC

# Collaborative Resilience (CoRe)

## - Concept Proposal -

### Introduction

1. This paper introduces a concept aimed to enhance NATO Collaborative Resilience (CoRe) in support of military operations and asks for informal feedback/declarations of interest on its scope. It is written from the perspective of the military and seeks to complement the NATO work on civil preparedness and integrate with ongoing development of NATO concepts dealing with the enablement of the operational theatre. Principal beneficiaries of the concept will span the three sectors (Civilian, Military and Private) and include member nations and NATO strategic and operational planners.

### Background

*Resilience: the ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from shocks and stresses, combining civilian, economic, commercial and military factors. Resilience is achieved by enhancing preparedness within the public and private sectors, supported and amplified by military capability and capacity. The Resilience Cycle is considered to have four phases: Prepare, Absorb, Recover, Adapt.*

2. Fundamental to NATO's Deterrence and Defence Posture is a more resilient Alliance. The first step to building resilience was the recognition of an interdependency<sup>1</sup> between the three sectors and the facilitation of a whole of government approach.

3. At the Warsaw Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government committed to enhance Alliance resilience against the full spectrum of shocks and threats.<sup>2</sup> Informed by developing work on countering the hybrid threat, enabling SACEUR's AOR and increasing the state of civil preparedness, this concept will support NATO HQ efforts by providing a conceptual framework.

4. To date, NATO's support to nations and enhancing Alliance resilience has been primarily focused on civil preparedness, through the implementation and ongoing assessment of the NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience (the so-called '7 baseline requirements'<sup>3</sup> - 7BRs).

5. Progressing the Summit commitment, NATO Allied Command Transformation's conference on "Interdependency in Resilience" highlighted that building resilience demands persistent interconnectedness between the military, civil and private sectors.<sup>4</sup> In addition, conference surveys reinforced the potential requirement for a concept, written from the military perspective, advocating collaborative working and fostering enduring, trusted relationships.

### Problem Context

6. Our present global environment is characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. Hybrid attacks and deliberate exploitation of vulnerable civilian systems will demand increased resilience of Alliance structures and processes in order to conduct successful operations. Pre-agreed coordination and cooperation mechanisms among civilian, military, and private sectors will be essential to withstand the effects of actions that stretch support capabilities and infrastructure beyond their single structural limit.

7. Furthermore, there is a lack of awareness and understanding of the additional demands that major scale NATO operations will place on Nations' critical infrastructure and services in times of crisis or conflict, particularly during a Collective Defence scenario. Although forces should possess the capabilities to sustain themselves, coordination is required to avoid civilian system failures having cascading effects on military ability to conduct operations. This recognizes that a large military force presence may disrupt local resources and therefore impact and potentially be affected by the societal resilience of populated areas.

<sup>1</sup> PO(2016)0029, dated 21 Jan 2016, a 'Food for Thought' paper issued by NATO Secretary General to the Permanent Representatives

<sup>2</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133180.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm)

<sup>3</sup> 1) assured continuity of government and critical government services; 2) resilient energy supplies; 3) ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people; 4) resilient food and water resources; 5) ability to deal with mass casualties; 6) resilient communications systems; 7) resilient transportation systems.

<sup>4</sup> Held 2-4 May 2017 in Norfolk, VA and supported by 230 leaders from across the military, civil and private sectors, representing 34 NATO and EU nations. <http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2017/resilience/resilience-wp.pdf>

## Concept Vision<sup>5</sup>

“An Alliance able to sustain successful operations by preparing for, absorbing, recovering and adapting to surprise or strategic shock, through harmonized and resilient<sup>6</sup> structures, systems and processes, enabled by a persistent collaboration across civil, military and private stakeholders”.

8. In the context described, the Alliance is only able to retain and sustain capable forces by collaborating, sharing responsibilities and pooling capabilities with the entire “defence and security community”, broadened to include relevant civilian and private actors. This collaborative approach affords all stakeholders a shared ability to endure adversity over time and to recover quickly from strategic shocks or operational setbacks.

9. Focusing on key principles to include trust, transparency and shared awareness, CoRe achievement cannot be based on pure redundancy and resistance alone, but rather through interconnection and integration of all external structures, systems and processes identified as critical to enable and sustain military activity across the entire Resilience Cycle.

10. In order to overcome these complex scenarios, characterized by unpredictable magnitude and nature of attacks capable of threatening the survival of the Alliance or its members, NATO should achieve:

- A progression of the NATO crisis response system and planning methodology from a reactive/proactive approach toward a predictive one: based on early warning systems, multi-factor analytics, scenario-based simulations combined with procedures for timely assessment and activation of potential external assets in addition to (or in combination with) deployable military capabilities. (Outcome 1: Prepare)
- Realize system Redundancy<sup>7</sup>, Robustness<sup>8</sup> and Resourcefulness<sup>9</sup> by design. (Outcome 2: Absorb)
- The highest possible interaction between civilian and private capabilities in support of military operations to allow the quickest recover from strategic shock in order to safeguard or restore government and business continuity as well as societal stability and equilibrium. (Outcome 3: Recover)
- Develop common Strategy and Plans for continuous adaptation of critical infrastructure and services. (Outcome 4: Adapt)

## Approach and way ahead

11. Starting from the agreed political commitment of implementing the 7BRs, the concept will follow 5 main lines of efforts (LoEs), prioritized<sup>10</sup> towards Projects 1-3:

- **Project 1: Buy-In.** Form a Tiger Team supporting CEPC and the “Resilience Tenet” within the TF Enablement Plan to develop a lexicon and conceptual framework to facilitate continuous information exchange, overcome misconceptions and facilitate the sharing of good practice between stakeholders;
- **Project 2: Gaps.** Develop a comprehensive model(s) to identify needs, critical shortfalls and enabling factors for a generic scenario in accordance with the NATO level of ambition and functional area risk assessments, sufficiently scalable to allow Nations to develop geographically appropriate models;
- **Project 3: Goals.** Contribute to the development of CEPC advice for Nations to prioritize efforts and investments in critical capacities, infrastructure, services and assets that directly enable and sustain Military operations in a collective Defence scenario with a theatre-wide approach;
- **Project 4: Network.** Reinforce the networks already established<sup>11</sup> between the 3 sectors and, building on NATO-EU cooperation, facilitate dialogue and persistent relationships with relevant Non NATO Entities and actors<sup>12</sup> committed to develop resilience;

<sup>5</sup> Refined during the 1st CoRe WS, 20-22 Mar 2018, The Hague.

<sup>6</sup> A system is resilient when it can adapt to internal and external challenges by changing its method of operations while continuing to function. While elements of the original system could still be present, there is a fundamental shift in core activities that reflects adapting to the new environment.

<sup>7</sup> A system is redundant when it contain duplication of critical components or functions with the intention of increasing its reliability, usually in the form of a backup or fail-safe capability.

<sup>8</sup> A system is robust when it can continue functioning in the presence of internal and external challenges without fundamental changes to the original system.


<sup>9</sup> A system is resourceful when it's able to determine whether it has achieved its goals or, if not, to develop and carry out alternate plans. Having networks of trust that enable flexible self-organising to adapt to crises in novel ways.

<sup>10</sup> The five LoEs were assessed and prioritized during the 1st CoRe WS, 20-22 Mar 2018, The Hague.

<sup>11</sup> At the 2017 Resilience and Civil Preparedness Conferences in Bucharest and Norfolk.

<sup>12</sup> Primarily IOs, NGOs, global-scale private enterprises, academia, think tank, research agencies and management consulting firms.

- **Project 5: Tools.** Identify procedures and tools to enhance common R&D, interoperability, dual-use of civilian, military and private assets and spare capacity including collective training and exercises requirements.



Points of contact:

OF-5 Deborah Porter, NATO HQ SACT, Tel. +1.757.747.3844, Email: [deborah.porter@act.nato.int](mailto:deborah.porter@act.nato.int)

OF-3 Enrico Cimaglia, NATO HQ SACT, Tel. +1.757.747.3799, Email: [enrico.cimaglia@act.nato.int](mailto:enrico.cimaglia@act.nato.int)