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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)
NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)
NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

19 December 2022

1. The enclosed Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01 Edition F, Version 1, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE has been approved by the nations in the Military Committee, and is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2437.

2. AJP-01 Edition F, Version 1 is effective upon receipt and supersedes AJP-01, Edition E, Version 1 which shall be destroyed in accordance with local procedures for the destruction of documents.

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4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

Dimitrios SIGOULAKIS
Major General, GRC (A)
Director, NATO Standardization Office
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## Summary of changes

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<td>• Introduces and explains the continuum of competition.</td>
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<td>• Updates deterrence, and includes principles, ways and types.</td>
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<td>• Contextualises NATO’s core policies with projecting stability and fight against terrorism.</td>
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<td>• Reintroduces campaign themes and describes their relationship with the continuum of competition.</td>
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<td>• Updates the comprehensive approach.</td>
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<td>• Introduces and describes the behaviour-centric approach, the manoeuvrist approach and mission command alongside the comprehensive approach as tenets of NATO joint operational doctrine.</td>
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<td>• Includes and expands on the cross-cutting topics, which comprise protection of civilians; children and armed conflict; cultural property protection; women, peace and security; conflict-related sexual violence; sexual exploitation and abuse; combating trafficking in human beings; and building integrity. Further, it introduces the notion of human security.</td>
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Allied publications

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AJP-2  *Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security*
AJP-3  *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*
AJP-4  *Allied Joint Doctrine for Sustainment* (in development)
AJP-5  *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations*
AJP-6  *Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems*
AJP-10 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Strategic Communications*

Allied administrative publications

AAP-47  *Allied Joint Doctrine Development*
AAP-77  *NATO Terminology Manual*

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Preface

Context

1. The strategic context within which the Alliance operates continues to evolve. NATO's military capabilities, strategy and plans continuously adapt to meet the challenge of enduring strategic competition. NATO conducts campaigns, operations and activities to fulfil its core tasks of deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management and cooperative security. Although each campaign, operation or activity is unique, planning and conduct can be approached in a similar manner. The principles that guide the Alliance's approach to campaigns, operations and activities are provided by doctrine.

Scope

2. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine* is the NATO capstone doctrine for Allied joint operations and activities. It explains the strategic context for such operations and focuses on the fundamentals of joint operations and activities.

Purpose

3. AJP-01 provides commanders and their staff with a common framework for understanding the approach to employing the military instrument of power. It does this by explaining the fundamentals and principles, and it is the basis from which all subordinate NATO doctrine is derived.

Application

4. AJP-01 is intended as guidance for NATO commanders and their staff. It describes the strategic context and provides guidance on how Alliance forces and its partners operate. It also provides a reference for NATO civilians and non-NATO civilians operating with the Alliance.

Linkages

5. AJP-01 directs and complements the other level-1 keystone publications. Together, these contain the overarching premise of Allied joint doctrine, which is expanded further in the functional doctrine series. AJP-01 should be read in conjunction with the NATO Military Strategy, the Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area and the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept.
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Chapter 1 – Strategic context

1.1 Chapter 1 sets the context for this publication and subordinate doctrine that is under development within the Allied Joint Doctrine Architecture. The strategic context suggests that the Alliance is now entering the fourth period of its strategic thinking. The Alliance has had to rapidly adapt to operate more effectively in a period of strategic competition to deter and counter adversaries pursuing objectives below the threshold of armed conflict and be better prepared to fight and defeat adversaries if deterrence fails. NATO has responded to this changed strategic context by producing: a new NATO Military Strategy; the first Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area in 50 years; and a new NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept for how the Alliance will operate and fight over the next 20 years. This chapter introduces some of the key doctrinal terms before they are further explained in later chapters. It updates how NATO views international relations through the framework of competition and introduces the conflict triangle and continuum of competition. It then explains how key drivers in the current security environment have driven NATO’s adaptation and the doctrine development in this publication. All the themes in this chapter aim to enhance comprehension of the policy and the doctrine covered in this document to enable personnel to apply judgement in its application and when developing subordinate doctrine.

Section 1 – Introduction to doctrinal terms
Section 2 – Understanding conflict
Section 3 – Competition and international politics
Section 4 – Security environment

1.2 Key tenets of doctrine. There are four key tenets of doctrine: the behaviour-centric approach; the manoeuvrist approach; the comprehensive approach; and mission command. They apply across all levels of operations and in any situation that the military instrument is used. The behaviour-centric approach recognizes that people’s attitude and behaviour are central to attaining the end state, and that the Alliance has to take account of a much broader audience than simply the ‘enemy or adversary’. The behaviour-centric approach is about a comprehensive and persistent understanding of audiences and how they can affect our end state. This approach uses narrative-led execution to converge effects from all levels of operations and from across the coalition to preserve or change audiences’ attitudes and behaviours. Audiences are segmented into three general categories – public, stakeholder and actor – depending on their ability to affect the end state, as depicted in Figure 1.1. The comprehensive approach is the combining of all available political, military and civilian capabilities, in a concerted effort, to attain the desired end state. This complements the manoeuvrist approach, which seeks to pit strength against vulnerabilities,

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1 Generally speaking, since the birth of NATO, there have been three distinct periods within which NATO’s strategic thinking has evolved: the Cold War period; the immediate post-Cold War period; and the security environment since the events of 9/11. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm?
mostly through indirect ways and means, targeting understanding, capability, cohesion and, ultimately, an adversary’s will to contest. Mission command advocates centralized intent and decentralized execution, allowing the force to take calculated and managed risks and learn, anticipate and adapt more quickly than unsupportive and hostile actors to exploit opportunities. Together the tenets offer the prospect of achieving rapid gains or results that are disproportionately greater than the resources applied.

1.3 **Engagement space/battlespace.** Engagement space and battlespace are synonyms. This document uses engagement space throughout to remain coherent with the *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive* (COPD). COPD uses engagement space because it better reflects activity conducted at all levels of operations and by non-military partners.

1.4 **Operational domains.** The five operational domains are maritime, land, air, space, and cyberspace, and it is through these that military and non-military organizations integrate their capabilities. The term ‘operational’ does not reflect the operational level of operations, it reflects operations and engagement space activity. The working definition of
multi-domain operations is: ‘orchestration of military activities, across all domains and environments, synchronised with non-military activities, to enable the Alliance to deliver converging effects at the speed of relevance.’\textsuperscript{2,3}

\section*{Section 2 – Understanding conflict}

\textbf{Conflict triangle}

1.5 NATO's purpose is to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. Understanding the causes of conflict underpins the ability to de-escalate and resolve disputes. There are three fundamental causes of conflict, as illustrated in Figure 1.2 and explained below.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Contradiction} is an issue over which conflicting beliefs and aims exist and there might be disagreement.
  \item \textbf{Attitude of the actors} – the perception of actors is shaped by their emotions, judgements and desires towards the contradiction, combined with their perceived advantage relative to a competitor. Whether the perception is accurate or not is immaterial; neither is the merit of the contradiction. What matters is how actors perceive things, and what their beliefs are.
  \item \textbf{Behaviour} that arises from attitudes and beliefs in a contradiction.
\end{itemize}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{conflict_triangle.png}
\caption{The conflict triangle}
\end{figure}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{2} This working definition is included in MCM-0019-2022, 7 April 2022, \textit{The Alliance Warfare Development Agenda}.
\textsuperscript{3} Reader to note that United States joint doctrine uses the terms ‘joint operations’ and ‘all domains’.
\end{flushright}
1.6 The three elements of the conflict triangle interrelate and any one of them may be the origin for increased hostility between competitors. For example, ownership of territory might be a resource contradiction between actors. Analysis of attitudes and behaviour may reveal that the territory itself is not important, but the actors wish to keep it out of the hands of the other side, and that is the source of contradiction. The source of the conflict lies in the actor's attitudes toward each other and drives their behaviour. Equally, a change in behaviour may ameliorate the attitude and resolve the contradiction.

1.7 Differences exist quite normally between actors but can become the basis of a contradiction that, if unresolved, can harden to the point that the actors polarize and turn to violence, even total war. After a time, the actors might decide to stop fighting and call a ceasefire, which can lead to talks and an agreement. As the situation normalizes, opportunities arise for the actors to explore the possibility of reconciliation. Essentially, the conflict cycle sees escalation as an increasing constriction of negotiating space, reducing options and increasing the level of threat and then the use of violence. De-escalation is the process in reverse.

1.8 According to this conflict model, appropriate preventive measures delivered at the right time in the course of a conflict lowers the level (or intensity) of conflict, as shown in Figure 1.3. The aim is to act as early as possible to prevent the intensification, prolongment and any spread of the conflict. If action is not taken towards normalization and cooperation, the stages will re-escalate towards armed conflict again. Preventative measures include:

- activities to deepen mutual understanding to ameliorate attitudes;
- preventive diplomacy, both formal and informal, to resolve contradictions; and
- crisis management to change behaviour.
Section 3 – Competition and international politics

1.9 Competition is an enduring reality of international relations as each actor seeks to protect and advance their respective aims; it is a condition to be managed, not a problem to be solved. Actors pursue their interests constantly and in a variety of ways. Sometimes this interaction leads to issues within the conflict triangle, but most actors use agreed competitive interactions to achieve their aims.

Continuum of competition

1.10 The continuum of competition is a model depicting how attitudes and behaviours shape international relations. The continuum depicts four types of relationships between states/groups of people: cooperation, rivalry, confrontation and armed conflict. The boundaries between cooperation, rivalry and confrontation, and the threshold between confrontation and armed conflict, are complex and dynamic; the progression between each is neither linear nor easily defined. Interstate relations are typically sectoral: two or more states may cooperate in one sector and be in confrontation in another. The continuum is described below and illustrated in Figure 1.4.

a. Cooperation. Cooperation occurs when states or non-state actors work together to achieve the same objectives. Often this occurs when actors’ attitudes on a contradiction align. NATO is an example of cooperation to protect and defend member states’ security. Cooperation provides the ideal basis for enduring stability.
b. **Rivalry.** Rivals exist in a state of peace but have conflicting aims or contradictions. The actors compete with an attitude or behaviour in accordance with the rules-based international order (RBIO). The RBIO is a shared commitment by all countries to conduct their activities in accordance with agreed rules that evolve over time through multinationally agreed processes. Rivalry is not necessarily negative, it is the normal state in international relations, and when it exists within the RBIO framework it can be beneficial to all parties and the international system. For example the United Nations (UN) rules on the global commons and freedom of navigation activities.

c. **Confrontation.** Confrontation occurs when differences have not been reconciled and adversaries oppose each other with hostile intent or behaviour such that a state of crisis develops. Adversaries use hostile behaviour or attitudes, including posturing, threats and perhaps violence, as a competitive tool to resolve the contradictions in their favour. There is no defined threshold that separates confrontation from armed conflict because many actors intentionally try to obscure or confuse exactly where this threshold lies. Adversaries will consciously strive to stretch or constrict the threshold to increase their freedom of action or to restrict that of others. Proxy warfare, brinkmanship, terrorism and economic coercion are all examples of sub-threshold activity within the confrontation zone.\(^4\) In response, other

\(^4\) For more information on these examples see Royal United Services Institute, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/future-conflict-operating-environment-out-2030.
states will conduct deterrence and defensive activities to reduce the confrontation or alternatively escalate the violence to armed conflict.

d. **Armed conflict.** Armed conflict occurs when escalation cannot be prevented or contained, leading to one party resorting to military force to compel their enemy to resolve the contradiction in their favour.\(^5\) Armed conflict is a special kind of competition because it is not enduring; its role is to set the conditions for other forms of competition. Since armed conflict includes acts of nationally directed military violence, it invariably has an exponential effect on human emotions, uncertainty and friction. Moreover, armed conflict is an extreme trial of physical and moral strengths, and tests both institutional and individual resources of endurance and resilience.

![Figure 1.4 – The continuum of competition](image)

**Nature of competition**

1.11 Competition among states (and other actors) pursuing perceived interests is an inherent feature of international relations. To operate proactively within the continuum of competition, the enduring themes need to be understood. Some of the themes are recognizable from the nature of armed conflict itself, although they are applicable across the continuum of competition.

1.12 **Competitive advantage.** ‘Advantage’ is a relative state between competitors: when one actor is able to do something better than its competitor or competitors. Competing actors will have different sectoral advantages, which they leverage to achieve their aims.

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\(^5\) The term ‘armed conflict’, rather than ‘war’, is preferred today because it is wider in scope than the term war, which was, and indeed still is, a technical term with certain legal implications. The act of declaring ‘war’ is not commonplace in the contemporary security environment.
Actors apply creativity and science to develop advantages, which causes the form of competition to constantly evolve. In fact, it is co-evolutionary; as one actor develops an advantage, other actors adapt to it by trying to either counter it or develop another tool that displaces it.

1.13 **State and non-state actors.** State and non-state actors can engage in competition. Non-state actors may include a variety of organizations, civil society and the commercial sector, all competing in pursuit of their aims and interests.

1.14 **Campaign mindset.** Competitive relationships can endure over long timelines: decisions and actions can be executed over months, years or even decades. Addressing competition’s enduring nature requires a campaign mindset. This is characterized by: long-term thinking; maximizing advantages; working with other actors to mitigate disadvantages; and recognizing that competitive advantages shift over time.

1.15 **Human factors.** Human factors are central in contradictions, attitudes and behaviours and, therefore, competition. They are subject to the complexities, inconsistencies and peculiarities that characterize human behaviour. Human factors are the combination of language and social, cultural, psychological and physical characteristics that shape the contradictions, attitude and behaviour of individuals and groups.

1.16 **Friction.** Friction is the very essence of competition because a clash of opposing human behaviour and attitudes creates friction. Competition’s interactive nature, the duality of two (or more) independent and animate forces seeking advantage or the self-interests of cooperating actors creates the context to understand the existence of friction as a central element in competition.

1.17 **Uncertainty.** Competition takes place in an atmosphere of uncertainty and ambiguity. The only limit to the ways and means of competing seems to be the extent of human imagination. The reality of unknown and possibly unknowable relevant elements is a pervasive and fundamental characteristic of competition.

**Character of competition**

1.18 The character of competition – its face or form, what it looks and feels like – shifts, sometimes dramatically, over time and space. Ways of competing are almost limitless. The character and intensity of competition at any time, and in any area, reflects the nature of the societies waging it and is influenced by the political, military, economic, social, cultural and technological dynamics of the actors. Understanding the character of the competition is essential for political and military leaders.

1.19 **Competitive techniques.** While competition is persistent, its intensity varies as the conflict triangle evolves over time. Where the RBIO is observed, rivals’ national interests are achieved through consensus. However, during periods of strategic competition, actors are likely to become increasingly assertive and exploit ambiguity to advance their interests using the following techniques.
a. **Boundary and threshold shifting.** A boundary or threshold is the limit that, when crossed, would normally trigger a significant reaction. The aim of boundary shifting is for an actor to achieve a goal in such a way that a movement in the boundary is forced and a response is not triggered. A boundary shift often results in a new limit being established, with the boundary ‘shifted’. The threshold of armed conflict is often shifted as adversaries try to achieve war-like objectives without becoming engaged in armed conflict or direct confrontation. This is called sub-threshold activity.

b. **Gradualism.** Gradualism is a technique in competition in which an actor uses and creates ambiguity to cause a competitor to hesitate to act. The actor then exploits that hesitation to take incremental steps toward achieving their objectives. Each step taken is by itself so small it does not cause a significant reaction from a competitor.

c. **A fait accompli (something already done).** Competitors use ambiguity and uncertainty to conceal their intent and seize their aim while their competitor is still orientating to the situation. By the time the competitor understands the situation, the aim is already achieved.

d. **Opportunism.** Actors will take advantage of conditions to achieve their strategic aims. Opportunity is often created when conditions change suddenly or temporarily, such as during a pandemic, economic crash or armed conflict. This diverts attention, energy and resources, which creates a gap for an alert actor to exploit.

1.20 **Perceptions of competition.** Perceptions of competition can have a significant influence on how actors compete to achieve their aim. For example, some actors may view competition as a perpetual struggle of regime survival and merge confrontation and armed conflict into one operational space. Those perceptions can originate from different values, beliefs and cultures, as well as strategies, which may lead them to differing intuitive choices. When an actor makes an intuitive choice within their own culture, the choice is often judged as a correct one by others from that culture. Therefore, the legitimacy of how to compete is driven by the actor’s own perception of the competition. An actor who views competition as a perpetual struggle may not feel bound to comply with the international norms adhered to by another actor. The actor’s strategies and how they use their instruments of power is the biggest driver of the character of competition. This is explained in the next section.
We cannot eliminate uncertainty, friction or human fallibility in competition. We can minimize its impact with rigorous training and adaptive doctrine to overcome our own friction and uncertainty, as well as maintaining our humanity.

National strategy and instruments of power

1.21 National strategy. National strategy defines, secures and advances a nation’s long-term, enduring core interests and aims over time. Generally, aims are based on security and prosperity. The national strategy is supported by subordinate sectoral strategies that explain why two actors may cooperate in one sector and be in confrontation in another within the continuum of competition. Perception of advantage is key in shaping the aims and interests of a nation, as well as how it allocates resources. Strategies form the basis for potential contradictions and, in turn, the actor’s attitude and behaviour in relation to other actors.

1.22 Power projection. Actors will use a mixture of hard and soft power across the continuum of competition to influence other nations and secure their own aims. The balance of how they project their hard and soft power reflects the overall attitude of the nation. Descriptions of soft and hard power are below.

a. Hard power. Hard power uses military and economic strength, complemented by diplomatic and information activity, to effectively influence actors or to directly change the course of events. Actors use hard power to attract, deter and compel.

   o Attraction uses incentives and rewards to get another actor to act in a desirable way.

   o Deterrence is used to dissuade an adversary from taking action.
Compulsion is a form of coercion to make an actor take favourable action. To successfully compel and deter, the perception of a competitive advantage must be clear enough that it affects the competitor’s decision calculus, thereby making will and resolve a key element of the relative advantage. Hard power is used in many ways across the continuum of competition; for example, actors can compel or induce rivals as well as adversaries to cooperate.

b. **Soft power.** Soft power is the ability to persuade or encourage others to adopt an alternative approach, primarily through cultural and ideological means or by encouraging emulation. Soft power is generally slower and more difficult to employ in a targeted way. Much of the process also lies outside a state’s control. Therefore, applying soft power demands: a campaign mindset; clear, consistent communication strategies and measures of effectiveness; and a developed understanding of the intended audience and their societal attitudes and cultures. Diplomatic and information capabilities underpin soft power's effectiveness.

1.23 **Instruments of power.** Nations achieve their national and sectoral aims through the coordinated use of the four instruments of power. These instruments are used to interact with other nations, but they also play a key role in supporting a nation’s internal stability, cohesion and resilience. A nation does not necessarily need to excel in every instrument. The most successful actors are the ones that manage them synergistically to maximize their competitive advantage.

a. **The diplomatic instrument.** The degree to which diplomatic engagement succeeds is governed by the ability to: negotiate; broker agreements; and manage relationships through soft and hard power. The diplomatic instrument is key in the evolution and the collective interpretation of the RBIO. A state that adopts a campaign mindset often uses the diplomatic instrument to: gain an understanding of a rival's view of competition; sense a competitor’s strategic operating techniques; and reinforce its reputation of delivering actions that reflect its words through the other instruments of power. The diplomatic instrument is strongly influenced by the relative advantage of the other instruments of power.

b. **The information instrument.** Nations operate in an information environment that has seen an exponential growth in information processing, data and digital connectivity. The classification of information as a discrete instrument of power recognizes audience centrality, public perception and information’s influence on decision-makers. The information instrument often competes via narratives. Narratives are important because they give meaning to facts for audiences. Narratives are also used to align a nation’s actions across all the instruments of power. The campaign mindset requires credible narratives, supported by coherent actions from the other instruments to have a persuasive effect on actors' decision-making.
c. **The military instrument.** A nation derives advantage through the military instrument by the generation of fighting power and its subsequent application across the operational domains. The priority of any national strategy is to defend the state. The ultimate form of arbitration between enemies within the continuum of competition is compulsion through armed conflict, in which the actor primarily relies on the military instrument. An advantage in the military instrument is therefore key to successfully compel and deter. The military instrument is also used to induce actors to cooperate. The campaign mindset requires the military instrument to be used in a supporting role below the threshold of armed conflict, across the continuum of competition, therefore ensuring rivals will prefer cooperation rather than coercive interactions.

![Image of ships](image)

*In difficult negotiations with obstructive adversaries, diplomacy might only be successful if it is backed up by the credible threat of force.*

d. **The economic instrument.** The economic instrument is an influential hard and soft power tool, especially when used below the threshold of armed conflict. In a globalized world, nations are attracted to economic alliances to gain an economic advantage. Inferring economic advantage on a competitor may attract support through beneficial concessions or investment of capital, aid and trade to support prosperity. Conversely, economic disadvantage can be inferred on a competitor through measures such as sanctions, closing markets and withdrawing investment. Malign actors use attractions as part of their campaign mindset to cause dependence, which can be used to compel and deter. Others use economic engagements to enable both actors to make progress towards prosperity, thus bringing stability.

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6 NATO's components of fighting power are explained in Chapter 3.
1.24 **Non-state capabilities.** Nations have capabilities that mirror instruments of power but are not subject to the nation's authority, as shown in Figure 1.5. Domestic and international laws regulate national, multinational or international institutions, groups, organizations, private companies or non-state entities. Depending on the context, these capabilities can be significant and, even though non-state actors may not work as a homogeneous group, their collective or individual capabilities may have greater influence and effect than a nation. These non-state capabilities can:

- strengthen nations’ instruments of power when interests align and efforts are complementary;
- degrade nations’ instruments of power when uncoordinated and overlapping efforts congest the environment; and
- weaken nations’ instruments of power when opposing interests and contradictory efforts clash.

**Figure 1.5 – Non-state capabilities**

1.25 **Integration.** The campaign mindset requires nations to endeavour to maximize their advantage to achieve their strategic aims. This is achieved through being more integrated across their instruments of power, and augmenting their instruments with allies, partners and civilian actors. Integration forms the basis for the transnational alliances and a comprehensive approach.
Section 4 – Security environment

1.26 This section sets the context for NATO’s policy, concepts and doctrine adaptation by explaining the current character of competition. NATO’s Secretary General reported ‘Today, we face the most complex and unpredictable security environment since the end of the Cold War’. The themes within the security environment are not only connected but proliferate each other.

1.27 **Strategic competition.** The Alliance is in a period of strategic competition because of:

- the shifting balance of global, regional and national power – meaning more actors are more motivated to challenge the status quo;
- complex interdependence within the international political economies – meaning more states are increasingly vulnerable to others in more ways;
- technological convergence – meaning more actors have more means available to do more harm while avoiding confrontation or armed conflict; and
- the increased lethality within the contemporary engagement space, and the difficulty of securing victory in the traditional sense, leading to armed conflict becoming significantly more costly.

1.28 **Challenges to the rules-based international order.** The RBIO can be viewed as a line of acceptable behaviour against which the Alliance judges other actors’ activities as rivalry or confrontation. Boundary stretching and gradualism is an increasing challenge to the RBIO. Those state and non-state actors who will not adhere to the RBIO seek to delegitimize and destabilize it, championing their own perception for their own interests. As political power becomes more dispersed and increasingly contested by state and non-state actors, governance of the RBIO that shapes international behaviour continues to be a contentious issue. It is hard to forge internationally binding treaties when an attitude and behaviour of boundary shifting of international laws is taking place. The destabilization of the RBIO and its ability to ameliorate contradictions is a growing issue due to an increasing reliance upon capabilities and infrastructure that are dependent upon access to the global commons. Examples of challenges to the RBIO include regimes deliberately ignoring their obligation to stop using chemical weapons and countries violating international law by conducting missile and nuclear device tests.

1.29 **The Information Age.** Processing power, the volume and variety of data, connectivity and technological advancement continue to grow exponentially. As an

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8 ‘International law identifies four global commons, namely the High Seas, the Atmosphere, the Antarctica and the Outer Space. These resource domains are guided by the principle of the common heritage of mankind.’ UN Report: Global governance and governance of the global commons in the global partnership for development beyond 2015.
increasing number of people spend more time conducting an ever-widening range of activities in cyberspace, information and narratives are becoming ever more central to humanity and have an increasing influence on the conflict triangle. Information activities are used to spread information, including false and harmful information. Social media informs competing narratives from a broad range of actors to influence attitudes and gain support for their contradictions and behaviours, resulting in the cognitive dimension of the engagement space becoming increasingly contested.

Never have so many people been connected in an instantly responsive network, through which ‘memes can spread more rapidly than natural viruses’. Our perception of the world is being manipulated at an extraordinary pace and on a previously unimaginable scale.⁹

1.30 **Advancement and proliferation of technology.** As well as improving computing power, technology has driven improvements in virtually every area, including military technology. Emerging and disruptive technologies and their proliferation makes it harder for NATO to preserve its competitive advantage. This technological convergence means more stakeholders and actors have an increasing number of means available to do more harm, which influences all three elements of the conflict triangle. Examples include the increase in area-denial systems, artificial intelligence and personal computer cyberspace capacity.

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⁹ Picture credit: Production Perig/Shutterstock.com
Space-based capabilities are increasingly important to the Alliance's and Allies' security and prosperity, thereby making it another operational domain to maintain.

1.31 Malicious cyberspace activity knows no international boundaries and has grown in terms of intensity, complexity and severity. There are several established and capable actors who seek to target and exploit nations’ networks and devices to gather intelligence or intellectual property, making cyberspace an operational domain to deter and defend.

1.32 The spread of offensive nuclear capabilities outside the Alliance constitutes a potential threat to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Additionally, proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, devices and substances in parallel with innovative means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern. Despite NATO’s ongoing efforts to strengthen international non-proliferation regimes, major challenges remain.

1.33 **Pervasive instability and terrorism.** There is a strong correlation between terrorism, corruption, organized crime, state fragility and conflict. The networks of terrorism and organized criminal groups are global, fuelling and spreading confrontation and armed conflict to the Alliance’s nations and partners. Some of the causes of instability are described below.

a. A growing world population and rising living standards are increasing the demand and competition for all resources, including food, water, energy and rare earth materials. Furthermore, climate change, pollution, habitat destruction and over-exploitation have far-reaching consequences. For example, floods, drought, storms, heatwaves and heavy rainfall increase poverty and pressure on scarce resources; this increases interstate and intra-state contradictions and strains attitudes over resources, increases migration both internally and externally, and intensifies competition.

b. States face increasing competition for public service provision as the rates of population and urban growth outstrip the capacity of many developing countries’ governments. This leads to the growth of slums, corruption and criminal activity. Emerging non-state actors, both domestically and internationally, who provide public services are challenging the attitudes and loyalties that exist between the population and state.

c. The information environment and a compelling narrative are used by terrorists to gain legitimacy and radicalize local, regional and global audiences to their cause.

1.34 Terrorist groups aim to take advantage of this instability by using the following operating concept: destabilize, disorder and decisive military advantage.

- **Destabilize** – by attracting and exploiting existing contradictions to mobilize support for violent change.
• **Disorder** – by spreading information and disinformation to elicit tacit and active support or acceptance of their attitudes and behaviour.

• **Decisive military advantage** – by creating opportunities to direct, support or inspire a mix of lethal and non-lethal actions to achieve physical and psychological outcomes, gain notoriety, garner attention, sustain and increase their support base and finances, and advance their cause.

1.35 **Sub-threshold activities.** The success and capability of NATO to safeguard its members from coercion has forced adversaries to pursue their aims through threshold stretching, gradualism and fait accompli behaviour. This behaviour is achieved through increasing overt and covert sub-threshold activity. Sub-threshold activity is orchestrated by state and non-state adversaries to undermine NATO’s and its partners’ security, the integrity of its democracies, its public safety, reputation or economic prosperity. Such sub-threshold activity does not seek overt conflict but is a way for adversaries to alter the balance of advantage and achieve their aims without the material, financial and social cost of armed conflict. These sub-threshold activities have implications that require an evolution of our deterrence doctrine and the campaign themes, which are explained in Chapter 2.

a. Theories of victory emphasize seizing a decisive advantage in the early stages of armed conflict. NATO’s adversaries’ experience gained through exploiting the cyberspace domain, electromagnetic spectrum and the cognitive dimension in recent conflicts has provided experience that sub-threshold activity is both a starting point and delivers an overall advantage in armed conflict. Crossing into armed conflict with a head start from years of sub-threshold activity could overload the Alliance with predicaments and dilemmas in a way that makes it harder to gain the initiative and plays into our adversaries’ short war preference.

b. The emphasis in creating and exploiting ambiguity and deception, combined with creatively using unconventional methods to target all areas of society, challenges the traditional use of indicator-based methods for early detection of hostile intent. Some unconventional methods lie dormant but are ready to be used as sub-threshold activities if required.

c. Sub-threshold activities are designed to be abstruse, making them: less attributable to states and therefore more difficult to identify liability and responsibility; less defined by geographical, functional and organizational boundaries; and more able to blur the distinction between military and civil entities. This combination results in added complexity for the Alliance’s decision-making, consequently making it harder and its reaction slower.

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10 For example: on 27 April 2007, Estonia was hit by major cyberattacks, which in some cases lasted weeks; and the European Medicines Agency was subject to a cyberattack on 9 December 2020 relating to the regulatory submission for Pfizer and BioNTech’s COVID-19 vaccine candidate.

11 For example, some members of the Alliance have expressed national security concerns over foreign ownership of social media apps.
d. There is a requirement to deter, but also a need for space to enable political manoeuvre. This requires force capabilities that can deliver effective counters and impose proportional costs below the level of armed conflict when required.

e. Sub-threshold activity is open to miscalculation, which could result in an armed conflict.

1.36 **Resurgence of potential state armed conflict.** The risks from state-based threats have grown and diversified. Though political and military channels of communication remain open with Russia, the Alliance has concerns about Russia’s destabilizing pattern of military activities and aggressive rhetoric. Russia’s fait accompli, gradualism and opportunist military activities, particularly along NATO’s borders, have made the Euro-Atlantic security environment less stable and predictable.\(^\text{12}\) Russia is also challenging Euro-Atlantic security and stability through sub-threshold activity, including: attempted interference in the election processes and the sovereignty of nations; widespread disinformation campaigns; malicious cyberspace activities; and the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.\(^\text{13}\)

1.37 **Shock events.** A shock event is an unpredictable event that is beyond what is normally expected of a situation and one that has potentially severe consequences. Shock events are characterized by their extreme rarity and severe impact. Due to globalization, these rare events are increasing. These shock events, such as COVID-19 or a financial crash, can deliver a sudden change to competitive advantages and can be exploited by opportunist adversaries.

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\(^{12}\) Examples include: Russian forces stationed in Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova without their consent; and deployments near NATO borders.


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Chapter 2 – The Alliance

2.1 Chapter 2 provides an overview of how the Alliance has adapted to operate within the current security environment. It explains NATO’s core tasks, including the role of Article 3, layered resilience and collective defence. This chapter also introduces doctrine for the core policies of deterrence and defence, projecting stability and fight against terrorism. It updates NATO’s campaign themes to reflect the direction of the NATO Military Strategy and Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR’s) Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area.

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Section 1 – Introduction

2.2 NATO’s essential and enduring aim is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. NATO strives to secure a lasting peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is an intergovernmental organization which provides a forum where members can consult and make decisions on any political or military matters affecting their security. Thus, no single member state needs to rely solely on its national capabilities to meet its essential national security objectives. The resulting sense of shared security among members contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

NATO’s essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means.
2.3 The fundamental guiding principle of the Alliance is mutual security and cooperation; if any one member is threatened, all are affected. In signing the North Atlantic Treaty, every member makes a commitment to respect this principle, sharing the risks and responsibilities, as well as the advantages of collective defence. This means that security considerations that members would ordinarily consider in isolation are undertaken collectively.

2.4 **The whole-of-Alliance approach.** The instruments of power face increasing competition from rivals, adversaries and enemies. To maintain an advantage the Allies pool their instruments into a whole-of-Alliance approach. The whole-of-Alliance approach uses the most appropriate combination of instruments of power to maximize their hard and soft power effectiveness within the legal and ethical standards of the rules-based international order (RBIO). The Alliance therefore acts as a forum, in an Article 4 or other context, in which different and interrelated aspects of instruments of power can be examined and coordinated to deliver measures to reduce the risk of an escalation into confrontation or armed conflict.

![Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty states: 'The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.'](image)

2.5 **The comprehensive approach.** The comprehensive approach is a key tenet of NATO doctrine. It brings together actors from the whole-of-Alliance approach with the contribution of other partners, creating a determined political, military and civilian coalition of interest working towards the agreed end state. The comprehensive approach was derived from projecting stability operations in a period of hegemony. Its application will continue to evolve in the context of strategic competition across all of NATO’s core tasks of: deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security. The comprehensive approach is explained in more detail in Chapter 4.

2.6 **Peace, crisis and conflict.** NATO uses the framework of peace, crisis and conflict to describe NATO’s situation, posture and activities. This framework correlates with the continuum of competition through peace within the rivalry zone, crisis within the confrontation zone and conflict within the armed conflict zone. For the rest of this document the term ‘continuum of competition’ includes peace, crisis and conflict.

**Section 2 – NATO’s core tasks**

2.7 The **NATO 2022 Strategic Concept** is based on the three core tasks of: deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security. The character of the tasks is adapting to the current security environment. Each task requires the Alliance and its members to have capabilities of enough quality and quantity to be able to conduct every type of operation to which the Alliance may commit.
Deterrence and defence

2.8 Deterrence and defence remains the Alliance’s primary responsibility and is the core element of the North Atlantic Treaty and the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept’s overall strategy – preventing adversaries’ hard power strategies. Whilst collective defence has always been associated with Article 5, the current security environment has increased the need for further resilience in civil society and infrastructure, and the negative impacts of globalization, such as shock events, has resulted in renewed focus on the importance of Article 3.

2.9 Article 5. NATO members will assist each other against attack in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance’s military instrument must therefore be able to:

- detect, deter and defend against any threat of aggression;
- maintain or restore the territorial integrity of member states; and
- rapidly terminate armed conflict or aggression.

Campaigns conducted under this provision can vary by character and intensity depending on the evolving character of the threats. For example, the Alliance agreed that cyberspace activities would not normally constitute an attack but they could rise to that level, and thus trigger an Article 5 response, if their effect becomes comparable to that of a conventional attack.

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states: ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America, shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.’

2.10 Article 3. Improving civil preparedness and national resilience contributes to the obligation to individually and collectively maintain and develop the capacity to resist any form of attack as enshrined in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance’s security relies on maintaining layered resilience. In broad terms, layered resilience is the ability of the Alliance to sustain long and protracted campaigns, which are likely to occur regardless of its preferences. The Alliance’s vision is to reconstruct resilience along three mutually reinforcing layers.

a. Military resilience. Military resilience includes the forces being ready for employment with the capabilities and redundancy the military instrument requires to ensure its ability to absorb shocks, provide early resistance and conduct counter-offensive operations.
a. **Military-civilian resilience.** Military-civilian resilience includes those plans, processes and connections that must be in place to ensure civilian support and infrastructure, transport and logistic supplies are a strength and not a vulnerability.

b. **Civilian resilience.** Civilian resilience is the civil ability to deny competitors the ability to target civil vulnerabilities and distract/overstretch the military instrument. It also includes those forces and capabilities that the military instrument will be expected to deploy in support of civilian society in the case of human-made disasters, as well as shielding the society from adversaries’ malign activities. The Alliance has agreed baseline resilience requirements in seven strategic sectors: continuity of government; energy; population movement; food and water resources; mass casualties; civil communications; and transport systems. To deter, counter or recover from threats or disruptions to the civil sector, these baseline requirements require clear plans and response measures, which are defined ahead of time and exercised regularly.

Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty states: 'In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.'

**Crisis prevention and management**

2.11 Crisis prevention and management employs a whole-of-Alliance approach with other partners to manage confrontations across the continuum of competition. NATO’s robust crisis prevention and management capabilities, delivered through a sustained operational posture, through multiple operational domains, enable it to deal with a wide range of crises that could pose a threat to the security of the Alliance’s territory and populations inside or outside the Euro-Atlantic area. The sectoral nature of competition means these crises are diverse and multi-regional, as adversaries exploit instability around NATO. Furthermore, shock events are increasing. Member states decide whether to engage in a crisis management operation on a case-by-case basis and by consensus. Crisis management operations include the following.

a. **Non-Article 5 crisis response operations.** These are multifunctional operations conducted in support of non-state actors like the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mandate, or at the invitation of a sovereign government involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. Non-Article 5 crisis response operations are designed to achieve long-term political settlement or other conditions specified in the mandate.

b. **Natural, human-made or humanitarian disaster relief operations.** These are operations to assist Allies and partners who are affected by natural or human-made disasters such as hurricanes, heavy flooding, pandemics or chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incidents.
NATO’s robust crisis management capabilities enable it to deal with a wide range of political, military or humanitarian crises that could pose a threat to the security of the Alliance’s territory and populations.

Cooperative security

2.12 NATO is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders, which requires NATO to seek cooperation with partners. The Alliance actively engages to enhance international security through partnerships with relevant countries and other international organizations to reduce instability and encourage countries to cooperate or compete in line with the RBIO. Cooperative security includes strengthening partnerships, contributing to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, and assisting countries who want to join NATO prepare for membership.

2.13 NATO maintains a broad network of partnership relations, with Euro-Atlantic countries and beyond. Over two decades, NATO developed partnerships with over 40 countries. These are grouped in different regional frameworks: the Partnership for Peace/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Partners who do not belong to any of the three formal frameworks are known as ‘partners across the globe’ or ‘global partners’.

2.14 Through partnerships, NATO helps countries strengthen their capacity to tackle their own security, defence reforms and to participate in international missions. Partnerships are part of many of the core activities that NATO undertakes, and they contribute to the Alliance in many ways. This includes enriching NATO’s situational awareness through political consultation and intelligence sharing, developing interoperability with the Alliance, benefitting from NATO advice on reforms, participating in education and training events, contributing to NATO-led campaigns, and undertaking new capability development and scientific projects.
Section 3 – NATO’s core policies

2.15 The North Atlantic Treaty and the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept are core documents that establish and reflect NATO’s transatlantic consensus. Core policies of deterrence and defence, projecting stability and the fight against terrorism contribute to the three core tasks across the continuum of competition, which is illustrated in Figure 2.1 and explained in more detail below.

![Diagram showing the relationship between core tasks and policies across the continuum of competition]

Deterrence and defence

2.16 Chapter 1 explains that the security environment in an era of strategic competition is uncertain and volatile, which makes deterrence a continuous escalation management activity. NATO’s capacity to deter is supported by an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, which complement each other and are underpinned by an array of governmental, civil and military resources to support these capabilities and the posture more broadly. NATO also maintains the freedom of action to compel an adversary by responding to gradualism, boundary and threshold shifting and fait accompli techniques with an appropriate and tailored approach, at the minimum level of force required.
Deterrence

2.17 Principles of deterrence. Deterrence involves five principles: credibility, cognition, capability, competition and communication. When combined they create a deterrent effect on audiences. They are like a multiplication product: if any one of the elements is set at zero, there will be no deterrence. Deterrence begins with the intention of influencing a hostile stakeholder to not become an adversary in the first place. It continues prior to armed conflict by convincing an adversary not to escalate across the threshold of armed conflict. Deterrence remains relevant during armed conflict in convincing an enemy to neither expand nor escalate the crisis across multiple sectors. The principles of deterrence are also applicable to conflict termination.

a. Credibility. Audiences constantly analyze NATO’s attitudes and behaviours; patterns of predictable behaviour over time contribute to their perceptions of the Alliance’s credibility. NATO must be perceived by audiences as having the collective will to act and the capability to do so, underpinned by a record of success. Credibility reinforces audiences’ attitude in the futility of malign activity against the Alliance. NATO’s credibility in safeguarding its members from conventional methods has forced adversaries to resort to unconventional methods like terrorism and other sub-threshold activities. The Alliance is building credibility in competing and responding successfully to sub-threshold activities. In some cases, it is necessary for the joint force to take considered risk to communicate the strength of the Alliance’s commitment by conducting operations that confront adversaries and reassure allies and partners. At the same time, credibility against terrorism stems from legitimacy in countermeasures and removing its root causes.

b. Cognition. Conducting audience analysis with our partners allows the Alliance to understand hostile audiences’ intent, the drivers of their behaviour, their thresholds and points of influence. Equally, the Alliance needs to understand its own strengths, weaknesses, limitations and essential red lines. This not only includes situations when member states/partners’ interests reinforce one another, but also where interests diverge. Cognition affords precision in deterrence activities, prioritizing actions and activities, acknowledging areas where greater risk can be tolerated. Continual assessments that evaluate the effectiveness of ongoing activities on audiences allows the Alliance to be strategically predictable but operationally unpredictable, thereby assuring members states and partners and other audiences, whilst simultaneously countering the malign influence of our adversaries. Cognition requires three elements of situational awareness: perception, comprehension and projection.

- Perception involves the processes of monitoring, indication, detection and recognition, leading to an awareness of multiple situational elements.

- Comprehension requires integrating the information to understand how it will impact on objectives.
Projection involves the ability to make assessments as to the range of possible effects that potential actions may have within the operating environment.

c. **Capability.** Successfully competing and deterring in strategic competition requires a whole-of-national-government approach, coordinated and integrated by NATO into a whole-of-Alliance approach with other partners. The whole-of-Alliance approach is operationalized by the comprehensive orchestration and integration of political, military and civilian actions. Conventional forces, nuclear weapons and ballistic missile defence capabilities are core components of NATO’s military capabilities for deterrence and defence. Additionally, many technological challenges that are required to operate and contest within the five operational domains are best addressed through partnerships between the military and the commercial sector. Other government actions need to be integrated to exploit adversaries’ vulnerabilities across different sectors. This can have an exponential effect; for instance, some social departments help address the contradictions of terrorism and instability, while others can affect economic prosperity. Furthermore, a wide range of government departments and commercial actors help build layered resilience.

d. **Competition.** Deterrence is a competitive dynamic due to competition’s interactive and co-evolutionary nature. Deterring an adversary from operating in the confrontation zone or escalating into armed conflict requires the Alliance to consistently contest and win against an adversary’s sub-threshold activities in any operational domain, effects dimension and in multiple regions. By successfully contesting, the Alliance will degrade adversaries’ will to compete, which in turn empowers the credibility of its narrative to other audiences.

e. **Communication.** Narrative-led execution allows the Alliance to align its actions and words, from the lowest level of command to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), to continuously reinforce strength of purpose to our targeted audiences. An unclear end state, objectives, actions, words or apparent discrepancies and contradictions may suggest the Alliance’s policy position is not firm, and that it is instead malleable under pressure. Narrative-led execution is explained in Chapter 4. The deterrence narrative expounds on the principles of credibility, capability and comprehension, with the focus shifting between the principles depending upon the type of deterrence being conducted. This ensures that: audiences understand the capability and credibility of the Alliance’s fighting power; audiences attribute malign activity correctly; and partners are reassured, whilst minimizing the risk of escalation by fueling the conflict triangle through a misunderstanding. Effective communication is the first phase of deterrence, aiming to persuade a stakeholder not to become an adversary in the first place.
The Alliance must be able to address the full spectrum of current and future challenges and threats from any direction, simultaneously. The Alliance has been strengthening its deterrence and defence posture in light of the changed and evolving security environment.

2.18 **Ways of deterrence.** Deterrence may be achieved in several ways, including denial-of-benefits, imposition-of-costs and encouragement-of-restraint.

a. **Denial-of-benefits.** A secure home base acts as the first tier of deterrence by denial. It aims to convince an adversary that by following such a course of action they would not be able to realize their hoped-for benefits. In deterrence terms, this usually means that the Alliance or partner nation has sufficient layered resilience that the adversary perceives that they will not achieve their objectives.

b. **Imposition-of-cost.** This achieves deterrence by convincing the adversary that the costs would outweigh the intended or hoped-for benefits of their action. This is based on the stakeholder or adversary’s perceptions of NATO’s capability advantage and resolve to apply a comprehensive approach against their points of influence. The Alliance’s nuclear deterrence acts as the ultimate insurance policy.

c. **Encouragement-of-restraint.** This convinces an adversary, through communication, that there is a more beneficial course of action to ameliorate their contradictions, usually through the RBIO, and by doing so, it encourages restraint. This encouragement-of-restraint may be viewed as an indirect strategy, accommodation or compromise. In any event, the aim is based on an attraction strategy to deter the adversary from pursuing a course of action that would be damaging to the Alliance.

2.19 **Types of deterrence.** There are three main types of deterrence: general, tailored and immediate. The sectoral nature of the continuum of competition means the Alliance may be cooperating in one sector whilst being in confrontation or armed conflict in another;
this could result in the Alliance potentially conducting all three types of deterrence simultaneously. Furthermore, proficiency in one type of deterrence is mutually supporting to the others.

a. **General deterrence.** General deterrence may be broadly described as being derived from NATO’s overall reputation as an actor as perceived by stakeholders. It is a general reputation, generated by predictable behaviour over time, supporting the five principles of deterrence to encourage restraint. General deterrence targets the attitude of stakeholders within the cooperation and rivalry zones of the continuum of competition. The comprehensive approach actions and narrative focuses on the underpinning principle of credibility; Exercise Steadfast Jupiter,\(^\text{14}\) support to civil sector response exercises and air policing are examples of the military contribution to general deterrence.

b. **Tailored deterrence.** Tailored deterrence occurs when the stakeholder or a rival has transitioned, or is in the process of transitioning, into an adversary. Their attitude reflects potential malign behaviour, resulting in the relationship escalating into the confrontation zone of the continuum of competition. Having detected such threats, tailored deterrence is a response to influence the perception of imposition-of-cost, denial-of-benefits and encouragement-of-restraint to ameliorate the adversary’s attitude to resolve their contradictions through the RBIO. Tailored deterrence is more specific than general deterrence but must still address a range of threats. As such, the comprehensive approach actions and narrative would focus on the range of capabilities that the Alliance possesses to counter those threats. NATO’s vigilance measures are examples of state-based tailored deterrence, which includes: enhanced forward presence; establishing the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force; and Exercise Trident Juncture 2018, which demonstrated NATO’s readiness to respond to potential threats. Tailored deterrence against threats like terrorism involves counterterrorism and support to partners through peacetime military engagement.

c. **Immediate deterrence.** Immediate deterrence is used in the confrontation zone to constrain an adversary’s behaviour when there are indications of an imminent action against the Alliance’s interest. Immediate deterrence is against a specific threat. As such, the comprehensive approach actions and narrative would emphasize the Alliance’s cognition of that threat and its capability to counter it, whilst highlighting the imposition-of-cost and denial-of-benefits. It may or may not involve escalatory measures under the rule of law through the security campaign theme. Examples of the military contribution to immediate deterrence are Graduated Response Plan part 1, reducing its High Readiness Force (Land) or Force Integration Units’ readiness times, or enforcement of ‘no-fly zone’, and counterterrorism and defensive cyberspace and military space operations.

\(^{14}\) Exercise STEADFAST comprises a series of overarching training exercises that, communicated effectively, support general deterrence.
The nuclear triad of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles and air-launched missiles and gravity bombs are all vital to NATO’s nuclear deterrence mission.

Defence

2.20 Where the use of force by an enemy has crossed the threshold of armed conflict, NATO will employ its fighting power in defence. The Alliance acts to compel the behaviour through the warfighting campaign theme, before returning to other forms of competition, below the threshold of armed conflict. It is the intensity and frequency of engagement and the strategic narrative that separates the baseline of defence and an immediate deterrence response. NATO may need to respond to different scenarios, ranging from an area of responsibility-wide crises developing simultaneously, to graduated regional responses or rapidly developing crises occurring in unexpected regions.

2.21 Defence requires layered resilience to overcome the initial aggression. It requires effective integration of forces that are mutually supporting to provide the Alliance with diverse options to address disadvantage in one operational domain by adapting, shifting and strengthening other operational domains and exploiting opportunities through multi-domain operations. It requires the capacity to prosecute defence using a full range of comprehensive actions, at a scaling intensity, conducted deep, close and rear of the Euro-Atlantic area. Figure 2.2 illustrates deterrence and defence in the continuum of competition.
Projecting stability

2.22 Chapter 1 described how instability creates areas that adversaries can exploit. This necessitates NATO to act by the projecting stability concept. NATO’s Secretary General explained projecting stability in a simple sentence: “When our neighbours are more stable, we are more secure.”\(^\text{15}\) Projecting stability is a set of proactive activities, coherently articulated and comprehensively developed, which influence and shape the operating environment to make it more secure and less threatening.\(^\text{16}\)

2.23 Crisis management has involved NATO’s action ‘out-of-area’ in response to extant security threats or attacks. Cooperative security aims to enhance partnerships outside NATO boundaries to improve regional security mechanisms in more benign environments, and even to offer membership options in line with the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. Projecting stability involves both of these core tasks and more. It is a conceptual guide for the coordinated use of military and non-military activity and interventions in neighbouring regions. Its purpose is not solely to provide mutual benefit to partner nations, but to also shape the environment in regions where the Alliance has strategic interests. It seeks to prevent or pre-empt the emergence of threats to stability and security that can be exploited by rivals and adversaries.

\(^{15}\) Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference, 6 February 2015. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_117320.htm

\(^{16}\) Military Committee (MC) 0655, *Military Concept for Projecting Stability*. 
The Alliance seeks to contribute to the efforts of the international community by projecting stability and strengthening security outside NATO territory.

2.24 **Principles of projecting stability.** The following list describes the four principles of projecting stability.

a. **Clear political guidance.** The rationale of projecting stability is more complex than deterrence and defence. Audiences’ perception of the legitimacy of projecting stability activities should not be assumed and could inadvertently cause problems within the conflict triangle, which are then exploited by our rivals and adversaries. Projecting stability requires an articulation of clear political guidance and narrative, based on the intention of making neighbouring regions more stable and secure. The engagement is requested by partner nations and regional organizations in support of international community efforts. Political guidance should identify which contradictions, attitudes and/or behaviours are to be influenced.

b. **Develop effective statehood.** Projecting stability should invest in capacity-building and focus on effective statehood as a path to stability. State fragility and the absence of effective governance are key drivers of instability. Projecting stability aims to reduce potential issues within the conflict triangle by developing sufficiently resilient and representative local societies, thereby gaining or maintaining the credibility and legitimacy from the local population and forestalling or reducing confrontation or armed conflict.

c. **Cooperative effort.** Projecting stability is a cooperative effort using the comprehensive approach. NATO can assist and contribute to their local partners’ broader efforts. Local partners are the main agency and have the local knowledge and responsibility to stabilize their state or region. If NATO works in isolation or attempts to dominate local partners, it may create parallel structures and dependencies that inherently imply instability within the conflict triangle.
d. **Sustainability.** Sustainability means that any assistance given by NATO will continue to create effects after NATO ends its support to a partner country. This requires reform to be embedded into institutions and their systems, procedures, mindsets and cultures to ensure intra-state and regional competition complies with the RBIO.

2.25 **Types of projecting stability.** Projecting stability enables the NATO Command Structure to coordinate a broad range of activities, that include: military dialogue, capacity building and operations.

a. **Military dialogue.** Military dialogue aims to contribute to regional security and stability by achieving a high degree of mutual understanding and dispelling any misconceptions about NATO that might lead to contradictions or a hostile attitude. It is a key activity within the cooperation range of the continuum of competition. Military dialogue includes the political engagement via high-level consultations and agreement on practical support to enhance partnerships through cooperative security. Examples of military dialogue include NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

b. **Capacity building.** Capacity building occurs in a range from cooperation to confrontation in the continuum of competition. NATO’s assistance serves to preserve stability and uphold the RBIO by improving the governance and deterrence capability of a partner to enable intra-/interstate stability. Any NATO assistance is provided following a specific request by a partner. This request is then assessed and considered by the NAC, which considers the mutual political commitment and local ownership. A capacity building package can include various types of support, ranging from strategic advice on defence and security sector reform and institution building to developing local security forces through education and training, or advice and assistance in specialized areas such as logistics, cyberspace defence or public order management.

c. **Operations.** NATO conducts operations to compel behaviour and provide other actors the time and space to resolve contradictions and ameliorate attitudes. Projecting stability includes a range of crisis response operations that predominantly occur as part of peace support, security or warfighting campaign themes. Examples of projecting stability operations include the Kosovo Force and International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan.

**Fight against terrorism**

2.26 Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, is the most immediate asymmetric and transitional threat to NATO and its populations. The terror threat is expected to remain high in the years to come. It is a persistent global threat that knows no border, nationality or religion. Terrorist methods coalesce political ideology, propaganda, non-violent and violent efforts to establish or promote regional and international sympathies and garner legitimacy.
for their actions. Increasingly in this era of strategic competition, the Alliance’s adversaries exploit areas of instability using terrorist proxies as a means to contest the Alliance and further their own aims without crossing the threshold of armed conflict.

2.27 Chapter 1 explains the link between terrorism and instability and a generic terrorism operating concept. Individual NATO members have primary responsibility for protecting their own populations and territories against terrorism. However, cooperation within NATO can enhance member states’ efforts to prevent, mitigate, respond to and recover from acts of terrorism. NATO will seek to avoid unnecessary duplication of the existing efforts of individual nations or international organizations as it develops its own contribution to counterterrorism in a manner that complements those efforts. The conflict triangle and the core policies of deterrence and defence and projecting stability are inherent and complementary in the fight against terrorism to:

- reduce contradictions to demobilize support for violent change by helping resolve the causes of instability and deterring adversaries’ exploitation;
- defeat the terrorist’s narrative and replace it with one that empowers legitimate governments; and
- conduct, direct or support comprehensive actions to achieve outcomes that neutralize terrorists’ bases, finances and networks.

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, international conventions and protocols against terrorism, and relevant UN resolutions provide the framework for all national and multilateral efforts to counterterrorism, including those conducted by the Alliance.

2.28 NATO ensures shared awareness of the terrorist threat, including foreign terrorist fighters, through consultations, enhanced intelligence-sharing and continuous strategic analysis and assessment. Intelligence reporting at NATO is based on contributions from member states’ intelligence services, both internal and external, civilian and international organizations including the: UN, European Union, OSCE and the Global Counterterrorism Forum. NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division benefits from increased sharing of intelligence between members’ services and the Alliance.

2.29 The Alliance is not only strengthening outreach and cooperation with partner countries and international actors through projecting stability but also through fight against terrorism initiatives. NATO’s long-standing work on civil resilience and crisis management provides a resource that may serve both allies and partners. This field can relate directly to counterterrorism in several forms: from cyberspace attack and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear, to building resilience and ensuring appropriate planning and preparation for responding to, and recovering from, terrorist acts.

2.30 NATO may conduct fight against terrorism operations with partner nations and Allies to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks, thereby rendering them incapable of using violent behaviour to instil fear and coerce governments or societies into
helping them achieve their goals. An example of a fight against terrorism operation is Operation Sea Guardian.

**Section 4 – Direction and guidance**

2.31 **North Atlantic Council.** The NAC is the principal political decision-making body within NATO. The NAC receives support from NATO Headquarters and several committees (Military, Operations Policy, Political and the Civil Emergency Planning), and the international community. The NAC shares intelligence, exchanges data, compares different perceptions and approaches, harmonizes its views and takes decisions by consensus. During a crisis management event the NAC will use the NATO Crisis Response System. A key step in the NATO Crisis Response System is issuing the NAC Initiating Directive. The Directive integrates efforts between the national representatives at NATO Headquarters, member states and the Allied Command Operations. It includes the NATO end state, political objectives and political-military objectives, which inform the extent of the military contribution to the strategic aims. Policies decided in the NAC are the expression of the collective will of all member states of the Alliance since decisions are made on the basis of unanimity and common accord.

2.32 **Military Committee.** The Military Committee is the primary source of consensus-based advice to the NAC and the Nuclear Planning Group on military policy and strategy.\(^{17}\) It provides guidance to the two strategic commanders – SACEUR and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT). As such, it is an essential link between the political decision-making process and the military structure of NATO.

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\(^{17}\) The Nuclear Planning Group acts as the senior body on nuclear matters in the Alliance and discusses specific policy issues associated with nuclear forces.
2.33 **NATO 2022 Strategic Concept.** The *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept* is a policy document. It re-emphasizes that NATO is a defensive Alliance which continues to strive for peace, security and stability in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area. It also strives to protect and defend the Alliance’s indivisible security, freedom, common values and uphold the RBIO through the core task of deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security. To achieve the *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept’s* objectives, the Alliance directs the military instrument to maintain or modify elements of the security environment through the *NATO Military Strategy*.

2.34 **NATO Military Strategy.** The 2019 *NATO Military Strategy* is the principal military strategic direction. The *NATO Military Strategy* creates a shared understanding of threats and challenges and sets out a common understanding of NATO’s goals (ends), intended approaches (ways) and resource requirements (means). It outlines how the Alliance’s military instrument of power, within the parameters set by the NAC and across peace, crisis and conflict, will deter, defend and provide military support to the efforts in projecting stability and in the fight against terrorism. Reinforcing the 360-degree approach around the Alliance’s security, *NATO’s Military Strategy* supports the three core tasks as laid out in the *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept*. It translates Alliance policy into effective direction and guidance to the NATO Military Authorities for continued coherent, effective and efficient development and employment of the Alliance’s military instrument of power. Furthermore, it assists member states to develop and employ their military forces and capabilities, and to inform and reinforce their respective national military strategies, operations and defence planning documents.

2.35 **Military strategic concepts.** The *NATO Military Strategy* is operationalized and implemented through the subordinate strategies known as the *Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area* (DDA) and the *NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept* (NWCC). The objective of these two concepts is to ensure that the Alliance is better prepared to deter and, if necessary, defend against potential threats and challenges now, and further, that it continues to innovate, adapt and develop its forces, capabilities, concepts and plans into the future.

   a. **Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area.** The DDA guides member states and SACEUR in what and how the Alliance maintains NATO’s security now. It brings together current NATO military thinking, when facing an unpredictable world and when dealing with the consequences of a changed and evolving security environment.

   b. **NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept.** The NWCC guides member states and SACT by setting the vision 20 years in the future. The NWCC support Allies’ efforts to develop Allied military forces, identify potential capability gaps and provide the necessary recommendations to ensure NATO is ready and able to meet the requirements of the future.
Section 5 – Strategy and campaigns

Levels of operations

2.36 The military instrument’s strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations provide a framework to rationalize and organize military activity and planning across the engagement space to achieve strategic objectives. All levels of operations’ activities support the military strategy and NAC Initiating Directives, which generates the end state, the strategic military objectives and the military instrument’s freedoms and constraints. The levels are explained in more detail below and the link between command and the different levels of operations is explained in Chapter 5.

a. **Strategic level.** The NAC, supported by NATO Headquarters at the political-strategic level, determines NATO strategic end state and objectives and determines Allies’ military contributions to achieve them, and starts the relationship with other actors to deliver complementary or supporting actions to achieve security objectives. SACEUR works at the military strategic level of operations and integrates ends, ways and means and achieves strategic objectives derived from the military strategy or NAC Initiating Directive. Achieving these objectives usually requires management of the military strategy through the coordination, synchronization and prioritization of deliberate and contingent campaigns to create convergence of military strategic effect. Scarce or politically sensitive capabilities are often commanded at this level.

b. **Operational level.** The operational level is defined by its role, which is to link and resource tactical-level activities to strategic objectives. It is the essential gearing between the strategic and the tactical levels, where campaigns and major joint operations are planned, and actions are integrated and sequenced to achieve strategic objectives. Tactical successes have intrinsic value but, more importantly, they are the means to achieving strategic objectives. Capabilities that are required by multiple tactical commands are often controlled at the operational level to enable them to be allocated when required. The scale of the operational level is not pre-defined; it should assume a size and shape commensurate with the requirements of the campaign. Notwithstanding the size and shape of the operational level, the headquarters is generally inter-agency and multinational.

c. **Tactical level.** The tactical level of operations is the level at which activities, battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units. The tactical level uses the echelons of command to further integrate, prioritize and coordinate their activity. This activity creates a range of effects that together contribute to successful operations. In a NATO joint operation, the highest tactical levels are the components operating directly under the commander joint task force. However, some actions and planning will overlap with the operational level and a component command may in some instances be appointed as the operational headquarters. A component commander
will normally be designated and be responsible for planning and conducting operations within a specific operations area. Components are groupings of force elements normally organized by service or function, but the force will be organized to reflect each specific operational requirement. The maritime, land, air, special operations, Joint Logistic Support Group and the cyberspace operations commands are the normal component commands.

2.37 **Relationship between the levels of operations.** The levels of operations should not be seen as discrete; however, they should be protected as each level shields the other from being overwhelmed and allows an appropriate tempo to be reached at each level. The need to integrate actions within multi-domain operations is blurring the distinction between the levels of command for the following reasons.

a. The political and civilian capabilities are not organized in the same way as the military instrument, making it harder to coordinate, particularly at the operational level. Furthermore, space-based, cyberspace and electromagnetic capabilities may be held by a nation’s highest political level.

b. Modern joint operations, information activities and increased political accountability have caused the diffusion and compression of time within the engagement space. Whereas close contact tactical actions have comparable immediate time horizons as before, the time for the strategic level of operations to plan, prepare, execute and assess has reduced.

c. Our adversaries will seek to present the Alliance with multiple dilemmas through deception and by sowing confusion across the continuum of competition. The ambiguity of such activity is likely to be greatest where relationships are in confrontation, near the threshold of armed conflict, when the potential to gain advantage is at its highest. This requires effects to be created across the levels of operations quickly and concurrently.

2.38 To overcome the compression of the levels of operations, military activity and planning must ensure there is unity of effort through horizontal and vertical integration to converge the creation of effects. Horizontal integration uses the whole-of-Alliance approach with allies and partners, through the comprehensive approach. Vertical integration is achieved by recognizing and resourcing the operational level of operations, through the philosophy of mission command and using narrative-led execution. Figure 2.3 shows the relationships between the levels of operations.
2.39 **Military strategy.** Military strategy is fundamentally about choices. It uses ends, ways and means to create a roadmap between the present and a desired future state or condition, using military power, while providing flexible options on how best to arrive there, expressed in coherent and clear terms. In doing so, military strategies: address a wide range of audiences; identify resources, risks and organizational issues to give rigor to policy choices; and provide rationale to military planning.

2.40 **Ends, ways and means.** In its simplest expression, strategy must balance the application of ends (end state and objectives), ways (broad approaches) and means (resources). Having decided on the strategic ends and the role of the military force in achieving them, the ways through which the ends may be achieved are discerned and elected, and then the means are allocated. Logical thinking must be applied to ensure the means and ways are orchestrated to achieve the ends.

a. **Ends.** The core issue for commanders and staff is to identify the essential conditions that must be met. If, at the strategic level, identifying a clear and enduring strategic objective is not possible, initial planning must be conducted against policy or broad guidance, informed assumptions and an expression of the current unacceptable conditions.

b. **Ways.** Given the political end state, the broad approaches are identified, which will establish the conditions to achieve the objectives through sequenced actions in
time and space. These approaches should include: clear command and control; a communication plan, including a narrative and a comprehensive approach framework to account for all stakeholders; restrictions that apply to the force; and the assessment methodology. The ways to accomplish military tasks should be subject to continuous constructive challenge during formulation and implementation to stop group think and to recognize that uncertainty and the opposition will react to the strategy.

c. **Means.** Preparing the statement of requirements and executing the force generation process provides the means at a commander's disposal, although additional forces may be requested by a commander if they feel they are necessary. These means should be employed in ways that are coherent with the objectives and narratives.

2.41 **Operational art.** Operational art is the mechanism the military uses to implement strategies. Operational art combines the science of planning and the guidance from the tenets of doctrine with the skill, knowledge, experience, creativity and judgement of commanders and staff to design and conduct strategies, campaigns and tactical operations to achieve policy goals and higher strategic objectives. In this era of strategic competition, it is increasingly important that strategy is the conceptual basis for operational art, and persistent campaigning is the method by which the Alliance balances activity across the continuum of competition, in multiple regions and against multiple threats to achieve strategic objectives within acceptable risk.

2.42 **Campaigns.** Campaigns are a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective. Deliberate campaigns tend to focus on direction from the military strategy and direct day-to-day operations to deliver long-term objectives that are achieved over an extended period. Contingency campaigns are conducted in response to changes in the security environment and are generally a branch from a deliberate campaign, based on a new NAC Initiating Directive. Contingency campaigns focus on objectives that are achievable in a fairly short time frame. The Alliance’s campaign themes of peacetime military engagement, peace support, security and warfighting, which provide a conceptual framework for campaigns, are explained later in this chapter.

2.43 **Assessment.** Assessment is a continuous and actionable process that monitors and evaluates the current situation and the progress made towards the end state and objectives. Assessment enables continuous learning and modification of strategies, campaigns and operations, thereby enabling the Alliance to adapt and innovate in response to evolving situations and to better link tactical activity to strategic objectives. For more information on the wide range of assessment methods and tools see Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*.

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Campaign themes

2.44 To ensure NATO is ready to respond swiftly and firmly in a period of strategic competition, the NATO Military Strategy and DDA impart an evolution from the operation themes to campaign themes. The NATO Military Strategy and DDA compel NATO to think about how it competes across the continuum of competition. It calibrates towards competition’s campaign mindset, with an agile and adaptable posture and the right capabilities in the right places, ready to converge as part of an overall NATO strategic position every day of every year, rather than focusing on discrete operations with a finite end. They challenge NATO to consider if, how and when it will transition between the campaign themes, with the ability to increase its tempo to manage these transitions and the burden of concurrency.

2.45 Campaign themes (peacetime military engagement, peace support, security and warfighting) can be linked to the continuum of competition as shown in Figure 2.4. The campaign themes use the concept of limitations (such as objective, means, area, time, rules of engagement and other political constraints) and the concept of intensity (the expected degree and frequency of violence of the subordinate operations) to provide the framework for campaigns. The selected themes reflect the political context and strategic narrative that guides the ends, ways and means requirements. The themes support operational art in guiding tactical operations to achieve the desired strategic objectives. Types of operations are not fixed to a campaign theme and the composition of operations within each theme is fluid and depends on the operating environment and political appetite. For example, combat operations can be conducted in warfighting, security and peace support campaigns. However, combat operations would be scarce in peace support but may be predominant in warfighting campaigns. For more information on operations see AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.

![Figure 2.4 – Most common relationships between campaign themes and the continuum of competition](image-url)
2.46 Campaign themes are interdependent and they must not be thought of as a linear or sequential progression. Competition’s campaign mindset requires SACEUR to contribute to NATO’s strategic objectives by persistently delivering deliberate and, when required, contingent peacetime military engagement, peace support and security-themed campaigns to attract and deter audiences, and, if necessary, deny malign actors their objectives. This constrains adversaries, discourages unsupportive stakeholders and prevents competition escalating. Warfighting is a contingent campaign to compel an actor’s behaviour before returning to other forms of competition. The following paragraphs describe the campaign themes.

2.47 **Peacetime military engagement.** Military engagement acknowledges that the Alliance cannot address all risks on its own and it therefore makes developing relationships with allies, partners and other stakeholders central to what it does. Military engagement: demonstrates political unity; preserves local and regional security structures; and limits the expansion, connection and proliferation of instability. Deliberate military engagement campaigns intend to shape the operating environment in the medium to long term. Military engagements apply below the threshold of armed conflict and play a supporting role to the other instruments of power. Military engagement campaigns predominately consist of the following activities.

a. Persistent engagement creates relationships and develops mutual understanding, influence and interoperability through: building partners’ capacity; defence diplomacy; outreach; multinational training exercises; and other cooperative security activities.

b. Humanitarian relief activities are the results of complex emergencies involving natural or human-made disasters or other endemic conditions, such as disease, hunger or privation.

2.48 Peacetime military engagement is a key component of competition’s campaign mindset. NATO and other states’ primary aims are based on defence and prosperity. The current security environment includes multiple threats to these aims. This makes peacetime military engagement a key tool for NATO and its partner states’ diplomatic instruments. Peacetime military engagement builds trust, upon which the diplomatic instrument can build a comprehensive relationship. NATO’s rivals will also be using military or economic engagements to further their aims. Therefore, the key measure of success of engagement, not including humanitarian relief, is not just the tactical success of the engagement but also the empowerment of the diplomatic instrument. Examples of peacetime military engagement include NATO’s Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative; Defence Institution Building; African Union Mission in Somalia; Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre’s COVID-19 response; Pakistan earthquake relief assistance support; and expert training support to the African Standby Force.
Response to a global request by the United Nations for airlift support in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre coordinated the transportation of a field hospital from Europe to Accra, Ghana.

2.49 **Peace support.** This theme takes place in the rivalry zone of the continuum of competition. It supports the RBIO and is underpinned by the four principles of projecting stability. The theme seeks to preserve peace or intervene early within a potential conflict to maintain stability, prosperity and the rule of law. Activities guided by this theme contribute to the comprehensive approach on a range of civilian tasks to redress the contradictions of a conflict, including: maintaining public order and security; security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; transitional justice; infrastructure reconstruction; and national reconciliation. The theme implies both soft and hard power actions. Soft power and hard power’s attraction comes through developmental actions aimed at enhancing a government's willingness and ability to care for its people. Hard power’s coercive actions apply a cost or a denial-of-benefits to those who try and stretch the boundary of the peace settlement or the RBIO. This theme predominantly consists of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities.

a. **Peacekeeping** relies on consent and impartiality, which allows the implementation of a permanent peace settlement. Activities range from supervising ceasefires, monitoring and reporting on developments in conflict areas, or acting as a buffer or an interposition force between rival factions. It is the narrative, and the risk to force that separates peacekeeping from warfighting and security’s peace enforcement. The theme seeks to maintain stability and prosperity, and is underpinned by the rule of law.

b. **Peacebuilding** seeks early engagement and partnership with a host nation to forestall confrontation or continue engagement and reconstruction post-peacekeeping to help consolidate the foundations for sustainable peace. The Alliance integrates activities with other actors to alleviate the issue and ameliorate
attitudes and behaviour to prevent the dispute from escalating into confrontation and crisis.

2.50 Peace support has evolved since the relative period of hegemony in the early 2000s. Strategic competition increases the number and intensity of internal, regional and global rivals competing to retain, re-establish or gain power, status or strategic advantage through instability or creating new governmental or social institutions. In some cases, the global or regional rivals’ proxies or surrogates are replaced by rival peace support actors pursuing different aims. Therefore, peace support often operates in geostrategic ‘zones’ of strategic competition, in which the actors’ perception of competition diverges. This can result in incoherent and competing approaches to diffusing the contradictions and delivering investment and development. Therefore, success requires whole-of-Alliance and comprehensive approaches over a long period of time. Often the key advantage to success in this theme is the diplomatic instrument’s resolve to engage. Activities can include: supervising ceasefires; monitoring and reporting on developments in conflict areas; support to counterterrorism; or acting as a buffer or an interposition force between rival factions. Examples of peace support include Operation Allied Protector, counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, and the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

NATO ships and aircraft have patrolled the seas off the Horn of Africa as part of a broad international effort – including the European Union’s Operation Atalanta – to combat maritime piracy. Operation Ocean Shield has helped to prevent or disrupt hundreds of pirate attacks. Many pirates were detained during the mission and prosecuted by national authorities.

2.51 **Security.** The security campaign theme applies within the confrontation zone of the continuum of competition, with the five principles of deterrence being implicit in the theme’s nature. The theme implies that the Alliance detects, deters and, if required, responds to strategic competition’s operating techniques, especially threshold shifting. This may be
contesting sub-threshold activity or conducting peace enforcement pre- or post-warfighting operations." It demonstrates control, capacity and commitment to defend and contest multiple domain, dimension and regional threats to the Alliance and its partners. It therefore requires an agile and adaptable posture, speed of recognition and decision-making, supported by suitable policies, permissions, capabilities and readiness to enable the agility to transition from deterring (tailored deterrence) to responding (immediate deterrence) and, if necessary, the warfighting theme. Equally, successful deterrence requires a de-escalation transition to peaceful forms of competition, campaign themes and general deterrence.

a. The theme deters threshold shifting, gradualism or fait accompli techniques through multi-domain operations that persistently amplify credible overt military capability, layered resilience and discrete employment of activity. Vigilance measures and security assistance are central elements of campaigns that deter by highlighting the potential or actual imposition-of-costs or denial-of-benefits of escalating malign behaviour.

b. If the adversary’s malign activities are not contained by tailored deterrence, the theme responds through imposing a cost on the aggressor and denies the aggressor any benefit of their malign activities through crisis response operations. The desired goal is to ensure that the adversary’s decision-making is clear: on where the threshold of armed conflict rests; that NATO has the understanding, will and means to respond; and that a higher cost may be imparted if the adversary tries to escalate to the threshold again. It is the intensity or regularity of engagements, or strategic narrative that separates this theme’s security and warfighting’s major crisis response activities.

2.52 The security theme is applied persistently in periods of strategic competition with actors operating with creativity within the confrontation zone to gain an advantage. The difficulty with deterrence is that it is hard to prove that military operations have actually imposed restraint on another actor. A competitor’s strategic ‘ends’ may be to build their influence, or to fuel disorder or a degree of chaos. Examples of activities within the security theme include: enhanced vigilance measures, such as enhanced forward presence; enhanced air policing; operations such as Operation Resolute Support (Afghanistan), Operation Sea Guardian (Mediterranean Sea) and Operation Unified Protector (Libya); counterterrorism missions; support to sanctions or civilian resilience; and Exercise Trident Juncture.

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19 Sub-threshold activity is explained in Chapter 1. It is orchestrated by hostile state and non-state adversaries to undermine NATO’s and its partners’ security, the integrity of its democracies, its public safety, reputation or economic prosperity. Such sub-threshold activity does not seek decisive conflict, but is a way that adversaries alter the balance of advantage without the material, financial and social cost of armed conflict.
NATO has enhanced its presence in the eastern part of the Alliance, with four multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Their presence makes clear that an attack on one Ally will be considered an attack on the whole Alliance.

2.53 **Warfighting.** Warfighting occurs above the threshold of armed conflict and encompasses more than just an Article 5 response. Warfighting takes place when the conflict has reached a point that the only way to change behaviour, attitude or resolve a contradiction is primarily through armed force. Activity will be usually a series of high-intensity engagements through one or more domains with effects created in all dimensions against a significant form of armed aggression perpetrated between one or more states, or a well-organized and resourced non-state actor. It is likely the enemy will combine unconventional and sub-threshold methods with their combat operations as part of an overall strategy. As a result, the wider effects of armed conflict may be less bounded by traditional distinctions, such as the home base and theatre of operations. This theme will predominantly consist of combat and major crisis response operations.

a. **Combat operations.** These operations are characterized as a contest between the armed forces of states and/or action against large-scale irregular forces. The size of the military footprint, the intensity and scale of the campaign, and the operating environment will generally determine the extent to which civilian populations are exposed to the consequences of combat operations. Combat operations demand significant financial and organizational commitment, with rehabilitation and recuperation implications that extend beyond the military and the immediate conflict.

b. **Major crisis response operations.** These operations use a significant form of armed force to prevent a confrontation from escalating and spreading. The aim is to intervene with armed force to contain instability by providing the security for other actors to resolve the contradictions and attitudes that constitute the more deep-seated causes of conflict. Another aspect of a major crisis response is a series
of high intensity contested engagements to neutralize or defend from hostile action within cyberspace or space. Examples of major crisis response operations are Operation Allied Force (Yugoslavia), Operation Deliberate Force (Bosnia) and some offensive or defensive cyberspace operations.20

2.54 Warfighting is not enduring; its role is to set the conditions for other campaign themes and types of competition. In periods of strategic competition in which adversaries merge the armed conflict and confrontation zones, warfighting rarely ends with a cessation of violence and normal competition. Armed conflict’s destruction of government and societal institutions can create conditions for intense rivalry and confrontation among internal, regional and global actors seeking to retain, re-establish or gain power, status or strategic advantage within a new order. Global or regional rivals and adversaries can exploit these conditions by supporting groups as proxies or surrogates to continue or pursue their aims in other ways. Therefore, the campaign mindset requires the joint force to plan towards the transition to other forms of competition through security or peace support campaign themes.

Operations planning and the NATO Crisis Management Process

2.55 NATO is a defensive organization, which means that its adversaries will have an advantage of initiative as they create and exploit uncertainty and ambiguity to start their boundary and threshold shifting, gradualism or fait accompli activity. In response, NATO’s ability to sense, understand and respond quickly to initiate or transition between campaign themes is a vital requirement of competition’s campaign mindset. The NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP) enables the Alliance to respond effectively.

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2.56 The NCMP is primarily designed to allow the relevant staffs and NATO committees to coordinate their work and to submit comprehensive advice to the NAC in a timely and compelling way. In so doing, it facilitates grand strategic political decision-making by member states, through the NAC, early in an emerging confrontation, as well as throughout its life cycle. It also provides a procedural structure that allows SACEUR to undertake some prudent preparatory planning activities in light of a developing or actual confrontation in a reasonable time frame and, subsequently, for providing strategic assessments and advice, including on campaign and operation planning and execution. Thus, the NCMP should be seen as providing the Alliance's overarching procedural architecture against which both military and non-military planning processes are designed.

2.57 The Alliance will be monitoring and maintaining situational awareness across its area of interest on a daily basis. The NCMP is initiated once indications suggest that there is an emerging confrontation that may affect NATO's interests. The NCMP, detailed in the NATO Crisis Response System Manual, consists of the following generic successive phases that generally conform with the cycle of a crisis.

- Phase 1 – Indications and warning of a potential or actual crisis.
- Phase 2 – Assessment of the developing, or reassessment of an ongoing, crisis situation and of its potential or actual implications for Alliance security.
- Phase 3 – Development of recommended response options to support NAC decision-making throughout the cycle of a crisis.
- Phase 4 – Planning.
- Phase 5 – Execution of NAC decisions and directives.
- Phase 6 – Transition and termination of NATO's crisis management role.

2.58 At the strategic level, the purpose of the operations planning process (OPP) is to prepare the Alliance to meet any future possible crisis and to provide for the timely and efficient development of contingent campaign or operation plans in response to a change in the security environment. Consideration must be given to expanding the internal NATO civil-military interface available for use within operations planning. In line with NATO policy and the planning principles, military planners will integrate civil emergency planning (CEP) into the appropriate steps of the OPP and liaise with relevant NATO agencies and non-NATO organizations. NATO's CEP planners are responsible for providing expert advice and support to their military counterparts during all phases of the planning process.

2.59 The OPP, containing the political-military estimate process and detailed procedures for the initiation, development, endorsement, approval, execution, review and cancellation of all campaign or operation plans, is linked to the NCMP as shown in Table 2.1. The process for developing all plans is similar and, as a consequence, the planning process for all categories of plans will be addressed in parallel. See AJP-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations* for more information on the OPP.
### Table 2.1 – Relationship between operations planning process and the NATO Crisis Management Process

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>NATO Crisis Management Process</th>
<th>Operations planning process</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indications and warning</td>
<td>Situational awareness</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Assessment of the crisis</td>
<td>Strategic assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Development of response options</td>
<td>Military response options development</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Strategic concept of operations development</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic operation plan development and force generation</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>Execution, assessment and operation plan review</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Transition</td>
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#### 2.60 Stages of a joint operation. If the NCMP decides a contingent campaign or operation is required, the joint operation will normally consist of the following stages:

- analysis (framing the problem and environment);
- developing an operation plan;
- force generation and preparation, including resources, personnel and equipment provision, assembly and pre-mission training;
- sustainment build-up;
- theatre entry or deploying to the area where operations are to be conducted, or to reinforce or replace in-place forces;
- conduct of operations (supported by the operations process plan–prepare–execute) and continuous assessment and review, and adjusting the conduct of operations as required;
- operation (mission) termination and transition;
- redeploy forces; and
- identifying lessons.

These stages can exist continuously or concurrently throughout a campaign or operation. It may be necessary to repeat some stages. It is essential to consider all stages.
Chapter 3 – NATO’s fighting power

3.1 Chapter 3 uses fighting power components as a framework to explain how NATO’s military instrument maintains its advantage over its competition in the current security environment. It introduces interoperability and responsiveness as force multipliers.

Section 1 – Components of fighting power

Introduction

3.2 Fighting power represents the ability of the armed forces to shape, contest and fight. There are three components of fighting power, none of which can claim precedence and each mutually supports and informs the others. Fighting power comprises a:

• conceptual component (the ideas and thought process);
• moral component (the ability to get people to fight); and
• physical component (generates the means to fight).

3.3 The Alliance’s fighting power is enhanced by three force multipliers: interoperability; responsiveness; and effective orchestration of its fighting power. NATO’s fighting power advantage is generated through multiple advantages across the components and force multipliers. Figure 3.1 illustrates fighting power and force multipliers.

Figure 3.1 – Fighting power and force multipliers
Developing fighting power

3.4 While the nature of competition is unchanging, like warfare, its character constantly evolves. Adversaries continually strive to improve their competitive advantages and gain the initiative. Developing fighting power is a continual effort and in itself a competitive act. Success in sustaining a fighting power advantage requires fighting power development to focus on four requirements.

a. Armed conflict is the final arbiter of competition. It is the ability of the force to win high intensity, violent combat operations, from which all military advantage across the continuum of competition is derived.

b. The use of military force is fundamentally a human endeavour. It is the professionalism of people and a culture that unlocks talent and potential across the three components that has the most exponential effect on fighting power.

c. Sustained fighting power requires a spread of multiple advantages, rather than a single advantage that adversaries can target to replicate or degrade.

d. Competition’s character changes. As a result, fighting power should evolve accordingly, whilst guarding against the allure of novelty.

3.5 The current character of competition requires NATO to adapt its fighting power to achieve the NATO Military Strategy’s strategic objectives. NATO’s fighting power is applicable across the continuum of competition in the context of both rapid technological development producing emerging and disruptive technologies and rivals willing to expend resources to challenge the Alliance’s technological advantage. Some adversaries may even gain temporal advantage or parity in some aspects of fighting power. Consequently, success is based on the ability of the Alliance to sense changes in the character of competition and develop its effectiveness and efficiency accordingly. Development is achieved by incremental improvements to advantages that already exist, and disruptive innovation to develop new ones. Incremental improvements require appropriate practice, exercising and an effective lessons learned process. Disruptive innovation requires experimentation and a change management culture that can proactively introduce new fighting power capabilities and approaches to displace the old methods.

3.6 Some of NATO’s rivals and adversaries might have an authoritarian political (or strategic) leadership that may give them an advantage in directive change. However, NATO is a collection of states with different strengths and specialisms. Harnessing individual states’ and NATO’s centres of excellences’ expertise enables constant development and innovation of fighting power advantages. This diversity of thought and expertise is how NATO can sustain a competitive advantage of their fighting power over competition’s long campaign.
Section 2 – Conceptual component

Description

3.7 The conceptual component provides a framework of thinking within which military personnel can develop understanding about both their profession and the activities that they may have to undertake. Chapter 1 explains that NATO is rapidly losing the technological edge that it has recently enjoyed over its adversaries. This erosion serves to reduce the advantage within the physical component. To outmatch the Alliance’s adversaries, NATO needs to out-think them by focusing on enhancing the cognitive capabilities of its people and investing in the conceptual component. The conceptual component serves as the foundation for creativity, ingenuity and initiative when conducting operations and developing fighting power. It is the conceptual component that allows the Alliance to use existing or new technology more efficiently and effectively than its adversary. Bad strategy, policy or doctrine cannot be rescued with superiority in other components. The aim of the conceptual component is to:

- provide the intellectual basis for the military instrument by creating and applying doctrine with understanding and initiative;
- preserve and develop corporate memory, experience and knowledge; and
- integrate tactics and procedures with new methods and technology to adapt to the developing character of competition.

To outmatch the Alliance’s adversaries in a period of strategic competition, it needs to out-think them by focusing on enhancing the cognitive capabilities of its people and investing in the conceptual component.
3.8 The conceptual component reflects accumulated experience, improvements to existing practice gained through lessons and experimentation, technology and analysis of the future operating environment. It is the distilled experience of many years of making strategy and of mounting and conducting operations. It is disseminated and implemented through a variety of means, including publications and professional military education. Conceptual thought is articulated through policy, concepts and doctrine, which are closely related, but each fulfills fundamentally separate requirements.

3.9 Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) is responsible to the Military Committee for the transformation and development of the Alliance. SACT provides the evidence to enable strategic policy and concepts development and plays an essential role in Allied joint doctrine development.

To prepare for NATO's future operations, Allied Command Transformation ensures that NATO's warfighting capabilities maintain future relevance, provide an indispensable understanding of the current and future security environment, and contribute to developing NATO doctrine, concepts and interoperability standards.

Policy

3.10 Policy develops in response to changing circumstances in the political-military security environment, agreed political guidance, practical lessons learned or new technology. Policy is essentially prescriptive. It can direct, assign tasks, prescribe desired capabilities and provide guidance for preparing NATO forces to perform their assigned roles. Implicitly, policy can create new roles and a requirement for new capabilities. Doctrine primarily evolves in response to changes in policy, capabilities or force employment considerations. Therefore, policy, through conceptual development, normally
leads and directs doctrine. On occasion, capabilities might exist that are not covered by a policy. These extant capabilities require a validated concept to be created first, before they can be written into doctrine.

Concepts

3.11 A concept is defined as: ‘an agreed notion or idea, normally set out in a document, that provides guidance for different working domains and which may lead to the development of a policy.’ A concept is usually a solution-oriented, disruptive innovation that addresses a capability shortfall or gap. Concepts sit at the heart of force and capability development because they propose solutions to challenges and opportunities for which no doctrine exists or for which existing doctrine is inadequate. A concept should be sufficiently detailed to be tested and developed through experimentation, and it should be validated by demonstrating a clear and substantial paradigm shift in the way the Alliance operates. Ultimately, a successful concept should transition into doctrine, while concepts that do not demonstrate credible advantage should be discarded or modified. Concepts can be initiated from across a broad spectrum of activity including:

- operational lessons learned;
- technological advances;
- policy and strategy changes;
- academic research; and
- horizon scanning.

3.12 NATO makes a distinction between a strategic military and an operational concept. Strategic military concepts like the Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area and the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept contain high-level political-military assessments, objectives and guidance. Such concepts are military strategies on which operations are based, or they provide a vision for the Alliance for the mid- to long-term future. These concepts shall be approved at the senior committee level or at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) level. Such concepts can affect doctrine, as would a new policy.

3.13 Operational concepts are proposed solutions to operational- or tactical-level problems. These concepts will be initially validated through the normal concept development and experimentation process by the Allied Command Transformation before considering the need to develop supporting doctrine.

Doctrine

3.14 Doctrine is defined as: ‘the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.’ Doctrine provides a foundation of professional knowledge; it does not, and should never,
replace the skill, experience, creativity and judgement of commanders. However, since commanders cannot predict the timing, location and conditions of future campaigns and operations, doctrine provides a common handrail of what is taught, believed and advocated as best practice, which commanders can adapt to any circumstance that involves the military instrument.

3.15 Doctrine interprets ideas about operating by combining validated conceptual ideas, and insights and lessons from training and operations into functional guidelines for action. Doctrine provides the Alliance and its partners with a common philosophy, language and guidance, as well as a unity of effort to plan and conduct training and operations. Although doctrine has enduring principles and tenets, it is constantly reviewed for relevance and is therefore evolutionary in nature. This evolution is the foundation for developing incremental improvements to fighting power.

3.16 A hierarchy or framework of doctrine provides guidance for all levels of command, but its application varies. High-level doctrine is best thought of as instructive: part of the conceptual component and the professional education of a whole force. Tactical-level doctrine is generally more prescriptive, as reflected in tactics manuals. However, across all levels of command, the overall intent of using doctrine to bring order to chaos remains the same. There are three levels of Allied doctrine, and they are detailed below. The Allied Joint Doctrine Architecture (AJDA) can be found on the NATO Standardization Office protected website.\(^22\)

a. Level-1. This level of doctrine comprises capstone and keystone publications. These Allied joint publications (AJPs) contain overarching Allied joint doctrine. This publication is AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine* and is the capstone publication that links doctrine to Alliance strategy and policy. Keystone publications (such as AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*) establish the doctrinal foundation for a series of joint publications found in the AJDA.

b. Level-2. Level-2 publications are supporting joint doctrine for specific functional areas and themes at the operational level. These publications also carry an AJP designation in their titles. For example, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations* is numbered AJP-3.2. They should not contain detailed procedures, but should address operational-level concepts (how, not what, to think) relevant to the joint commander.

c. Level-3. Level-3 publications contain tactics, techniques and procedural-level joint/single service doctrine that support and enhance AJPs, for example, Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-3.2.1, *Allied Tactical Doctrine Conduct of Land Tactical Operations*. These publications are Allied publications but do not appear on the AJDA.

3.17 **The key tenets of doctrine and principles.** The tenets and principles guide commanders and their staff in planning and conducting operations. While the tenets and

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\(^{22}\) The website is available at https://nso.nato.int.
principles reflect the nature of competition and so should be enduring, they will also evolve over time. The relative importance of each may vary according to context and the means available to commanders. Their application requires judgement, common sense and intelligent interpretation. The four enduring tenets are: the behaviour-centric approach, the manoeuvrist approach, the comprehensive approach and mission command. They are explained in Chapter 4. The military instrument’s overarching principles are the principles of multinational and joint operations; these principles are explained at the end of this chapter.

**Policy, concepts and adaptive doctrine relationships**

3.18 The policy, concepts and doctrine horizons are being compressed by strategic competition, which in turn stresses a hierarchical and stovepiped structure. The conceptual component's advantage stems from its agility to match the pace of change while remaining authoritative. Doctrine, concepts and policy roles are distinct, and require protecting; however, their development should be co-evolutionary, through coherence along pathways. Advantage will only be achieved if conceptual knowledge and understanding is imparted to its people through professional military education (PME) and training.

3.19 **Co-evolution of the conceptual component.** Doctrine provides fundamental principles and best practice, and it has an enduring nature, which makes it less susceptible to short-term policy changes and presentism. Consequently, enduring doctrine should be considered when developing policy and concepts. Concepts support policy and doctrine by producing a validated, solution-oriented innovation that addresses a capability or doctrine shortfall or gap. Ultimately, policy, concepts and doctrine are mutually supportive and should proactively be developed together. This is especially important in NATO, in which a published policy, concept or doctrine acts as a baseline for Alliance consensus.

3.20 **Concepts and doctrinal pathways.** The ultimate aim of a concept is to become doctrine for the current force, whilst doctrine’s contribution to conceptual advantage of the current force requires it to be adaptive and responsive to the changing character of competition. Therefore, the conceptual component requires the identification of concept-to-doctrine pathways. The most successful pathways involve doctrine making incremental improvements as elements of a concept are validated through its development. Not all concepts will become doctrine; like a hypothesis, many will not (and should not) survive scrutiny and this is a natural and healthy part of capability development. The invalidation of a concept should not be considered a failure of the concept development methodology, but a success because the methodology has invalidated unsatisfactory elements of a concept, and prematurely stopped its implementation.

3.21 **Policy and doctrinal pathways.** The time between editions of a doctrine publication is often too long to capture the policy changes and doctrinal improvement from lessons, experimentation, and Allied Command Transformation, Centres of Excellence or
Multinational Capability Development Campaign studies. Therefore, ensuring the current force has the most appropriate doctrine requires pathways within the AJDA to be identified to leapfrog doctrine. Leapfrogging is identifying new doctrine and including it in a linked doctrine publication under development. The doctrine is then subsumed back into its normal publication when it is next developed. This leapfrogging ensures the incremental development of doctrine keeps pace with the changing operating environment. Figure 3.2 illustrates the co-evolutionary process of developing NATO’s conceptual advantage.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3.2 – Co-evolutionary process of developing NATO’s conceptual advantage**

3.22 **Professional military education.** PME and training are vital elements of the conceptual component because it teaches an understanding of doctrine to personnel. More detail on PME and training is found in the physical component section of this chapter.

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23 The Multinational Capability Development Campaign series is developed with close links with NATO, NATO member states and partners to collaboratively develop and assess concepts and capabilities to address the challenges associated with conducting joint, multinational and coalition operations.
Section 3 – Moral component

3.23 Competition, and especially armed conflict, is a human contest of wills. The moral component is about getting people and their commands to operate and sustain the will to operate in the way they have been ordered to. This is why the manoeuvrist approach focuses on defeating the moral component, rather than the physical component, of fighting power. NATO’s advantage in the moral component is derived from its professional military culture and the moral legitimacy gained through the conduct of its military forces.

Professional military culture

3.24 Culture can be considered as the way people within an organization think, feel and respond to events. The Alliance’s member states each convey a broad range of characteristics that reflect their national cultures. It is NATO’s professional military culture, based on liberal democratic values, that binds the Alliance. The professional culture consists of leadership culture, warfighting culture, morale and moral cohesion.

3.25 Leadership culture. Command is a position of authority and responsibility to which personnel are appointed, whereas leadership is the ability to inspire those they command. Critically, it is through leadership that commanders gain the endorsement of those they command. There is no definitive style of a leader and no prescription for leadership, but the nature of leadership remains unchanged. It is a variable combination of example, persuasion and compulsion; the projection of personality and purpose to influence subordinates they command to prevail in demanding circumstances. It provides the inspiration, purpose and direction to develop and protect all components of fighting power. In armed conflict, it is leaders who break the paralysis deriving from human fallibilities, uncertainty, death and destruction. Their vision, intellect, communication and unceasing motivation paves the path through chaos and confusion. Bad leadership, often masked in the hierarchy of command, has far-reaching and damaging effects. It rapidly demoralizes and destabilizes fighting power effectiveness. The Alliance should consider the following aspects to maximize its leadership potential.

a. Leadership as a system of leaders. The military has always had a hierarchy of commanders, with individual leaders whose actions and intent can be heroic. However, when confronted by the complexity of the operating environment, individual leaders can quickly become overwhelmed (whether they acknowledge it or not). The Alliance will not perform well unless the leadership at every level reaches a suitable level of effectiveness. A systems approach considers all leaders, and how they interact up, down and across; in hierarchical terms this means that individuals should be considered as concurrently functioning as leaders, followers and peers.

b. Leadership has no rank and is not just a military endeavour. Leadership is not constrained solely to the chain of command, to those of rank or to military personnel. The complexity of the operating environment puts a premium on low-level leadership. As the military instrument integrates capabilities to operate across the
operational domains, the force will become increasingly comprehensive; anyone can motivate those around them through initiative, example and courage.

c. **Leadership across the continuum of competition.** Within this operating context, the ability to bring influence to bear on actors and audiences and gain advantage over adversaries will be more complex and contested. The ability for the Alliance’s leaders to adapt to these changing operating environments, ahead of their adversaries, will be fundamental to their leadership effectiveness.

d. **Assessing ‘good’ leadership.** What is assessed as ‘good’ military leadership can be generally considered in two senses: good in the sense of being effective in achieving tasks; and good in the moral sense of looking after the team and acting in ethical ways. For the former, it is a reasonable assumption that a good leader is one who achieves the mission. Assessing what constitutes good moral leadership becomes much more subjective. However, such a primary focus on objectives (or sometimes just activity) serves to limit understanding and thinking about the moral sense of leadership. With the growing diversity of personnel and operating environments, these moral aspects will become a more critical factor to enable leaders to gain the moral cohesion required to achieve missions in the most demanding of circumstances.

The battlefield is increasingly decentralized with a premium placed on the talent of low-level leadership executing mission command.24

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24 Picture credit and copyright: Bundeswehr/Robert Habermann.
3.26 **Warfighting culture.** The most important function of military forces is to prepare for and, if necessary, fight and win in armed conflict. A warfighting ethos unifies the force by providing the vital moral, emotional and spiritual capacity, or human resilience, to operate across the continuum of competition, and particularly when in armed conflict. Armed conflict is bloody and violent, characterized by uncertainty, friction and chaos. Fear is commonplace, even within the minds of those most conditioned to cope with its challenges. The best counters to fear are courage and leadership, coupled with unit cohesion, training and discipline. A warfighting ethos:

- comprises courage to cope with fear and the initiative and determination to adapt;
- enables success in the most demanding circumstances; and
- embodies the ideals and duties of the military and service.

3.27 **Morale.** Morale is both the will to fight and the confidence of success, which enables a force to fight and overcome uncertainty and friction. It is often more critical to operational success than physical qualities. Morale is a product of the synergy of the three components of fighting power and in this Information Age it is increasingly susceptible to external influences, including public opinion and narratives. The will to fight is substantially reinforced and sustained by the belief that their nation supports them; therefore, the media and social media’s contributions are important. Training under realistic conditions, including live fire exercises, boosts morale as it raises self-assurance, combat unit reliability and confidence in using equipment.

3.28 **Moral cohesion.** Moral cohesion underpins a professional culture and the attitude to keep on fighting. Cohesion occurs when individuals work together, share tasks and rewards, and achieve a common goal. Moral cohesion is built on shared experiences, a common sense of worth, discipline, collective identity and trust among colleagues. It is sustained by shared common values and standards. As an Alliance of different nations, effective leadership and NATO training are essential elements to build moral cohesion and allow us to compete with our adversaries’ powerful ‘struggle’ message.

**Moral legitimacy**

3.29 In the era of strategic competition, the contest for the perception of moral legitimacy to the global audience is vital ground and a key component of competing narratives. As the justification for using force, and the way it is applied, legitimacy has both collective and individual aspects, both of which directly affect the use of force. Legitimacy is based upon both subjective perceptions, such as the values, beliefs and opinions of a variety of audiences (at home and overseas), and demonstrable, objective legality. Therefore, audiences’ perceptions of legitimacy are unlikely to be universal or unequivocal; they will vary with each operation and may be shaped by many factors, including the media. It follows, therefore, that the authority for military action, both legal and political, should be articulated clearly to members of the Alliance, the public, international audiences, as well as
to adversaries and their domestic populations. The potential for the law to be used against the Alliance must be anticipated in planning. Equally, the Alliance must be robust in challenging actors’ (including NATO forces) abuses of the law.

3.30 Once military forces are committed, the perception of the way they conduct themselves is an essential element of overall legitimacy. Maintaining legitimacy depends on a variety of issues, such as consistently reputable behaviour, moral and ethical considerations, and the prospects of attaining a desired end state. Strategy, narrative-led execution, training and leadership are all fundamental in gaining and maintaining the legitimacy of military action.

3.31 NATO must operate within a legal framework, defined by applicable national and international law to maintain moral legitimacy. Observing the rule of law is fundamental to our professional military culture and to maintaining authority, noting that adversaries may try to exploit the law to undermine NATO and its member states.

3.32 **NATO and international law.** There are three basic criteria in international law under which NATO can act as an international political and military cooperation organization across the continuum of competition. These are:

- in individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack against one of the member states occurs, as set out in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
- as a crisis management tool, based on a United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) provided mandate adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (also referred to as the Charter); or

- based on an intervention by invitation of the legitimate government of the host nation.

3.33 The inherent right to political independence and respect of other states' territorial integrity are two of the fundamental principles governing friendly relations between states in the international system. Consequently, in Articles 2(7) and 2(4), the UN Charter says: 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state…' and that: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’

3.34 When NATO acts, it draws on the legal framework for these actions from Article 51 of the UN Charter. Furthermore, Article 24 of the UN Charter lays down the responsibility of the UNSC to maintain international peace and security. To comply with this responsibility, the UNSC enjoys wide powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in that it may make recommendations, or binding decisions, when acting on situations endangering international peace and security.

3.35 Chapter VII of the UN Charter is an evolving process, in which the UNSC, under Article 39, determines whether a situation constitutes a threat to the peace, and it may adopt binding resolutions under Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter to initiate measures involving sanctions or the use of armed force. The UNSC may authorize international organizations, such as NATO, regional arrangements or agencies, or members of the UN to use armed force to enforce measures taken in resolutions adopted under Article 42 of the Charter. When NATO, as an international organization, acts as a crisis management tool, NATO finds the additional legal framework for these actions in a specific UNSC resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; or based on an intervention by invitation or consent of the legitimate government of the receiving state.

3.36 **Law and political direction.** One of the measures the UNSC may take under Chapter VII is to authorize organizations to conduct enforcement actions, including the use of force. Once it has been decided to deploy military capability, the legal basis, aims and objectives, as well as the limits for using that capability, are detailed in mission directives and rules of engagement. In armed conflict, the law of armed conflict and international law must be followed. Rules of engagement are not a comprehensive statement of either the law or policy, although they take account of both. The rules of engagement ensure that military personnel’s actions:

- are consistent with NATO policy;

- reflect what the Alliance can legally do and not do; and
• reflect the operational context.

While rules of engagement may limit activity, they do not limit the legal right of individual personnel to act in self-defence, where force is both necessary and proportionate.

3.37 Using military force in an armed conflict must contribute towards setting the conditions for a politically defined end state. Political constraints and freedoms are a constant reality. Political decisions that affect using force include those that:

• place limitations on objectives and targets;
• delineate the theatre of operations;
• restrict the types of weapons used; and
• aim to avoid escalation.

Ethical considerations

3.38 Ethical and moral considerations underpin the law and reflect operational decision-making and military conduct to ensure moral legitimacy. Commanders are accountable for their actions and the actions of those under their command. Commanders are duty-bound to ensure that the highest moral and ethical standards are maintained by their subordinates and they can achieve this through a robust ethos, personal example, and training and education. Ethical and moral behaviour are key aspects of narrative-led execution.

3.39 Military personnel will be exposed to the realities and complexities of operations. They will face rivals with different moral, ethical and legal boundaries and perspectives, while themselves operating under intense scrutiny. Governments, domestic and international courts, humanitarian organizations, non-governmental organizations and the media continuously monitor the Alliance’s activities in relation to their compliance with the law and their moral and ethical impact.

3.40 The trend towards transparency of military activities reflects the expectations of the society whose values the Alliance reflect. If NATO is to maintain legitimacy, then the military forces must respect the ethics of Euro-Atlantic culture. Moreover, while never compromising NATO’s moral standards, it must understand and consider local traditions, customs and practices, as well as paying appropriate attention to the needs of minority or otherwise vulnerable groups, such as women, children and ethnic minorities. It follows, therefore, that we must be able to challenge, with evidence wherever possible, when legal, moral or ethical norms are breached.

3.41 A challenge is to ensure that society’s expectations of greater legal and ethical regulation are incorporated within the imperatives of operational effectiveness, particularly if operating in partnership with nations that have different values. It is essential that
commanders can articulate the mission and its legal and moral basis, as well as the safeguards in place to ensure legal compliance.

3.42 Gender perspective. Gender perspectives need to be considered during all stages of a NATO operation; all genders must participate equally to achieve a comprehensive and enduring resolution. NATO is committed to fully implementing the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, and related resolutions, and NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council’s Policy on Women, Peace and Security across all three of its core tasks. Gender inequalities are often exacerbated during periods of crisis and armed conflict and, if not addressed, may continue when armed conflict has transitioned into another form of competition.

Cross-cutting topics

3.43 NATO forces and NATO-led forces always operate in accordance with international law, which applies as ‘lex specialis’ across all campaign themes, but also human rights when applicable.\(^\text{25}\) The respect of non-derogable human rights (such as the prohibition of torture) is, however, essential in times of armed conflicts, when there is increased risk of mistreatments, inhuman or degrading treatments or punishment.\(^\text{26}\) Human rights are reflected in a number of treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, in UNSCRs, as well as in customary law.

3.44 Part of NATO’s institutional narrative is its commitment to ensure that the entire population is minimally impacted by conflict and disaster; in particular, military personnel have the responsibility to recognize, report and respond to human rights violations, as well as to know who to refer survivors of such violations to. To embolden the narrative, NATO has identified the following overarching topics to ensure gender integrated planning to deliver consistency of actions in support of the strategic and institutional narrative. Annexes A and B provide more detail on the following cross-cutting topics:

- protection of civilians;
- children and armed conflict;
- cultural property protection;
- women, peace and security;\(^\text{27}\)
- conflict-related sexual violence;

\(^{25}\) Recent changes in international law reflect movement towards the extraterritorial application of certain human rights and treaties, even during armed conflict. NATO member states may be bound by different human rights obligations and may interpret similar treaty-based obligations differently.

\(^{26}\) The extent to which human rights impact on military operations and activities will have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, considering all circumstances, including relevant provisions of applicable domestic law.

\(^{27}\) Women, peace and security is operationalized within NATO through the integration of gender perspective in all core tasks.
• combating trafficking in human beings;
• sexual exploitation and abuse; and
• building integrity.

Section 4 – Physical component

3.45 The physical component generates the means to fight within the five operational domains and across electromagnetic and acoustic spectra. There are five elements that comprise the physical component:

• personnel;
• equipment;
• training;
• readiness; and
• sustainment.

3.46 Technological innovation in equipment continues to be a key driver of change and advantage, posing new threats and opportunities. As access to emerging and disruptive technologies becomes more widespread, it erodes the Alliance’s technological and equipment advantage. Therefore, it is increasingly personnel, training, readiness and sustainment that can deliver the clear advantage in the application of the physical component.

Personnel

3.47 The nature of competition places human capability at the heart of fighting power. The right mix of trained and motivated personnel is fundamental to successful operations. Rather than simply relying on superior fire power and technical capabilities, commanders must seek out, develop and exploit human qualities such as effective thinking, human resilience and adaptability to build the agility that NATO will need to succeed. Personnel is interrelated to the moral and conceptual components. The comprehensive approach provides the right and diverse mix of personnel and includes military, civilians, contractors, other agencies and actors to conduct successful operations. There are several considerations to be made when developing the Alliance’s human capability if it is to retain an advantage.

a. Adaptability and agility as a capability. The current and emerging character of competition will challenge militaries in many new ways, some of which can be foreseen today, some of which cannot. The Alliance will need people who are adaptable with the readiness to adjust to shifting conditions and circumstances in an

28 Examples include: data, artificial Intelligence, autonomy, space, hypersonic and new missile technologies, quantum technologies, biotechnologies and human augmentation/enhancement.
operating environment where volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity dominate. But, to gain advantage in a context of strategic competition, there is a need for such adaptations to outpace adversaries. This required rate of adaptation is achieved through an agility that reflects the ease and pace with which people can adapt themselves, their teams and, for some, their organizations.

b. **Thinking as a capability.** Thinking is much more than just a conscious mental activity. It is a combination of unconscious, instinctive and learned processes that are influenced profoundly by the cultures in which it is practiced. As it forms the basis for all activity, the Alliance should consider thinking in terms of a capability rather than simply as an individual trait. The importance of PME should not be underestimated in developing thinking as a capability in a continuous, progressive process of development. As people progress through their careers, they need to develop mastery of their conceptual component and their trade. This provides the foundations for creativity, adaptability and agility to operate across the continuum of competition and the cycles of innovation that are essential to stay at the forefront of competition’s enduring campaign.

c. **Talent management as a capability.** People from across the Alliance have different strengths, weaknesses and diverse perspectives. The organizations that compete most effectively place their people in positions to use their strengths and encourage diverse perspectives to reduce group think. To maximize fighting power, commanders are required to understand and develop the talents of their people and then match these skills to the duties they perform. Sustained talent management maximizes the potential of their people over time, giving a sustainable competitive advantage.

d. **Transitioning people to the Information Age.** The Information Age is here, well-established and continuously evolving. The fog of ‘big data’ in which people will operate will include a multitude of sources of information and data. This will confront people with a volume and variety of data that will make it difficult to distinguish what is relevant from what is ‘noise’. However, the requirement to train people to operate and harness this data and convert it into a form suitable for decision-making will remain, and – done well – it will provide a huge source of advantage.
Armed conflict is manifestly and elementally complex and difficult to do; it strains and degrades people and technology even without an adversarial element that compounds this strain and degradation.

Equipment

3.48 A credible fighting force depends upon sufficient and effective equipment, optimized and scaled according to strategic direction. NATO is dedicated to maintaining its technological advantage but is being challenged by emerging and disruptive technologies that operate above and below the threshold of armed conflict.

3.49 The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) identifies the capabilities that NATO requires, and promotes their development and acquisition by Allies. The NDPP provides a framework within which national and Alliance defence planning activities can be harmonized to meet agreed targets in the most effective way. It should facilitate the timely identification, development and delivery of the necessary range of forces that are interoperable and adequately prepared, equipped, trained and supported, as well as the associated military and non-military capabilities required to undertake the Alliance’s full spectrum of missions. The NDPP enables Allies to harmonize their national defence plans with those of NATO, without compromising their national sovereignty. The NDPP apportions requirements to each Ally as capability targets will respect the political principles of fair burden sharing and reasonable challenge that underpin the Alliance, facilitates their implementation and regularly assesses progress.

29 ‘In line with our defence planning priorities, we are committed to delivering heavier and more high-end forces and capabilities.’ Brussel NATO Summit 2016.
3.50 The NDPP methodology is not static and it continues to evolve. It takes a threat/risk-informed, capability-based approach that provides the detail to enable Allies to develop the forces and capabilities necessary to undertake the full range of NATO missions and tasks required by the current character of competition.

3.51 **Designing the force.** Capabilities from multiple domains should be considered the norm for commands and units on operations. The aim should be to provide the decision-maker with the ability to create effects using the best placed capabilities, irrespective of domain. As a guide, a warfighting campaign’s force should be designed to be capable of the four complementary and concurrent functions of the functional framework (find, fix, strike and exploit) and the geographic framework (deep, close and rear). These functions do not require equally sized forces for each; rather, they are resourced according to the operational/tactical requirements. More information on multi-domain operations and functional and geographic frameworks can be found in Chapter 4.

3.52 **Quality over quantity.** Technology has enhanced military lethality and enabled precision, but at enormous financial cost. Many of the maritime, land and air platforms have become increasingly multifunctional, with more roles incorporated into fewer, bespoke platforms. These platforms are highly capable, but their cost and complexity limit production and, in turn, availability, redundancy, resilience and regeneration.

3.53 **Ability to operate in a degraded environment.** The force needs to be able to operate in a degraded environment by protecting and dispersing its vulnerabilities and dependencies. Armed conflict is manifestly and elementally complex and difficult to do, and it strains and degrades people and technology even without an adversarial element that compounds this strain and degradation. Capabilities create dependencies, which in turn create vulnerabilities that are targeted by adversaries. For example, exquisite platforms are highly dependent on vulnerable networked information, particularly delivered by space-based capabilities. These include everything from communications, navigation and even propulsion; denial of satellite connectivity would degrade the ability to conduct precision warfare.

3.54 **Operating across the continuum of competition.** Adversaries are increasingly pursuing their aims via sub-threshold activities. NATO must have capabilities to operate across the continuum of competition with the ability to impose proportional costs and deny benefits below the threshold of armed conflict when required.

**Training**

3.55 Strategic competition increasingly requires NATO to use training and associated activity as a surrogate for armed conflict and sub-threshold activity. This includes using common NATO operational/tactical doctrine, driving adaptation, generating the professional military culture, empowering commanders and delivering tactical innovation. This approach will support incremental improvements to fighting power, whilst using training for experimentation is key to developing disruptive innovation that leads to new advantages.
Conditioning personnel for adversity and the changing character of competition begins with initial training, PME and continues through demanding collective training. Tolerating failure generates active conversations and engenders solutions that encourage people to accept responsibility, improve decision-making and builds resilience; but failure must be balanced with the lost motivation to succeed when assured failure overrides the training objectives.

The strategic competition requires NATO to use training and associated activity as a surrogate for armed conflict and sub-threshold activity. This includes using common NATO operational/tactical doctrine, driving adaptation, generating a force ethos, empowering commanders and delivering tactical innovation.

3.56 Effective collective performance is characterized by the high levels of moral and physical cohesion, trust and proficiency achieved by units and formations that have trained or operated together. Furthermore, opportunities should be provided for subordinates to gain experience in higher command and to develop the mission command philosophy. Thereafter, training should develop the ability of commanders to become proficient at commanding, controlling and protecting their assigned capabilities and understand how to use these capabilities to contribute to the achievement of objectives. Training should also demonstrate NATO’s institutional and strategic narratives to reinforce the activity’s effects on adversaries and allies.
Readiness

3.57 NATO’s Secretary General explained that the Alliance will enhance deterrence by creating a new ‘culture of readiness’. This ‘culture of readiness’ requires the preparation, planning and posture of all Alliance forces to create the full spectrum of physical, virtual and cognitive effects across the engagement space. This readiness culture deters the rapid escalation of activity short of armed conflict and denies adversaries the ability to establish a fait accompli.

3.58 This readiness culture involves the troop-contributing nations being responsible for providing trained, equipped and certified forces at appropriate readiness to meet the minimum military requirements. Readiness includes all components of fighting power: the physical and conceptual components’ readiness and a strong moral component ready and postured in time to complete their operational task. Forces must be ready to integrate from ‘day zero’.

3.59 NATO holds forces at varying states of readiness consistent with the assessed risks and threats. Readiness is the period measured from an initiation order to employment or deployment.

   a. **Employment.** Employment is the moment when the headquarters or unit is ready to perform its task from its peacetime location (permanent or forward deployed).

   b. **Deployment.** Deployment is the relocation of forces from its national location to the area of operations.

3.60 Given NATO’s core tasks, the intended area of operations for Allied forces is invariably uncertain. The local and strategic transit time will vary. Therefore, deployment readiness does not include the time to move to and within the area of operations and the time to be ready to perform its mission once deployed. However, this does not negate the importance of having the required legal transit and host-nation support agreements in place to further ensure rapid deployment and transit of forces.

3.61 All deployments can be expected to be disrupted as actors compete across the engagement space, agnostic of international boundaries. Therefore, agility includes responsiveness, force mobility, speed of decision-making, speed of assembly, and speed of deployment, as much as readiness. Readiness has the following considerations.

   - The need to balance the time needed for force generation and deployment preparation with available resources.
   - The requirement to comprise a combination of capacity (how much of the force is usable within a certain time frame), capability (relative to an adversary),

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interoperability (an absolute requirement and potential mitigation for capability gaps) and sustainability.

- Readiness can contribute to deterrence by demonstrating NATO’s preparedness and resolve.

3.62 **NATO’s Readiness Action Plan.** The Readiness Action Plan reflects the readiness culture by ensuring that the Alliance is able to respond swiftly and firmly to new and evolving security challenges. Graduated readiness is explained in more detail in Chapter 5. However, the basic readiness forces and time limits are set out below, supported by graduated response plans, which will enable plans to be generated exceptionally quickly, commensurate with the readiness requirements of the forces.

a. **Vigilance measures.** Vigilance measures comprise a series of land, maritime and air activities that are already strategically prepositioned and postured around the eastern part of the Alliance’s territory. These are reinforced by exercises focused on deterrence and defence, and crisis prevention and management.

b. **NATO Readiness Initiative.** The NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI) consists of 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 combat vessels. This force’s employment time ranges from 0 to 30 days. The NRI is derived from national high readiness forces or other high readiness task forces, which may include non-NATO members like the Joint Expeditionary Force.\(^{31}\) NATO has no control over these forces until they are deployed. The NRI enhances NATO’s ability to rapidly respond to crises by expediting the Alliance’s political and military decision-making process on deterrence and defence, and crisis prevention and management operations.

c. **NATO’s high readiness forces.** High readiness forces include the 40,000 personnel of the NATO Response Force and 5,000 personnel from the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. The deployment time ranges from 0 to 90 days. These forces are distinct from the NRI and are commanded by Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Any decision to use the NATO Response Force is a consensual political decision, taken on a case-by-case basis by all NATO Allies in the NAC.

d. **NATO low readiness forces.** These forces are normally used to sustain deployed headquarters and forces. Readiness ranges from 91 to 180 days.

3.63 **Military mobility support.** The high readiness forces are supported by military mobility support as part of NATO–European Union\(^{32}\) cooperation to identify and remove obstacles to the rapid deployment of forces in Europe.

\(^{31}\) The Joint Expeditionary Force is a rapidly deployable multinational force that may consist of, as necessary, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

\(^{32}\) For the strategic partnership between NATO and European Union on military mobility, all non-European Union Allies’ involvement in this effort is considered essential, facilitating the effectiveness of military mobility.
All deployments can be expected to be disrupted as actors compete across the operational domains, agnostic to international boundaries. Therefore, agility includes responsiveness, force mobility, speed of decision-making, speed of assembly, and speed of deployment, as much as readiness.

**Sustainment**

3.64 Sustainment is an essential element of delivering credible and effective fighting power, which can also affect the moral and the physical components. Sustainment is the comprehensive provision of personnel, logistics, medical, military engineering, finance, budget and contracts support necessary to generate and sustain the force throughout all phases of operations. More information about sustainment can be found in Chapter 4.

**Section 5 – Force multipliers**

**Interoperability**

3.65 Interoperability is the ability of NATO, other political departments, agencies and, when appropriate, forces of partner nations to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives. This can be through a combination of the dimensions of interoperability.

- **Technical interoperability** concerns systems and equipment, such as communication and information systems, and their ability to operate together.
- **Procedural interoperability** is based on measures such as common doctrine, procedures and terminology.
- **Human interoperability** concerns mutual trust and understanding achieved by strengthening relationships in training and on operations.
Interoperability within NATO and with our allies and partners is ensured by using NATO standardization agreements, which define processes, procedures and terms and conditions for common military or technical procedures and equipment between signatories.

3.66 **Levels of interoperability.** The level of interoperability required for each relationship and capability varies according to context. Interoperability must be considered from the strategic to tactical levels, and within all the capability frameworks to ensure NATO’s ability to conduct operations quickly and effectively. Levels of interoperability are increased through: standardization; education, training, exercises and evaluation; lessons learned; cooperative programmes; trials; and tests. Levels of interoperability are as follows.

a. **Level 3 – Integrated.** Forces operate together **effectively** without technical, procedural or human barriers; it is characterized by **common** networks, capabilities, procedures and language.

b. **Level 2 – Compatible.** Forces operate together **without prohibitive** technical, procedural or human barriers; it is characterized by **similar** or complementary processes and procedures.

c. **Level 1 – Deconflicted.** Forces operate in the same operational area in pursuit of a common goal but with **limited** interaction due to **prohibitive** technical, procedural and human barriers.

d. **Level 0 – Not interoperable.** Forces have no demonstrated interoperability and must operate independently from each other.

**Responsiveness**

3.67 Responsiveness is the ability to react quickly and positively, which is increasingly important in a period of strategic competition. Responsiveness is made up of military resilience and adaptation.

a. **Military resilience.** Military resilience is a key element of NATO’s layered resilience concept. Military resilience seeks to maintain sufficient fighting power to deter, anticipate, mitigate, absorb, adapt and overcome a disruptive event or multiple events whilst maintaining NATO’s core tasks, including a potential counter offensive. Layered resilience also incorporates civilian preparedness, which includes civil and commercial sectors that the military force requires to deploy rapidly and freely across Alliance territory. For example, the joint force is reliant on civilian transport facilities, satellite communication and power supplies. NATO military resilience is enhanced by working partners to increase capacity and capability. Assessment and development of NATO’s force resilience and civil preparedness through the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership development, personnel, facilities and interoperability processes is vital.
b. **Adaptation.** Opportunities and vulnerabilities change as the environment or threat changes; no organization, person, network, doctrine or system can be absolutely resilient. Therefore, opportunities and risks must be managed dynamically through adaptation. The force that orientates, innovates and adapts more quickly than their adversary in conflict is likely to gain an advantage and achieve their objectives.

**Orchestration of fighting power**

3.68 The ability to orchestrate fighting power is essential in an interconnected world where the military instrument’s application across the continuum of competition is assessed by audiences for relative advantages. Operational art is objective-focused, influencing the right set of audiences by making use of all forces at the Alliance’s disposal. By being objective-focused, the Alliance will be able to orchestrate its activities more strategically, be increasingly comprehensive in its approach, and more effective across the continuum of competition. The doctrine to orchestrate fighting power is explained in Chapter 4 and the overarching principles of joint and multinational operations are explained below.

3.69 **Principles of joint and multinational operations.** These mutually supporting principles guide commanders and their staff in planning and conducting campaigns and operations across the continuum of competition. Commanders should strive to achieve these principles, and concurrently seek to deny or degrade the ability of the adversary to do the same. It is not an exhaustive list, and their application requires judgement, common sense and intelligent interpretation. Underpinned by the tenets of doctrine, they represent enduring principles; the relative importance of each may vary according to context and the means available to commanders. The principles are explained in more detail in Table 3.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unity of effort</td>
<td>Unity of effort emphasizes the requirement to ensure all means are directed to a common goal. Military forces achieve this principally through unity of command. As part of a comprehensive approach, unity of effort binds all the parts of the coalition together whilst retaining the benefit of diverse perspectives and approaches. It enables the integration and convergence of effects horizontally, across the Alliance and partners, and vertically, through the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations. To achieve such unity of effort, it is essential to plan, communicate and coordinate at all levels and with all actors involved in NATO activities and operations. It will require a flexible approach towards establishing shared objectives amongst NATO, partners, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, private sector and other stakeholders, based on the principles of civil-military interaction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Definition of objectives</td>
<td>Operations must be focused towards clearly defined and commonly understood objectives that contribute to attaining the end state. Understanding is central to providing insight and foresight to define effective objectives. Objectives must maintain the legal and moral legitimacy of a campaign and the force. To ensure strategic coherence the military instrument must be used proportionately and discriminately in relation to other instruments of power with an understanding that negative actions can have serious political and strategic effects. By correctly selecting and defining objectives, it focuses the force on what is achievable and decisive, thereby supporting the principles of unity of effort, freedom of action, concentration and economy of effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of morale</td>
<td>All forms of competition are human activity, with psychology being key to success and failure. Maintenance of morale provides the will to fight. High morale is derived from fighting power and is characterized by steadfastness, courage, confidence and sustained hope. Morale manifests itself as will and resolve, which will drive the force to successfully achieve its objectives. It requires confidence in the superiority of information and equipment, inspiring leadership, tight cohesion and is sustained by the belief that the nation supports the force. It also demands freedom of action, taking and retaining the initiative, and controlling the narrative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Competition involves the interplay between initiative and response. Achieving objectives demands dictating the course of events in a competitive situation. To hold the initiative is the ability to set or dictate the terms of action throughout the operation. Maintaining the initiative results in relentless cognitive pressure on the adversary, degrading their morale and decision-making. Furthermore, it forces the adversary to</td>
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</table>
respond by trying to protect themselves; such a reactive posture is difficult to recover from and usually leads to defeat. Gaining the initiative requires relentless determination to succeed and an ability to impose one’s will on the adversary, to do the unexpected and achieve surprise and delegate the freedom of action for subordinates to exploit opportunities. Initiative is dependent on the other principles being applied in unison.

**Freedom of action**

Freedom of action is minimizing restrictions to enable a subordinate to use their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity and judgement to achieve their objectives. Freedom of action requires a disciplined offensive spirit and it enables the flexibility for subordinate commanders to make timely decisions within the context of their higher commander’s intent. Rather than constantly awaiting further orders, freedom of action is a precondition for successfully maintaining and exploiting the initiative. Freedom of action across all levels of command allows the force to adapt quicker to a rapidly changing operating environment, and to deal with unforeseen problems that are inherent in operations. Training, mutual trust and understanding, simple plans and clear, concise orders allows commanders to delegate the maximum freedom of action in line with their subordinates’ ability and the context of the mission.

**Offensive spirit**

Offensive spirit delivers the benefits inferred by purposeful action rather than inaction. Offensive spirit implies an incisive approach, with a willingness to understand and accept political and military risk, to seize, maintain and exploit the initiative in line with one’s freedom of action. Critically, offensive spirit does not preclude defensive action. Central to offensive spirit is maintenance of morale and definition of objectives.

**Concentration**

In an increasingly transparent and lethal operating environment it is ever more difficult to maintain security and survival. Concentration is therefore not synonymous with the physical massing of forces for a decisive action, but concentration of effects created from a dispersed force. Integrating and coordinating actions across the operational domains in concert with allies and partners will achieve mass. Through concentration of actions and effects, it is possible to affect a rival’s capacity for decision-making through imposing multiple dilemmas, gaining the initiative and achieving objectives, whilst also maximizing economy of effort. Effective concentration demands unity of effort, definition of objectives and the ability to sustain the mass.

**Economy of effort**

Concentration must be delivered economically and precisely, targeting the right objects in the right space at the right time with the appropriate resources. Of all the principles, it is the most difficult to apply due to its close interdependence with the ever-changing conditions of the operating environment. Precision in the definition of objectives, surprise
and security prevents wasted resource and effort by allowing the concentration of effort to be on what is decisive.

| Security | Security limits vulnerability to hostile activities, threats and surprise. It is a shield that can help conserve fighting power and affords the initiative and freedom of action, when and where required, to achieve objectives. It requires unity of effort, understanding the points of influence, particularly vulnerabilities, risk management and resilience. Security contributes to preparedness but does not demand over-committing resources to guard against every threat or possibility, thereby diminishing relative fighting power. Lack of security, or a false interpretation of the principle of security, leads directly to being surprised and loss of initiative. Commanders should anticipate the effects of being surprised and make appropriate contingency plans to safeguard their freedom of action. |
| Surprise | Surprise, achieved through unexpected actions, achieves a cognitive effect – a feeling of relative confusion, or perhaps shock – that can undermine the adversary’s cohesion and morale. Using surprise is a significant way of seizing the initiative and may be a critical pre-condition for success. It is transient and must be exploited rapidly. Deception is closely related to surprise and requires deliberate measures to mislead targeted decision-makers into behaving in a manner advantageous to the achievement of one’s objective. Surprise is also dependent on security. |
| Flexibility | A flexible force is one that has the ability to be highly responsive to changing circumstances. Plans and procedures should be sufficiently flexible to respond to the unexpected and they should empower commanders with maximum freedom of action. This allows the force to adapt to a situation and learn lessons more quickly than a rival, thereby gaining the initiative. Flexibility is enabled by a clear definition of objectives, freedom of action and sustainability. |
| Sustainability | Operations are demanding and often brutal and visceral, placing extreme physical and psychological demands on personnel and requiring the constant care of people and equipment. A force that lacks sustainability and resilience is rarely successful. Personnel, equipment, systems and effects must be sustained and maintained to prevent culmination and to maintain resilience. The ability to generate and re-generate, avoiding shortages and waste, maintains a commander’s flexibility and freedom of action to maintain the initiative, while also inspiring confidence and enhancing morale. |

Table 3.1 – The principles of joint and multinational operations
Chapter 4 – Orchestrating fighting power

4.1 Chapter 4 outlines how fighting power is orchestrated by NATO. The chapter explains the enduring tenets of doctrine and how they exploit the nature of competition. It introduces supporting doctrine, including strategic communication, information advantage and sustainment. Finally, it explains the relationship between doctrine and the supporting frameworks to provide additional conceptual support to applying operational art.

Section 1 – Doctrinal key tenets

4.2 The tenets of doctrine are: behaviour-centric approach; manoeuvrist approach; the comprehensive approach; and mission command. Together these tenets guide our thinking and underpin our attitude of mind and approach to operating across the continuum of competition, at all levels of operations and in any circumstances involving the use of the military instrument. The behaviour-centric approach recognizes that people’s attitude and behaviour are central to attaining the end state. The comprehensive approach is the combining of all available political, military and civilian capabilities, in a concerted effort, to attain the desired end state. This complements the manoeuvrist approach in which unsupportive and hostile audiences’ points of influence are targeted to make them less than the sum of their parts. Mission command involves centralized intent and decentralized execution which allows the force to take calculated and managed risks, as well as learn, anticipate and adapt quicker than unsupportive and hostile actors to exploit opportunities. Skill in applying the doctrinal tenets is difficult to acquire and requires greater investment in training than other hierarchal and basic approaches.

Behaviour-centric approach

4.3 People are at the heart of competition. In a period of strategic competition, in which pervasive information is communicated to multiple audiences globally and effects can be created using a plethora of capabilities, the Alliance is required to take account of a much broader audience than simply adversaries, enemies or actors. Therefore, the Alliance’s actions must be designed and conducted accordingly. The behaviour-centric approach is the primary tenet that guides commanders on the selection and maintenance of their objectives. This approach focuses planning and execution of activity from all levels of operations to influence the attitudes and behaviour (elements of the conflict triangle) of targeted audiences to attain the end state.

4.4 Audiences. People are grouped into audiences according to their attitude and behaviour towards the attainment of the end state. There are many types of state and
non-state audiences; examples include, but are not restricted to, (host) nations, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, transnational organizations, interest groups, irregular groups and individual people. Audiences’ objectives will vary, they may be shared but often they will be different and complex.

4.5 Audience analysis is required to understand points of influence that may change or reinforce audiences’ attitudes and behaviours. Changes to behaviours may be long-term, as a result of persuasion, or short-term, as a result of coercion. Audiences should be segmented to provide the commander with more focused understanding and permit subsequent targeting of effects to achieve or maintain the desired behavioural changes. Audiences are segmented into three general categories – public, stakeholders and actors – depending on their ability to affect our political, agreed end state. These segments can be further subdivided according to need. All these audiences may be considered friendly, supportive, neutral, unsupportive or hostile. This understanding provides the focus for planning and execution of actions.

a. **Actor.** An actor is an audience whose actions are currently affecting the attainment of the end state. The terms shown in Table 4.1 represent the spectrum that is used in this document.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>The relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>An actor belonging to a declared, presumed or recognized friendly nation, organization, faction or group sharing a common goal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>An actor whose characteristics, behaviour, origin or nationality indicate that it is neither supporting nor opposing either side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rival</td>
<td>Actors who are competing with another actor, for the same objective, to achieve advantage, without hostile intent, and compete in accordance with the rules-based international order. Rivals are usually found in the rivalry zone of the continuum of competition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary</td>
<td>An actor whose intentions or interests are opposed to those of friendly parties and against which legal coercive political, military or civilian actions may be envisaged and conducted. They may have many different motivations and may be subject to a broad range of influences and are usually found in the confrontation zone of the continuum of competition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>An actor whose actions are hostile and against which the legal use of armed force is authorized. Enemies operate in the armed conflict zone of the continuum of competition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 – Spectrum of actors
b. **Stakeholder.** A stakeholder is an audience who can affect or is affected by the attainment of the end state. The Alliance’s activities encourage or develop supportive stakeholders to become partners, whilst discouraging or denying unsupportive or hostile stakeholders from becoming actors.

c. **Public.** A public is an audience who is aware of activities that may affect the attainment of the end state. Public’s attitude may range from hostile to supportive.

4.6 The position of individuals and groups within the range of audiences is not fixed. The sectoral nature of the continuum of competition means that an audience could concurrently be classified as an adversary in one sector and a partner in another. Within a sector, the relationship and classification of an actor escalates or de-escalates as the attitudes, behaviours and capabilities shift. In Figure 4.1 attitudes and behaviours are depicted on the horizontal axis, while audience classification is shown on the vertical axis. The interrelated factors of changes in the audience’s will and capability generally determine whether an audience is an actor, stakeholder or public. A range of effects can undermine or strengthen an audience’s will. The capability of an audience can be developed, purchased, enabled, as well as being neutralized, denied or destroyed. Generally, changing an audience’s capability is quicker and more readily achievable than changing attitudes, which requires long-term, persistent engagement.

![Figure 4.1 – Audiences in the operating environment](image-url)
4.7 **Narrative-led execution.** Every action creates an informational effect and, via the information environment, that effect will influence multiple audiences, be they global, national or within a theatre of operations. The information that audiences receive is often cluttered, so they use narratives to give meaning to actions and facts. A narrative will often compete with other narratives to give the fact its meaning. If the facts are not irrefutable, it is often the credibility of the narrative that is decisive in influencing the perception of different audiences. Therefore, to effectively influence audiences, it requires consistency of actions, images and words; this consistent message is the narrative and is supported by narrative-led execution.

4.8 The Alliance uses narratives to explain how NATO arrived at the current situation, defines that situation and expresses a desired end state or outcome. Vague, unclear and inconsistent narratives increase the likelihood of confusion, misinterpretation and potentially unintentional escalation by the Alliance’s forces or other audiences. It is important that NATO and national narratives are mutually supporting. Equally, as missions often include non-Alliance partner nations and other organizations, the Alliance’s narratives must be crafted to meet the expectations of the entire coalition.

4.9 Narrative-led execution sets a unifying strategic intent across the Alliance at all levels of command delivering centralized intent and enabling decentralized execution to converge the creation of multiple effects on targeted audiences. Narrative-led execution is key to ensuring that operational and tactical actions support the end state. Therefore, activities must be conducted in the context of the narrative, rather than acting in ignorance and being forced to manage the consequences.

4.10 The Alliance uses institutional, strategic and micro narratives that should be mutually supporting and connected. Whilst the institutional narratives are generally political in nature, the strategic and micro narratives support campaigns and operations.

a. **Institutional narratives.** These are enduring narratives that support an enduring campaign and provide the context for long-term predictable behaviour. These narratives should be included and explained as part of any NATO induction or pre-employment package.\(^\text{33}\)

i. **Primary narrative.**\(^\text{34}\) The narrative is rooted in the North Atlantic Treaty: ‘A democratic, multinational alliance uniting across borders to guard, with courage and competence, against threats to our home.’

ii. **NATO protects.** The ‘NATO protects’ pillar is based on the Alliance’s commitment to collective defence, and how this contributes to the protection of citizens across all Allies: ‘Any potential adversary must know that an attack

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\(^{33}\) NATO protects, NATO unites and NATO strengths are being turned into narratives. PO(2020)0400, 2021 NATO Communications Strategy.

\(^{34}\) PO(2020)0400, 2021 NATO Communications Strategy.
against one Ally is an attack against all. NATO stands as a pillar of stability in an unpredictable world.’

iii. **NATO unites.** The ‘NATO unites’ pillar focuses on the solidarity of NATO and how the Alliance brings like-minded Allies together to confront challenges to the rules-based international order: ‘We are stronger when we stand together bound by the shared values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law.’

iv. **NATO strengthens.** The ‘NATO strengthens’ pillar supports cooperative security to bring about stability and address the common challenges faced by both Allies and partners across the globe: ‘In an unpredictable world, the NATO Alliance works with partners across the globe to promote peace and stability, through political dialogue, building capacity and responding to crisis.’

b. **Strategic narrative.** Strategic narratives drive the campaign themes and provide the political-military guidance for the activity. For a campaign or operation, NATO’s strategic narrative will be developed by NATO Headquarters, in conjunction with the joint force commander.

c. **Micro narrative.** Audiences are diverse with cultures interpreting narratives in different ways. Micro narratives act as local narratives to support short-term objectives and activities.

NATO’s primary institutional narrative: ‘A democratic, multinational alliance uniting across borders to guard, with courage and competence, against threats to our home.’
Manoeuvrist approach

4.11 The manoeuvrist approach provides the mindset required to achieve behaviour-centric outcomes by exploiting the inherent friction, uncertainty and human fallibilities found within competition. It represents an indirect approach that seeks to out-think and out-maneuuvre unsupportive or hostile actors (rivals, adversaries and enemies), and discourage stakeholders from becoming unsupportive or hostile actors; it focuses on degrading their will to contest. The manoeuvrist approach seeks to shape understanding, avoid strengths and selectively target and exploit critical vulnerabilities and other points of influence to disrupt cohesion and to seize, maintain and exploit the initiative. Such an approach offers the prospect of achieving rapid gains or results that are disproportionately greater than the resources applied. The manoeuvrist approach contrasts with other direct approaches, such as attrition or annihilation. Whereas an attritional approach seeks to achieve an incremental reduction of the hostile actor’s means and endurance, an annihilation approach demands the complete destruction of the actor’s means. These direct approaches can easily become stalemated, time-consuming and indecisive unless there is a significant advantage in combat power. Whilst the manoeuvrist approach often involves an element of attrition and annihilation (armed conflict is inherently violent with physical destruction), this is not its primary focus.

4.12 Seizing and holding the initiative. Central to the manoeuvrist approach is the requirement to seize, hold and exploit the initiative to gain a position of cognitive advantage. This advantage is achieved by: forcing the hostile actor to react or a stakeholder not to act; increasing the friction and uncertainty that faces them; and creating confusion and overwhelming their ability to make decisions and act coherently. Seizing the initiative is intrinsically linked to applying the tenet of mission command. Maintaining the initiative allows the commander to dictate the course of events and maintain relentless pressure on the unsupportive audience. Seizing and maintaining the initiative requires the application of several factors. These factors are mutually reinforcing and should not be applied in isolation.

a. Pre-emption. Pre-emption involves seizing an opportunity to deny actor an advantage before they act, or preventing a stakeholder from acting. It denies them the initiative and frustrates their plan. Its success lies in understanding, taking calculated risk, speed of execution and subsequent exploitation.

b. Surprise. Surprise is a principle of multinational operations and is one of the most significant contributors to military success at all levels. Surprise involves using ambiguity, concealment, deception, originality and audacity to confuse and disrupt decision-making. Surprise is a potent cognitive weapon, causing shock through unexpected action in time, location and operational domain.

c. Simultaneity. Simultaneity seeks to overload the decision-making of actors and stakeholders by confronting them with a concentration of simultaneous threats, which is achieved through the integration and synchronization of actions and effects. This
will overload their ability to understand the situation or prioritize responses, thereby creating a dilemma that effectively paralyzes their command and control. By acting simultaneously, the effect is cumulative; they are threatened by so many concurrent threats that they are denied the ability to concentrate on one problem at a time or even establish priorities between them.

d. **Tempo.** Tempo is the rate of action relative to another audience. Speed and quality of decision-making is key to gaining and maintaining a favourable tempo. Importantly, tempo is relative and can be achieved by slowing down the hostile actor’s decision-action cycle through methods like surprise, simultaneity or disruption of key capacities.

e. **Exploitation.** Exploitation is the use of successes or opportunities to maximize advantages or gains. It means seizing opportunities created by activities to achieve an objective, exploiting points of influence, or directly fulfilling part of the higher commander’s intent. Success must be ruthlessly exploited to maintain the initiative, extend and expand its effects, and accelerate the collapse of the unsupportive actor’s will. Opportunities for exploitation may occur only fleetingly and commanders at all levels should anticipate and seize opportunities as they occur, which makes mission command critical to exploiting the initiative.

4.13 **Targeting the moral component of fighting power.** The manoeuvrist approach seeks to influence an audience’s perceptions and understanding and, in doing so, shape their attitude towards a given situation. Stimulating a perception of inevitable failure is the best mechanism by which to promote actual failure, convincing the hostile actor, the unsupportive stakeholder, and a wider audience, of the futility of their actions. Perceived illegitimacy and immorality can contribute to this attitude and a narrative of failure.

4.14 Understanding shapes an audience’s attitude by influencing how they think, feel and respond to information or events, and ultimately the actor’s will to continue contesting a situation. Therefore, reducing an audience’s ability to understand the situation serves to weaken their moral component. An unsupportive actor’s moral component is also weakened by the erosion of will and cohesion. Will is the determination to persist in the face of adversity and comprises two aspects – intent and resolve – both of which can be influenced, attacked and undermined. The unsupportive actor’s intent is thwarted when a belief emerges that their aim is no longer achievable. Resolve, meanwhile, is the will of an actor to continue. Whilst eroding the resolve and intent of an unsupportive actor’s, we must simultaneously seek to protect our own resolve from their actions.

4.15 If essential capabilities are lost or threatened, both the moral and physical cohesion of the actor are reduced, while the freedom of action and initiative of our own forces are enhanced. While seemingly attritional or annihilatory in nature, dislocation or disruption of physical and virtual elements are, therefore, advocated by the manoeuvrist approach as a way to undermine the will and cohesion of an unsupportive actor.
a. **Dislocation.** Dislocation denies an actor the ability to bring strengths to bear by not accepting the premise or terms of the engagement. Dislocation is about ensuring that the unsupportive actor’s strengths are unavailable, focused in the wrong place, or rendered ineffective or irrelevant. Ideally dislocation would shape the potential and actual engagement to be conducted on the Alliance terms, where there is the biggest delta between the Alliance’s strengths and the unsupportive audiences. Dislocation must always occur in the context of the narrative.

b. **Disruption.** Disruption denies an unsupportive actor’s ability to cohere their actions by targeting critical capabilities and other points of influence upon which they depend. This is attained by neutralization or destruction, which can be either attritional or annihilatory in nature. Disruption on multiple points of influence can create cognitive paralysis.

It is important to remember that adversaries are not foolish or supine; they will seek to attack us asymmetrically to gain the initiative and undermine our will.

**Mission command**

4.16 A commander’s primary responsibility is to accomplish the missions and tasks that contribute to specific objectives in line with their higher commander’s intent and the strategic narrative. This requires the fusion of:

- leadership, derived from the leadership culture (that is part of the moral component);
- command authority, as allocated formally to a commander through orders and directives; and
- control, the manner in which the commander manages and directs forces and functions consistent with command authority.

4.17 How a force blends leadership, command authority and control is fundamental to how it orchestrates fighting power. Mission command is NATO’s command philosophy, it shapes the command styles, attitudes and behaviours of commanders and subordinates. It is based on empowered leadership, which enables decisions to be made by those best placed to make them, exploiting opportunities that emerge from competition. Mission command offers a significant advantage when applied correctly, enabling the joint force to overcome a rival in the most chaotic and demanding circumstances by maximizing initiative to seize opportunities. Figure 4.2 illustrates the relationship between mission command fundamentals and principles.
4.18 **Mission command fundamentals.** Successful mission command is guided by the fundamentals of trust and mutual understanding.

a. **Trust.** Trust is a prerequisite of command at all levels. The level of trust between the commander and a subordinate dictates the level in which the subordinate can and will be free to decide how to execute their mission and task within the framework of the higher commander’s intent and assigned mission and includes:

   - where and how to establish their main effort;
   - what risks to take; and
   - how to synchronize their activities.

The spirit of mission command requires a bond of trust between superiors, subordinates and peers that will develop through shared experience. While trust must be earned and not demanded, the default should be for commanders to trust their superiors and subordinates. Equally, the subordinates trust in their commander is based on the commander’s skills and capabilities in combination with a willingness to develop their subordinate. Building trust calls for a willingness to accept mistakes, both ways, albeit at a reasonable level. This can be challenging for rapidly task-organized or multinational forces, or agencies lacking shared experience, understanding and interoperability. This makes clear command and control and the system of leadership at all levels paramount.

b. **Mutual understanding.** Like trust, mutual understanding is established over time and through applying common training and doctrine. The practice of acting in
accordance with the higher commander’s intent, even when communications are limited, can only be successful if there is a high degree of unity in thinking and action at all levels of operations. Mutual understanding builds trust. With experience, commanders gain an understanding of the issues and concerns facing their subordinates, partners and peers. Professional knowledge and cultivating personal relationships in turn gives subordinates an insight into command at higher levels, enabling them to anticipate and apply their initiative to good effect. Mutual understanding is also based on common doctrine and command philosophy and so cannot be assumed when operating in a multinational, inter-agency and civilian context. Where shared experience and common doctrine do not exist, commanders should pay attention to developing and sustaining mutual understanding as a central pillar of effective force interaction.

4.19 **Mission command principles.** The following principles provide a continuous cycle of unity of effort, timely and effective decision-making, and decentralized execution.

a. **Unity of effort.** To achieve unity of effort, it is essential to plan, communicate and coordinate at all levels and with all actors involved in a comprehensive approach to crisis. Achieving unity of effort is often complicated by the variety of international military and non-military actors involved, the lack of command and control arrangements between them, and varying views of the objectives or end state. It might only be possible to achieve harmonization of effort which is characterized by goodwill, common planning, clear and agreed division of responsibilities, an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of others, and respect for others’ autonomy. In the absence of a formal multi-agency unifying mechanism, the commander supported by the staff may be in a coordinating role, attempting to align divergent perspectives and priorities. In some cases, NATO forces may operate in support of other international organizations with which terms of reference or memoranda of understanding should be signed stating the kind of support to be provided by NATO. Some international organizations and non-governmental organizations may refuse to cooperate directly with military forces. This will require a flexible approach towards establishing processes or bodies to share information between the involved international organizations and non-governmental organizations and the NATO military force based on the principles of civil-military interaction (CMI).35

b. **Timely and effective decision-making.** Successful command requires timely and effective decision-making at all levels. Mission command empowers subordinate commanders, who are best placed to make decisions, the authority to do so. Timely decisions allow the Alliance’s forces to gain and maintain the initiative. Despite the increasing availability and speed of information, it remains essential for commanders to make decisions on the basis of incomplete and imperfect understanding. This can

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seem risky and good judgement is required to decide when is the right time to act or not act. In general, however, it is often less risky to act quickly than it is to wait for more information and give unsupportive audiences more time. Developing an intuitive understanding of when to decide is as integral a component of the art of command as knowing from where to command. The essential elements to any decision-making process are detailed in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*.

c. **Decentralized execution.** Decentralized execution enables subordinates the freedom of action to act independently, which enables agility in changing situations and the ability to exploit opportunities in accordance with their overall objective. Systematically granting, accepting and also demanding freedom of action and requiring initiative and creativity from subordinate commanders are principles that need to permeate all levels of the command to allow for its full exploitation. Therefore, commanders must delegate the maximum freedom of action in line with their subordinates’ ability. This is affected by a commander’s style of command. Where control measures are established, these have a role in reducing the complementary need for direct command style. If control measures are ambiguous, weak or absent, more direct command is inevitably required. These control measures only specify how a mission will be executed if there are political, legal or military restraints, to enable coordination and synchronization of actions on the objective. Decentralized execution depends upon:

- commanders ensuring that their subordinates understand the intent, their own contributions and the context including the narrative within which they are to act;
- commanders exercising minimum control over their subordinates, consistent with the context and nature of the mission, and the subordinates’ experience and ability, while retaining responsibility for their actions;
- subordinates having a sound understanding of the overall plan, what objective they are contributing to, the effect they are to create, and why;
- subordinates being allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions, and subordinates deciding for themselves how best to act on their superior’s intent, including where and how to establish their main effort and what risks to take;
- subordinates communicating their plan to the commander to ensure situational awareness; and
- subordinates having the willingness to accept the trust placed in them, and the initiative to act within any freedom of action given.

36 Examples of different command styles would be decentralized command, command by veto or centralized command.
Comprehensive approach

4.20 Competition presents many strategic challenges that the military instrument cannot solve alone. The comprehensive approach provides for how the commander, with partners, coordinates military activity, with political and civilian actions, through all levels of operations, to influence audiences and attain a unified end state. From a NATO perspective, the comprehensive approach brings the actors derived from the whole-of-Alliance approach together with other partners and actors who are involved in creating an effect or achieving an objective. Through this cooperative working, a common analysis and collective strategy, mutual coordination, tasks, roles and responsibilities are established. While it is unlikely that complete integration will be achieved between political, military and civilian capabilities, the comprehensive approach strives to optimize the synchronization of capabilities.

4.21 The comprehensive approach, supported by the other doctrinal tenets, requires commanders and staff to be clear about their mission, the objectives they seek and to analyze the operating environment relevant to the achievement of these objectives. Further analysis identifies the physical, virtual and cognitive effects that need to be created to influence the audience to achieve objectives. In turn, commanders and their partners can determine the most appropriate mix of political, military and civilian capabilities to create the desired effects. The following constituents of the comprehensive approach need to be understood to apply this unifying tenet of doctrine:

- collective strategy and capability generation;
- end states;
- objectives (guided by the manoeuvrist approach and behaviour-centric approach);
Collective strategy and capability generation

4.22 At the political and strategic level, NATO concentrates on building confidence and mutual understanding between international actors to create a collective strategy based on a unified effort balancing ends, ways and means across the Alliance, its partners and aligned actors. This strategy will consider their relative strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy.

4.23 Within this collective strategy, political, military and civilian organizations will give their commanders and/or leaders an agreed end state and issue direction/missions. A mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the actions, activities or operation required. A mission should consist of five parts: who, what, when, where and why. Under the tenet of mission command, how a mission is conducted is left to the tasked commander. The collective strategy and mission forms the basis for capability generation.

4.24 Capability is the ability to complete a task, perform a function or execute a mission under specified conditions and to specified standards of performance. The comprehensive approach endeavours to generate political, military and civilian capabilities into a force. The force will consist of an integrated component derived from the whole-of-Alliance approach and long-term partners that should have a high level of integration with: the requisite command and control relationships; an agile and adaptable posture; empowered permissions; and force resilience to enact the manoeuvrist approach and mission command. The force will also have a component of actors who are not integrated but are contributing to the unified effort. Commanders should respect the autonomy, decision-making and methods of these actors and support collaborative working. Collaborative working enhances the trust that underpins productive relationships across the force. Integrated information management, infrastructure and connectivity, as well as supporting common working practices, generate a more collaborative ethos. All partners have a voice, some have a vote and others a veto; knowing how this simple rule applies to allies, partners and other actors will ensure that appropriate weight is given across the headquarters to their respective interests. The contribution of political, military and civilian actors, as well as their relationship to the instruments of power, are described below.

a. Political capabilities. Political capabilities include those activities delivered by the Alliance and its partners’ governmental, or transnational governmental, departments and agencies. Political actors and the joint force should endeavour to achieve an integrated level of interoperability. It is by cooperating and synchronizing military actions alongside those of other political actions that the Alliance can leverage all instruments of power. Military considerations for integrating political capabilities include the following.
Political actors will have been involved in crafting the Alliance’s strategy for an affected area before any decision to commit military resources has been made. Political actors will, in almost all cases, be the lead for the strategy, and national governments may have long-established interests in the area. Some of the capabilities are held at the highest level by the national government departments due to their impact, classification or effectiveness once the capability has been exposed. Consequently, the time taken to use certain capabilities (for example, information, diplomatic, space-based and cyberspace) should be understood.

Inter-agency describes how multiple political actors are combined with the joint force to conduct operations. An integrated response is most likely to succeed if a single individual, ideally formally empowered, orchestrates the activities of all the agencies involved. How the role is agreed, and the formal authority that the leader is granted, varies on a case-by-case basis.

b. Military capabilities. Military capabilities include those activities delivered by the Alliance and its partners’ military capabilities. Considerations for military capabilities include the following.

i. Joint action is how the joint force contributes to a comprehensive approach.

ii. NATO’s military instrument is always multinational and normally joint, in that it involves more than one armed service, and is referred to as a combined joint force. NATO’s military forces may also find themselves operating with forces from outside the Alliance, either in Alliance operations with third party nations, or in coalitions. Through training, education and interoperability, the Alliance and its partners should aspire to achieve the highest possible level of interoperability. Training with long-term partners enables an expanded and effective integrated force.

iii. All forces operating in a multinational construct have two chains of command. The first is the chain of command constructed either by the Alliance or a coalition. The other is a national chain of command that extends back to the national government of each participating military. National sovereignty can be a difficult issue. The role of each participating military force is determined by the laws and regulations that govern the conduct of their armed services. National caveats are restrictions placed on the use of national military elements contributing to a multinational operation. These caveats can often limit a coalition member’s ability to perform certain tasks or missions. Commanders at every level should know the caveats of their constituent forces and how they can appropriately address these restrictions when it comes to mission planning. Preserving cohesion across the Alliance and with its partners is a strategic priority in any multinational operation. A successful commander will routinely
have to accomplish the mission through coordination, communication and consensus, rather than the formal concepts of command authority. See Chapter 5 for detail on command authorities.

c. **Civilian capabilities.** Civilian capabilities include those activities delivered by non-state actors that are not a political or military capability. Civilian partners are increasingly part of Alliance operations, ranging from civilian organizations, charities and transnational businesses, which have been part of the security scene for many years, commercial organizations working in support of the mission and integrated civil-military partnerships operating various capabilities. All these civilian partners will have unique and valuable experience, a distinctive culture and unique aim. Outreach and CMI through the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) joint function are key to an effective communication and coordination with the broad spectrum of non-military actors.

### End states and objectives

4.25 **End state.** The end state is the North Atlantic Council statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation for NATO’s involvement. An end state is reached through the achievement of objectives.

4.26 **Objectives.** An objective is a clearly defined and attainable goal for an operation. Objectives are achieved by aggregating decisive conditions through effects and their underlying actions. Objectives are described in the following ways.

a. **Strategic objectives.** Strategic objectives establish the strategic purpose for all actions by the Alliance within a comprehensive approach. Strategic objectives are subdivided into non-military strategic objectives and military strategic objectives (MSOs).

b. **Military strategic objectives.** MSOs define the role of military forces in the wider context of the Alliance’s strategic objectives.

c. **Non-military strategic objectives.** These define non-military objectives that must be achieved in the wider context of the Alliance’s strategic objectives.

d. **Operational objectives.** Operational objectives define the role of the joint force within the context of the MSO. Further details can be found in AJP-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations*.

### Effects

4.27 An effect is a change to the engagement space as a consequence of action. Derived from objectives, effects bridge the gap between objectives and actions by describing what changes in the engagement space are required. There are three types of effects: physical, virtual and cognitive. Although all physical and virtual effects will lead to some form of
cognitive effect, their primary purpose will be to influence the capabilities of audiences, while cognitive effects are principally directed towards changing or maintaining audiences’ attitude and behaviour. Achieving an objective often requires all three types of effects to be created in a supported and supporting relationship. Effects must be measurable and should be limited in number.

4.28 The interplay between action and effect is inherently uncertain in adversarial human conflict, even when mitigated by a high level of understanding. First order effects are those we seek to create, second and third order effects are the consequential changes in the engagement space that occur from creating an initial effect. The interconnectivity of the engagement space means that an action inside an operations area may create an effect outside it, and vice versa. Furthermore, an effect may be immediate, short-term or long-term, and it will be perceived and interpreted differently by different audiences. The unpredictability of the consequence of action means that planners cannot deliver or orchestrate effects, they can only intend to create them. In the execution of a mission, actions will create:

- desired effects – those effects that have a positive impact on achieving objectives; and
- undesired effects – those effects that disrupt or jeopardize achieving objectives.

Therefore, commanders need to constantly assess and reassess the consequences of their actions, as perceived by audiences, and adjust accordingly. There are many different ways to conduct operational assessment. Selecting the right operational assessment criteria is critical in judging if the effect is desired or undesired. Operational assessment is explained in more detail in AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*.

4.29 **Effect dimensions.** Effect dimensions highlight the interdependencies of the engagement space, thereby gaining a better understanding of the consequences of actions. The elements that constitute dimensions are as follows.

a. The **physical dimension** relates to consequences on the audiences, the sub-surface, surface, airspace and space areas where all physical activities take place, and where audiences live, including all physical objects and infrastructure that support them.

b. The **cognitive dimension** relates to the consequences on the audiences’ perceptions, beliefs, interests, aims, decisions and behaviours. It encompasses all forms of interaction between them (such as economic and political).

c. The **virtual dimension** relates to the consequences of activity on the storage, content and transmission of analogue and digital data and information, and all supporting communication and information systems and processes.
4.30 Unsupportive audiences, especially adversaries and enemies, will defend their perceived points of influence. Considering effect dimensions supports a commander to use the manoeuvrist approach to achieve objectives by cognitively, physically and virtually out-maneuvering hostile audiences. This is done by identifying indirect and original ways of affecting points of influence and/or converging mass effects to overwhelm points of influence defences, whilst dislocating the actor’s strengths. Effect dimensions provide a framework for the political, military and civilian partners to coordinate and synchronize their forces’ activities in time and space to create mutually supporting desired effects, whilst respecting the autonomy of each actor. A better understanding of potential second and third order effects will support deliberate exploitation and maintenance of the initiative.

**Actions and multi-domain operations**

4.31 In the context of military operations, an action is described as the process of doing something to create an effect on a system within the engagement space. A sequence of coordinated actions are grouped into operations. Actions are expressed as tasks or assignments and are imposed by an appropriate authority or derived during mission analysis. Examples of actions are fires, manoeuvre, information and CIMIC.

4.32 The concept of multi-domain operations is an evolution of joint operations. The transition to multi-domain operations started when the Alliance recognized the cyberspace and space domains. In the same way that the introduction of air power transformed a single-service focus to a joint approach, the persistence of the space domain and the ubiquitous and pervasiveness of the cyberspace domain is changing how the Alliance operates.

4.33 **Capability integration.** The comprehensive approach supports multi-domain operations by combining political, military and civilian capabilities whose activities and actions can be orchestrated and integrated across the five operational domains. This approach also coordinates complementary actions by actors who are not part of the force but are contributing toward an agreed end state or common narrative. Therefore, the comprehensive approach facilitates the integration and coordination of the full spectrum of political, military and civilian actions to enable concentration and economy of effort in the creation of desired effects to attain the agreed end state.
The comprehensive approach provides the full spectrum of capabilities required to operate successfully within the five operational domains. Furthermore, it provides complementary actions to achieve objectives by actors who are not part of the joint force, but are working towards a unified outcome or common narrative.

Section 2 – Supporting doctrine and concepts

4.34 The role of supporting doctrine is to harness competition and support the operationalization of the key tenets. With the Alliance’s conceptual component undergoing a significant evolution, this section brings aspects of important concepts into doctrine, which will be explained further in upcoming keystone publications.

Operating environment

4.35 Environments and systems. An environment describes the system surrounding an activity. A system is a functionally, physically or behaviourally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements. A group of systems is a network. There are multiple types of environments, both physical and non-physical, and commanders use many terms to describe them. Examples include (but are not restricted to): information, maritime, urban, political and human.

4.36 Operating environments. The operating environment aids the commander and staff’s understanding of the mission, and their force’s part in the overall strategy. Operating environments define the surroundings of a mission and combine all the elements, conditions, circumstances and influences of applicable factors that affect a commander’s decision-making in accomplishing their mission. We can understand the operating environment as a global set of complex, dynamic and interrelated networks, comprising political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information systems, each exerting pressure and influence on the others. Understanding the nature and interaction of these systems as part of mission analysis helps the commander define their engagement space and affects how they will integrate actions with it.
4.37 **Engagement space/battlespace.** The engagement space and battlespace are synonyms. The engagement space is part of the operating environment where actions and activities are planned and conducted. The commander’s engagement space is often broader than their operations area due to increasing interconnectivity of the effect dimensions. Furthermore, the varying degrees of relevance that geography has in cyberspace and space, the electromagnetic spectrum and the information environment means that a geographically bounded engagement space is not always suitable. A commander’s engagement space is also becoming increasingly cluttered. The need to orchestrate political and civilian actions, and the compression of the level of operations, means that the engagement space encompasses activities from all levels of operations and from across the political, military and civilian spectrum.

Understanding

4.38 Understanding is one of the cornerstones of our military philosophy and it is implicit in applying the tenets of doctrine. Fighting power cannot be applied effectively and efficiently without understanding: the competition and its context; the operating environment; our own capabilities; and the capabilities of audiences. Understanding helps commanders to make decisions; it also helps them to manage any associated risks and any second and subsequent order effects that could be harmful in influencing the targeted audiences. Understanding helps commanders and their staff to identify the causes of

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37 NATO’s *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive* (COPD) has replaced battlespace with engagement space. Allied Command Transformation’s multi-domain operations programme is also using the term.

38 Picture credit: Sergey Nivens/Shutterstock.com
conflict, the nature of emerging crises, and the context required for determining deterrence, coercion or response postures. Annex C explains how to develop understanding. AJP-2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-intelligence and Security and AJP-10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Strategic communications contain further information on this subject.

4.39 Commanders set the climate in which understanding is enabled. If commanders are to make the right decisions, they must create a climate that encourages open-mindedness, critical analysis and cooperation with partners. They must also clearly articulate their requirements for understanding and enable their staff to work effectively. Understanding is never entirely comprehensive or accurate; however, the planning and conduct of operations to accomplish a mission is based on attaining the highest level of understanding in the time available.

4.40 In a period of strategic competition where adversaries are creating and exploiting ambiguity and uncertainty, the importance of the sensing component of understanding is increased. Sensing is essential to orientating and the decision to act to achieve tempo; it is also crucial to inform the measures of effectiveness. As a component of understanding, sensing covers the attitude and behaviour of audiences. This involves surveillance tasks of detection, classification, recognition, tracking and identification. However, sensing needs to be considered more broadly than just military surveillance systems and be part of a comprehensive effort using sensors across the civilian, military and political spectrum.

4.41 Comprehensive understanding of the operating environment. Strategic competition, with its multi-regional, sector, domains, dimensions and audiences, makes the character of understanding complex, requiring an increasingly comprehensive approach to understand. Coherence in the planning and conduct of operations requires building and fostering a shared understanding of the operating environment from the very beginning of planning and maintaining this understanding throughout the process. The comprehensive understanding of the operating environment (CUOE) is the primary and continuous process through which the joint task force staff manages the analysis and development of products that help the commander and key staff understand the operating environment. CUOE’s methodology fuses operational assessments from across the functions, for example, joint intelligence preparation of the operating environment and information environment assessments. CUOE aims to give a comprehensive understanding of the operating environment to the best extent possible in the time available. See NATO's Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) from more information.

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39 The term comprehensive preparation of the operating environment (CPOE) is often associated with comprehensive understanding of the operating environment (CUOE). In particular, CPOE has traditionally been used to describe the appreciation of an environment, however, CUOE with the use of the word ‘understanding’ better implies the need to acquire the knowledge and then interpret or comprehend its significance with regard to the crisis or operations planning process. COPD, Version 3.0, pages1–10.
Operational domains

4.42 Operational domains represent five specific spheres of military activity within the engagement space and provide a framework for organizing the military instrument. The term ‘operational’ does not reflect the operational level of operations, it reflects operations and activity. These operational domains provide a structural framework to group and analyze capabilities that are unprejudiced by considerations of nations, political, military services or civilian ownership. Though capabilities are distinctive, some capabilities may act as a platform for other domain capabilities. The characteristics of the operational domains are as follows.

a. **Maritime domain.** The maritime domain comprises capabilities and activities primarily related to operating below, on and above the surface of the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas and at the high-water mark, overlapping with the land domain in the landward segment of the littorals.

b. **Land domain.** The land domain comprises capabilities and activities primarily related to operating on and directly above the Earth’s land mass, ending at the high-water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals.

c. **Air domain.** The air domain comprises capabilities and activities primarily related to operating in the airspace that begins at the Earth’s surface (overlapping with the maritime and land domains) and extending to the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible.

d. **Space domain.** The space domain comprises activities and capabilities primarily related to operating in space, where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible.

e. **Cyberspace domain.** The cyberspace domain comprises capabilities and activities primarily related to operating within the interdependent networks of information, technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications, networks, computer systems and embedded processors.

4.43 Information is not a domain. However, information activities use operational domain capabilities to specifically affect the cognitive elements of the engagement space. Although the electromagnetic and acoustic spectra could be viewed as distinctive spheres of capabilities and activities, they do not constitute an operational domain. Both spectra are strongly interconnected with the five recognized operational domains. The ability to use these spectra is crucial to conducting activities effectively in all operational domains.

4.44 The interaction between operational domains, effect dimensions and the engagement space is displayed in Figure 4.3. Capabilities and activities in the operational domains create physical, virtual and cognitive effects in the engagement space. Understanding this interaction enables the commander to orchestrate available capabilities
in flexible, agile and integrated action while remaining resilient to disruptive or hostile action.

Figure 4.3 – Interaction between operational domains and the engagement space

4.45 Successful integration of actions enables the commander to apply the manoeuvrist approach to gain and exploit the initiative by enhancing the opportunities for pre-emption, surprise, simultaneity, tempo and exploitation. This is achieved by enhancing a commander’s ability to: identify and compensate for the weaknesses in one capability or domain with the strengths of another; exploit a wider array of points of influence; or concentrate multi-domain operations on a single point of influence, while minimizing their own exposure to risk. This dislocation and disruption generates greater freedom of manoeuvre to create physical, virtual and cognitive effects in the engagement space.

4.46 Experience has shown that this integration will not be easy; the commander, with their partners, will be trying to coordinate political, military and civilian capabilities that they may not control and cohere activity from across the levels of operations and outside their joint operations area. Furthermore, multi-domain operations require the synchronization of actions that range from the speed of light to walking pace. Where time, space and resources are finite, prioritization is required. This makes command and control a pre-eminent joint function, with a heavy dependence on battlespace management, to
optimize the tempo of decision-making and action to achieve and maintain the initiative. Battlespace management is a method whereby boundaries and permissions within the joint operations area are arranged to enable the dynamic integration of actions and activities across the engagement space.

**Strategic communications**

4.47 The information environment is complex and rapidly evolving, and it is complicated by the return of strategic competition, coupled with easy access to technology that makes the engagement space increasingly interconnected. The current character of competition has resulted in the Alliance creating a new staff directorate – J10-Strategic Communications (StratCom) and a new keystone doctrine publication, AJP-10, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Strategic Communications*. StratCom seeks to influence audiences’ attitudes and behaviours in pursuit of the desired end state in two ways, it:

- supports the Alliance to implement narrative-led execution through all levels of command; and
- targets elements in the cognitive dimension through planning information activities and exploiting other domain actions.

4.48 **Fundamentals of strategic communications.** Recognizing success can only be achieved as part of a comprehensive approach, in which military activity is coherent with its political and civilian efforts. NATO’s approach to StratCom consists of three main elements: understanding, integrated planning and narrative-led execution.

a. **Understanding.** The behaviour-centric approach requires all decisions and actions to be based on a thorough knowledge of audiences, and that part of the information environment relevant to them. The information environment assessment (IEA) identifies audiences and their cultural narratives, existing perceptions and beliefs, and the linguistic nuances they use to communicate with each other. The Alliance endeavours to know how they receive and process information, how that information circulates within the audience, and what their ability is to impact NATO’s end state. StratCom’s IEA is fused with other assessments through CUOE.

b. **Integrated planning.** StratCom exploits the cognitive dimensions by planning first order effects and anticipating, exploiting and mitigating second and third order effects.

c. **Narrative-led execution.** StratCom supports and advises commanders and partners in conducting narrative-led execution. The Alliance must demonstrate consistency in activities, images and words, ensuring they always reflect the strategic and micro narratives, and thus pre-empting any attempts to exploit gaps between what NATO does, shows and says.
For StratCom to be effective it requires clear political direction and guidance – consisting of an end state, clear objectives and a coherent strategic narrative – driven from the top and executed by commanders at all levels through the narrative-led execution and mission command. It also requires innovative working processes that are responsive to a fluid and dynamic environment.

**Information advantage**

StratCom exploits the information environment for a cognitive effect. Information advantage recognizes that connectivity and data underpin economic and military power in the Information Age; the side that gains the upper hand in exploiting information is likely to possess a significant advantage across all campaign themes. Information advantage underpins the comprehensive approach and efforts across all five operational domains and levels of operations to achieve superior understanding, decision-making, execution, assessment, resilience and ultimately superior tempo to achieve and maintain the initiative. Information advantage is not a static state but a relative position that must be maintained; it is often local and temporal.

Information advantage is visualized through three broad pillars. A marginal advantage in each pillar can provide an exponential and decisive advantage.

a. **Information as an enabler.** Information is a critical enabler to mission command and multi-domain operations. It enables understanding, decision-making and command and control. Command and control requires the art and science of decision-making to rapidly translate decisions into action, leveraging capabilities across all domains to achieve tempo and maintain the initiative. Effective command and control requires a sensing grid to deliver a cross-functional, holistic, accurate and timely characterization of the operating environment. Federated Mission Networking connects the full spectrum of domain capabilities and activities through all levels of operation, enabling windows of opportunity to be identified and exploited at a faster pace than our adversaries. While technologies that enable real time communication can provide an advantage by compressing the traditional military levels of operations, they also increase the ability for commanders to micromanage their subordinates, thereby undermining mission command, which should be avoided. The role of information is to empower commanders at all levels of operations to make more timely and informed decisions to create tempo. See AJP-6, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems* for more information on Federated Mission Networking.

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40 Federated Mission Networking. Federated: is a key contribution to the Connected Forces Initiative, helping Allied and partner forces to better communicate, train and operate together. Mission: enables a rapid initiation of mission networks by federating NATO organizations, nations and partner capabilities, thereby enhancing interoperability and information sharing. Networking: is a governed conceptual framework consisting of people, processes and technology to plan, prepare, establish, use and terminate mission networks in support of federated operations.
b. **Information resilience.** As part of force resilience, it is imperative that information systems focus on the protection, confidentiality, integrity, interoperability and availability of our own information. Resilience also requires the ability to defend in a contested cyberspace domain, and in the electromagnetic and acoustic spectra.

c. **Information denial.** Information denial is the ability to deny information to unsupportive audiences and to degrade their understanding by incorporating both passive and active measures. It encapsulates more than physical capabilities; it can range from encouraging the responsible use of social media by our own personnel, through promoting, developing and reinforcing a security culture, to camouflage, concealment and deception techniques and jamming across the acoustic and electromagnetic spectra.

**Sustainment**

4.52 When deploying a force, sustainment is a critical enabler of fighting power; it influences the tempo, duration and intensity of all actions, operations and campaigns, and the available sustainment capacity often determines the initial manoeuvre capability. The character of how the Alliance sustains itself is changing, which is reflected in its doctrine. Sustainment has evolved into the provision of personnel, logistics, medical, general military engineering, finance and contracts support required to maintain the force throughout all phases of the operation. Efficiencies enable the joint force to apply constant pressure on adversaries by identifying, creating and exploiting sustainment mismatches that can cause additional dilemmas and lessen an adversary’s capability. Sustainment planning should have an overarching approach and be integrated in the operations planning process (OPP). There are a number of sustainment considerations, which are detailed below.

a. **Joint.** Multinational sustainment solutions through burden sharing should be found to keep costs down and to prioritize scarce resources so that equitable provision amongst the nations can be reached. NATO Joint Headquarters and national staffs are to adhere to the principles of sustainment from the outset of planning an operation through the OPP. The level of sustainment will also have implications on the commander’s freedom of action, so it is imperative to consider how to exploit often in-demand resources as effectively as possible. Rigorous information management, including sustainment information sharing, during the execution phase will be key. This can be enhanced by inclusion within the CUOE, which will aid commander’s decision-making and enable timely and relevant sustainment across the force.

b. **Political.** Throughout all phases of an operation a distinct responsibility lies with a host nation to make both military and civil resources available for deployed or transiting forces. This requires the political will to be achieved in a timely manner. The comprehensive approach requires nations to intelligently use civil resources,

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41 See AJP-4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Sustainment*, of which a new edition is currently being developed.
including ‘call-off’ contracts with service providers, to enable readiness and agility. 
Activation of such agreements when needed (i.e., for strategic lift air/sea/rail, 
ininfrastructure, road management, port support and general supplies) will ease the 
execution of both deployment, execution and redeployment activities. Political 
understanding and agreement to forward plan is essential if arrangements to 
successfully deliver personnel, equipment, materiel and services are to support the 
overall national intent.

c. **Collaboration for effect.** Cooperation and synchronization of sustainment 
activities should be initiated as early as possible during peacetime before specific 
operations. Some agreements between nations and headquarters may need political 
and/or legal preparations, including releasing national resources to be organized in 
advance. Maximizing interoperability in terms of equipment, services and processes 
operated by nations to deliver sustainment and other broader support activities will 
contribute to a force’s operational efficiency and success. Legitimate prerequisites 
for strategic contracts and necessary arrangements to invite other nations to 
collaborate are important to enhance the overall sustainment capability of forces. 
Nations should be prepared constitutionally to take on the responsibility of a host 
nation, which includes (but is not limited to) agreeing the area of operations, 
providing freedom of movement, preparation and availability of ports of embarkation 
and transit agreements. Timely cooperation between Allies/partners and 
headquarters on sustainment issues will increase effectiveness and simplify burden 
sharing.

d. **Contract support.** To optimize the sustainment footprint and NATO’s and the 
nations’ individual costs of sustaining operations, the Alliance encourages 
multinational cooperation to deliver civilian sector support. Contractor support to 
operations using pre-planned and/or ad hoc commercial contracts developed and run 
by the respective headquarters, nations or through NATO agencies can be highly 
effective. Preference should be given to commercial entities and/or agencies that can 
assure optimized sustainability whilst minimizing a negative impact on the conditions 
in the operating environment. Contractors satisfying a portion of the total sustainment 
support requirements provides NATO commanders and troop-contributing nations 
with an assured service so they can focus on the organization and management of 
pure military resources and capabilities. Cooperation amongst the nations and with 
NATO will contribute to the best use of contractorized resources and encourage 
healthy competition between providers.

e. **Commonality advantage.** Prerequisites for effective sustainment operations 
are: common terminology through doctrine and NATO standardized agreements; and 
standardization of materiel and visibility of resources through effective information 
management systems. Cooperation, collaboration and careful synchronization of 
sustainment activities at all levels between forces, nations and headquarters will 
contribute to better informed planning and visibility of assets. This, and the overall 
ability of nations to be interoperable, will enable efficient sustainment solutions. The
benefits of optimized sustainment can be a reduction of costs, an improved use of available resources, a better employment of available capacity and enhanced burden sharing. This may contribute to a reduction of the (sustainment) footprint.

Sustainment has evolved into the provision of personnel, logistics, medical, general military engineering, finance and contracts support required to maintain the force throughout all phases of the operation. Sustainment influences the tempo, duration and intensity of all operations and actions.

Section 3 – Doctrinal frameworks

4.53 To be successful, commanders and their staffs should develop and maintain situational awareness, balance ends and means, determine ways, and orchestrate and direct actions and capabilities, using conceptual frameworks to aid understanding and design operations. They include analytical, operations, functional, geographic and joint function frameworks.

Analytical framework

4.54 Considering the end state, a thorough understanding of the operating environment's system of systems allows the commander to frame the problem, allocate appropriate resources across the levels of operations, understand the effects of actions and anticipate potential outcomes. The understanding and assessment of the operating environment is supported by analytical frameworks such as the political, military, economic, social,
infrastructure and information (PMESII)\textsuperscript{42} that feed into the CUOE to support the commander’s decision-making process.

**Operations framework**

4.55 The operations framework describes tactical operations as shaping, decisive or supporting, and links them to the commander’s manoeuvre plan. It sets the operating scheme and desired result. The commander uses the operations framework to synchronize their forces’ activities in time and space according to the objective. It enables a clear view of relationships between the effects and objectives. It also enhances the forces’ focus on the end state and avoids mission creep.

4.56 Concepts for tactical operations stemming from the operations framework are best described in relation to the decisive conditions/supporting effects and lines/grouping of operations. A number of shaping and decisive operations may be needed to realize decisive conditions/supporting effects along a line of operations. Shaping, decisive and sustaining actions can apply to all effect dimensions.

**Functional framework**

4.57 Actions that focus on creating desired effects that support the achievement of objectives are performed through three core functions: find, fix and strike. The need to be prepared to use the fourth core function, exploit, is always implicit. The finding and fixing of targeted audiences helps to shape the engagement space. Striking and exploiting can potentially be decisive. The core function of fixing is not merely confined to the tactical task of fixing. Offensive or defensive activities stemming from the core function ‘fix’ can be enabling for offensive activities for the core function ‘strike’. Operational experience has shown that finding, fixing, striking and exploiting should all take place in association with each other.

4.58 In armed conflict or confrontation there is constant interaction between finding, fixing, striking and exploiting to create effects in all dimensions. Separately, they only have a limited impact. To maximize that impact, core functions should always be coordinated by commanders.

4.59 Political, civilian or military actions can perform these core functions. Security organizations, the judicial system and even development organizations can find, fix, strike and exploit a rival’s capability or ability to influence audiences. For example, a developmental organization can fix an adversary by providing social improvements, allowing host-nation governmental actors to strike by resolving core grievances.

\textsuperscript{42} The operating environment can be initially viewed through several conceptual models. The most common in NATO are the six listed PMESII elements. But modification or other models are admitted PMESII + physical and time (PMESII-PT), geospatial + PMESII (GPMESII), PMESII + health (PMESIIH), or areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events (ASCOPE) may fit to describe a certain operating environment or support a planning process.
Commanders use conceptual frameworks to aid understanding and design actions.

**Geographic framework**

4.60 The geographic framework (deep, close and rear) describes the ‘where and when’ of employing actions. In this framework, deep and rear operations are defined by the close operational engagement space around the joint force. Conceptual geography in the operating environment is important because it describes where intended operations take place. Even in a non-linear engagement space, the concepts of deep, close and rear, and a sense of range and proximity, aid understanding. When used in combination with other frameworks, they provide a powerful method to help visualize, organize and integrate activity across the operational domains, and the electromagnetic and acoustic spectra.

**Joint function framework**

4.61 The joint function framework assists commanders to integrate political, military and civilian actions through the operational domains. The joint functions describe the detailed capabilities of the force. In any operation these joint functions are to be considered, although the individual functions’ contributions, significance and demands will vary. The joint function framework uses a combination of manoeuvre, fires, information and CIMIC to affect the audience’s attitude and behaviour. It is ‘informed and directed’ by the joint functions of command and control and intelligence, and ‘supported’ by the joint functions of sustainment and force protection, as shown in Figure 4.4. AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations* contains further detail.
Section 4 – Applying key tenets, supporting concepts and frameworks

4.62 The key tenets of the behaviour-centric, manoeuvrist and comprehensive approaches form the foundation of orchestration by understanding the ends, ways and means to be applied to attain the end state. This basis is supported by the narrative-led approach and mission command to maintain focus on the strategic end state and achieve agility in the often chaotic and demanding operating environment. The supporting doctrine, concepts and frameworks provide the conceptual support while applying operational art.

4.63 Understanding starts with analyzing the operating environment, after which the commander and their staff determine the role of the military force in support of attaining the end state and achieving higher-level objectives to initiate the planning process. The next step is mission analysis, which includes identifying the objectives, decisive conditions and desired effects. Centre of gravity analysis helps to identify vulnerabilities and how an actor’s will might be influenced to achieve objectives. The manoeuvrist approach is the primary tenet focused on centre of gravity analysis, supported by the operations framework.

4.64 When objectives are established, decisive conditions and supporting effects can be identified through the analytical construct of effect dimensions. When the effects are identified, effective and efficient actions to resource those effects are created through multi-domain operations and the comprehensive approach.
4.65 The next step is developing courses of action (COAs). Before our COAs are developed, understanding is developed of relevant national and international actors’ actions. This is conducted to avoid adversely impacting their actions, or our own COA, and to enhance interaction through the comprehensive approach.

4.66 Our COA development should illustrate the actions needed to generate the decisive conditions through: creating desired effects; the engagement space’s systems at which actions are directed; the joint functions required to carry out the main actions and the related capabilities required by the joint force to resource the task (troop-to-task); the required complementary civilian actions; and an outline of information activities.

4.67 Throughout this step, effective StratCom, information advantage and sustainment are determining factors, and without them, the COA will fail. So, with StratCom being a core element of planning and execution, a continuous approach to information advantage and sustainment forms an integral part of COA development. After a COA is selected, the plan development starts when the COA is implemented, supported by the joint functions and the geographical and functional frameworks, leading to the different planning products. This concept is illustrated in Figure 4.5.

![Figure 4.5 – Applying key tenets, supporting concepts and frameworks](image-url)
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Chapter 5 – Command and control

5.1 Chapter 5 outlines NATO’s evolving command and control (C2). The chapter explains the C2 requirement and principles. It then gives a general description of NATO’s military structure, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe’s (SHAPE’s) C2 architecture, command relationships and the principles of joint and multinational command.

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Section 1 – Command and control requirements

5.2 Command and control is an institutional and compound term. It can be a process, a capability, a system or a structure. It can also be treated as a single whole, ‘command and control’, with a different meaning to the separate words of ‘command’ and ‘control’. The words ‘command’ and ‘control’ are explained below and are exercised through mission command.

a. Command. Command is defined as: ‘the authority vested in a member of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces.’ Direction is defining the objectives to achieve, the actions to take, and the resources and procedures required to achieve those objectives. Coordination is harmonizing and guiding assigned forces to achieve the objectives. Command authority is allocated formally to a commander through position, orders and directives and has a specific individual component vested in personal credibility. To command is to exercise that authority by motivating and directing people and organizations. Exercising command requires leadership and decision-making.

b. Control. Control is defined as: ‘the authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under their command, encompassing the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.’ Control is to manage and direct forces and functions consistent with a commander’s command authority.

5.3 Command and control takes place dynamically throughout the assessment, planning, preparation and execution of activities. While the activities are cyclical and continuous, they do not necessarily occur sequentially. Furthermore, a commander must understand that higher and subordinate commands may be in different stages of the process at any given time.
5.4 **Principles of joint and multinational command.** The following are the principles of joint and multinational command. For further detail on these principles, see Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unity of command</strong></td>
<td>Unity of command means that all forces operate under one designated authority. It requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of the agreed objectives or end state. At the military strategic, operational and tactical levels of command, a fundamental element of C2 is unity of command, which provides the necessary cohesion for the planning and execution of operations. Command relationships, by which commanders derive this authority, will be determined when a joint task force is established. These relationships will acknowledge the constraints that are placed on the use of national force contributions and supporting national assets, and the extent of military activities of other authorities in a designated joint operations area. As a minimum, a commander would normally have operational control (OPCON) over all NATO or attached forces within a joint operations area. When unity of command (for forces or agencies outside the joint task force) is not wholly achievable, unity of effort should be established using clear coordination arrangements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Continuity of command</strong></td>
<td>Command should be continuous throughout an operation. During an operation, further enhancement of unity of command is desirable through continuity of command. In principle, ‘the commander who plans should execute’; however, circumstances may not permit this. The higher command authority, in consultation with the operational-level commander, should arrange a succession of command and, in turn, an operational-level commander should arrange an alternate headquarters to meet operational contingencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chain of command</strong></td>
<td>The C2 structure is a hierarchical system and should be defined and understood, with all its command responsibilities, by all levels of command. A clear chain of command strengthens integration between components. Where necessary and appropriate, direction and orders to a subordinate commander may include tasks for specific force elements, subject to any limitations imposed by nations. Irreconcilable differences may need to be referred up the chain of command to be resolved at the strategic level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integration of command</strong></td>
<td>The command structure should ensure that the capabilities of the nation, or those of several nations, are directed decisively to achieve the operational objectives in the most effective way. Component</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
commands, to which national contingents contribute, are normally environmental or functional, but the specific task organization will reflect the higher commander’s specific operations requirements. An efficient and comprehensive liaison structure, linking the joint task force headquarters, all force elements and other organisations (such as international organizations and non-governmental organizations) is an essential element of the C2 structure.

5.5 Command and control and the comprehensive approach. Traditionally, with the notion of force elements in our area of responsibility being ‘under command’, it is assumed that the Alliance has ‘control’ over them. However, as part of the comprehensive approach, this is not routinely achievable. Depending on the nature of the partners or neutral actors, varying C2 approaches will be required – ranging from directing to engaging under the mission command philosophy – to drive or influence internal and external organizations, with the intent of shaping the engagement space. Each of these approaches will have different applicability and all will be applied simultaneously based on differences in context and organizational needs and capabilities. For example, at the lower tactical level, where external relationships are reduced and linear hierarchies are likely to dominate, command will be largely directive in nature. However, at higher levels, where partners and other actors will be more numerous, engaging to influence will become increasingly important and the use of a direct style will be less prevalent and effective. Furthermore, the C2 approaches will depend on the following levels of force interaction.

a. **Coexistence.** Organizations have no interaction. Two or more actors are aware of each other’s presence but will not directly interact.

b. **Consultation.** Different organizations will seek the opinion or advice of other actors. While some information will be shared, decisions are made independently. At the very least, this will enable the military to provide security advice and deconflict efforts and movements.

c. **Deconfliction.** Formal communication will take place and decisions are coordinated, but actions are conducted independently. This will help ensure that the best organization available will undertake the required tasks and that the military can advise on, and be prepared to provide, any specific security measures. Organizations will avoid undesirable interference between actors, especially where they perform the same function or occupy the same space.

d. **Coordination.** This can be described as the process of bringing together different elements of a complex activity or organization into an efficient relationship. Organizations share information and frequent communication occurs. Some shared decision-making will take place, fostered by shared objectives. The military and other agencies might help each other undertake their tasks. For example, the military may provide transportation to help deliver the humanitarian aid organized by a non-governmental or other government agency.
e. **Cooperation.** Organizations will work together for mutual benefit. A shared decision-making process may exist between organizations. Cooperation does not mean giving up authority or autonomy.

f. **Coalition.** Partners that operate within a formalized task and responsibilities structure. Coalition partners devolve a defined level of their authority and autonomy to a single authority to integrate decision-making and actions towards the end state.

5.6 It is likely that a commander will be simultaneously working with actors from multiple levels of force interaction within the engagement space. The different levels of force interaction require different C2 models and the degree to which they allocate decision rights and permissions will vary. Given that force interaction may be fluid and alter in response to changes in the engagement space, the C2 model will require agility; that is, the ability to change to the required C2 model with speed and ease.

5.7 **Command and control capability.** A C2 capability is a dynamic and adaptive socio-technical system configured to design and execute multi-domain operations through the comprehensive approach. Its purpose is to provide focus for individuals and organizations so that they may integrate and maximize their resources and activities to achieve the objectives. The essential functions commanders need C2 to accomplish to achieve its purpose include, but are not limited to:

- creating shared awareness (including awareness of command intent);
- allocating resources to create effects;
- assessing progress; and
- providing the C2 agility to recognize and conduct a change of approach and/or the plan of action.

The principles of C2 structure are outlined in Table 5.1.\(^{43}\)

\(^{43}\) Military Committee Memorandum (MCM)-0169-2019, *Joint Command and Control concept of operations.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>C2 availability enables responsiveness through readiness, deployability and mobility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>Flexibility allows Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to force generate a mission-tailored package optimized for its role, based on interoperability, sustainability and multinationality as an operation arises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarity</td>
<td>Command relationships must be coherent and commanders should clearly understand their command relationship and priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplicity</td>
<td>C2 is to be designed with a logical and simple framework. It must be flexible enough to change when necessary, while concurrently striving to evolve with the least amount of transformation as the task and environment changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience</td>
<td>C2 must continuously enable tempo, initiative and information advantage in degraded, austere and contested environments. This requires distributed C2, robust federated networks and mission command.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 5.1 – Principles of a command and control structure

Section 2 – Military command and control structure

5.8 NATO has established a military structure to meet its requirements, which includes the ability to provide a rapid military response to an emerging crisis. It includes a:

- NATO Command Structure (NCS), comprising static and deployable elements; and
- NATO force structure (NFS), comprising deployable Allied national and multinational forces, which includes joint headquarters and component commands.

The NCS and NFS may receive support from other headquarters and force elements, including national entities or specialists in an augmenting role, to meet specific requirements. All NCS and NFS force elements will be trained according to common NATO standards. C2 will be structured to provide capability throughout the force from the strategic, through the operational, to the tactical levels and horizontally across the whole comprehensive force. The C2 structure is purposely flexible and adjustable to best fit a multitude of potential scenarios.
NATO Command Structure

5.9 The NCS is composed of permanently established headquarters and supporting organizational elements at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. At the strategic level, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), as the commander of the Allied Command Operations (ACO), assumes the overall command of operations and is responsible for planning, preparing, conducting, executing and sustaining all NATO operations. SACEUR determines the C2 arrangements and designates those who will exercise operational and tactical authority. These arrangements are endorsed by the Military Committee (MC) and approved by the North Atlantic Council.

Allied Command Operations' overall aim is to contribute to Allied defence and security by maintaining the integrity of Alliance territory, safeguarding freedom of the seas and economic lifelines, and to preserve or restore the security of its members.

5.10 Allied Command Transformation (ACT) leads large parts of the NATO Defence Planning Process. ACT provides strategic support to NATO operations. The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation is responsible for developing NATO's capabilities through education, training and exercises, experimentation, assessing concepts and promoting interoperability. Examples of activities and programmes that are led by ACT include joint operations pre-deployment training, doctrine development, and identifying and promulgating lessons for remedial action.

44 As outlined in MC 0324/3 FINAL, The NATO Military Command Structure.
The NATO force structure

5.11 The NFS provides additional and follow-on joint headquarters capabilities, most of the tactical C2 capabilities and the forces to meet the full level of ambition. The NFS is composed of Allied national and multinational deployable forces and headquarters that have been placed at the Alliance's disposal on a permanent or temporary basis under specific readiness criteria to meet the operational requirements. National contributions are made available to the Alliance for operations by agreed mechanisms for transfer of authority, in accordance with the MC 0133/5, and by coordination and cooperation agreements, supplemented by common assets for specific capabilities and scenarios.

The NATO force structure includes packages of capabilities consisting of graduated readiness force headquarters (joint, maritime, land and air), special operations and other combat forces and appropriate supporting assets.

5.12 The NFS will include packages of capabilities consisting of graduated readiness forces (GRF), headquarters (joint, maritime, land and air), special operations forces and other combat forces and appropriate supporting assets (including transportation, force protection and communication and information systems (CIS)) for both the headquarters themselves and the assigned forces. Clear and transparent arrangements are required between SACEUR, the framework nation, GRF headquarters, participating nations and nations providing forces. These are maintained through memoranda of understanding and technical arrangements that cover C2 responsibilities and procedures, transfer of authority, training, preparation, evaluation and operations planning in peacetime, crisis and operations. These arrangements provide increased readiness through establishing responsibility for training, operations planning and evaluation. The NFS headquarters and forces are able to deploy, operate and re-deploy without host-nation support.45

45 See NATO Bi-SC Conceptual Framework for Alliance Operations for a more exhaustive list of other forces, structures and assets available to NATO.
Section 3 – Command and control architecture

5.13 SHAPE’s C2 architecture comprises two types of command. These are: joint force commands and theatre components/component commands.⁴⁶

a. **Joint force commands.** Joint force commands (JFCs) are warfighting and deterrence headquarters that plan, prepare and conduct joint activities, missions and operations across all operational domains in their assigned geographic area within usual peacetime activities and current operations, through crisis and up to conflict.

b. **Theatre components/component commands.** Theatre components/component commands are warfighting headquarters in command of domain activities, missions and operations, including those that span across geographic boundaries. Additionally, they serve as domain and functional advisers. Functional domains are a C2 construct; all military activity occurs through the five operational domains framework, as explained in Chapter 4.

Allied Command Operations command levels

5.14 Ordinarily there are three command levels that reflect the levels of operations. These are strategic, operational and tactical.

5.15 **Strategic level of command.** SACEUR, as head of ACO, is supported by SHAPE, which acts as the strategic headquarters for operations. SHAPE, in turn, is supported by all subordinate commands at the operational and tactical levels.

5.16 **Operational level of command.** There are two commands at the operational level. These are: joint commands and theatre components.

a. **Joint commands.** The joint operational level of command is provided by three JFCs (Brunssum, Naples and Norfolk). The JFCs are primarily focused on collective defence. The main task of the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) is to ensure seamless, swift and secure movements of NATO forces through European NATO states. To that end, the JSEC prepares and coordinates processes and procedures with national authorities and other relevant entities’ planning. In particular, it supports execution and coordination of security, force protection and area damage control. Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (in its joint headquarters role), as well as non-NCS joint headquarters committed through the Long-Term Commitments Plan (LTCP), are primarily focused on small joint and non-Article 5 crisis response operations, providing a deployable or expeditionary C2 capability.

⁴⁶ MCM-0169-2019, Joint Command and Control concept of operations.
b. **Theatre components.** The theatre components consist of:

- maritime theatre command;
- land theatre command;
- air and space theatre command;
- special operations forces theatre component (NATO Special Operations Headquarters and SHAPE Office of Special Operations);
- cyberspace theatre component (Cyberspace Operations Centre (CyOC)); and
- sustainment/logistics theatre component (Standing Joint Logistic Support Group Headquarters).

The theatre components are the domain and functional advisers to the strategic and operational levels and are responsible for determining the priority, timing and creation of desired effects for activities, missions and operations within their given theatre of operations. The theatre components ensure unity of effort and reduce the impact of C2 seams at the joint operations area boundaries. The single service commands exercise OPCON of those forces transferred to NATO that are not assigned to the JFC or JSEC.

5.17 **Tactical level of command.** The tactical level consists of NCS and non-NCS commands, which include regional or permanent headquarters, organizations provided through memoranda of understanding and rotational headquarters generated through the LTCP. Tactical component commands can be augmented or enhanced by the NCS.

a. **Maritime.** Tactical-level headquarters consist of NCS’ maritime component commands (MCCs) and high-readiness force (Maritime). The MCCs are normally provided by the nations based on the GRF headquarters and identified in the LTCP. Allied Maritime Command could in some instances, particularly during transition, also act as an MCC supporting the JFCs. If required, maritime component headquarters can be deliberately force generated.

b. **Land.** Tactical-level headquarters consist of regionally focused and rotational headquarters, corps headquarters and division headquarters identified in the LTCP. Land component commands are provided by either regionally focused headquarters or rotational headquarters identified in the LTCP. If required, tactical land component headquarters can be deliberately force generated.

c. **Air.** Tactical-level headquarters consist of NCS' joint force air component (JFAC), two combined air operations centres, a deployable air command and control centre and NFS' JFAC. The NCS' JFAC normally provides the air tactical component commands and is the default option for NATO operations larger than a small joint operation. Allied Air Command now also hosts the NATO Space Centre.

d. **Logistics component commands.** Tactical-level headquarters consist of a NCS Joint Logistic Support Group Headquarters and a non-NCS Joint Logistic
Support Group. Logistic component commands are provided by NCS Joint Force Logistic Support Group Headquarters or rotational headquarters identified in the LTCP though specific augmentation process.

e. **Special operations forces.** Tactical-level headquarters consist of non-NCS special operations component commands (SOCCs). SOCCs are multinational or national joint component commands formed around a national framework or a composite structure with a lead nation. SOCCs are non-standing headquarters in the NFS, generated from national inventories and tailored for each operation.

f. **Cyberspace.** At the tactical level, CIS provides support to tactical headquarters. These providers may be part of the NCS’ memoranda of understanding organizations, commercial organizations, NFS or national non-NFSs. They take operational guidance and direction from ACO via the CyOC, based on contractual and other C2 arrangements. The CyOC concentrates its cyberspace C2 support on four areas: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; cyberspace defence; cyberspace offense; and CIS. Cyberspace actions are synchronized and integrated via the CyOC in coordination with respective commands at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

**Section 4 – Command relationships**

**Degrees of authority in operations**

5.18 A common understanding of the degrees of delegated authority is a prerequisite for military effectiveness within the Alliance. Agreed definitions on the authority delegated to commanders enable a seamless assignment of units from NFS to the relevant entities within the NCS. It allows for a flexible assignment of forces that are most suitable for the situation and the operational requirements. NATO definitions of delegated authority are used for the whole of the Alliance. The following definitions in Table 5.2 form the basis for this common understanding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command authority</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full command (FULLCOM)</td>
<td>The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. Notes: 1. Full command covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. 2. The term “command” as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. 3. NATO and coalition commanders do not have full command over their forces assigned to them since nations will delegate only operational command or operational control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Authority Definition</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational command (OPCOM)</td>
<td>The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical command and/or tactical control, as the commander deems necessary. Note: Operational command does not include responsibility for administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational control (OPCON)</td>
<td>The authority delegated to a commander to direct assigned forces to accomplish specific missions or tasks that are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical command or control of those units. Note: Operational control does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned and does not include administrative or logistic control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical command (TACOM)</td>
<td>The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under their command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority, and to retain or delegate tactical control of units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical control (TACON)</td>
<td>The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative control (ADCON)</td>
<td>Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Note: No NATO or coalition commander has administrative control over the forces assigned to them since, in assigning forces to NATO, nations will delegate only operational command or control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics control (LOGCON)</td>
<td>The authority granted to a NATO Commander over assigned logistics units and organisations in the joint operations area, including national support elements, that empowers them to synchronize, prioritize, and integrate their logistics functions and activities to accomplish the joint theatre mission. Note: It does not confer authority over nationally owned resources held by a national support element, except as agreed in the transfer of authority or in accordance with NATO principles and policies for logistics.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2 – Command authority definitions

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47 This definition has been submitted to the NATO Terminology Office for modification.
5.19 Some aspects of authority will remain national issues as reflected in full command, which is normally retained at the national level. When a transfer of authority (TOA) of forces takes place from a nation to NATO, the delegation of authority is normally operational command and/or OPCON. The TOA usually assigns units to the designated commanders, normally (but not exclusively) at the operational level. Within operations, OPCON can be further delegated to assign units to tasks and/or tactical missions. OPCON may be exerted through the delegation of tactical command and tactical control. Authority can also be delegated for a defined matter as administrative control. The coordination – both combined and joint – can be facilitated through the delegation of coordination authority, which allows units and commanders to interact directly and find workable solutions without having to refer to higher headquarters.

5.20 If a nation so desires, some level of logistics control (LOGCON) may be granted to a NATO commander over assigned logistic units and organizations in the joint operations area, including national support elements. LOGCON over logistics would be specified in the nation’s TOA letter and would not confer authority over the nationally owned resources held by a national support element, except as agreed in the TOA.

5.21 Command arrangements must accommodate the situation prior to and after the TOA. A commander may delegate to a subordinate commander a clearly stated part of their authority. While commanders can delegate specific authority, they retain overall responsibility for their commands. Accountability involves a liability and obligation to answer for the proper use of delegated authority and resources; it includes the duty to act. Thus, the authority granted to a subordinate should be commensurate with the task given; the subordinate, meanwhile, remains responsible to their superior for its execution.
The execution of operations should be guided by the supported/supporting relationship to allow the strengths and capabilities of the headquarters and forces to complement each other to best effect. Establishing clear supporting/supported relationships between commands allows commanders to leverage available capabilities and resources to achieve synergy, in a unified effort. This relationship provides a means of balancing the phases of Alliance operations between NATO commanders receiving support from, and providing support to, other commanders. The supported/supporting relationships are based on a clear prioritization and established and defined by SACEUR, or an appointed operational commander when appropriate. Supported/supporting relationships are contingency/mission specific and are limited in scope, geography or means.

5.23 The supporting commander could play a theatre advisory role and have to support several supported commanders at the same time. When advising as theatre component command, the supporting commander has to assure that the supported commander has been fully involved in the process of producing the related assessment and will always seek supported commanders’ concurrency beforehand.

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48 Picture credit: AB Forces News Collection / Alamy Stock Photo.
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Annex A – Cross-cutting topics

General

A.1 This annex summarizes the key aspects of cross-cutting topics that could affect a mission. NATO has identified the following cross-cutting topics:

- protection of civilians (PoC);
- children and armed conflict (CAAC);
- cultural property protection (CPP);
- women, peace and security (WPS);
- conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV);
- sexual exploitation and abuse;
- combating trafficking in human beings; and
- building integrity.

Protection of civilians

A.2 NATO is committed to the PoC\textsuperscript{49} in the planning and conduct of operations, missions and other North Atlantic Council-mandated activities. PoC is a cross-cutting concept relevant to all three core tasks of NATO. The PoC policy complements existing efforts in areas such as CAAC, WPS, and CRSV and gender-based violence.\textsuperscript{50} NATO’s approach to PoC is based on legal, moral and political imperatives and, consistent with applicable legal frameworks, NATO recognizes that all feasible measures must be taken to avoid, minimize and mitigate harm to civilians. When planning and implementing such measures, NATO should consider those groups most vulnerable to violence within the local context. NATO recognizes that, in general, men, women, boys and girls are affected differently by armed conflicts or crises and have different security needs, which need to be identified and addressed. A sound approach to PoC is important for continued credibility and legitimacy, and therefore we should adhere to the following conceptual framework.\textsuperscript{51}

A.3 The \textit{Concept for the Protection of Civilians} sets the framework\textsuperscript{52} as depicted in Figure A.1. The framework comprises four sections:

- understanding the human environment (UHE);
- mitigate harm;


\textsuperscript{50} Sexual and gender-based violence refers to any act that is perpetrated against a person’s will and is based on gender norms and unequal power relationships. It encompasses threats of violence and coercion. It can be physical, emotional, psychological or sexual in nature, and can take the form of a denial of resources or access to services. It inflicts harm on women, girls, men and boys. Source: http://www.unhcr.org/sexual-and-gender-based-violence.html.

\textsuperscript{51} See also the \textit{NATO Military Concept on the Protection of Civilians}, 20 December 2017.

\textsuperscript{52} MC 0668 FINAL, \textit{Concept for the Protection of Civilians}, 25 April 2018.
• facilitate access to basic needs; and
• contribute to a safe and secure environment (C-SASE).

Figure A.1 – The Concept for the Protection of Civilians framework

A.4 Understanding the human environment. UHE is reached by applying a ‘population-centric’ view on the overall operating environment, and by analyzing and assessing strengths and vulnerabilities of the population. It seeks to identify existing or potential threats to civilians in order to integrate PoC factors into the planning of NATO operations and activities to enable the following PoC sections.

A.5 Mitigate harm. To avoid causing harm to civilians by their actions, the military is to exercise caution in operations and activities, and apply civilian casualty management to mitigate negative effects if harm was caused. To prevent or mitigate harm caused by other belligerents’ actions, the military uses influence, within the mission mandate, to prevent, deter, pre-empt and respond to situations where civilians are subject to unlawful violence or are under the threat of it.
A.6 Facilitate access to basic needs. While NATO or NATO-led forces are not normally responsible for providing basic needs to the civilian population, they can, in accordance with the mandate, play an important role by contributing to the provision of a safe and secure environment, which is normally the responsibility of a civil administration or humanitarian aid organizations. In exceptional circumstances, and based on humanitarian considerations, NATO may also respond to requests for assistance by humanitarian actors.

A.7 Contribute to a safe and secure environment. Within the continuum of competition from baseline activities and current operations to Article 5 collective defence, C-SASE includes conflict prevention, stabilization, capacity building and development tasks. Since the provision of a safe and secure environment is primarily the responsibility of the host-nation governmental authorities, NATO’s role in this section could be to support their efforts if their capacity is insufficient. The primary role of C-SASE is to provide the necessary security conditions to reduce the chance of localized or widespread escalation, conflagration or reversion into armed conflict. C-SASE supports the strengthening or re-establishment of a sufficient protective environment to enable conditions to develop long-term security and stability where the population is served by a functional, legitimate, self-sustaining and resilient government.

Children and armed conflict

A.8 NATO is committed to implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1612 and related resolutions on the protection of children affected by armed conflict. NATO will integrate CAAC considerations into planning and the conduct of its operations, as well as training, monitoring and reporting.53

A.9 The pattern of armed conflict has led to an increased risk for civilians, and especially children.54 The involvement of children in today’s conflicts has long-term destabilizing implications for society; patterns of violence rooted in communities are passed on to younger generations, thereby threatening long-term stability and increasing the chance of renewed violence. Children who have been victims of warfare or former perpetrators of violence show psychosocial disturbances. Rehabilitation and reintegrating into society are challenging and very complex endeavours. The protection of children in armed conflict is an important aspect of a comprehensive strategy towards resolving conflict and building a durable peace, and as such it is a matter of peace and security.

A.10 NATO, in consultation with the United Nations (UN), has targeted four key priorities where its actions can add value to the effort of the international community. These actions are to:

• report violations and support monitoring;

54 In UNSCR 1325 the United Nations Security Council expressed concern that civilians, particularly women and children, are increasingly targeted by combatants and armed elements.
• train Allies and partner nations forces;
• raise awareness of local security forces; and
• initiate political dialogue.

A.11 The UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict has identified six categories of violations that warrant priority attention; the so called ‘six grave violations’ against CAAC. Standard procedures for monitoring and reporting on the six grave violations are developed in consultation with relevant non-governmental organizations/international organizations to operationalize UNSCR 1612 and its related resolutions. The identified six grave violations are:

• the killing and maiming of children;
• attacks on schools or hospitals;
• abduction of children;
• sexual violence against children;
• recruitment or use of children as soldiers; and
• denial of humanitarian access.

A.12 Commanders should ensure that objective, accurate and reliable information is collected and reported in a timely manner on violations committed against children in armed conflict. Therefore, cooperation with the international community is key when considering CAAC. NATO’s forces should try to create a liaison network, which is vital to facilitate the exchange of information. When the mission ends, the military should ensure the efforts regarding CAAC have not been in vain and include them in the transition process.

Cultural property protection

A.13 History has shown that cultural property is vulnerable in times of conflict. Cultural property can be destroyed or damaged unintentionally by opposing forces as collateral damage, or destroyed or damaged intentionally. Culture plays an essential role in modern day conflict as the identity of a group of people is often connected to symbols reflected in buildings, monuments and artefacts. Damaging, destroying or plundering cultural heritage undermines a community's social, ethnic or religious identity, cohesion and resilience. In addition, in times of unrest or armed conflict, artefacts are prime objects to be looted and the trade in antiquities is a source of income for illegal armed groups and can fuel criminal and terrorist activities. Because of the importance of cultural property, not only to the local community but to society in general, it needs protection.

A.14 CPP has mission relevance and there is a role for the military as stipulated in international and national law. Ensuring CPP can lead to goodwill from the local community and greater force acceptance. In comparison, a lack of action on the part of the international community, and especially the armed forces, can lead to a decline in goodwill.
from the international community and can have a negative effect on the public opinion of the mission at home and worldwide. CPP prevents armed groups from illegally financing their activities through looted antiquities. CPP preserves national, ethnic and religious identity.

A.15 Effective CPP activities must start before an actual outbreak of armed conflict. This is normally a responsibility of the host-nation government. After the outbreak of an armed conflict, the military might be the first to arrive and be capable of assisting in CPP. The military have an essential task and responsibility to protect cultural heritage in times of armed conflict when others cannot take on this task to protect the remains of previous generations. The integration of CPP into a military mission requires identifying cultural property within engagement parameters, but also looking at the significance of cultural property for the identity and culture of the population. The fundamental key to effective CPP is solid liaison between the military and the cultural heritage sector.55

**Women, peace and security**

A.16 Explained further in Annex B, *Gender and women, peace and security*, NATO’s commitment to the WPS agenda underlines the need to respond appropriately to integrate a gender perspective in operations and organizational structures to avoid the risk of failing to respond effectively. To provide security to the entire population and to get a full understanding of the operational environment, military actors need to analyze and consider the different security needs of women, men, girls and boys. Military commanders and decision-makers that fail to integrate a gender perspective will risk putting vulnerable populations in greater jeopardy. They also risk failing to gather crucial information, increasing the threats for their own troops and, consequently, putting the success of the mission at risk.

**Conflict-related sexual violence**

A.17 NATO has an enduring obligation to combat CRSV as part of its commitment to implement the WPS agenda. Developing the capacity to prevent and address sexual violence constitutes a clear responsibility for military organizations. If the military does not take proper action to prevent and respond to CRSV, the overall mission is at risk through reduced credibility and increased tension among local communities. These tensions could contribute to aggravating the security situation.

**Sexual exploitation and abuse**

A.18 Sexual exploitation and abuse constitutes an important topic within the WPS agenda and runs counter to NATO’s principles and core values. When acts of sexual exploitation and abuse are committed, it undermines the professionalism and credibility of the Alliance.

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55 For more information see Bi-Strategic Command Directive 086-005, *Implementing Cultural Property Protection in NATO Operations and Missions*, 1 April 2019.
and risks mission success. This means that preventing sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by one’s own personnel is fundamental.

**Combating trafficking in human beings**

A.19 Times of conflict, post-conflict, disaster, and other crisis and emergency situations heighten vulnerabilities, particularly for women and children, to human trafficking and exploitation. Trafficking in human beings affects countries of origin, countries of transit and countries of destination and is closely associated with sexual and gender-based violence, terrorism and transnational organized crime. NATO recognizes trafficking in human beings as a transnational problem, which requires concerted multilateral action to be defeated and NATO is committed to reinforcing efforts to prevent and combat such activity.\(^{56}\)

**Building integrity**

A.20 Building integrity\(^{57}\) is a key element of Alliance activities. The importance of implementing measures to improve integrity building, anti-corruption and good governance applies to NATO, allies and partners alike. The building integrity programme addresses the adverse effects of corruption on military operations. Dealing with this requires inter-agency cooperation and coordination as part of the military contribution to a comprehensive approach. Corruption is a common foe for all actors and offers an opportunity for developing a common agreed approach among the international community.

A.21 Within this framework of its building integrity programme, NATO works to support Allies and partner nations to promote and implement the principles of integrity, transparency and accountability in accordance with international norms and practices established for the defence and related security sector. The NATO-led capacity building programme provides practical tools to help nations strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability and reduce the risk of corruption in the defence and security sector.

A.22 Corruption is a security risk; it undermines public trust and confidence, wastes resources and limits a commander’s ability to achieve operational objectives. Corruption affects the whole society and the needs and interests of an entire population. It is therefore essential that both men and women are included in anti-corruption decision-making and that gender is considered in assessing risks and in developing strategies to reduce corruption and promote good governance in the defence and security sector.

A.23 The *Military Concept for Building Integrity in Operations* (BIIO) provides guidance for NATO military and civilian personnel for the implementation of building integrity in all phases of NATO-led operations, missions and activities. It is predominantly aimed at the

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\(^{56}\) NATO Policy on combating trafficking in human beings: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_71856.htm

\(^{57}\) See PO(2016)0310, *NATO Policy on Building Integrity*, 18 May 2016. Also, for building integrity, the Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector under Norway’s Ministry of Defence serves as the curricular Department Head.
strategic and operational levels, but is also applicable at the tactical level. The concept establishes a framework, principles and guidelines for the holistic and coherent development of NATO’s approach to BIIO. The approach is founded on three principles – integrity, transparency and accountability – which are operationalized using the 'understand, plan, execute and assess' framework.

A.24 Education and training are key to making and sustaining change, which will produce long-term benefits. Courses are organized to assist and train nations in building capacity and enhance institutions. Education and training aims to raise awareness by sharing best practices, processes and methodologies, as well as increasing interoperability and promoting international cooperation, all of which are important tools in achieving a more secure environment.

**Human security**

A.25 NATO has not implemented a specific policy and does not have a definition for human security. However, the Alliance acknowledges the commitment to the UN concept through the establishment of a Human Security Office in the NATO Headquarters.

A.26 The UN concept of human security promotes a comprehensive view to security that goes beyond militarily secured national security. It shifts from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security and thus encompasses not only the freedom from fear (of violence or military aggression) but also the freedom of want and the freedom to live in dignity. The seven main categories of human security are: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. The safeguarding of these categories of human security are generally a national sovereign responsibility, whereby the international community complements and provides necessary support. Human security is supported by the internationally agreed Sustainable Development Goals.

A.27 The notion of human security is distinct from the responsibility to protect and does not entail the threat of the use of force or coercive measures. It is therefore not a cross-cutting topic, but it complements them as a part of the comprehensive approach.
Annex B – Gender and women, peace and security

B.1 As outlined in Chapter 1, NATO’s approach to conflict is based on understanding and situational awareness. The term ‘gender’ refers to the social differences and relations between women and men, which are learned through socialization and determine a person’s position and value in a given context. Understanding these gender relationships and the power dynamics behind them is a prerequisite for understanding: individuals’ access to, and the distribution of, resources; the ability to make decisions; and the way women and men, boys and girls can affect and are affected by political processes, social development and conflict. The inclusion of a gender analysis into conflict analysis and military planning secures the ability to respond to these differences in a more nuanced and effective way and provides an increased understanding of conflict factors, actors and dynamics. In particular, it can identify of the root causes of conflict-related sexual violence.

B.2 Integrating a gender perspective contributes to the orchestration of fighting power as an integral part of both a behaviour-centric approach and a comprehensive approach. A gender lens should always be applied when analyzing the operating environment.

B.3 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 was unanimously adopted on 31 October 2000 and established the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda. The WPS agenda recognizes the vital role of women in negotiation as well as the disproportionate impact that conflict has on women and girls. Conflict-related sexual violence has been recognized as a tool of armed conflict, perpetuating insecurity and risking continued and prolonged conflict. Ignoring gender-based similarities and differences will negatively impact conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict stabilization.\footnote{For details see Allied Joint Publication-3.28, \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization}.}

B.4 Drawing on the Alliance’s core values, NATO recognizes the necessity of integrating gender perspectives and has committed to the WPS agenda through the principles of integration, inclusiveness and integrity. NATO operationalizes the WPS agenda by systematically integrating gender perspective into planning, doctrine and training. These areas are a tool to mainstream gender into all NATO activities. The active and cross-functional participation of men and women is important to the security and the success of the Alliance and its partners.

B.5 Integrating a gender perspective has a force multiplying effect across all three components of NATO’s fighting power, and core policies. It leverages the full talent of the Alliance to deliver all three of the Alliance’s core tasks. It requires institutional leadership at all levels in NATO, as well as support from outside the Alliance through dialogue and collaboration.\footnote{Including partner nations, host nations, international organizations, governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations.} The collection of sex-disaggregated data and applying a gender perspective will reveal the potential ways our operations could affect and be affected by audiences and will contribute to building a more comprehensive understanding (or common operating
picture) of the environment. The development of gender-based early warning indicators and understanding improves situational awareness across all campaign themes. This in turn enhances decision-making through greater understanding of the second and third order effects of a particular course of action. In particular, commanders must recognize the risks of failing to deliver on their moral and legal responsibilities to act within their mandate to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual violence and sexual exploitation and abuse in accordance with current policy.

B.6 Gender analysis, monitoring and reporting are all iterative components of every phase of the operations planning process. These activities can be tailored and scaled to suit the type of operation and the particular planning element under consideration. Specialized staff (gender advisers and gender focal points) within the organizational structure (NATO Command Structure and NATO force structure) support commanders in achieving gender-integrated planning, doctrine and training. Their work contributes to the mandates and guidance of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives and Secretary General’s Special Representative on WPS.
Annex C – Understanding

Understanding – philosophy

C.1 Our collective understanding dictates how we develop our attitudes and opinions and how we behave or operate. It is our responsibility as individuals, as single services and as professionals to understand ourselves, the world around us and our potential adversaries. Understanding is one of the cornerstones of our military philosophy and we must want to understand. This philosophy embraces two principles.

a. **A professional approach.** Experience and knowledge, including the body of professional knowledge enshrined in doctrine, together with education and training, underpin effective understanding. This enhances both our ability to make timely and effective decisions and to take measured risk. We must seek knowledge, consider all available information sources (especially if they hold views opposed to our own) and conduct self-study as well as formal education and training.

b. **A proactive approach to sharing information.** Understanding depends on access to information and knowledge, but access is often problematic, particularly in the intelligence field where sources must be protected. The impact of any caveats may decrease as an environment and approach is created that enables intelligence sharing with those who need it. The following list enables proactive information sharing.

   o Sharing requires applying judgement, particularly regarding classification, and must be built upon trust.
   o Sharing is resource intensive, requiring investment in information management and exchange systems, and relevant training.
   o Being proactive is also an attitude of mind, and the approach to information may also extend to fostering individual, collective and common contacts.
   o Classification of materials is done by the originating organization or nation, and sharing of materials requires authorization from the originator.

C.2 Understanding has a number of meanings depending upon the context in which it is used and the communities or institutions that develop it. Military understanding relates to what military forces need to understand to complete their missions, deliver operational success and, when necessary, identify, monitor and defeat adversaries.

C.3 Understanding involves acquiring and developing knowledge to a level that enables us to know why something has happened or is happening (insight) and be able to identify and anticipate what may happen (foresight).

a. **Insight.** Developing understanding requires situational awareness to identify
the problem. By analyzing the context, we can gain greater insight of the problem; applying judgement to this insight then generates understanding and in so doing may tell us why the situation has developed.

b. **Foresight.** Foresight will never be complete but improving both the quality and analysis of our information, and the timely release of that intelligence, may to help to refine it.

C.4 Many decisions (especially those that are new or novel) can only be assessed with hindsight (understanding a situation or event only after it has happened). We should be careful to avoid using hindsight to support any claim that we ‘knew’ an outcome was inevitable (this is a very common mistake). Commanders should consider historic situations with outwardly similar parameters when framing new problems but treat them with caution; while history may appear to recur, it never repeats.

C.5 Knowledge comprises the information and skills acquired through experience or education. Understanding, however, is about applying judgement to both make sense of, and recognize the significance of, facts in a given context. Table C.1 illustrates the differences between knowledge and understanding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge</th>
<th>Understanding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The facts</td>
<td>• The meaning of the facts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A body of coherent facts</td>
<td>• The ‘theory’ that provides coherence and meaning to those facts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Verifiable claims</td>
<td>• Fallible, in-process theories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Right or wrong</td>
<td>• A matter of degree or sophistication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• I know something to be true</td>
<td>• I understand why it is, what makes it knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• I respond on cue with what I know</td>
<td>• I judge when to, and when not to, use what I know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table C.1 – The differences between knowledge and understanding**

C.6 Understanding requires the ability to transfer what we have learned to new and sometimes confusing settings. The ability to transfer our knowledge and skills effectively involves the capacity to take what we know and use it creatively, flexibly and fluently in different settings or applying it to different problems. Transferability is not merely ‘plugging in’ previously learned knowledge and skills.
Understanding – time and consequences

C.7 Building understanding takes time, and commanders may not have a comprehensive understanding at the outset of a crisis. While knowledge derived from information is a key source for building understanding, commanders should remain flexible and adaptive enough to consider views from a range of experts.

C.8 As factors (including the context, the role of actors, politics and power) can change over time, understanding is perishable. Evolving situations can present a challenge if insufficient time is available to develop, analyze or refresh our understanding. Commanders may have limited time to develop their understanding and accept that their responses to situations in an unfamiliar environment may result in greater risk, negative consequences or missed opportunities. This highlights the importance of recognizing intended and unintended consequences, and the need to learn and adapt to improve our understanding.

a. **Intended and unintended consequences.** Potential consequences may be foreseen during planning in the form of best- or worst-case scenarios, and contingency plans should be developed accordingly. Unforeseen consequences will need to be addressed as they arise. Commanders should note that unintended consequences are not always negative and may provide opportunities for exploitation; understanding will enable opportunities to be seized.

b. **The need to learn and adapt.** Learning and adapting allows us to develop our understanding more quickly to account for the changing situation. Learning and adapting also enables:
   - reduced likelihood of negative consequences;
   - better mitigation of unforeseen consequences;
   - more effective exploitation; and
   - our ability to influence.

C.9 Developing a command culture that embraces a culture of learning and adaptation requires commanders to be both open-minded and able to learn from their own mistakes, as well as allowing their subordinates to make their own mistakes. To develop understanding, commanders must clearly articulate their requirements. Commanders may have direction from a higher authority that frames thinking about a problem, and this will influence their intelligence requirements. A commander’s own knowledge, analytical skills and the command climate they foster each shape the level of understanding that will be achieved. Commanders should ask the following questions as a situation develops:

- what do we want to understand;
- how soon do we need to understand;
- what do we already know;
- what are the potential gaps in our knowledge; and
- how do we fill those gaps?
Developing understanding

C.10 In a crisis, our initial understanding could be limited. We are likely to know the location of the problem, the general nature of the situation, the rough time frame during which it has been developing and have a broad idea of the information sources we will need to access. We will develop and build on that initial understanding by defining more accurately the requirement for further knowledge, establishing networks and selecting the most effective analytical tool. Analysis allows us to construct a more accurate perspective of the human factors that affect the operating environment and enhance our understanding of how the separate environments interact with one another. This then allows us to identify what effects we can create, and who we can or cannot influence.

C.11 It is very difficult to test understanding. Understanding cannot be observed but can only be inferred from behaviours such as contextualizing, comparing and contrasting, and analyzing. The following list of activities provides a summary of how to develop understanding.

a. Clearly articulate the understanding requirements.

b. Self-awareness: knowing ourselves as individuals and as organizations; and understanding our own strengths, weaknesses, prejudices and perceptions.

c. Learn how our own whole-of-Alliance and relationships work, how they may be improved, and how departments may gain a better appreciation of each other’s efforts.

d. Research our own culture, society and the wider population, including their perceptions of us and what we do, and how these impacts on political and military decision-making.

e. Analyze our allies and partners: understand their interests, intent, values and best practices.

f. Establish situational awareness by collating information and intelligence already available – this represents initial understanding.

g. Determine what type of understanding you require. This might be to understand something for your own decision-making or to achieve collective or common understanding to try and influence others.

h. Frame the context in which we intend to operate.

i. Connect the aims of the strategy, operation, mission and/or role and how it fits into the bigger picture to enable the execution and mission command.

j. Study the culture, traditions, population and society of the country/countries in
which we may operate, or from whom we may request support, or with whom we wish to remain neutral.

k. Promote (through example) the value and importance of personal relationships with other actors throughout the operating environment.

l. Develop a vision, intent and narrative and share it with staff and partners within a command climate conducive to developing understanding.

m. Encourage staff to challenge the accepted wisdom.

n. Build a network of information sources to answer your questions and provide specific knowledge by using all available resources, including headquarters staff, intelligence organizations and subject matter experts.

o. Encourage working together and open-mindedness and be prepared that the staff may take this challenge and provide reasonable feedback to the commander.

p. Analyze the human factors that affect the operating environment based on the cultural, institutional, technological and physical factors in relation to the actors.

q. Identify how to achieve influence (for example, using hard or soft power to affect the adversary’s decision-making).

r. Identify actors and their motivations, affiliations and needs. From this analysis, determine where internal and external narratives may compete.

s. Learn from the consequences of decisions made and adapt when necessary.

t. Remain aware that understanding is a temporary condition and must be constantly refreshed.

Enabling understanding

C.12 Developing understanding is supported by information management, education and training, and collaborative networks. These are explored in further detail below.

a. Information management includes the physical aspects of managing information (personal and staff management procedures) and the technical aspects (procurement, operating systems, technical support and upgrades). Physical information management aims to present relevant information to commanders to enable effective decision-making and to protect commanders from the negative impact of information overload. Several factors that should be considered are listed below.

   o What information is it essential that we protect?
o What are the priorities for information and intelligence?
o How much detail is required to allow a decision to be made?
o Which key decision-makers need the information?
o What resources are available and for how long?
o How can we best balance the need to circulate information to enable understanding and the need to maintain security (including operations security) and to protect sources and methods?

b. **Education and training** enable understanding. Command and staff training must advance the skills that develop understanding; this should promote self-awareness, critical and creative thinking skills and open-mindedness. For a specific operation, subject matter experts will undergo specialized training. All other personnel should undertake pre-deployment training that includes a focus on cultural awareness and skills that enable military personnel to interact with the operating environment.

c. **Collaborative networks.** The single intelligence environment aims to establish a collaborative network that fuses all sources of intelligence to provide a common resource within the contemporary operating environment. It prioritizes the collection of data, integrates sensors, sources and cross-cues them in a seamless and timely fashion. A single intelligence environment will allow better adaptation to complex environments and the changing requirements for intelligence over time. Establishing networks requires significant investment in education and training, and the technical solutions to make it viable.

### Factors that affect the development of understanding

C.13 **Command climate.** Leaders at all levels should establish and maintain a climate that enables the continuous development of understanding. They should create an atmosphere that encourages open-mindedness, critical analysis and creative thinking. The command climate should enable staff to tell commanders what they need to know, even if it appears to contradict the commander's views. However, this is a two-way process and commanders should clearly articulate their requirements for understanding and trust their staff to deliver.

C.14 **Perception** involves forming a view of something through intuition or interpretation of available knowledge. Internal sources, education, our experiences and prior beliefs shape the way we individually perceive situations. The fact that we are shaped by our perceptions reinforces the first principle of understanding: the need for self-awareness. However, there are limitations to perceptions. Our initial perception may be flawed or wrong because of biases in interpretation, inaccurate intelligence, false information or deception. There is also a tendency to look at a problem from only one standpoint. Commanders should recognize the impact that perceptions can have on the development of understanding and their decision-making process. Similarly, other actors have their own perception of a situation on
which they base their actions. Commanders should strive to understand others’ perceptions and the narratives they develop from them, as well as their own. Commanders should consider:

- the scope of the problem;
- their own initial perceptions;
- what they believe or know to be the views of the other actors;
- how to identify those issues on which views are similar and those on which they diverge;
- how to identify, and close, the gaps in their understanding; and
- cultural awareness.

C.15 **Cultural awareness** is critical to understanding, requiring us to develop cultural expertise in areas where we are likely to operate, as well as having a more general awareness of other cultures. On multinational operations, commanders should also consider the wide cultural differences that may exist within an alliance. Commanders should ask the following questions to understand the operating environment.

- What defines the cultures (dominance, basic ideology, beliefs and practices)?
- What are the ‘dos and do nots’ (accepted behavioural norms)?
- Who can tell us what we need to know (specific sources from that culture)?
- How can we exploit greater knowledge of the culture to our advantage (application)?

C.16 **Cultural awareness.** Commanders may receive advice from specialists, both military and civilian. Advice may also be available from other sources with varying levels of cultural awareness.

a. **General awareness.** General awareness requires an active approach to learning more about different cultures. Providing lectures on culture during initial pre-deployment training for personnel before they enter an operational theatre is one example of general cultural awareness familiarization.

b. **Awareness competence.** Awareness competence is gained through proximity to a culture and may be achieved during an extended operational tour. A daily requirement to interact with another culture either directly (where basic language skills have been achieved) or, more likely, through an interpreter, requires confidence, interest and a willingness to succeed. This approach can deliver a degree of cultural competence that can develop over time into expertise. Commanders and key staff should aspire to this level of personal cultural awareness competence.
c. **Cultural expertise.** Cultural expertise requires immersion in another’s culture and generally develops in concert with the ability to speak the language and to understand their mindset. Developing expertise is a long-term process, requiring opportunities for immersion and proximity to the culture, as well as continuity. Selecting individuals for such opportunities should focus on their aptitude and availability to develop such expertise; the attributes may not necessarily be those required in other aspects of military life. Commanders must recognize the value of cultural expertise; true cultural experts are invaluable.
## Lexicon

### Part 1 – Acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Allied administrative publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>Allied Command Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Allied Command Transformation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADCON</td>
<td>administrative control</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJDA</td>
<td>Allied Joint Doctrine Architecture</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>Allied tactical publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIIO</td>
<td>building integrity in operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAAC</td>
<td>children and armed conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>civil emergency planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>civil-military cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>communication and information systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>civil-military interaction</td>
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<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPD</td>
<td>Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPOE</td>
<td>comprehensive preparation of the operating environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>cultural property protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRSV</td>
<td>conflict-related sexual violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-SASE</td>
<td>contribute to a safe and secure environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUOE</td>
<td>comprehensive understanding of the operating environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CyOC</td>
<td>cyberspace operations centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDA</td>
<td>Deterrence and Defence of the Euro Atlantic Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>FULLCOM</td>
<td>full command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPMESII</td>
<td>geospatial + political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRF</td>
<td>graduated readiness force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEA</td>
<td>information environment assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFAC</td>
<td>joint force air component</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force command</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSEC</td>
<td>Joint Support and Enabling Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOGCON</td>
<td>logistics control</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTCP</td>
<td>Long-Term Commitments Plan</td>
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<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>maritime component command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCM</td>
<td>Military Committee memorandum</td>
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<td>MSO</td>
<td>military strategic objective</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCMP</td>
<td>NATO Crisis Management Process</td>
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<td>NCS</td>
<td>NATO Command Structure</td>
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<td>NDPP</td>
<td>NATO defence planning process</td>
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<td>NFS</td>
<td>NATO force structure</td>
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<td>NRI</td>
<td>NATO Readiness Initiative</td>
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<td>NWCC</td>
<td>NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept</td>
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<td>OPCOM</td>
<td>operational command</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPP</td>
<td>operations planning process</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMESII</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMESIIH</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure + health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMESII-PT</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure – physical and time</td>
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<tr>
<td>PoC</td>
<td>protection of civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>professional military education</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBIO</td>
<td>rules-based international order</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Transformation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCC</td>
<td>special operations component command</td>
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<tr>
<td>StratCom</td>
<td>strategic communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACOM</td>
<td>tactical command</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOA</td>
<td>transfer of authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>UHE</td>
<td>understanding the human environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPS</td>
<td>women, peace and security</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Part 2 – Terms and definitions

actor
An individual, group or entity whose actions are affecting the attainment of the end state. (NATO Agreed)

adversary
An individual, group or entity whose intentions or interests are opposed to those of friendly parties and against which legal coercive political, military or civilian actions may be envisaged and conducted. (NATO Agreed)

audience
An individual, group or entity whose interpretation of events and subsequent behaviour may affect the attainment of the end state.
Note: The audience may consist of publics, stakeholders and actors. (NATO Agreed)

campaign
A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective. (NATO Agreed)

command
The authority vested in a member of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces. (NATO Agreed)

command and control
The authority, responsibilities and activities of military commanders in the direction and coordination of military forces as well as the implementation of orders related to the execution of operations. (NATO Agreed)

comprehensive approach
Combining all available political, military and civilian capabilities, in a concerted effort, to attain the desired end state. (NATO Agreed)

concept
An agreed notion or idea, normally set out in a document, that provides guidance for different working domains and which may lead to the development of a policy. (NATO Agreed)

control
The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under their command, encompassing the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. (NATO Agreed)
counterterrorism
All preventive, defensive and offensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property against terrorist threats and/or acts, and to respond to terrorist acts.
Note: In the frame of the NATO Comprehensive Approach, these measures can be combined with or followed by measures enabling recovery after terrorist acts. (NATO Agreed)

cyberspace
The global domain consisting of all interconnected communication, information technology and other electronic systems, networks and their data, including those which are separated or independent, which process, store or transmit data. (NATO Agreed)

cyberspace operation
Actions in or through cyberspace intended to preserve friendly freedom of action in cyberspace and/or to create effects to achieve military objectives. (NATO Agreed)

deterrence
The convincing of a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. This requires the maintenance of a credible military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act. (NATO Agreed)

doctrine
Fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. (NATO Agreed)

effect dimensions
An analytical construct that translates actions in the engagement space into the physical, virtual and cognitive consequences that these actions may have. (NATO Agreed)

enemy
An individual or group, entity or state actor whose actions are hostile and against which the legal use of armed force is authorized. (NATO Agreed)

engagement space/battlespace
The part of the operating environment where actions and activities are planned and conducted. (NATO Agreed)

fighting power
The ability of the armed forces to shape, contest, and fight
Note: It represents three interrelated components: the moral, conceptual and physical. (NATO Agreed)
gender
The social attributes associated with being male and female, learned through socialisation, that determine a person’s position and value in a given context, including in the relationship between women and men and girls and boys, as well as in the relations between women and those between men.
Note: Gender issues do not equate to an exclusive focus on women. (NATO Agreed)

information activities
Activities performed by any capability or means, focused on creating cognitive effects. (NATO agreed)

narrative
A spoken or written account of events and information arranged in a logical sequence to influence the behaviour of a target audience. (NATO Agreed)

neutral
In identification, the designation given to a track, object or entity whose characteristics, behaviour, origin or nationality indicate that it is neither supporting nor opposing friendly forces. (NATO Agreed)

operational art
The employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. (NATO Agreed)

operational domain
A specified sphere of capabilities and activities that can be applied within an engagement space.
Note: There are five operational domains: maritime, land, air, space and cyberspace, each conditioned by the characteristics of their operating environment. (NATO Agreed)

outreach
An action to establish communication with a community, organization or individuals with the aim of creating opportunities for engagement and/or liaison. (NATO Agreed)

public
An individual, group or entity who is aware of activities that may affect the attainment of the end state. (NATO Agreed)

situational awareness
The knowledge of the elements in the battlespace necessary to make well-informed decisions. (NATO Agreed)
**stakeholder**
An individual, group or entity who can affect or is affected by the attainment of the end state. (NATO Agreed)

**strategic communications**
In the NATO military context, the integration of communication capabilities and information staff function with other military activities, in order to understand and shape the information environment, in support of NATO strategic aims and objectives. (NATO Agreed)

**sustainability**
The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives. (NATO Agreed)

**terrorism**
The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives. (NATO Agreed)