


# Civilian-Military Information Sharing Guidebook for Mission Planning in a Federated Mission Networking Environment





## **MCDC 2017-2018: CMIS Guidebook**

The CMIS Guidebook is provided for use by military forces when required to share information with civilians. The focus of the Guidebook is on the application of best practices during an operation where civilian entities are present and provide guidance for military information sharing with civilian entities. It also recommends changes to how these forces employ and apply the multinational FMN framework and the US instantiation of FMN known as the Mission Partner Environment (MPE). The FMN and MPE approach leverages the systems architectures of participating nations to create a common information environment. Technical details on achieving CMIS will be promulgated through the FMN Joining, Membership, and Exiting Instructions (JMEI). This document does not represent a formal international agreement. Use of the recommendations provided herein are entirely at the discretion of the individual nation or organization.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Civilian-Military Information Sharing (CMIS) Guidebook's purpose is to support military operational planners when civilian-military (CIV-MIL) information sharing is critical to mission accomplishment. This guidebook will attempt to eliminate known problem areas by identifying processes, procedures, and best practices gained from experienced civilian and military participants. It does not change how governments, at any level, the humanitarian community or other non-military organizations conduct their operations. These actors will continue to share information within limitations they set. CMIS will not require any entity to provide information to anyone else except as they see fit. The information contained in the guidebook is based on lessons learned and best practices that have been relearned and refined over decades of CIV-MIL engagement.

The central focus of the CMIS Guidebook is to provide an understanding of how to move from a national (bilateral) response to civilian-military information sharing to a multinational effort. By establishing the capability within a military-military Federated Mission Networking environment, agreeing to best practices and establishing common protocols, information sharing with entities outside the network will be easier to establish in military environments ranging from humanitarian support to complex environments.

In almost any land environment where military forces operate, they will share the space with civilian organizations. These organizations may include other government actors than their own, non-governmental agencies and humanitarian organizations. Many of these actors will be international. While most military doctrine and policy encourages and often directs information sharing with non-military entities, there is a lack of guidance in how to actually train, organize and establish an information sharing environment. Where capabilities do exist, these tend to be bilateral or single nation provisioned. This situation is unsatisfactory given that most nations can anticipate their forces operating as part of a multinational mission partnership. The combined, joint force commander, his staff and subordinate forces must have an information sharing capability to support their mission requirements. This guidebook describes the ways and means to achieve the end of Civilian - Military Information Sharing (CMIS).

Civilian-Military information sharing is a voluntary process shaped by mission requirements and levels of trust between people and organizations.

For any given military requirement, from Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR) through the entire spectrum of conflict, every nation's military responds based on the guidance of their national response coordinator and chain of command. Within that construct, information sharing and coordination with civilian organizations operating in the affected state is essential to understanding the environment, synchronizing efforts where appropriate, and to avoiding unnecessary destruction, injury or death. Communicating in support of this coordination can be accomplished

via the CMIS capabilities within Federated Mission Networking (FMN). CMIS will require extension from an FMN network to support CIV-MIL information sharing. CMIS does not supplant either the sovereignty of the affected state or the authority of contributing states over their own Military or Civil Defense Assets (MCDA). CIV-MIL information sharing serves as a mechanism for improved communication, coordination and cooperation which supplements those authorities.

Initial research (Enclosure 1, *Report on Quick Look Analysis of Communications Issues for CIV-MIL in a Humanitarian Assistance Environment*) indicated many CIV-MIL interaction issues related to information sharing. This document's effort addresses these issues which includes:

- Lack of direction in how to implement doctrine authorizing information sharing with non-coalition entities such as foreign governmental agencies and humanitarians.
- Over classification of information derived from open or unclassified sources.
- Lack of planning and process to share information with non-military entities.
- Information sharing with non-coalition participants in the operating area not part of the planning or command organization.

Current military information sharing architectures, practices and standards are inconsistent with the ability to rapidly establish or join an unclassified information sharing environment. This is inadequate for missions requiring interaction with humanitarian organizations in order to meet operational needs. CMIS events may range from the rapid onset of HA/DR to coexistence of HA and military activities during complex emergency and combat operations. In all cases, effective information sharing is critical to successfully achieving the military objective as well as assuaging human suffering.

Effective information sharing enables appropriate coordination between military and civilian actors through communication, cooperation, and/or collaboration among the military and non-military groups in order to best meet the needs of the affected population in cases of natural and man-made disasters. Military planners must include capable CIV-MIL information sharing as part of crisis-action planning.

This guidebook supports the following objectives:

- Improved information sharing between civilian and military participants in a shared environment
- Improved mutual understanding of planning perspectives to support CIV-MIL information sharing requirements
- Improved CIV-MIL planning response time

For simplicity, the guidebook will use the singular term FMN to represent the unified effort to rapidly establish a mutually supported information sharing environment among mission partners. MPE is the US implementation of the FMN development effort and will be compatible with the FMN's overarching structure and operation. MPE uses the FMN Joining Membership and Exiting Instructions (JMEI) which are informed by this guidebook, the Operational Concept and the Mission Thread Package.

## PREFACE

This guidebook and supporting documents are intended to enhance information sharing between willing civilian and military organizations. **The CIV-MIL relationship is neither a partnership nor autonomous.** Nevertheless, in any operation where the two entities interact, there will be a necessity for information sharing.

Most military forces have policies that either support or direct information sharing with civilian organizations, even if only to a minimal level. All elements of the CMIS project provide an overarching common starting point for national and multinational organizational development of CIV-MIL information sharing. The guidebook is especially focused on CMIS when using an FMN framework for information sharing.

What information is shared, and how, will be situationally dependent based on the context of the relationship and the shaping of events. Military forces must include CMIS as part of both a planning consideration and as part of their normal operating capabilities. Establishing and maintaining capability requires both the availability of technical means and the competence to perform CMIS. The guidebook will focus on military planning considerations for CMIS to include identification of key participants and best practices. The recommendations in this guidebook cover activities ranging from cooperative military support during rapid onset disasters (i.e. earthquake, flood, and tropical storms), complex, high risk operations (i.e. biological, chemical or nuclear hazards), and combat operations in a fully hostile environment (as seen in Syria and Iraq).

Regardless of the nature of the engagement, military planners and deploying staffs must understand their relationship with the non-military entities to include government and humanitarian communities. Military planners and operators need to cultivate the most effective means of establishing and conducting information sharing with key civilians.

The Operational Concept describes the environment and requirements to conduct CMIS operations in a range of operating environments. The CMIS Guidebook provides recommended information sharing venues, based on the operating environment, and best practices to effectively establish and facilitate information sharing outside the military network environment. The effort seeks to address the following documented CMIS deficiencies:

- Lack of mutual trust in information protection and sharing.
- Military forces not understanding civilian culture, organizations, operations, policies, and purposes.
- Information sharing processes are neither standardized nor supported by best practices.
- Military use of classified systems for unclassified operations.
- Insufficient specific military capability or authority as an information release specialist (i.e. Foreign Disclosure Officer).
- Lack of shared situational awareness and an inability to share a common operating

- 45 picture and unclassified imagery or video.
- 46 • Improper security classification designations by military entities (i.e. For Official
- 47 Use Only – FOUO on documents which are actually releasable to the public)
- 48 restricts sharing information.
- 49 • Lack of CIV-MIL information sharing planning.

50

51 FMN is a framework, an operational concept, and -- for the US -- a Joint Information

52 Environment (JIE) use case. FMN implementation occurs when more than two partners

53 agree to establish a unity of effort by joining trusted mission networks. This arrangement

54 forms a federation of networks composed of collective, partner-provided policy,

55 transport, systems, applications, security, services and operational processes.

56

57 FMN is not a single network but rather an organizing construct enabling member

58 contribution(s) to a federation of partners to provide mission-specific networks and

59 systems. FMN includes best practices (tactics, techniques, and procedures) for establishing

60 a shared network, conducting information sharing operations, and disestablishing the

61 network in a coordinated manner. Details of the FMN and MPE concepts are contained in

62 references A-F respectively.

63

64 To improve CIV-MIL information sharing greater emphasis must be placed on

65 education, training, and preparation. Military forces rarely operate in an environment

66 where they will not encounter civilians. Understanding the humanitarian community's

67 fundamental principles and various missions (e.g. humanitarian, development,

68 protection of women and children), and integrating them, where appropriate, into

69 exercises, will enable CIV-MIL entities to better understand one another and hopefully

70 reduce friction. Changes in military doctrine, organization, training, materiel,

71 leadership & education, personnel, facilities, policy and interoperability (DOTmLPF-PI)

72 can improved CIV-MIL information sharing. CIV-MIL Information Sharing DOTmLPF-

73 PI Change Recommendations are contained in the CMIS Operational Concept (Chapter

74 1, Section 1.3) and provides an initial look at potential areas of improvement in each of

75 the DOTmLPF-PI change elements. Enclosure 2, *CIV-MIL Information Sharing Universal*

76 *Joint Task List (UJTL)* provides the US tactical and operational training tasks related to

77 establishing a coalition network and conducting CIV-MIL information sharing.

78

79

80

81

82

83

84 **CMIS TRANSITION and IMPLEMENTATION**

85  
 86 As presented by the figure in the preface, the CMIS guidebook is a comprehensive,  
 87 nation and region agnostic product. Implementation of the CIV-MIL precepts for  
 88 information sharing from within an FMN network will need to be adapted and  
 89 integrated into each participating member nation’s military doctrine and training. By  
 90 using the CMIS as a common reference, multinational forces should develop a mutual  
 91 understanding of CIV-MIL information sharing while developing a collective  
 92 implementation outcome.

93  
 94 Using the continental staff system to identify the functional area where the guidebook  
 95 should be applicable, the following reference matrix is provided. For simplicity J for  
 96 joint (multiservice) is used, but are equally relevant to military service codes.  
 97

Code	FMCM Guidebook Area (Chapter.Section)
J1 (Manpower/Personnel)	1.2, 2.0, 3.2, 3.3, 5.2, 5.3, ENCL 1, 5
J2 (Intelligence/Security)	1.2, 5.2, 5.3, ENCL 1, 5, 6
J3 (Operations)	1.1, 1.3, 2.1, 4.3, 4.9, 5.1-3, ENCL 1, 4, 5, 6
J4 (Logistics)	5.3, ENCL 5, 6
J5 (Plans)	1.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.9, 5.1-3, ENCL 1, 3, 4, 5, 6
J6 (Communications/IT)	3.4, 4.9, 5.1-3, ENCL 1, 3, 5, 6
J7 (Training)	1.1, ENCL 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
J8 (Finance/Contracts)	
J9 (CIMIC/Civil Affairs)	3.1, 3.2, 5.3, ENCL 1, 3, 4, 5, 6

98  
 99 In order to improve CIV-MIL information sharing there needs to be an overall  
 100 improvement in staff knowledge and execution. The military needs to understand their  
 101 role in a CIV-MIL event, and understand the role and dynamics of the humanitarian  
 102 community. This in turn will translate to improving CIV-MIL interaction when the two  
 103 entities are co-located and conducting their own missions, as in the case of  
 104 peacekeeping/stabilization operations.  
 105

106 To best effect this change from the military perspective policy and doctrine need to  
 107 support information sharing. Training and education must introduce CIV-MIL  
 108 information sharing and establish a basis for the military to understand the  
 109 humanitarian community’s precepts and guidelines. Given that in almost any  
 110 environment that the military operates in a coalition environment there will be CIV-  
 111 MIL interaction. Each exercise that has an FMN MIL-MIL information sharing structure  
 112 should also establish a CIV-MIL counterpart to exercise unclassified information  
 113 sharing with civilian governments and humanitarian and other civilian organizations. A  
 114 secondary effect of doing this is that it allows civilian organizations to become familiar  
 115 with the military. Information is not limited to the coordination needed in HA/DR  
 116 events. It is necessary for de-confliction and building situational awareness during  
 117 activities across the range of military operations and CIV-MIL interactions.

118  
119 Finally, understanding both the necessity and the methodology for information sharing  
120 in a CIV-MIL situation must become the norm for commanders, staffs and forces. Each  
121 party, whether military, governmental agency, humanitarian or developmental  
122 organization understands the other's roles, requirements and culture. This ensures all  
123 can anticipate the actions of the others in establishing an information sharing  
124 environment based on the situation where they are operating.  
125

## CHAPTER I

### CIVILIAN-MILITARY PLANNING

#### 1. General

- a. Where civilians and military forces will interact there should be coordination within the limits of what is suitable, feasible and acceptable for each. Whether the relationship will be one of cooperation, de-confliction or coexistence, coordination must take place.
- b. Information sharing is a pre-requisite for coordination. This chapter supports deployment planning that involves CIV-MIL coordination, collaboration and cooperation - both electronic and physical. The CMIS guidebook is not all-inclusive. The focus here is on information sharing and isn't comprehensive for all aspects of CIMIC or CMCoord. This chapter is focused on a key framework of considerations for military planners.
- c. The core lesson from CIV-MIL interaction in events ranging from HA/DR to open hostilities is each has unique requirements. The environment is also i complex and dynamic. While the operating environment affects civilian response, individual organizations will have unique cultures and concerns which shape their perceptions and amenability to sharing information. It is very important to understand the nature of each organization expected to be in the operating area. During hostilities, the interaction between civilian and military participants will normally be much more restricted and circumspect than during a natural disaster and emergency response. Figure 1 shows the spectrum of coordination between military and civilian entities. At one end of the spectrum is 'cooperation', most often manifested during HA/DR operations in which the CIV-MIL goals closely align, information is shared relatively freely, and association is not limited. On the other end of the spectrum, 'coexistence' represents a more complex environment, such as where the military is engaged in hostilities that limit CIV-MIL information sharing and association. De-confliction is an environment that is more restrictive than the cooperative environment but less restrictive than coexistence. In a de-confliction environment information sharing should be aimed at optimizing the overall strategic objectives of the mission, both military and civilian. Military planners should note that the willingness of civilian organizations to engage with

Be aware that the term de-confliction can have divergent meanings to civilian and military personnel. The civilian interpretation is deescalating a conflict. The military interpretation is avoiding actions that interfere with the other entities mission, where possible, especially those which might endanger non-combatants. For the purposes of this document, CMIS employs the military interpretation of de-confliction.

the military along the coordination spectrum will depend not only on the conflictual nature of the operating environment. It will also depend on the culture of each agency and the degree to which they need to protect their perceived independence and neutrality. .




Figure 1

**CIV-MIL information sharing will likely occur anytime the two entities are in the same operating area. The operational environment and requirements, and the level of trust between the military and civilian agencies drive information sharing. In most instances, the level of trust by humanitarian groups is closely aligned with the perceived risk of harm that information sharing with the military could cause to the humanitarian organization’s staff, the affected population, and their ability to accomplish their mission goals.**

- d. Successful CIV-MIL collaboration, coordination, and cooperation will hinge on good communication and relationship building in pre-crisis planning and during all phases of the response. Trust and confidence among all stakeholders are critical in building CIV-MIL interaction and the ability to share the right information, with the right people, at the right time. Information sharing requires collaboration among willing participants regardless of their particular objective.
- e. Information sharing is the cornerstone of CIV-MIL success. Lessons learned from past CIV-MIL operations indicate that communications issues out number others by about five-to-one (Enclosure 1, *Report on Quick Look Analysis of Communications Issues for CIV-MIL in a Humanitarian Assistance Environment*). To support mission objectives military forces must effectively share information among:
  - Components

- Own government departments and agencies
- Multinational military partners
- Foreign and host governments
- International organizations
- Commercial organizations
- Local government and organizations

Information sharing improves:

- Common and shared understanding
  - Unity of effort
  - Decision making and timing
  - Adaptability of participants
  - Situational awareness
  - Precision in CIV-MIL planning and execution
- f. Military forces often bring a significant capability in information gathering and analysis to an operation. This enables them to build an overarching situational awareness of the operating environment. Much of this information can and should be shared with civilians. Unfortunately the **military has a propensity to over-classify information, making it difficult to share information in an unclassified environment**. Information needs to be timely and actionable to influence operations. Even in conflict scenarios where hostilities and an active enemy intelligence activity are presumed, an **unclassified information path is needed** in order to de-conflict activities and avoid unintended consequences against civilians or other aspects of the humanitarian space. Examples of the type of information required is covered in Enclosure 5, *CIV-MIL Information Sharing Planning Considerations*.
- g. Where there are non-combatants there will be humanitarians in the mission space (e.g. Médecins Sans Frontières, World Food Program, and Save the Children). This remains true across all regions and the majority of operations. Humanitarian organizations operate under different principles than the military, see above. Although each organization may have its own specific principles, four general ones – humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence – are common across most organizations, and are grounded in international law. Military commanders must be consistently sensitive to the humanitarian principles and consult Civil- Military coordination specialists where and when appropriate. The need to respect these principles will affect information sharing.

### Humanitarian Principles

1. **Humanity:** Alleviate human suffering wherever it is found and save lives.
2. **Neutrality:** Humanitarian Actors must not take sides.
3. **Impartiality:** Humanitarian assistance must be provided based on needs of those affected by the particular crisis.
4. **Independence:** Humanitarian action must be autonomous from political, economic, and military objectives.

(The Humanitarian Principles are further explained in Enclosure 6, Section 3.)

- h. There are three broad mission areas in which CMIS must occur. These are disaster response, peacekeeping and stability operations, and combat/hostilities. These three broad environments are the bases of the use cases laid out in Enclosure 3, *Use Cases from CMIS Operations Concept for Civilian-Military Information Sharing in a Federated Mission Networking Environment* (Ref J).

## 2. Required Specialist Personnel

A number of personnel with specialized capabilities will contribute to a military organizations CIV- MIL information sharing. These include the following (this list is not exhaustive and is for illustrative purposes):

- a. **CIMIC/Civil Affairs.** Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is a NATO structure. Civil Affairs (CA) is the US structure. While each has some unique functions, both support the military commander's coordination and cooperation with civilians. CIMIC/CA is the common point of CIV-MIL interaction.
- b. **Joint Media Operations/Joint Public Affairs Team.** Joint media/public affairs and image specialists (i.e. Combat Camera) can deploy and run a Press Information Centre. They also provide still photograph and broadcast-quality video. These professionals plan and implement the commander's public affairs communication strategy; establish and direct the public information narrative; and enable the military to successfully meet continuously evolving public affairs and information challenges in the respective theater of operation. Public affairs professionals also maintain a partnership with the Defense Media Activity and can provide still and video images supporting the information narrative. They will establish and operate the Military Information Operations Center (MIOC) to support media information requests. Media specialist can support the military in information sharing with the affected state, the affected

population, and the humanitarian community. **Most importantly the public affairs specialist help determine if with who information can be shared.**

- c. Foreign Disclosure Specialist. Many nations require a specialized review by an expert in determining what is releasable to foreign actors. This may involve more than classified information. It might also include technical information. The key is to ensure that the need is considered and the personnel are integrated into the sharing process.
- d. Classification Management Specialist. If policies require a specifically qualified person to determine if classified information can be declassified, these personnel must also be available and integrated into processes.
- e. **Privacy Specialist.** Any information that has personal identification information will require special handling. This can occur by collecting information about an areas leadership, when providing medical aid or processing internally displaced persons, detainees or refugees for handover to host nation government or humanitarian organizations as deemed fit. The legal requirements concerning personal information are becoming universal, and operationally collected sensitive personal information should be protected.
- f. **Specialist Communications Personnel.** Website manager and personnel with skills to enable Rich Site Summary (RSS) feeds are key to establishing and maintaining military unclassified Web sites and information feeds to support information sharing.
- g. **Knowledge Management (KM) and Information Management (IM).** IM and KM personnel support development of a plan for the management of information, but to also support the execution of the plan by supporting operational personnel.
- h. **Information Technology/Network Personnel.** Military forces must have the support of an unclassified network configured to access the World Wide Web and have connectivity with entities outside of the FMN environment. This will meet information sharing requirements with the affected state, first responders, vulnerable populations, the humanitarian community, and military liaisons. There will also be the need to engage ad hoc unclassified communities of interest to support CIV-MIL interaction. Experts in web-services such as SharePoint will also prove useful.
- i. **Liaison Officers.** CIV-MIL information sharing operations require dedicated personnel to provide one of the most important forms of information sharing - organizational representatives in the form of liaison officers. Their role and employment are covered in chapter 5, section 2.c.

### 3. CIV-MIL Information Sharing Planning Considerations in FMN

- a. Identify Requirements. Military personnel tasked with CMIS need to plan for the mission. In order to effectively execute the mission, requirements need to be developed by the military staff. If established, the J9, who is tasked with CIV-MIL interaction, will develop the mission support requirements. Military planners and execution staff will tailor information sharing to meet the tasking demands with willing military partners. These requirements will be submitted to the J6 (communications) to establish the unclassified communications pathways required by the staff to interact with non-FMN entities. In developing the needed capability to support CMIS the critical information is to identify; who, what, and how. This includes establishing CMIS capability to share information with civilians.
- **Who: Identify Key Civilian Interactions?** In all crises there will be multiple participants. The military will not be the only entity responding to the crisis. Military planners need to identify what humanitarian and government agency entities will be in the operating area. From this list military planners can identify key initial civilian entities that should be part of the CMIS environment planning.
  - **What: Information sharing planning must identify the likely information sharing requirements.** Information needed by the military from civilian entities and what information the military may be called on to share with the civilian entities initiates the CMIS process. Identification of likely CMIS requirements allows planners to identify sources amongst civilian entities that can provide access to information from within their organizations; this also initiates the process of identifying information within the military system that can be a verified unclassified source or identifying information that will likely require declassification. **At this step, planners should begin preparing the Information Exchange Matrix (IEM) which lists possible information sharing in a tabular form. As a minimum this should address what information needs to be shared, by whom, with whom, when in relation to the operational timeline, where in terms of node and network, how in terms of methods and tools, and classification of the information. The J9 should create and maintain this, coordinating it with the J6.**
  - **How: Identification of the means to share information.** There is a wide range of possible methods to conduct CMIS. Liaisons using face to face exchanges have been identified often as the most effective means to convey and clarify shared information. Liaisons are discussed in further detail in Chapter 5, section 2.c. Electronic means, such as email, teleconferences, and web chat offers speed and possibly a wider reach to recipients. In order to be effective contact information needs to be shared that will enable the CMIS connection. An indirect means of CMIS is the use of the Internet, either through social media platforms or through proprietary services indigenous to the military. Information can be posted for readers to access, thus providing a persistent

information source. Effectiveness in CMIS requires sharing the domain address and if access controlled, a login and password. Recommended best practices in Chapter 2 provide recommendations to conduct CMIS in a bandwidth constrained environment.

- The specific information sharing process is determined by the participant with the most significant limitations in both method and information path.
- Specific sharing platforms identified in planning, should be integrated into command information technology structure.
- Signed agreements with key information sharing partners will identify any control, access, and sharing limitations to information provided.
- Handover/Takeover planning must determine what data/information repository can be relinquished when the military departs and what controls the recipient is required to exercise.

Requirements derived during the planning phase and early phase 1 engagement enable the J6 to provide the means for J9 and the CMIC/CA element to conduct CMIS in support of the JTF mission. Knowing the scope of the CMIS engagement can scale the information technology requirement, and support the initiation of CMIS by sharing and obtaining contact information with those key civilian entities in the same operating area as the military forces.

1. A detailed planning checklist for CMIS is included in Enclosure 5, *CIV-MIL Information Sharing Planning Considerations*.

## CHAPTER II BEST PRACTICES

Military operators faced with a CIV-MIL information sharing requirement should plan on limited bandwidth and extensive use of hand held technology (PDA, tablets, cell phone). There will continue to be civilians who are reliant on hard copy paper documents. Military forces will face similar limitations unless they deploy the necessary communications equipment and information systems, and obtain appropriate permission to use these. It is advisable that rules for use be coordinated, established and practiced prior to deploying, and carefully adhered to in order to not over stress the local networks and their civilian operators. Other best practices are to ensure that communications flow to the appropriate staff cell. Consideration should be given to adapting to the requirements and limitations for the actor with the least technical capacity or resources.

1. **Plain speaking.** CIV-MIL participants use words differently even if using the same language. Avoid jargon, acronyms, and ambiguous phrasing. Both entities need a common lexicon of terms understood by all recipients.
2. **Primary language.** English may not be the local or even the relief primary language. Determine how to effectively translate between the local language and the responding force language. (Note: it is common, especially in Spanish or French speaking nations, to conduct the relief operation in their primary language. Responding international NGOs will attract non-English speaking staffs. Military responders must be adaptable to working in whatever language is the primary language of the government and the relief agencies.)
3. **Minimize File size.** Attachments and postings need to be of a size that can be downloaded in an austere environment. File size should be kept as low as possible depending on the communications situation in the mission area. Use of common compression systems such as .zip should be used. Large files may be posted to a website or broken down into usable sizes for recipients to download when better connectivity and throughput becomes available to access the data.
4. **Control Attachments or use Links.** The number of email recipients receiving an attachment should also be limited. If more than five addresses are in a message, the file attachment should be posted to an accessible Web site with the link included in the email instead of the actual attachment. This will reduce network demand and allow the recipient to download the file when time and system allows. If the message is to a co-located group, one recipient can download the file and post it to a local drive for the other recipients to view.

5. **Establish Position and Group email addresses.** During an operation, personnel can be redeployed or reassigned alternative duties. If the email address provided to other participating organizations is a personal one, the message traffic will follow the individual and not to the functional area desired by the sender. A positional or group email (i.e. RAF\_Nepal\_Air\_Schedules\_Officer@gmail.com, TF505\_Air\_Logistics\_Cell@gmail.com) would allow assigned position holders or members of a working group to access the email and handle the information. Additionally, group/username password positional accounts support multiple user access to email to support continuity with external organizations.
6. **Use graphical maps.** Graphical depictions will often suffice instead of satellite images to provide information that does not require an actual high resolution image as shown in Figure 2 depicting washed out bridges. Alternatively, the bridges can be marked with symbols to indicate those destroyed or only damaged. Roads can be marked as blocked (clearable) or destroyed. Cities and villages can be annotated with percentage of damage. In the case of flood/fire, the area covered by the event can be annotated to indicate isolated areas. The net result is a smaller file depicting actionable information for logistics and infrastructure restoration teams.



Figure 2

7. **Establish KM and IM plans.** KM and IM plans for both information (data) collection and message/report submission need to be standardized. Information and data must be time stamped using 'date-time-groups' (DTG), such as 24Aug2016 1400Z recorded as 240820161400Z, to enable sequential storage of data and to rapidly identify updated information.
8. **Collaborative tools.** Civilians use a broad range of commercially available collaborative document management tools such as Google Docs and other cloud services. Early determination of what tools are used allows the military

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planning staff to make necessary adaptations, gain permissions and/or licensing if required, and understand restrictions affecting use of these tools for CMIS.

9. **Latitude and longitude.** Used in decimal form enable the information to be sorted in Excel.
10. **Bottom line reporting.** Many organizations do not have the time or manpower to process data or parse through reports due to resource and time constraints. Use summaries and bottom line writing with supporting details later in the documents if the reader requires more information.
11. **Trained liaison Officers.** It is important to identify face-to-face communications as a key method to establish trust. Prior to a crisis conduct orientation with major agencies (ICRC, IFRC, MSF, Oxfam, Care, Save the Children, etc.), exercising participation to gain insight in humanitarian culture and building interpersonal contacts that can bridge the trust gap and reinforce relationships once trust is established. Flexible liaison arrangements with major aid agencies outside the UN umbrella will enable the military to more effectively conduct information sharing and coordinate/de-conflict operations as the situation dictates.
12. **Include CMIS in training and exercises.** Opportunities to work with international and local aid agencies and other civilian actors should be integrated into exercise scenarios as a means to build trust, understand CIV-MIL cultural differences, and practice techniques and procedures before a crisis event occurs.
13. **Organizational level relationships.** At the field level, interpersonal relationships are critical. No less critical are relationships at the organizational level. At a minimum sharing contact information between aid organizations and military staffs can accelerate information sharing. At a higher level, it may enable participation in training and exercise events that support CIV-MIL information sharing and understanding of the organization's operations and policies.
14. **Consistent use of collaborative tools.** Use common collaboration tools (e.g. SharePoint, the All Partner Access Network (APAN), and Army Collaborative Information Management System (ACIMS)) available to the civilians in both exercises and real world operations to minimize their burden.

## CHAPTER III FMN CONCEPT IN A CIV-MIL ENVIRONMENT

### 1. FMN CMIS Overview

The FMN framework is based on a structure supporting the varied capabilities of military participants. This includes information sharing with participants who are not members of the mission partner network. For simplicity entities not connected as part of the FMN framework will be referred to as non-FMN entities. Typically, civilians are not able to meet the network security standards of the military force. Civilians will typically be non-FMN entities. Examples of Civilian, non-FMN entities include UN organizations, an affected state government to include regional disaster coordinators, other responding military forces not part of the FMN framework, non-UN associated humanitarian organizations, and local social development organizations.

- a. Figure 3 depicts the mixed capabilities of mission partner military forces connecting to form an FMN information sharing network based on agreed standards and specific joining instructions as envisioned under FMN. The concentric rings represent the inter-connecting military networks that support the FMN information sharing environment. The FMN architecture recognizes the need to share information with non-FMN entities who operate independent of the FMN structure but with whom information sharing is sought. Non-FMN entities, represented in the lower right hand corner of the figure, can be any organization not participating in the FMN architecture. (For more on FMN consult Reference A, section 5.3, page 27.)




Figure 3

- b. The FMN CMIS concept addresses application of this new approach for information interoperability being applied by military forces working in multinational environments where CIV-MIL coordination is required.
- c. Planners and operators should develop their own schematic for the information sharing architecture anticipated on any given operation. Figure 4 depicts an example of a very simplified HA/DR environment. It consists of military interacting with the affected state-led Multinational Military Coordination Center (MNMCC) to coordinate military operations within the affected state. The assisting state military forces use an unclassified FMN for CIV- MIL coordination. The FMN environment also supports CMIS to other coordination areas. In Figure 4 this is represented by the Humanitarian Military Operations Coordination Center (HuMOCC), which is a UN managed platform to match humanitarian support requirements with military capability. In situations where the government of the affected state is failed or hostile, the military will need to collaborate with the appropriate civilian authority.




Figure 4

## 2. Military CMIS Staffing

During peacekeeping/stability and in combat operations the military may establish specialized CIV-MIL coordination capabilities. One of these is the Civilian-Military Operations Center (CMOC). The CMOC is tasked to coordinate CIV-MIL cooperation and coordination actions and to serve as a focal point for the staff's

interaction with civilian entities. Many militaries organize along the Napoleonic structure of office codes 1-9. Figure 5 shows the internal relationships of a military staff. External to the staff organization, but in direct support of the military commander’s operation are command elements that support CIV-MIL interaction. The Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC), also known as the MNMCC, coordinates multinational military planning and execution among participating military forces to achieve coalition goals. The CMOC engages with all nine staff areas, but comes under the control of the 9 shop. In contrast, the Multinational Coordination Center coordinates multinational military planning and execution among participating military forces in achieving the coalition’s goals.




Figure 5

### 3. Current Capabilities and Gaps

Current CIV-MIL interaction is typically ad hoc in nature, with each military force attempting to establish an information release and dissemination process with non-military entities.

- a. Major shortcomings include:
  - Failure of the military force to plan and prepare for CIVMIL information sharing.
  - Lack of mutual trust in information protection and sharing.
  - Military forces not understanding humanitarian community organizations, operations, policies and purposes.
  - Information sharing processes are neither standardized nor supported by best practices.

- Military use of classified systems for unclassified operations.
- Insufficient specific military capability or authority as an information release specialist (i.e. Foreign Disclosure Officer).
- Information sharing delays resulting in information being old and insufficient to aid operational planning by the supported recipient.
- Sharing large amounts of data with information requesters who do not have the manpower, expertise, or time to process the information
- Distribution of unfinished information products.
- Military functioning as independent responders, not in coordination with the affected state and humanitarian communities.
- Military responders do not collaborate and fail to achieve unity of effort.
- Lack of shared situational awareness and an inability to share a common operating picture and unclassified imagery or video.
- Improper security classification designations by military entities intending to share information (i.e. For Official Use Only - FOUO) restricts sharing information outside government channels that should be marked “For Public Release”.
- Civilian counterparts not understanding the military structure, hierarchy or processes.
- High turnover of both military and humanitarian personnel in the affected State, which may hinder the flow and continuity of information sharing.

#### 4. Mission Networks and Information Sharing Capability

The FMN environment established by the multinational force must support information sharing at the unclassified (For Public Release) level. This is to allow information sharing with those entities that are non-FMN participants (i.e. affected state government and agencies, humanitarian community).

The FMN network must support those unclassified services commonly used to convey information. These include voice, text, email with attachments, data services, and access to the unregulated Internet and Web portals. Developing, coordinating and implementing common approaches to CIVMIL information sharing across a joint force prevents delay, disruption, and disappointment during tomorrow’s operations. For these reasons, planning, coordination, and training are essential.

**The emergence of smart device applications in partnership with wireless data providers can support direct upload of assessments by aid communities and aid workers. The rapid processing and distribution of information will aid and complicate operations. The data explosion already experienced in military has reached civilian operations. This trend has added alternative methods for information sharing (i.e. Skype, WhatsApp, and Viber, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, etc.) that the military may need to adapt to reach key civilian personnel.**

**CHAPTER IV  
OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT DESCRIPTION**

**1. Missions**

There are three distinct CIV-MIL environments: cooperative, coexistence, and de-confliction that impact both what information is shared and how it is shared. The level of trust between the information sharers will have the greatest impact on information sharing. The three environments that make up the CIV-MIL coordination spectrum are fluid and often not static. In larger operations it is not uncommon for all three to exist based on the threat level.




Figure 6

- a. **Cooperative** is best represented in an environment where trust is high between the CIV-MIL entities, such as in a HA/DR support response. The military’s role

is to support the relief mission by providing either unique capabilities that are not available in the civilian environment, or to serve as a rapid response force to provide an initial capability while humanitarian/commercial capability flows in to support relief operations. The key attributes in this environment are that the military supports the relief effort and is the resource of last resort. To be effective the military and the civilian entities (affected state and the humanitarian community) need to collaborate by sharing information and situational awareness, and coordinating operations. In this environment CIV-MIL collaboration, cooperation, and coordination are at their highest often with direct information sharing. This is referred to as a 'cooperative' CIV- MIL environment.

**Trust for the military in information sharing is based on an analysis of perceived risks to the mission, current and future operations, and personnel.**

**Trust for the humanitarian community is much broader. It is based on the organization and its people's willingness to communicate with the military and share information. Their decision is driven by:**

- A. Potential hazards to the population served**
- B. Potential hazards to members of their team (This can be in both the area of the affected state, or outside the affected state in other hazardous areas)**
- C. Organizational policy**
- D. Personal experience by field leadership**

- b. **De-confliction** environments, as explained in the blue box below, represent the area between cooperative and coexistence. This covers the middle-space between the two ends of the coordination spectrum. This situation is often found in environments with limited hostile entities, where sustained combat operations are not anticipated, and roles and functions are clearly understood. This includes environments associated with peacekeeping and stability operations. The military may have a role in providing critical enabling capabilities such as infrastructure improvements while not directly participating in the humanitarian operation. Interaction between CIV-MIL may or may not be overt through such events as meetings at either's facilities, or may occur in a "neutral" venue not associated with either party. De-confliction operations are the most difficult to establish due to the hybrid nature of the environment and the shifting role of the military forces.

The term de-confliction can have divergent meanings to civilian and military personnel. The civilian interpretation of de-confliction may be deescalating a conflict. The military interpretation is typically avoiding actions that interfere with those of other entities in the mission space where possible. For the military, it particularly means avoiding those actions which might endanger non-combatants. For the purposes of this document, the military interpretation of de-confliction is used throughout.

- c. **Coexistence** represents an environment where trust is low between the CIV-MIL entities. This would include a hostile conflict environment with the military conducting operations to counter a threat, while the humanitarian community provides support to the affected population. Whenever trust is low, the humanitarian entity will distance itself from the military. This is necessary to display and maintain the perception of neutrality and independence in all aspects of non-combatant operations. Within this environment information sharing focuses on avoidance of operational encounters to establish both humanitarian space, and to ensure independence from any armed forces operations. Since the CMIS interaction are possibly limited to sharing threat information and avoiding humanitarian locations, this environment is referred to as 'coexistence'.

## 2. Key Participants

It is important to identify the main participants and their role in an event. The three primary stakeholders in CIV-MIL information sharing are the affected state, the humanitarian community, and the military.

- a. **Affected State:** This is a nation's sovereign government. This term includes both national and regional governments and their associated departments and ministries. The affected state has ultimate responsibility to provide for and protect its population. Information sharing is particularly critical for any vulnerable population the affected state is unable or unwilling to satisfactorily assist to head off a larger crisis.
- b. **Humanitarian Community:** Consisting of independent international and local organizations, most community members strive to reduce suffering, save lives, and improve the health, education, and life of a population. Humanitarian communities are a collection of independent organizations. Though they will collaborate, cooperate, and coordinate when it is in their interest to do so – they are fully independent organizations accountable only to beneficiaries, donors, the affected state and to their own management. Humanitarian organizations will dedicate substantial resources to sharing information with donor agencies and their private donor base, often at the expense of sharing operational information with external agencies. The humanitarian community is discussed

in detail in Enclosure 6, *The Humanitarian Community*.

- c. **Foreign Military:** These are commonly armed forces under the control of their national government's authority and conduct operations supporting its national policy. Military forces can be grouped as a coalition or might operate as independent entities based on their respective national directives and policy.
- d. **Foreign Government Agencies:** There will be other agencies of the government engaged in the response effort beyond their military. This normally will include the diplomatic representatives in country and other agencies of the foreign office/state department of the responding nation's government.
- e. **Local Organizations:** Within the affected state there may be locally run organizations meeting one or more needs of the general population or a specific group. They may be endorsed or supported by the affected state, supported by other resources, or locally funded. Military planners and field personnel should be aware that not all actors in the operating area will be multi-national or international based organizations. Local organizations will need to be engaged similarly if they are within the operating area.
- f. **Host Nation:** Either due to limited access to the affected state, or the need to use facilities outside the affected state – host nation support for an operation will become necessary. Similar to the affected state, host nations exercise sovereignty that must be considered, therefore coordination with the host nation government and military will be necessary.

**National sovereignty must be observed throughout an operation. Especially in HA/DR operations foreign military forces operate with permission of the affected state. The authority (actual or perceived) of the affected state must never be infringed on during operations. This includes observance of affected state laws, regulations and customs. Foreign governments may advise the affected state, but ultimate authority resides with the affected state's government.**

### 3. Operational Context

The relationship between the stakeholders and the degree of information sharing control will dictate the information sharing arrangement. These dynamics are discussed in Enclosure 3, *Use Cases*.

- a. The military's concern with information sharing is multifaceted. Information gained from a system may disclose either a capability or a limitation of that

system, or both. Information from other sources may place those sources at risk of compromise, especially a human source. Military forces protect information about their movements or future operational plans so they can avoid counter moves from adversaries. Finally, the military community might not have the same trust that information shared will not be passed to adversarial organizations. Because of this concern for protecting capabilities, movement, etc., information shared with civilians often must be cleared “for public release” since it may find its way into the public domain.

- b. The affected state focuses on managing the problem within its borders. This involves politics and may constrain or skew shared information. Governments, like people, only reluctantly disclose negative information and attempt to manage the information flow to the public.
- c. The humanitarian community concentrates its specific efforts and will share information when and if it supports these efforts. It also always works to ensure the safety of both its personnel and the affected population. These constraints can delay, limit, or stop altogether the information provided to both the affected state and the responding military forces.
- d. Foreign governments responding to a call for assistance are by their nature political entities. Similar to other organizations they control what information is shared and with whom, and may have myriad reasons for choosing to cooperate or restrict their shared information.
- e. International and social media can have distorting impact on the operating environment for the military, affected state, humanitarian community, and other governments. It can impact the allocation of aid, change priorities, and reallocate resources without consideration of other competing needs. The media may have an agenda of their own, or may report without benefit of the broader scope of the relief effort and focus on one area/incident. This activity may conflict with information operations by the three primary stakeholders.

#### 4. Policies, Assumptions and Constraints

- a. **Policies:** Military information sharing in a CIV-MIL sharing environment can come from several levels within the military structure. Higher military authority, outside the operating area, may retain release authority and delegate a limited list of subject items which the deployed forces may share with the non FMN mission partners.

The quantity and quality of information shared between CIV-MIL will affect mutual trust. Shared information must be accurate, complete and timely. The recipient is looking for information to both build situational awareness and

support their decision making process. The more dynamic the operational environment (i.e. rapid onset natural disaster), the greater the need for accurate information sharing that enables the responding military, humanitarians and the affected state to determine the best course of action to meet the needs of the population. **When mutual trust is established, information sharing will usually follow. Without trust, collaboration is nearly impossible.**

- **FMN facilitates information exchange between all mission partners**
- **The originating nation retains control of the information. If a mission partner wants to share it outside the MPE environment permission must be granted by the originator - unless it is written and marked 'For Public Release'**
- **Mission partners should anticipate the need for CMIS and identify, process and mark releasable information in advance.**

- b. **Assumptions:** Information shared will be for a purpose that supports the originator's mission. This statement is not meant to be disapproving, but rather a fundamental aspect of the information sharing dynamic.

Assumptions that enable information sharing include:

- Civilian authority has sanctioned or approved a military response to the crisis.
- Members of the responding military will establish a Mission Network.
- CIV-MIL information sharing will be needed to conduct operations.
- Elements of trust will be developed between the civilian and military organizations sufficient that information sharing can be coordinated and executed.

- c. **Constraints:** A military's willingness for CIV-MIL information sharing is based on existing higher authority restrictions on sharing specific information or with specific entities. This will be situationally dependent based on the military mission (HA/DR or armed operations), the affected state (failed, weakened, totalitarian, monarchical, constitutional democracy), and the level of interaction between the military and the humanitarian communities. **FMN will change how the military performs its mission but will not change how the humanitarian community or affected state conduct their own operations.** Information sharing by the humanitarian community may also be based on mission need, staff and supported populace security, and finally, trust. Humanitarian community trust is often based on the humanitarian precepts covered in Enclosure 6, *The Humanitarian Community*.

## 5. Operating Concept

Responding multinational military forces will form a FMN mission partner network able to share information among members. FMN members will use Joining, Membership, and Exiting Instructions (JMEI) to form and exit the FMN. FMN members use these instructions to establish, maintain and disestablish the federated network. The humanitarian community is not excluded from joining the unclassified FMN environment. **Military planners must acknowledge that to maintain their independence, humanitarian organizations are not expected to join the network.** Non-FMN entities will not directly connect to the FMN environment (either due to political or technical limitations), but can share information by other means such as Internet Web sites, emails with attachments, voice and text, bi-lateral cross-domain gateways, or face-to-face bilateral conversations with members who have permission to share. Liaisons to coordination elements, if established (such as the MNMCC, MNCC, HuMOCC or CMOC) will conduct multilateral conversations. FMN will support military liaisons to centers of influence by providing connectivity between the liaisons and the FMN military operations centers.

## 6. Employment Modes

A Mission Network will be created at the appropriate classification for the mission. **This will contain an unclassified space with connectivity to the public internet.** The flow of information from the Mission Network will be controlled to ensure public release procedures are followed. The key information sharing environment difference is that in a cooperative environment information sharing between the FMN mission partners and the non-FMN entities (affected state and humanitarian community) will often be direct. In a coexistence environment, the information flow tends to be through a third party. The de-confliction environment is the hardest to establish due to the hybrid nature of the CIV-MIL information sharing dynamic. Greater coordination will be required in order to establish a mechanism that supports the humanitarian principles and maintains trust, while having utility to the participants.

## 7. Operating Environment

The FMN operations might be within or outside the affected state and can include airborne and shipboard operation centers. The mission partners may be co-located or distributed. The method of information sharing will adapt to the environment in which that the key players operate.

- Geographic Area(s) – FMN is a collaboration and coordination tool that can be co-located with responding forces or distributed outside an operational area. At the same time, the affected state disaster management and the humanitarian community may be distributed within the affected state as the situation requires (i.e. across an archipelago nation such as the Philippines).

- Environmental Conditions – FMN itself is largely insulated from environmental factors. Solar flares, flooding, electrical storms could be factors but are usually transitory in nature and effect on FMN. FMN is subject to the means of information dissemination selected to provide the sharing. This includes radio and satellite, or interconnections via local area networks as required to achieve information sharing.

## 8. Potential Impacts

CIV-MIL information sharing is not a new concept. The new element to this environment is the introduction of an FMN framework with associated common procedures and standards. The net result of FMN-enabled information sharing among the members and non-FMN mission entities will be increased unity of effort and reduced friction to facilitate coordination and cooperation among all parties. There will need to be a commonly defined approach to risk management for information security. This includes an approach for moving shared information between the Mission Network and the public internet.

## 9. Functional Capabilities

The tools affecting information sharing in the unclassified CIV-MIL environment are:

- Voice – this can include land lines, cell phones, satellite phones and voice over internet protocol (VoIP)
- Text – commonly associated with smart phones but can be internet based
- Email – Internet mail with of support attachments such as Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) and Adobe PDF files
- Video Teleconferencing – Similar to VoIP with video and audio shared between parties
- Face-to-Face – improves trust and discussions amongst participants
- Internet posting and access to upload or download information accessible to specific individuals with controlled access, or shared with the public without access control.
- Readable databases accessible to specific individuals with controlled access, or shared with the public without access control.
- Ability to ingest data from readable databases which are publically accessible or accessible by specific individuals with controlled access.
- File sharing with access control.

## 10. FMN Mission Connectivity

- a. **Military Connectivity:** The military internal communications will configure itself to support unclassified information sharing.
  - This might include establishing an unclassified FMN or a multi-level

classified network to share information among the mission partners to develop situational awareness and to coordinate operations.

- Military liaison personnel engaged in the area of operation may function externally to the FMN. These liaisons may be assigned to coordinate with other non-FMN partner military forces, the affected state's government (national and regional), and with the humanitarian community. To be effective liaisons will need connectivity with the FMN for access to their local commanders and other network members. This distributed connectivity allows the liaisons to be the commander's representative (for overall force or for an individual command) to provide effective communication between the FMN commands and the associated organization the liaison is assigned to.
- b. **Civilian-Military Connectivity:** The Operational Concept's central point is the ability to distribute information between CIV-MIL participants in an environment where both are operating to support their individual mission.
- **Direct sharing** – represents the shortest communications path between the CIV-MIL entities. This can be information that is pushed, meaning shared without request – or it can be pulled, meaning it is in answer to a query. There is no requirement within the CMIS Operational Concept as to what if any information must be provided. It simply recognizes that each party controls the content and access as best it can to any information disclosed to other parties. This may be accomplished at face-to-face meetings or via point-to-point correspondence.
  - **Indirect sharing** – represents the use of a third party to convey information (e.g. interlocutor or the using of a third party portal).
  - **General sharing** – represents the push or pull of information on uncontrolled Internet portals open to anyone with site access. This information can be re-used without controls by anyone who finds the content useful.

## CHAPTER V INFORMATION SHARING AND SERVICES

*‘The sharing of information between military and humanitarians should take place immediately.’*

UN-CMCoord ‘A Guide for the Military’

### 1. Information Networks

Generally, military units and forces operate with either independent classification-based systems or an integrated system capable of processing information in both classified and unclassified domains.

- a. Typically, a classified network is used to conduct military-related information sharing in an encrypted environment with resilient cyber capabilities to thwart adversarial access denial and system degradation efforts. Modern military operations have expanded to include rapid coalition formation with single-level security architecture. This is the precept of the mission network known as the Federated Mission Networking led by 22 nations mostly within NATO. FMN is incorporated in NATO’s Allied Joint Publication 6, 1-5. The Mission Partner Environment is the United States implementation plan for joining an FMN coalition. Information placed on the FMN/MPE network is visible to all network participants, but the information remains the property of the originating nation. This information will be classified (i.e. Confidential, Secret, NATO Secret) by the originator and must be handled accordingly.
- b. The second network available to military forces is use of unclassified access to the public internet. Nations may place firewalls and access restrictions on their systems based on their national and military service’s policies. As with classified systems, information identified as unclassified remains the property of the originator and can be marked to control distribution (i.e. Unclassified, For Official Use Only, and NATO Restricted). Because information with these handling restrictions is generally not sharable outside military channels, documents to be shared with non-military organizations should be identified “For Public Release”. This allows both FMN members and civilian personnel to share the information with others without risk of violating trust or requiring special handling.

- 1) The central effort of the CMIS guidebook is to provide an understanding of how to move from a national (bilateral) response to a multinational effort, and in complex environments use a similar multinational effort to effectively provide indirect CIV-MIL information sharing. Figure 7 diagrams the effort.




Figure 7

- i. At the national level CIV-MIL information sharing is between government agencies as indicated by the **blue** bidirectional arrow. Information sharing processes and procedures are conducted at the national level.
- ii. MIL-MIL information sharing can be through bilateral and multilateral agreements, with FMN representing the current process to rapidly enable multilateral military networks. This is represented by a **red** bidirectional arrow.

- iii. Multinational military to international and multinational civilian information sharing is represented by the green bidirectional arrow. The international community operates on information networks using processes established across the community. **The CMIS guidebook seeks to expand the information sharing between the international/multinational civilian community and the military by improving information sharing dissemination through an unclassified FMN environment.**
- iv. National government agencies share information with other nations and humanitarian organizations. This is represented by the **black** bidirectional arrow.
- v. Finally, there may be situations where the military may have a bilateral information sharing with a nation or organization. This represented by a **yellow** bidirectional arrow.

**An effective technique is for a higher military command to delegate specific CIV-MIL items that the deployed force commander will be responsible for. This by default places any information sharing outside this list the responsibility of the higher command. This technique enables the force commander to shape his resources to support what they are responsible for and flow information to the higher command to process for dissemination at their level.**

- 2) Policies and processes that allow for information release outside of military control usually govern information sharing mechanisms with civilian entities. With no control of information after it is provided to civilian and foreign governments, it must be cleared for public release. Military commanders must establish and promulgate clear policies and procedures for foreign information disclosure which complements the assigned operation. Planners and disclosure personnel must collaborate during mission analysis to identify disclosure requirements and ensure policy adherence for all relevant categories of classified military information. The information-release process must be established and understood at all levels of the command and by trusted military partners. These processes will control what is shared with the affected state, interlocutors and the humanitarian community. Lessons learned indicate a requirement for additional assigned headquarters personnel trained in foreign disclosure processes and standards necessary to facilitate information flow.

## 2. Lessons Learned

- a. The most effective information sharing means outside the military is writing for public release, and this is important for facilitating timely dissemination of information releasable to non-mission partners such as the humanitarian community. Proactively writing with the intent to release will avoid both significant delays in sharing information and unnecessary classification.
- b. Information derived from unclassified sources is much easier to evaluate for release. Images taken from commercial sources or hand held cameras do not compromise a unique military capability, but because it is originating from within the military, it must undergo the security-review process before release. Information derived from other Web sites must be scrutinized and validated as it could contain potentially inaccurate or dated information.
- c. Information derived from classified systems or sources must be reviewed for downgrading before public release. This could be accomplished by simply removing any reference to the information or image source. For example, during a disaster response, the affected state and the humanitarian community will need to know a bridge is destroyed but will not need to know what specific system was used to collect the information.
- d. Personnel specially trained in disclosure procedures at various command organizational levels conduct the information release process. The types of information routinely needed by an affected state and the humanitarian community are frequently known in advance. Information sources are also known, and any ability to expedite the release process will greatly aid information sharing. Information sharing should be conducted at the lowest command level engaging with the affected civilians. Preapproved information disclosure or automating the process will enable the deployed military to better support the civilian information consumers by rapidly delivering actionable information.
- e. In the case of classified derived information, there is the option to release information based on its perishability. Evaluate the information to determine if the classification can be downgraded based on the age of the information. What is designated as classified today might be shareable several days later. There are automated systems (i.e. CIDNE, INDURE) that extract information from reports and summarize them for possible release at the appropriate time interval. This is an option during complex emergencies when tactical information is downgraded to an activity report based on "historic" trends. A mine discovered or an explosion is important today, but in several days, the military and an adversary will have the information, thus sharing it with civilian entities might not be a security issue.

### 3. Information Sharing

- a. Information sharing is a dynamic setting that range from interpersonal (face-to-face) to high-tech systems (machine-to-machine). Each has its strengths and weaknesses, obstacles and opportunities. The simplest environment is co-location of civilian and military responders, allowing more information sharing and operational coordination. Such a relationship, however, is rare due to many factors. The realities of distance, space, competing mission requirements, and personnel limitations, liaisons typically serve as intermediaries representing their organization and national forces to another organization. Using the electronic environment allows for greater reach in information sharing, but can be hampered by local infrastructure constraints. Information must be tailored to fit the immediate requirements and provided in a format that is quickly understood for the end user.
  
- b. The military must either join, or where none exists establish, unclassified Web-based network Internet connectivity enabling military force planners to share information with various relief organizations and open direct communication with these same organizations. This connectivity must include unclassified email and access to the World Wide Web. Military forces also must have the ability to connect with other civilian communications equipment like mobile and satellite telephones. The force should also consider incorporating modern social media tools, such as texting and short message service (SMS), and use commonly accessible voice over internet protocol (VoIP) software such as Skype, with established and coordinated guidelines with the affected state and key humanitarian interlocutors.

#### **Personnel with the following capabilities and experience are highly desired for CIV-MIL operations:**

- ❖ Language capabilities and cultural knowledge of the affected state.
- ❖ Strong interpersonal relationship skills.
- ❖ Multifunctional logistics and security assistance operations.
- ❖ Experience and knowledge of the humanitarian community.
- ❖ Understanding of the humanitarian community, authorities, and roles.
- ❖ Understanding of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Human Rights Law (HRL) and International Disaster Response Law (IDRL).

c. Face-to-Face Interaction.

- 1) Liaison Representatives are critical to effective information sharing, coordination and collaboration. Liaisons must be highly knowledgeable about what their nation brings to the effort – not the theoretical capabilities of their assets, but the practical capability. The interaction between CIV-MIL responders is dictated by the level of trust and risk to each party’s mission/ personnel. Figure 8 diagrams the various ways that interaction can be achieved through liaison officials (LO). These face-to-face interactions are not limited to within the borders of the affected state.

Recall that “Trust” for the humanitarian community, the willingness to share information, is driven by:

- E. Potential hazards to the population served
- F. Potential hazards to members of their relief team. (This can be for both the area of the affected state, or outside the affected state in other hazardous areas.)
- G. Organizational policy
- H. Personal experience by field leadership




Figure 8

- i. **Co-location:** This allows for real-time interaction and communication with low organizational and technical impacts. This may be possible by liaison personnel at a regional headquarters in a cooperation strategy environment. The risk for the humanitarian organizations is the loss of the perception of independence.

- ii. **Liaison Exchange:** Co-location might not be possible for logistical reasons (e.g. limited facilities or geographic locations) or security considerations (e.g. military forces are more prone to become targets or use deterrence measures for self-protection). It might run counter to maintaining a visible civil-military distinction. The use of onsite liaison officers (LO) might be more feasible than having liaisons traveling to and from the coordination site. This would necessitate the military providing both access and support to non-FMN entities liaisons.
  - iii. **Limited Liaison:** Most humanitarian organizations are very careful to preserve their neutral status, especially in conflict environments. In this case, liaisons may attend relevant meetings and activities as needed, e.g. meetings on invitation of the lead organization, affected nation, or other neutral humanitarian lead as the case may be.
  - iv. **Interlocutor:** Working through a third party (physical or virtual) is another way of interaction between military and humanitarian actors. Many military and humanitarian actors would prefer direct dialogue, but in some cases, a third party (interlocutor) may be the only way to maintain a visible civil-military separation. This can be especially true for NGOs with a policy of not having a direct interaction with the military. An interlocutor (i.e. a UN Agency or another aid organization, or even a mutually trusted foreign government) can be the conduit for information sharing.
- 2) Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) units interface through the CMOC with all parts of the civilian environment within the operational area. CIV-MIL cooperation does not have a core doctrinal guidance shared by all nations. Some nations see CIMIC or civil affairs as solely supporting the military mission within a very limited framework. Others consider that CIMIC is part of a whole-of-government approach (in this case, representing the military component of the state) contributing directly to the achievement of the strategic goal through the interplay of military forces and other agencies. In the case of the latter nations, CIMIC funding may come from government departments other than their defense establishment. CIMIC for these nations does not necessarily support the military mission alone, but could contribute to broader national objectives.

- 3) Besides the access to a liaison (local or scheduled visits), the authority of the liaisons to participate in the decision-making process can significantly influence establishing effective coordination, collaboration and demonstrating active cooperation. A liaison who serves only as a conduit between the civilian and military organizations slows support operations tempo. This can be alleviated by providing a sufficiently senior representative, even with only limited authority, to obligate his organization, or to use alternative means to share information (i.e. cell phone text/voice) with that part of their organization that can fully represent and obligate the military organization. Figure 9 below shows that decentralized decision-making by co-located liaisons is most effective in achieving collaboration and coordination. The least effective approach is to both hold decision making authority away from the CIV-MIL coordination center and to provide a liaison who has only limited access with that center. In such a relationship, the result would be diminished collaboration and operational coordination effectiveness




Figure 9

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- 4) There are several key centers of face-to-face interaction in the CIV-MIL environment. The names can change based on the existing circumstances, but site function remains relatively constant. Following are those centers typically established by the UN and affected nation:
- i. On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC): An OSOCC is set up in the disaster area by the UN to help local authorities to coordinate international relief. Following a disaster, the first arriving international urban search-and-rescue team or United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination team deployed by OCHA establishes the OSOCC as soon as possible. An OSOCC has three primary objectives:
    - A. Be a link between international responders and the affected state's government.
    - B. Provide a system for coordinating and facilitating the activities of international relief efforts at a disaster site, notably following an earthquake, where the coordination of many international urban search and rescue teams is critical to ensure optimal rescue efforts.
    - C. Provide a platform for cooperation, coordination and information management among international humanitarian agencies.

## Liaison as a Resource

A liaison has only as much authority as granted by the represented organization. One critical liaison role is that of subject matter expert of the organizational capabilities contributing to a relief effort.

Rather than quoting manufacturer specifications, CIV-MIL planners must know the effective capabilities relevant to the operation at hand. For example:

- ❖ How long do water purification units need to run before producing potable water? How long between maintenance cycles? What is the steady state rate of production for the operational environment (silt, salinity, contamination)?
- ❖ Based on the elevation and prevailing weather (density altitude) what is the effective range, lifting capability and safe operating limits of helicopters and rotorcraft?
- ❖ What amount of excess shipboard water production is available for offload given the ships operating area (draft, debris, silt)?
- ❖ What are the weather and daylight operating limits for aircraft, helicopters, and rotorcraft?
- ❖ What are the key points in the organization's operating cycle?
  - Time to plan the mission (weather forecast, landing zone selection, coordination with recipient organization, route planning, alternate safe landing areas, etc.).
  - Time to position/prepare cargo and/or brief passengers.

- ii. Multinational Military Coordination Center (MNMCC), sometimes called the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC): HA/DR missions typically lack an established combined task force command, so a mechanism is needed to facilitate foreign military forces' coordination and cooperation supporting the affected state to maximize unity of effort and minimize confusion, duplication, and friction. When many nations respond to a disaster, the affected state establishes a MNMCC to coordinate foreign military support to humanitarian operations.

- A. The affected state should designate a senior military officer as the MNMCC director, and provide appropriate space and infrastructure support (including communications links) for foreign military force representatives. The MNMCC must be rapidly and efficiently organized to coordinate support to the affected state.
- B. MNMCC tasks may range from simply sharing information or de-conflicting the various military HA/DR operations to actively coordinating all multinational forces. The MNMCC focus should be maximizing the foreign military forces support to the affected state. The MNMCC should be aware of, and potentially engage with, other coordinating mechanisms within the government and humanitarian community.
- C. Though the MNMCC director will not command foreign military forces' representatives, they can recommend a proposed MNMCC structure and establish a venue and focal point for foreign military forces representatives.
- D. MNMCC members represent their countries' militaries and generally should not be organized along a traditional staff structure (i.e. J-codes). Nor should they necessarily be organized strictly along capabilities their countries can provide since many countries might be providing multiple capabilities. Instead, the MNMCC members, while retaining their national identities, work within various cells, boards or committees based on the combined foreign military forces capabilities. Consideration should be given to functional organizations that align along the UN cluster system since in general the foreign military forces will be supporting the affected state directly, or via international relief agencies.

**Regardless to how the staff is organized, it is critical that those staff divisions responsible for CIV-MIL planning and execution be identified throughout the command staff and to the key humanitarian entities in the operating area.**

- E. One of the most critical tasks for the MNMCC is to function as the military support element to the HuMOCC, focused on support to requests for assistance (RFA) and requests for information (RFI) by both the affected state and the humanitarian community.
- iii. Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Center (HuMOCC): The HuMOCC serves to provide a predictable humanitarian-military-police coordination platform. Complementing to the OSOCC, the HuMOCC provides the

physical space for facilitating the interface among humanitarian actors, national and foreign military actors, and the country's national police. Establishing the HuMOCC also facilitates rapidly processing RFA and RFIs. Figure 10 diagrams the RFA/RFI process.

**Military liaison officers participating in CIV-MIL meetings must be aware that main aid agencies may not attend, and if they do, they may not share relevant operational information in the UN meetings. Military liaisons should expect the opportunity to have sidebar bilateral exchanges with humanitarian representatives and potentially establish separate liaison with main humanitarian agencies.**

**While supporting the formal UN structure, military liaisons need to have the flexibility and available personnel to establish working relationship with main aid actors at bilateral or ad hoc sector level.**



HuMOCC in Nepal (April 2015)




Figure 10

The HuMOCC, or similar function, is a key CIV-MIL coordination and information sharing point. The following is an explanation of the HuMOCC process:

### Notional HuMOCC Process Flow

- 1) **Needs Identification:** Unfilled needs are identified by either the affected state or a humanitarian organization. An Excel based Request for Assistance (RFA) is completed by the requesting organization.
- 2) **Cluster Prioritization:** The responsible cluster vets and validates the RFA. If the request is within the cluster's capability, it is removed from the process and the response is conducted at the cluster level.
- 3) **Inbox:** Vetted and prioritized requests exceeding the cluster's capability are logged and assigned a tracking number starting the HuMOCC process.
- 4) **Humanitarian Validation:** The affected state reviews the requests and removes those it either wants to address internally or does not want proceed. National representatives (USAID in the case of the US) reviews and removes those aid requests it wants to handle directly or identifies requests its military may consider accepting.
- 5) **Trading Floor:** Military representatives select those RFAs (and the associated tracking number) they intend to perform.
- 6) **Military Provider:** Foreign military forces use the tracking number to report an RFA's status to the HuMOCC, enabling RFA submitters to determine who accepted their request. As the HuMOCC tracks the status of requests, military units have actionable tasking they can cross reference in their status reports.

#### Notes:

- 1) The LNOs working in the trading floor, where the liaison officers accept RFA/RFIs, need to be empowered to accurately determine those tasks their forces can accept for execution and coordinate with the HuMOCC and the RFA requesting agency.
- 2) Connectivity between the HuMOCC the MNMCC and the military operations centers is paramount to effectively coordinate mission acceptance, scheduling and execution status.
- 3) In the 2015 Nepal response, the trading floor was conducted within the MNMCC, demonstrating the flexibility and interrelationship of these coordination enclaves.

**The HuMOCC will likely not be the only method of submitting RFA's to the responding military. Organizations may go directly to the military's operation center (J3), or to the government representatives of the military force. In the case of the US, this may be USAID. This direct request is not isolated to within the affected state. Requests have be initiated at the national level directly to the government itself by the headquarters of the aid organization.**

- iv. Humanitarian Clusters: Among the multiple clusters, the military most often interacts with Logistics, Health, and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (known by the acronym WaSH). Early during the crisis response when the situation is urgent and quickly unfolding, it is helpful if the military provides liaisons to various clusters to both stay abreast of rapidly developing situations and anticipate requests for assistance to the MNMCC or HuMOCC. As the operational tempo reaches steady state, and the humanitarian community expands, liaison reach and capability will become less important. The cluster system is explained in greater detail in Enclosure 6, *The Humanitarian Community*.
- d. Machine-to-Machine Interaction. The Internet provides significant information, especially during disaster events. Military commands can monitor the situation and anticipate the environment they will encounter if called on to support relief operations. Several sites may allow military participation, thus expanding information sharing beyond the crisis area.

**Major aid agencies will conduct their national military and policy liaison functions directly with the host nation forces, and likely not via the HuMOCC/MNMCC. Typically, for sovereignty reasons, affected states usually favor direct contact. Humanitarian agencies in country pre-crisis will have their own network of contacts with the affected state agencies as well as with opposition groups as a primary means of security access and security for their operations.**

- 1) **The Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS):** GDACS (Figure 11) is a cooperation framework among the United Nations, the European Commission and worldwide disaster managers to improve alerts, information sharing and coordination during the first phase after major sudden-onset disasters. Through a multi-hazard disaster impact assessment service, managed by the European Commission Joint Research Centre, GDACS provides alerts and impact estimations after major disasters. GDACS hosts the real-time coordination platform "Virtual-OSOCC" for disaster managers worldwide. (<http://www.gdacs.org/>)




Figure 11

- 2) **Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centers (V-OSOCC):** The V-OSOCC is a controlled site (user name/password) that has evolved into an important information platform for the international disaster response community. V-OSOCC is used to facilitate information sharing not only in major sudden-onset emergencies but also during preparedness activities such as training events, simulation exercises, and meetings. The Virtual OSOCC has been continuously revised to improve information analysis support and to provide a multi-lingual interface. The V-OSOCC provides information sharing amongst the humanitarian community until the OSOCC can be established. Following the OSOCC standup, the V-OSOCC continues to serve as the virtual forum for information sharing. (<https://vosocc.unocha.org/>)
  
- 3) **IFRC Fednet** is the extranet of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (Federation), a platform where entities can work, collaborate, communicate and inform about the activities of the Federation, its member National Societies and the Secretariat. National Red Cross and Red Crescent societies have a chartered relationship with their government and military. The information in this network is published directly by National Societies and Secretariat offices both in Geneva and other locations. Access is ID and password controlled. (<http://fednet.ifrc.org>)
  
- 4) **Disaster Management Information System (DMIS)** (hosted on IFRC Fednet) is a powerful web-based work of the staff of the Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies, delegations and the Secretariat. It is a system that allows users access to:
  - real-time information on trends in disaster
  - online resources internal and external

- tools and databases.
- 5) **Humanitarianresponse.info** is a UN OCHA humanitarian Community site for globally sharing disaster-related information. This site pulls information from the various UN Clusters (i.e. cluster meeting Minutes). NGOs will also post information to this site. Whereas V-OSOCC serves to coordinate responses of all responders at the onset of a given disaster, HumanitarianResponse.info usually becomes active 4-10 days after the occurrence.
  - 6) Cluster entities have their own websites that may provide information on current relief operations. The clusters and their associated websites are:
    - i. Camp Coordination/Management: [www.globalcccmcluster.org](http://www.globalcccmcluster.org)
    - ii. Emergency Shelter: [www.sheltercluster.org](http://www.sheltercluster.org)
    - iii. Health: [www.who.int/hac/global\\_health\\_cluster/en/](http://www.who.int/hac/global_health_cluster/en/)
    - iv. Protection: [www.globalprotectioncluster.org](http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org)
    - v. Early Recovery: <https://reliefweb.int/organization/gcer>
    - vi. Emergency Telecommunications: [www.etcluster.org](http://www.etcluster.org)
    - vii. Logistics (managed by the World Food Program): [www.logcluster.org](http://www.logcluster.org)
    - viii. Water Sanitation Hygiene: [www.washcluster.net](http://www.washcluster.net)
    - ix. Education: [www.educationcluster.net](http://www.educationcluster.net)
    - x. Food Security: <https://foodsecuritycluster.net>
    - xi. Nutrition: [www.nutritioncluster.net](http://www.nutritioncluster.net)
  - 7) The UN also has organizations that focus on areas of responsibility:
    - i. Protection of Civilians: [www.globalprotectioncluster.org/en/areas-of-responsibility/protection-of-civilians.html](http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/en/areas-of-responsibility/protection-of-civilians.html)
    - ii. Child Protection: [www.cpwg.net](http://www.cpwg.net)
    - iii. Mine Action: [www.globalprotectioncluster.org/en/areas-of-responsibility/mine-action.html](http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/en/areas-of-responsibility/mine-action.html)
    - iv. Gender Based Violence: [www.gbvaor.net](http://www.gbvaor.net)
    - v. Housing, Land and Property: [www.globalprotectioncluster.org/en/areas-of-responsibility/housing-land-and-property.html](http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/en/areas-of-responsibility/housing-land-and-property.html)
  - 8) **ReliefWeb**: ReliefWeb reaches more than 168,500 subscribers through its email subscription services. This allows those who have low bandwidth Internet connections to reliably receive current information. Information from ReliefWeb is also available via RSS feeds, Facebook and Twitter. ReliefWeb updates its humanitarian information around the clock. It posts maps and documents daily from more than 5,000 sources, from UN organizations, governments, inter-governmental organizations, NGOs, academia and media. It engages a team of on-call cartographers to create original maps focusing on humanitarian emergencies. All site documents posted are categorized and archived, allowing for advanced search of documents from past emergency

responses. The database contains more than 500,000 maps and documents dating back to 1981. (<http://reliefweb.int/>)

**There is not a central web based platform for operational coordination during a crisis event. Organizations typically are focused on conducting their operations and providing updates to their leadership and sponsors. Though not provided in real time, general humanitarian websites can provide a general pattern to the operations.**

- 9) **Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX):** is an open platform for sharing data across crises and operations. (<https://data.humdata.org/>)
- 10) **All Partner Access Network (APAN):** APAN is an unclassified information sharing and collaboration enterprise supported by the United States Department of Defense (DOD). APAN provides authorized users work space and collaboration tools to leverage information to effectively plan, train and respond to meet their requirements and mission objectives. APAN makes these tools available over the open Internet so individuals and organizations who do not have access to traditional DOD systems and networks can participate in information sharing and collaborative events. (<http://apan.org/>)
- 11) **Max.Gov:** Max.Gov is another US government-sponsored collaboration Web site managed by the Office of Manpower and Budget. It is a controlled access Web site able to host multinational users in a cloud-based network that has embedded Microsoft Office tools and indexed and searchable document storage. The Web site supports mobile devices. (<http://max.gov/>)
- 12) Other humanitarian community information sources include Humanitarian Information Centers (HIC), UNHAS (UN Humanitarian Air Service) is managed by the World Food Program's Logistics Cluster website, National Disaster Management Office (NDMOs) and other relief organizations. It is also important to note that this information might not be verified or analyzed.
- 13) Regional humanitarian organizations and communities of interests are an additional information sources. Examples include the Pacific Disaster Center ([www.pdc.org](http://www.pdc.org)), the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (<https://www.cfe-dmha.org/>), and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) ([http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_117757.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_117757.htm)).

## 14) Web based Applications:

- ReliefWeb Crisis – provides the latest humanitarian updates, disaster trends and countries overviews as a link to in-country contacts, datasets and jobs and training with offline access.
- ReliefWeb Headlines – provides personalized content based on interests that allows access to the latest reports, new disasters, and updates on the users chosen countries or topics.
- Humanitarian Response – aims to be the central website for Information Management tools and services, enabling information exchange among operational responders during either a protracted or sudden onset emergency. This global site is complemented by country specific emergency sites.  
(<https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/>)
- Humanitarian ID – single contact management for everyone working in a humanitarian crisis or disaster. (<https://humanitarian.id/>)
- KoboToolbox – suite of tools for field data collection for use in challenging environments. Software is free and open source. Focused to support workers in humanitarian crisis, aid professionals, and researchers in developing countries.  
(<https://www.kobotoolbox.org/>)
- UN-Asign – crowd sourcing application using geo-tagged photos and text from areas affected by larger humanitarian disasters. Postings are displayed on map at receiver site.
- GDACS – application for global disaster alert and coordination system.
- ACAPS CrisisAlert – news and alerts for the most urgent humanitarian crisis with offline access.
- Humanitarian Kiosk – provides a range of up to the minute humanitarian related information from emergencies around the world.

**GLOSSARY TERMS AND ACRONYMS:**

<b>Term</b>	<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Affected State	AS	This is the sovereign government of a nation. This term includes both national and regional governments and their associated departments and ministries. The affected state has ultimate responsibility to provide and protect their population.
Army Collaborative Information Management System	ACIMS	NATO information sharing environment.
All Partners Access Network	APAN	US Department of Defense funded website for unclassified CIV-MIL information sharing.
Civil Military Coordination	CIMIC	Specialized military group that support the military commander's interaction with civilians.
Cluster		UN structure of 13 areas to support relief response and recovery.
Civilian-Military Operations Coordination	CMOC	Military structure specializing in coordination with non-military organizations in support of the military tasking.
Coexistence		In events with high physical threat and/or low trust CIV-MIL entities avoid direct interaction and contact in order to project independence.
Collaboration		Something created by working jointly with another or others to include a course of action or shared understanding.
Common Operation Picture	COP	Shared information used to develop a holistic view of the operating environment.
Cooperation		CIV-MIL environment common in low threat environment and high levels of trust commonly associated with high amounts of information sharing and direct interaction between the two entities.

Term	Acronym	Definition
Crisis Response / Peace Support Operations	CR / PSO	A “crisis response” or “peace-support operation” are generic terms that may include conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace building, peace enforcement and humanitarian operations (HA/DR).
De-confliction		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. This represents the transition area between the direct support and non-association environment. This environment is common as the dynamics of a response transition between the two extremes, or may represent a lower level of conflict or constricted roles of the military/civilian participants caused by political limits placed on them.</li> <li>2. To adjust or coordinate so as to prevent or resolve conflict and avoid a potential problem or accident involving activities by two or more entities in a particular combat area.</li> </ol>
Direct Support		The military’s role is either to support the relief mission by providing unique capabilities that are not available in the civilian environment, or to serve as a rapid response force to provide the initial capability while the civilian response is deployed. The key attributes in this environment are that the military is in support to the relief effort and is the resource of last resort to provide support capability to the overall HA/DR effort.
Disaster Relief		Monetary or services made available to individuals and communities that have experienced losses due to disasters such as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, drought, tornadoes, and riots.

Term	Acronym	Definition
Disaster Relief		Monetary or services made available to individuals and communities that have experienced losses due to disasters such as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, drought, tornadoes, and riots.
Doctrine, Organization, Training, materiel, Leadership & education, Personnel, Facilities, Policy, and Interoperability	DOTmLPF - PI	Process of parsing requirements and change requirements into discrete elements required to effectively introduce changes to systems or capabilities.
Federated Mission Networking	FMN	A capability consisting of three components: (1) Governance (2) FMN Framework and (3) Mission Network. Also considered the best means to create a common, mission-wide data and information sharing environment.
Federated Mission Networking/Mission Partner Environment Civilian-Military	FMCM	A FMN/MPE framework which supports and enables the planning and execution for the timely establishment of effective information sharing, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration with non-military entities across the range of Civilian-Military operations, including support of sudden onset disasters.
Field Assessment and Coordination Team	FACT	
Foreign Government Agencies		There will be other agencies of the government engaged in the response effort beyond their military. This normally will include the diplomatic representatives in country and other agencies of the foreign office/state department of the responding nation's government.

Term	Acronym	Definition
Foreign Military		These are commonly armed forces under the control of their national government’s authority and conduct operations supporting its national policy. Military forces can be grouped as a coalition or might operate as independent entities based on their respective national directives and policy.
For Official Use Only	FOUO	Document handling instructions for Controlled Unclassified Information, primarily used by US military.
Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System	GDACS	Cooperative worldwide framework to improve alerts, information exchange and coordination in the first phase after major sudden onset disasters.
Host Nation	HN	A nation which, by agreement: a. receives forces and materiel of organizations or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory; b. allows materiel and/or military organizations to be located on its territory; and/or c. provides support for these purposes.
Humanitarian Assistance	HA	Aid that seeks to save lives and alleviate suffering of an affected population. Assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality (General Assembly Resolution 46.182). UN seeks to provide humanitarian assistance with full respect for the sovereignty of the affected state. Assistance may be in the form of direct assistance, indirect assistance, and infrastructure support – which have diminishing contact with the affected population.
Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief	HA/DR	

Term	Acronym	Definition
Humanitarian Community		There are a myriad of organizations, great or small, that conduct operations intended to reduce suffering, save lives, and improve the health, education, and life of a population. Humanitarian communities are a collection of independent organizations. They associate to collaborate, cooperate, and
Humanitarian Coordinator	HC	Senior most UN official in a country experiencing a humanitarian emergency. The Humanitarian Coordinator is appointed by the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator with a new emergency occurs or and existing humanitarian situation worsens in degree and/or complexity.
Humanitarian - Military Operations Coordination Center	HuMOCC	Serves to provide a predictable humanitarian-military- police coordination platform. It provides the physical space for facilitating the interface among humanitarian actors, national and foreign military actors, and the country's national police.
Humanitarian Principles		Foundation for humanitarian action include four humanitarian principles: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. They are central to establishing and maintaining access to affected people whether in a natural disaster or a complex emergency, such as armed conflict.
Information Management	IM	The science that deals with definitions, uses, value and distribution of information that is processed by an organization, whether or not it is handled by a computer. Data origination or acquisition, its storage in databases, its manipulation or processing to produce new (value-added) data and reports via application programs, and the transmission (communication) of the data or resulting reports.

Term	Acronym	Definition
Information sharing		The conveyance of information to include data, particularly structured data, between civilian and foreign military entities to include humanitarian community and the affected state (AS) central and regional governments and their military.
Information Technology	IT	
Interlocutor		A third party person or organization who can be utilized as a conduit for information sharing or to help provide interaction between military and humanitarian actors,
International Committee of the Red Cross	ICRC	Responds to assist people affected by armed conflict. Will also respond to disasters in conflict zones.
International Disaster Relief Law	IDRL	Dictates an affected state's entry requirements for international aid personnel, equipment and supplies in case of a national emergency.
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	IFRC	Worldwide humanitarian aid organization who addresses major humanitarian and development challenges. Focus in three areas; disaster response and recovery, development, and promoting social inclusion and peace.
International Non-Governmental Organization	INGO	Legally constituted corporations created by natural or legal people that operate independently from any form of government. The term normally refers to organizations that are not a part of a government and are not conventional for-profit businesses.
International Organization	IO/IGO	An intergovernmental, regional or global organization governed by international law and established by a group of states, with international juridical personality given by international agreement, however characterized, creating enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose of fulfilling a given function and pursuing common aims.

<b>Term</b>	<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Joining, Membership, and Exiting Instructions	JMEI	Method and process for military information systems to form a unique network environment, exchange information and then disengage in an orderly manner.
Joint Information Environment	JIE	
Joint Operations Center	JOC	Military organization supported by coalition members to coordinate operations.
Knowledge Management	KM	Information results from the processing of raw data. Knowledge management is getting the right information to the right person at the right time and in a usable form.
Liaison Officer/Official	LO	Military term is Liaison Officer, civilian equivalent is Liaison Official.
Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders)	MSF	International and independent medical humanitarian organization that provides medical assistance to people affected by conflict, epidemics, disasters or exclusion from healthcare.
Medical Evacuation (air)	MEDEVAC	Emergency movement of injured personnel, often via airlift or helicopter.
Military and Civil Defense Assets	MCDA	Military and other governmental authorities, such as national police force.
Military Information Operations Center	MIOC	Military focus area designated to support media requests.
Mission Partner	MP	Any nation or organization, NATO or non-NATO, that participates in a mission, training or exercise activity, and is subject to appropriate arrangements for Consultation, Command and Control (C3).
Mission Partner Environment	MPE	An operating environment that enables Command and Control (C2) for operational support planning and execution on a network infrastructure at a single security level with a common language.

Term	Acronym	Definition
Multinational Capability Development Campaign	MCDC	Is a collaborative development environment of 24 nations and international governmental organizations focused on developing and evaluating concepts and non-materiel capabilities for joint, multinational and coalition operations to meet present and future operational needs of the US and coalition partners.
Multi-National Coordination Center	MNCC	Similar in function to the MNMCC. May be made up of a mix of civilian and military representatives.
Multi-National Military Coordination Center	MNMCC	Organization manned military representatives focused on coordinating military response to a crisis. Typically headed by a senior member of the affected state.
National Disaster Management Office	NDMO	Affected state government agency responsible for coordinating disaster response.
NATO CIMIC		Supports NATO commander and civil actor's coordination and cooperation. Civilian actors include national population, local authorities, INGO and NGOs.
Non-Association		In low environments with low CIV-MIL trust humanitarian entities may distance themselves from the military. This is necessary to present and maintain independence in all aspects of their operations.
Non-Governmental Organization	NGO	A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.
Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	OCHA	Part of the UN Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA ensures there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall

Term	Acronym	Definition
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance	OFDA	Responsible for leading and coordinating U.S. government response to overseas disaster.
On-Site Operations Coordination Center	OSOCC	Rapid response tool that provides a platform for the coordination of international response activities in the immediate aftermath of a sudden onset emergency or a rapid change in a complex emergency. The OSOCC is designed to support the affected state government as an OCHA tool to carry out its coordination and information management in an emergency response mandate, especially at the field level.
Operational Concept		Describes how selected capabilities are employed to achieve desired objectives or end-states for a specific scenario.
Private Voluntary Organization	PVO	
Public Affairs	PA	Element of a military organization designated to support media engagement on behalf of the military.
Range of Military Operations	ROMO	Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict intensity across a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations and campaigns.
Request for Assistance	RFA	Formal request by an organization or government for direct military support.
Request for Information	RFI	Formal request by an organization or government for information from the military.
Resident Coordinator	RC	
Rich Site Summary	RSS	A family of document types for listing updates to a website.
Short Message Service	SMS	
Status of Forces Agreement	SOFA	Formal agreement allowing foreign military to operate within a nations borders.

Term	Acronym	Definition
Subject Matter Expert	SME	The Subject Matter Expert is that individual who exhibits the highest level of expertise in performing a specialized job, task, or skill within the organization.
Trust		A. Potential hazards to the population served B. Potential hazards to members of their relief team. (This can be for both the area of the affected state, or outside the affected state in other hazardous areas.) C. Organizational policy D. Personal experience by field leadership
Universal Joint Task List	UJTL	Formal military training requirements to achieve a level of proficiency.
UN Civilian-Military Coordination	UN CMCoord	Facilitates the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals.
UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination	UNDAC	Part of the international emergency response system for sudden onset emergencies. Designed to help UN and affected state during first phase of sudden onset emergency. Assists in coordinating incoming international relief at national and/or site level.
UN Humanitarian Air Service	UNHAS	WFP managed assets to provide passenger and cargo transport for the humanitarian community.
United States Agency for International Development	USAID	US Government agency focused on foreign aid and development.
Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Center	V-OSOCC	Web-based information management tool supporting OCHA. Integral partner with GDACS.
Voice Over Internet Protocol	VOIP	

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<b>Term</b>	<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	WaSH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

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- J. *MCDC Operational Concept for Civilian-Military Information Sharing in a Federated Mission Networking Environment.*

## ENCLOSURES:

- 1. Report on Quick Look Analysis of Communications Issues for CIV-MIL in a Humanitarian Assistance Environment, October 28, 2015
- 2. CIV-MIL Information Sharing Universal Joint Task List
- 3. USE CASES for Federated Mission Networking (FMN)/Mission Partner Environment (MPE) Civilian-Military (FMCM) Information Sharing
- 4. Types of Disasters
- 5. CIV-MIL Information Sharing Planning Considerations
- 6. The Humanitarian Community

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# **Report on Quick Look Analysis of Communications Issues for CIV-MIL in a Humanitarian Assistance Environment**

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In support of the Federated Mission Networking

28 Oct 2015

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## Executive Summary

This is a report covering quick-look research into military to military and civilian to military information sharing during rapid onset, humanitarian assistance and disaster response. The research was conducted as part of the Federated Mission Networking and Mission Partnering Environment CIV-MIL (FMCM) Project. This report is intended to enable the User Discovery Event which will be conducted from 16-19 November, 2015, in Berlin, Germany. It is not intended to be a comprehensive report on the overall state of civilian to military (CIV-MIL) communication or a broad study of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR). This research specifically considered whether there is significant benefit in establishing coordinated processes, architectures and standards across the FMN and MPE communities which will facilitate multinational military to military (MIL-MIL) and CIV-MIL communications in the HADR environment.

Communications related issues were the most commonly reported type of factor or issue in after action review, operational analysis and lessons learned data and artifacts referenced in this study. This report considered 313 observations drawn from lessons-learned databases, after-action reports, and personal observations of military personnel. Of these 313 observations, 216 identified multi-national mil-mil AND CIV-MIL communication as a key factor for success in rapid onset HADR.

The research determined that this communication remains problematic. The report recommends solution development in the following areas.

- Mission Threads for CIV-MIL communication and the key associated artifacts must be developed along with the associated artifacts necessary to improve capabilities.
- Definition and adopt of common information exchange processes, architectures and standards, particularly those for data sharing, for use by military partners to enable better CIV-MIL communication in either or both unclassified and classified federated, mission partner environments. These standards must respect the needs and constraints of civilian parties to the HARD mission space.
- The FMN and MPE efforts should incorporate CIV-MIL doctrinal processes, CONOPS, and instructions, along with architectures and standards for communication with potential mission partners and similar stakeholders, into publications, instructions, and technical reference artifacts such as standards and Joining, Membership, and Exiting Instruction (JMEI) templates.

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- That training and education necessary to support these recommendations should be incorporated into national and multi-national approaches.

1. **Purpose.** This is a report covering quick-look research into military to military and civilian to military information sharing during rapid onset, humanitarian assistance and disaster response. The research was conducted as part of the [Formal Project Name]. This report is intended to enable the User Discovery Event which will be conducted from 16-19 November, 2015, in Berlin, Germany. It is not intended to be a comprehensive report on the overall state of civilian to military communication.

2. **Problem Space.** Military forces operating in a disaster response must communicate effectively with the Affected State (AS), its military and civilian agencies, and the international response community. The latter includes both military and civilian elements. The military elements and some civilians are associated with specific nations contributing support. There are typically numerous civilian non-national actors such as international treaty organizations, private volunteer organizations, and similar groups. Communications between these various actors is an essential capability which enables the cooperation, coordination, collaboration and coexistence necessary for effective response. This research is focused on operational and occasionally tactical matters associated with effective execution of humanitarian and disaster response. It did not gather information on strategic communications regarding policy, national access, and such.

2.1 The research examined all means of communications ranging from face to face using liaison personnel to machine to machine structured data sharing.

2.2. **Areas of Concern.** There is a perception that major processes, architectures and standards which support CIV-MIL communication during rapid onset humanitarian assistance and disaster response events are not well documented on the military side. This is particularly true at the structured data sharing level where web data services could be used. In particular, the working group felt that information and data exchanges, along with associated architectures and standards, are not in place to support CIV-MIL communication in ways which take advantage of the type of common approaches envisioned under the Federated Mission Networking and Mission Partnering concepts.

2.3 This research specifically considers whether there is significant benefit in establishing coordinated processes, architectures and standards across the FMN and MPE communities which will facilitate multinational military to military and civilian to military communications in the HADR environment.

3. **Research Summary.** This research supported the premise that military participants must be prepared to share information with military and civilian organizations from multiple nations in the mission space. It further support the view that this communication must include the use of international civilian sites, systems, portals and services to the fullest extent feasible as part of an overall ability to operate in the public, unclassified environment.

3.1. Projected Gap Areas as derived from review of current MPE and FMN implementation plans.

- Mission Threads. There are no mission threads in place for support of CIV-MIL operations, to include one for HADR.
- Information and Data Exchange Architectures and Standards. There are no clearly established, concepts, instructions and associated standards for communications during multinational CIV-MIL operations.
- FMN and MPE instructions and other supporting artifacts such as CONOPS and processes for supporting CIV-MIL operations are not in place.

3.2. Research Data Summary (See Appendix 1). Communications related issues were the most commonly reported type in after action review, operational analysis and lessons learned data and artifacts. There were 313 initial observations. Of these 313 observations, 216 identified multi-national CIV-MIL communication as a factor for success. The typical data indicated that communications with the affected state and humanitarian response community were significant to successful mission performance.

4. **Research Methodology.** Individual nations contributed data collected from reviews of their own of operational records, after action reports, observations and lessons learned and similar data collections. These were consolidated into a single database. The findings were then classified and grouped across operational functions and tagged for impacted areas. The findings were then compared semantically to identify common issues.

5. **Research Limitations.** There are a broad range of CIV-MIL and Humanitarian Assistance (HA) use cases. This research was constrained to the HADR use case and the perspective of responding militaries other than that of the AS. The available data was constrained by the number of nations participating and the time and labor available to them. The observations were not classified by severity or impact so higher or lower frequency doesn't mean one is more important than another, only that it is more commonly reported.

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## 6. Conclusions and Recommendations for Solution Development.

### 6.1 Conclusions.

6.1.1 Solutions which can improve MIL-MIL and CIV-MIL multi-national communications during rapid-onset humanitarian events will have a significant positive impact on the performance of participating, multi-national military forces and the overall outcome of the HADR event. While MIL-MIL and CIV-MIL information sharing is sometimes reasonably good, it is not consistently effective across multiple events. Application of lessons learned, best practices, and business process improvement, combined with definition and adoption of common architectures and standards (e.g. Mission Threads); by military partners can result in improved operational and technical performance.

6.1.2. Multinational military mission partners must be prepared to share information, including structured digital data, with the Affected State (AS), or Lead Nation (LN), United Nations (UN), and other civilian mission and non-mission partners in the unclassified, public internet environment, preferably using the sites, systems and services established by the humanitarian community. For military participants, this centers on the Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Center (HuMOCC) and Multi-National Coordination Center (MNCC) interface.

6.1.2.1. Military forces must understand and adapt to the humanitarian community and AS lead structure, not try to force the military information exchange requirements (IER), processes, standards, architectures, hierarchies and systems on to non-military actors during an operation. Leaders must ensure the military information exchange architecture maps to the information exchange requirements of CIV-MIL organizations and respect their processes, standards, and information architectures.

6.1.2.2. Responding military forces must have mechanisms in place with key mission partners before and during execution to coordinate and improve knowledge, information and data management and sharing. The more of these mechanisms coordinated, documented in standards and procedures, integrated into communications systems architectures and trained before an incident occurs, the better.

6.1.2.3. If the AS and On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) form an information interoperability working group as an adjunct of their efforts,

participating national militaries should support this. It is imperative that the Civil-Military Coordination Cell (CMCC), Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Cell (HuMOCC) and the Multi-National-(MNCC) IERs and associated interfaces be an aspect of this group's work. Military leaders should encourage the use this group to focus on providing solutions which the least robust partners and participants can support.

6.1.3. Military commanders will be challenged with getting key data out of national systems and military systems, as well as SECRET-REL networks, into the public and controlled unclassified networks and sites in ways that the civilians can access and use it.

6.1.3.1. Military forces should try to avoid over classification of data through the use of write for release and other approaches should also be prepared to apply foreign disclosure and related processes sufficiently quickly to provide releasable information in time to make a difference.

6.1.3.2. Before operations begin, military organizations should strive to ensure the process to make declassification and foreign disclosure happen is validated, documented, promulgated and trained.

6.1.3.3. Military communicators should have the technical aspects of cross-domain information sharing integrated in advance. Even if this involves an air gap, the necessary technical means must be documented, understood by those involved, and put in place.

6.1.4. It is important to train on CIV-MIL communication, coordination and collaboration processes using the intended systems in the expected information environment before facing an actual rapid onset HADR situation.

6.1.4.1. Collective and individual training with the potential humanitarian community, military mission partners and other key actors should preferably be conducted as part of multi-national training programs. This not only insures that military knows how to share information with civilians but also helps develop useful inter-personal relationships.

6.1.4.2. Key elements of a program of learning include individual learning in a military environment, attendance at UN lead courses, STAFFEXs, COMMEXs, knowledge exchanges, and other individual and collective methods. Distributed and multi-national efforts have an important place in learning.

6.1.5. Information sharing via electronic means will not replace the importance of liaison and other face to face information sharing.

6.1.5.1. Provide liaison to the sectors and centers, especially the MNOCC and HuMOCC clusters. Collocate with or man centers and nodes in support of the civilian centric coordination architecture.

6.1.5.2. Supplement basic liaison exchanges by integrating civilian mission partners into military mission partner and own nation command and staff battle-rhythm and organization.

6.1.5.3. Ensure liaisons are trained and equipped to use available communications means such as the unclassified, public internet, satellite phones, mobile phones, etc...., as well as military systems.

6.2. Recommendations. Solution development is required in the following areas.

6.2.1. Mission Threads for CIV-MIL communication and the key associated artifacts must be developed. These "Mission Thread Packages must document required information exchanges relative to operational activities and process. IERs will range from man-to-man, through man-to-machine, to machine-to-machine. Provision of these mission threads will allow the specific development of process, architecture, interface, standard and system solutions which can improve the ability of military forces to share relevant information with humanitarian assistance efforts.

6.2.2. The community of probably supporting states needs to define and adopt common information exchange processes, architectures and standards, particularly those for data sharing, by military partners is needed to enable better CIV-MIL communication in which armed forces are operating in either or both unclassified and classified federated, mission partner environments. These standards must respect the needs and constraints of civilian parties to the HARD mission space.

6.2.3. The FMN and MPE efforts should incorporate CIV-MIL doctrinal processes, CONOPS, and instructions, along with architectures and standards for communication with CIV-MIL mission partners and similar stakeholders, into publications, instructions, and technical reference artifacts such as standards and Joining, Membership, and Exiting Instruction (JMEI) templates.

6.2.4. That training and education necessary to support these recommendations should be incorporated into national and multi-national approaches.

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**Appendix.** Observation and Lessons Learned Analysis

Information Exchange (IX). The communication of data, particularly structured data, with civilian or host nation, the affected state (AS), and the AS military had a routinely observed impact on the mission performance of military forces. The list of findings below is ranked based on frequency of observation. Analysis is presented as factors which impact this performance. The raw data is in the attached spreadsheet.

1. A military organization's ability to identify and meet mission partner communication, information and collaboration requirements as early as feasible is a key factor in successful cooperation and coordination.
2. Identification and use of a common network/information environment for interaction with multinational responder community and the AS is routinely cited as a factor in successful cooperation and coordination necessary to support HADR.
3. The use existing civilian information sharing and collaboration systems and services to communicate with non-military actors wherever possible is a factor in successful cooperation and coordination.
4. The ability to use unclassified information environments, especially the public internet and means to communicate with non-military participants, is a factor in successful cooperation and coordination.
5. Pre-existing knowledge of people, practices and organizations is a factor in successful cooperation and coordination. Military organizations previous training or experience with other militaries, other governmental organizations, Inter-Governmental Organizations such as the UN, and non-governmental organizations such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent prior to deployment was a common factor in success.
6. The capacity to provide for declassification and foreign disclosure is a common factor in successful cooperation and coordination. Observers routinely encountered useful information which was over classified or in the wrong information domain during rapid onset response.
7. Liaisons and other face to face interactions are keys to success and have utility beyond simple communication of information. Observers routinely mentioned the importance of both providing liaisons and ensuring these liaisons had the technical means to communicate.

8. It is important that liaison, information sharing processes and architectures support the cluster and center organization used by the humanitarian assistance community. The clusters represent the data and information architecture of the humanitarian assistance community, not just the geographic layout during event response.
9. Over-classification of information within military circles is a common problem. Military forces must avoid over classification of data generated within military HQs. Frequently cited approaches were “writing for release,” and use of the common environment before defaulting to national networks.
10. Military participants in CIV-MIL environments must deploy with unclassified communications capability and use it. This often requires including commercial off the shelf equipment as part of early response packages.
11. The establishment of a CIV-MIL Information Interoperability Working Group as an effort between the Affected State, the United Nations, and participating military and civilian organizations was identified as a factor in successful technical and architectural interoperability.
12. Military participants observed that including Mission Partners in battle rhythm events, C2 processes and information sharing architectures had a positive impact on performance.
13. Coordination and communication with HN military at all levels is an important factor in mission performance.
14. Developing an IM/KM plan in conjunction with civilian and mission partners and other participants, and then executing it, is been frequently identified as a factor in success by military participants in rapid onset events.

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# CIV-MIL Information Sharing

## Universal Joint Task List

The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) is a comprehensive list of possible military tasks at the strategic, operational and (joint) tactical level of war. The UJTL was developed for the U.S. Armed Forces but it has been used by several other countries and international military organizations such as NATO, sometimes in adapted form and under different names, but usually including the term "task list".

The UJTL is meant to be a tool in operational planning and similar forms of military planning and developing training objectives. Within the UJTL library is a menu of capabilities (mission-derived tasks with associated conditions and standards, i.e., the tools) that a joint force commander may select to accomplish the assigned mission. Once identified as essential to mission accomplishment, the tasks are reflected within the command joint mission essential task list.

The FMCM project identifies those UJTLs that support establishing an FMN/MPE network and those UJTLs that support CIV-MIL information sharing. For this reason, the UJTLs selected will be for operational level (OP) and tactical level (TA) tasks. The operational UJTLs are presented first and then the tactical UJTLs. All are listed in numeric sequence based on the source document and do not represent a hierarchy of precedence.

### **OP 1.1.2.1 Conduct Airlift**

Description: Move personnel, cargo and equipment by air resources in support of a joint force commander campaign or operation.

Notes: This task could include the entire spectrum of operations from small scale contingency (SSC) (noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), humanitarian missions, etc.), combat support (sustainment), to direct support of combat operations (forcible entry by airborne assault).

### **OP 4.7 Provide Political-Military (POLMIL) Support**

Description: Provide assistance to other nations, groups, or government agencies that support strategic and operational goals.

Notes: Political-military (POLMIL) support is planned through the United States (US) Department of State (DOS). This task includes security assistance (SA), civil-military operations (CMO) support (such as humanitarian assistance [HA], advice on environmental cleanup, disaster relief), and other assistance from military forces to civilian authorities and population. The assistance can be personnel, material, or services. This task may require language proficiency and/or regional expertise and cultural knowledge to effectively communicate with and/ or understand the cultures of coalition forces, international partners, and/or local populations and/ or understand the operational environment (OE).

## **OP 4.7.9 Develop Civil Information Management (CIM)**

Description: Develop civil information from the civil dimension that can be fused or processed with the supported stakeholders in all phases and levels of the joint operation. Develop information from data about civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events that can be fused or processed to increase interagency, intergovernmental organization (IGO), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) situational awareness (SA).

Notes: This task includes the process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and fused with the supported joint force commanders (JFCs), higher headquarters (HHQ), Department of Defense (DOD) and joint intelligence organizations, other United States Government (USG) and DOD agencies, interagency partners, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the private sectors to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to achieve decision superiority. Civil information management (CIM) is a sequential process performed simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. CIM is not solely the task of the civil affairs (CA) officer or noncommissioned officer (NCO) in the CIM Cell. CIM is everyone's responsibility that is involved in civil-military operations (CMO).

## **OP 5.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Operational Information**

Description: Determine, establish, direct, or control the means used in sending or receiving operational information of any kind and to use Department of Defense (DOD) standard communication networks.

Notes: This task may include ensuring interoperability (through theater policies for transmission, message, and switching systems), anticipating information requirements, and utilizing existing systems to best support information requirements. This task also includes the requirement produce Annex K for all deliberate plans and operation orders (OPORDs) and monitor execution. It also includes the responsibility to monitor and integrate joint task force (JTF) transmission, message, and switching systems to achieve information superiority. Command, control, communications, and computers systems (C4S) support other agencies of the United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, and friendly nations. Mission Partner Environments and modes are also considered in the execution of this task.

## **OP 5.1.5 Monitor Strategic Situation**

Description: Understand national and multinational objectives, policies, goals, other elements of national and multinational power (diplomatic, economic, informational), political aim, and the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) strategic concept and intent.

Notes: This activity may include staying current on and projecting events, including religious, humanitarian, and cultural affairs.

## **OP 5.1.14 Establish a Collaborative Environment**

Description: Establish a collaborative environment in which joint, multinational, interagency, and non-Department of Defense (DOD) stakeholders share data, information, knowledge, perceptions, ideas, and concepts.

Notes: This task allows a joint force headquarters (JFHQ) to optimize the use of time and resources by leveraging the capabilities of a collaborative environment that includes decision-support tools. Collaborative planning can dramatically reduce planning timelines and coordination requirements associated with concurrent staff planning. A collaborative environment facilitates and strengthens communications and shared situational awareness (SA) among all stakeholders allowing them to adapt quickly to changing situations. A virtual collaborative environment also can promote force protection by reducing the need for physical meetings and associated travel. Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) procedures are key in collaborative planning among agencies. This task may also include consideration of operating in Mission Partner Environment construct.

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## **OP 5.7 Integrate Multinational and Interagency Participation**

Description: Coordinate with elements of the joint force, allies or coalition partners, and United States Government (USG) departments and agencies.

Notes: Memorandums of Agreement or Memorandums of Understanding are used to ensure cooperation, mutual support, and an understanding of what is to be accomplished. They may also state the priorities and support requirements of the joint force commander. This task may require language proficiency and/or regional expertise and cultural knowledge to effectively communicate with and/or understand the cultures of coalition forces, international partners, and/or local populations and/or understand the operational environment (OE).

### **OP 5.7.3 Develop Multinational Intelligence/Information Sharing Structure**

Description: Implement a multinational information and intelligence sharing framework. Optimize each member nations intelligence and information capabilities, incorporate and exploit those capabilities, and to provide member forces a common intelligence picture tailored to their requirements and consistent with disclosure policies of member nations.

Notes: This task may include establishing intelligence sharing arrangements with allied and partner military intelligence counterparts, who typically cluster around the joint task for headquarters (JTF HQ) in the form of national intelligence cells. It is imperative for the joint task force (JTF)/J-2 in this environment to establish good working relationships with allied and coalition partners to encourage a shared view of the operational environment (OE). Allied nations also bring valuable intelligence contributions and can often provide niche capabilities in support of the overall JTF mission. This task may involve establishing a multinational intelligence center to share the responsibility for receiving, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence from all sources. This task may require language proficiency and/or regional expertise and cultural knowledge to effectively communicate with and/or understand the cultures of coalition forces, international partners, and/or local populations and/or understand the OE. This task may require the establishment of a Mission Partner Environment.

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## **OP 5.7.6 Coordinate Coalition Support**

Description: Coordinate coalition support activities through command, control, communications, and computers systems (C4S) or liaison teams between elements of a coalition.

Notes: This task may provide the combined force commander the means to acquire coalition force status and capabilities. Accomplished these activities are often focused on efficient command and control (C2) and prevention of fratricide. This task may require language proficiency and/or regional expertise and cultural knowledge to effectively communicate with and/or understand the cultures of coalition forces, international partners, and/or local populations and/or understand the operational environment (OE). This typically requires the establishment of a Mission Partner Environment.

## **OP 5.7.9 Coordinate Interagency/Multinational Support**

Description: Synchronize and de-conflict activities among joint, interagency, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and multinational organizations. The roles and relationships among all participating agencies must be clearly understood. Success will depend largely on the ability to collaborate all elements of national power.

Notes: Military (including stability) operations planning, training, and exercising must be conducted within the authorities as established by the United States Code, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commander for subordinate sub-unified commands, joint task forces (JTFs), and joint functional component commands (JFCCs).

## **OP 6.2.6 Conduct a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO)**

Description: Evacuate noncombatants from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States.

Notes: Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are directed by the Department of State or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, NEOs have humanitarian, military, diplomatic, and political implications. NEOs usually involve swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of an objective, and a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission. NEOs may utilize the NEO Tracking System (NTS) for which there are 3 roles. An administrator is responsible for

setting up the NTS operational equipment. The Local Server Common Access Card (CAC) designee is responsible for facilitating the data transmission from the NTS operational equipment to the central NTS web server. The Web Report Viewer is any individual viewing NTS reports from a CAC enabled workstation, typically to provide leadership with insight as to the operational status of the mission.

## **OP 8.6 Provide Population Security**

Description: Provide security activities to safeguard civil populations.

Notes: Security activities may be performed before, during, or after combat and/or a man-made or natural crisis to help defeat an insurgency, restore/ maintain order, or aid in humanitarian assistance (HA). The joint force may conduct identity management in support of peace and security activities. Military forces may be required to extend protection and support to key host nation (HN) personnel, infrastructure, and institutions to ensure stability. This task includes external support for control of civil unrest.

### **OP 8.6.2.1 Protect Infrastructure**

Description: Conduct security activities to safeguard infrastructure including institutions of cultural and / or regional significance.

Notes: This task includes protection of host nation (HN) infrastructure, particularly indigenous infrastructure. When required, military forces may extend protection during or after combat to HN cultural sites and natural resources, as well as government officials, and/or religious or cultural key personnel. These activities may include law enforcement, physical security and surveillance.

## **TA 5.9.1 Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)**

Description: Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) in support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or Department of State (DOS), outside the United States (OCONUS), its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.

Notes: The following missions are common in foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations: Relief missions include prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of disaster victims. Potential relief roles for United States (US) forces include

immediate response to prevent loss of life and destruction of property, construction of basic sanitation facilities and shelters, and provision of food and medical care.

Dislocated civilian support missions are specifically designed to support the assistance and protection for dislocated civilians. Security missions may include establishing and maintaining conditions for the provision of FHA by organizations of the world relief community. Technical assistance and support functions may take the form of advice and selected training, assessments, manpower, and equipment. Foreign consequence management (FCM) is the Department of Defense (DOD) assistance provided by the United States Government (USG) to a host nation (HN) to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) attack or event.

## **TA 5.9.2 Conduct Nation Assistance (NA)**

Description: Provide assistance (other than foreign humanitarian assistance [FHA]) to a nation within that nation's territory based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States (US) and that nation.

Notes: Nation assistance (NA) programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance (SA), foreign internal defense (FID), military civic action (MCA), humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA).

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***Operational Concept  
Summary  
and  
USE CASES***

*for*

***CIVILIAN-MILITARY INFORMATION SHARING IN A  
FEDERATED MISSION NETWORKING ENVIRONMENT.***

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## PREFACE

Use Cases are high level descriptions that are written to a level of detail that provides an understanding of the major interactions required by the participants and the major interactions between the participants.

The overarching task CIV-MIL Information Sharing (CMIS) in a Federated Mission Networking (FMN) Environment is the ability to effectively share information with non-FMN entities. What is shared and to whom will always be controlled by the owner of the information. These Use Cases seek to cover the spectrum of information dissemination from cooperation to coexistence. Since MPE is the US implementation of FMN for simplicity the remainder of the document will refer to FMN/MPE as FMN. This enclosure to the CMIS Guidebook is a summary of the CMIS in FMN Operational Concept.

## OPERATIONAL CONCPET SUMMARY:

Effective information sharing between military and civilian actors operating or collocated in the same mission area is essential for the strategic success of the mission. There are challenges to every mission and inaccurate or insufficient information sharing between military and civilian actors will only intensify those challenges.

This Operational Concept, entitled Civilian- Military Information Sharing in a Federated Mission Networking Environment (CMIS) identifies a methodology and framework in which information can be shared between civilian and military actors. Military actors refers to any organization planning or conducting operations where information must be shared with civilians who are not members of the secure network environment. The Operational Concept assumes that some or all military actors are sharing information within a Federated Mission Networking (FMN) environment. The intent is to inform military actors how better to share information with civilians.

FMN provides instructions for rapidly forming a federation of multinational military networks, leveraging agreed standards and protocols to create a common information environment. Extending beyond the FMN boundary, information sharing becomes more challenging. What can be shared, with whom, where, when and how is determined by each military or civilian actor in accordance with policies, individual needs, constraints and decision-making processes.

**This concept is not intended to change how governments, militaries, international organizations or humanitarian communities conduct their business nor does it mandate the sharing of information** or require organizations to modify their inter-relationships.

Rather, it describes FMN capabilities that will be required to share information between FMN participants and non-FMN entities, including Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs) and private sector organizations.

**The CMIS Operational Concept is intended for use by military forces** when planning and executing information sharing with civilians. It is focused on mission environments in which FMN is deployed and provides a framework for information sharing during peacekeeping support and humanitarian operations. **The goal of the Operational Concept is to increase mission success through enhanced CIV-MIL information sharing.**

Inconsistent military information sharing practices and standards inhibit the establishment of a CMIS environment. The intent of this concept is to support effective information flow between civilian and military participants across the spectrum of military operations and different types of situations on-the-ground. Operations may range from rapid onset humanitarian assistance and disaster response in a benign cooperative environment to complex emergencies and armed conflict in which civilian activities and military operations at best can merely coexist.

Commanders must ensure CMIS frameworks are in place to support planning and execution of effective information sharing and that CMIS, including technical means and competencies, is part of normal operating capabilities. The FMN environment must be configurable to allow information sharing between classified networks and the publicly accessible internet. This may require the use of multi-level security and cross-domain gateways to control the flow of information.

CMIS has the following objectives:

- To use common standards that improve information sharing between civilian and military actors;
- To improve mutual understanding of military and civilian information management and planning processes; and
- To reduce the planning time required to establish information sharing between military and civilian actors.

The Operational Concept describes the environment and requirements to conduct CMIS in a range of operating environments. The CMIS Guidebook, based on the operating environment, recommends information sharing venues and best practices to effectively establish and facilitate information sharing outside the military network environment. The effort seeks to address the following documented CMIS deficiencies:

- Lack of mutual trust in information protection and sharing.
- Military forces not understanding humanitarian community organizations, operations, policies, and purposes.
- Information sharing processes are neither standardized nor supported by best practices.
- Military use of classified systems for unclassified operations.
- Insufficient specific military capability or authority as an information release specialist (i.e. Foreign Disclosure Officer).
- Military functioning as independent responders, not in coordination with the affected state and humanitarian communities.
- Military responders do not collaborate and fail to achieve unity of effort.
- Lack of shared situational awareness and an inability to share a common operating picture and unclassified imagery or video.
- Improper security classification designations by military entities intending to share information (i.e. For Official Use Only - FOUO) restricts sharing information outside government channels that should be marked "For Public Release".
- Lack of CIV-MIL information sharing planning to include:
  - What information is needed
  - Who has release authorization
  - Where/who needs the information
  - What form is the information needed to be usable

## **SECTION 1: CAPABILITY NEED:**

Information sharing among military and non-FMN entities has long existed as part of bilateral relationships. The CMIS Operational Concept addresses the fact that military forces work as mission partners in an FMN environment to improve unity of effort and enhance information sharing. Within the FMN environment, information is sharable and accessible by all network participants. For entities existing outside the FMN environment, the FMN capability can include one or more external gateways to allow external non-FMN entities to share (send and receive) information.

### **1.1. Information Sharing Construct:**

Figure 1 depicts the foundation required for supporting CIV-MIL information sharing. It recognizes that the most significant variable in the engagement is the role of the military in the operating area. Humanitarians have limited focus; save lives, alleviate suffering, while maintaining the dignity of those in need. This effort is applied uniformly in any environment where their support is needed regardless if is a natural disaster or man-made crisis. The

military’s purpose in the operating area will drive the CIV-MIL relationship and with this the information sharing activities.




Figure 1

**1.1.1 Federated Mission Networking:**

FMN provides the Joint Task Force (JTF) with the core information exchange services (VOIP, email with attachments, video teleconference, chat, web browsing, and directory) to support joint and combined operations. Typically, the FMN environment is classified; however, it may include an unclassified environment and/or a gateway to exchange these services with entities not participating in the FMN environment. Extending information sharing outside of the FMN environment requires agreed standards and TTPs along with information assurance and information management capabilities.

**1.1.2 Anticipated CMIS Interactions:**

Military contingency planning and stage 0 activities must include CMIS encompassing CIV-MIL interactions at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Planning should include engagement of CMIS specialist (e.g. Civil Military Coordination, Civil Affairs), development of CMIS instruction within tasking orders, establishment of contacts with key civilian organizations in the area of operation, and access to websites that support information sharing amongst civilian entities and thereby build situational awareness of the operating environment.

### **1.1.3 CIV-MIL Coordination in Support of Operations:**

This section discusses CIV-MIL Coordination in sufficient detail to support an explanation of CMIS. More detailed coverage of CIV-MIL Coordination can be obtained from these two references: UN CM Coordination Handbook; and NATO CIMIC COE CM Coord Field Guide.

The nature of the military and civilian missions in the operating area will drive both the level and method of CMIS. In a complex environment (e.g. combat), it is not uncommon for CMIS to be restrictive. CMIS can be open and direct in more stable operating environments. Effective CMIS requires a flexible approach by the military and the adaptation of CMIS approaches to meet specific mission needs, operational environments and levels of willingness by civilian actors.

Central to successful CMIS is the advanced consideration of what information civilian actors will need from the military. Equally important is knowing ahead of time what information civilian actors will share and how they might be willing to share it. This includes who, where, when and how information should be provided. Planning focus is at the organizational level, determining specifically who needs to be part of the CMIS effort and why they are key to a successful outcome of the mission.

### **1.1.4 CMIS Operational Planning and Execution:**

Embedded in operational planning and execution of CMIS is awareness of both the humanitarian principles and the humanitarian's use of trust. Principles and trust guide humanitarian interaction with the military, and in turn influence military interactions with civilian actors. Military operations either support or degrade this trust, which may require CMIS to adapt to these changes. Even in a combat environment, CMIS is needed to minimize risk to civilian actors and the affected population. CIMIS planning and execution is covered in detail in the CMIS Guidebook.

### **1.1.5 Operational Environments:**

#### **1.1.5.1 Crisis Response and Disaster Assistance:**

Figure 2 depicts an example of a very simplified HA/DR environment with responding military and civil defense assets (MCDA) and affected state military, on the left side of the figure, establishing a FMN MIL-MIL environment. Military members of the responding military participate in an affected state-led Multi-National Military Coordination Center (MNMCC) to coordinate military support operations within the affected state. (The MNMCC may be referred to as the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) in other CIV-MIL reference documents.) The MNMCC serves as the interface between the affected state and the responding military

forces. The MNMCC is responsible for coordinating actions among all multinational military forces providing assistance.

While each assisting nation’s military responds to the guidance of their national response coordinator and chain of command, sharing information and coordination with the affected state’s military and humanitarians operating in the affected state is essential. **Each assisting nation has their own unique structure by which their national lead coordinates support from their military.** Typically, national leads from assisting nations are civilian agencies. The Operational Concept is focused around the affected state, or an assisting state or other lead agent if the affected state is unable. The military entities form an FMN based network for information sharing between responding MCDA to support the work of the MNMCC. This network will be capable of providing information sharing with non-FMN entities (on the right side of the diagram) as required to accomplish the mission effectively and efficiently.




Figure 2

In UN-coordinated operations, the MNMCC will work closely with the Humanitarian Military Operations Coordination Center (HuMOCC) to parse, validate, and assign civilian requests for assistance (RFA) to the supporting military. **The HuMOCC may not be a separate stand-alone operation. The functions may be integrated into other CIV-MIL coordination settings.** Its

function may be divided among other coordinating platforms, nodes and facilities. The key is to understand where the functions associated with the HuMOCC concept are being performed. The HuMOCC will likely not be the only method of submitting RFAs to the responding military. In addition to the UN, the National Society of the Red Cross for the affected state, working closely with the International Federation of the Red Cross, may act as coordinating authority for all assisting state Red Cross and Red Crescent elements from other nations deployed to assist. National Red Cross and Red Crescent societies often have a chartered relationship with their government and military. Another path for organizations not using the UN HuMOCC process is for civilian organizations to communicate with the military through an interlocutor. An interlocutor is a third party willing to function as an intermediary between the military and a humanitarian organization. An interlocutor may be an organization, individual or government representative. The humanitarian coordination authority from each responding state will be in the RFA approval path for their nations responding military. In Figure 2 the far right represents the greater humanitarian community consisting of UN-based organizations, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), non-UN based organizations, and the affected state's National Disaster Management Office. CMIS information sharing provides the ability for the members of the FMN based network to share information with civilian humanitarian actors via multiple paths; either in conjunction with the HuMOCC, through other coordinating organizations, and via interlocutors.

Non-UN based organizations may go directly to the military's operation center, or to the government representatives of the military force. In the case of the US, this would be the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The military uses an unclassified CIV-MIL coordination process represented by both a HuMOCC and interlocutors serving as an interface with the broader humanitarian community.

**Some major aid agencies may not utilize the UN HuMOCC, choosing instead to conduct their national response through affected state offices, national military or with host nations. Typically, for sovereignty reasons, affected states usually favor direct contact or direct liaison between the humanitarian community and the MNMCC. Humanitarian agencies in country pre-crisis will have their own network of contacts with the affected state agencies as well as with opposition groups as a primary means of access and security for their operations. Assisting state military organizations must scrupulously avoid disrupting this structure. Assisting states must also respect their national lines of authority and the affected state's sovereignty.**

#### **1.1.5.2 Peacekeeping/Stability Operations:**

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations (PKSO) missions often preclude a common structure

or strategy due to the nature of the operation. PKSO missions involve coordination with a large number of international and national actors implementing their own activities in a post-conflict environment. In order to establish effective CMIS, PKSO missions necessitate identification of key non-military nodes outside the FMN environment. This will include regular meetings and information sharing processes to the maximum extent possible to gain insight into the mission planning process and to respond actively and substantively to requests for cooperation. Establishing dialog with key non-military entities at both the national and local level will have a significant impact on operational planning and achieving mission success. Several of the key non-military entities include:

- United Nations field leadership and operations centers.
- Foreign non-military governmental agencies.
- Independent humanitarian actors (non-UN based), especially those associated with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
- Affected state government at the national and local level.
- Contracted security forces.

Organizations and foreign government entities responding to a PKSO mission normally pursue independent agendas, which may not correlate with the responding military's PKSO operations. Some may operate according to widely different timelines or methods, or not be capable of engaging in cooperation and proactively sharing information. Proactive information sharing is still important even if cooperation is limited.

Some humanitarian actors, such as the ICRC, have an institutional imperative to maintain a high level of visible independence from political (UN) and military structures to ensure safety and independence of their actions and personnel. PKSO military must be aware of "humanitarian space", which is space created through respect of the humanitarian principles of independence and neutrality. Within this space, humanitarian actions take place. PKSO missions need to recognize that there is a distinction between politically motivated actions to end conflict and support national development, and apolitical humanitarian assistance based on impartial need assessment and response aimed at saving lives, alleviate suffering and maintaining or restoring the dignity of the affected population.

In a PKSO mission, CIV-MIL information sharing between all the actors typically utilizes regular meetings to the maximum extent possible in order to harmonize activities by seeking input to the mission planning process. This includes sharing non-operational geospatial data. In the event of a large-scale request for military support for a population *in extremis* an effective information sharing and coordination mechanism to ensure maximum adherence to the humanitarian principles and prevent any adverse impact on humanitarian and

development operations is required.

Historically, PKSO missions have involved establishing a permissive environment for the populace to resume a period of normalcy and an environment that supports humanitarian access (Humanitarian Space). Military specialty in infrastructure projects (repair or new construction) should be coordinated with humanitarians in order to both validate the need, but also to not duplicate projects underway by non-military entities. The use of a MNMCC type structure, made up of affected state government, humanitarians, and the responding military leadership can serve multiple purposes; share information, resolve conflicts, coordinate efforts in order to support a combined effort approach.

### **1.1.5.3 Complex Operations:**

Complex operations encompasses environments that may be involved in conflict or high threat evolutions (e.g. nuclear or biological hazards). In a conflict environment the key focus is in knowing where humanitarian operations are being conducted in order to avoid targeting that area, but also to avoid convergence of operations in order to maintain humanitarian projection of independence by not unwittingly mixing humanitarian and combat forces. The military should also provide humanitarians threat awareness information based on a specific risk to their operations or movement. There may be armed groups that may not respect humanitarian neutrality, or threats caused by mines and other explosive devices. Remember, due to the nature of humanitarian operations they may negotiate access to an at risk population with organizations hostile to the military forces. Because of the direct threat to humanitarians in the field, their reluctance to have public interaction with the military is likely. This does not negate the need to share information, it just needs to be carefully planned and controlled.

## **1.2 Current Capabilities and Gaps.**

Presently CIV-MIL interaction is typically ad hoc in nature, with each military force attempting to establish an information dissemination process with non-military entities in keeping with their own national policies and procedures. The process can be inefficient and lead to an overall lack of success and trust by all concerned regarding the desire to either coordinate or de-conflict operations. Major shortcomings include:

- Lack of mutual trust in information protection and sharing.
- Military not understanding humanitarian community organizations, operations, culture, policies and purposes.
- Information sharing processes are neither standardized nor supported by TTPs.
- Military use of classified systems for unclassified operations.
- Insufficient military personnel dedicated to performing the duties of a Foreign Disclosure Officer or equivalent, resulting in delayed information sharing.

- Delays in information sharing result in information being old or insufficient to affect operational planning by the supported recipient.
- Sharing large amounts of data with information requesters who do not have manpower, expertise, or time to process the information
- Sharing information that is incomplete
- Military functioning as independent responders instead of coordinating with the affected state, other military organizations and humanitarian communities.
- The military responders do not coordinate with one another and fail to achieve unity of effort and coherent shared awareness.
- Lack of shared situational awareness and an inability to share a common operating picture, UNCLAS imagery or video.
- Lack of CIV-MIL information sharing planning to include what information is needed, who has release authorization, and where/who needs the information and in what form.
- Military classifying information not for sharing (e.g. For Official Use Only - FOUO), restricting sharing outside government channels when it should be marked 'For Public Release'.
- Civilian counterparts not understanding the military structure, hierarchy, terminology or processes.
- High turnover of both military and humanitarian personnel in affected State, which may hinder the established information sharing process.

### **1.3 Current Military Environment.**

Currently the CIV-MIL relationships seen in response to a crisis requiring information sharing are ad hoc. The current structure typically results in:

- a delayed ability to establish information sharing pathways between key information consumers
- a constricted flow of information between the actors as a result of planning shortfalls
- unnecessary delays and disruptions caused by unsupported processes and understanding of polices


**SECTION 2: OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT DESCRIPTION**

**2.1 Missions.**

There are three distinct CIV-MIL environments: cooperation, coexistence, and de-confliction that influence both what information is shared and how it is shared. The level of trust between the information sharers, driven by the environment of the operation, will have the greatest impact on information sharing.

Trust in this context is the risk to the humanitarian organization’s ability to access the affected population. This also includes physical risk to the affected population and their field staff. Trust can also be based on organizational policy or personal experience.

Figure 3 depicts the spectrum of coordination, which encompasses the three CIV-MIL environments (cooperation, de-confliction, coexistence) and the military use case that is used in this document to represent that environment. In reading the use cases keep in mind that an operating environment may include any and all of the use cases at the same time, often separated by distance or geography.



**Figure 3**

2.1.1 **Cooperative** is best represented in an environment where trust is high between a majority of the CIV-MIL participants, such as during an HA/DR mission. The military’s role is either to support the humanitarian operations by providing unique capabilities that are not available in the civilian environment, or to serve as a rapid response force to provide an initial capability while humanitarian/commercial capability flows in. The key attributes in this environment are that the military is in support of the relief effort and is the resource of last resort. To be effective the military and the civilian entities (affected state and the humanitarian community) need to interact closely. They share information and situational

awareness, and coordinate operations. In this environment CIV-MIL collaboration, cooperation, and coordination is at its highest since the CIV-MIL goals align and are mutually supportive. This is referred to as a 'cooperative' CIV-MIL environment.

**2.1.2 De-confliction** environments represents the area between cooperative and coexistence. This is the transition area between the direct support and non-association environment. Information sharing is based on the level of interaction and trust between the CIV-MIL participants. This environment is often found in peacekeeping and stability operations where sustained combat operations are not anticipated. The military will have a role in providing an enabling environment for humanitarian operations with limited direct participation in the humanitarian operation. Interaction between CIV-MIL may be overt through such events as meetings at either's facilities, but may occur in an independent setting not associated with either party. De-confliction is the military definition regarding avoiding operations that interfere with the other entities mission, and not the humanitarian interpretation of deescalating a conflict.

**2.1.3 Coexistence** can be represented by a hostile conflict or complex environment with the military conducting armed operations to counter a threat, while the humanitarian community is engaged in providing support to the affected population. Due to the nature of these two roles, trust is low and the majority of the humanitarian community will likely distance themselves from direct contact with the military. This is necessary to ensure the humanitarian community presents and maintains independence in all aspects of non-combatant operations. Within this environment information sharing is focused on separation of operations in order to establish humanitarian space, but to also ensure independence from any armed forces operations. Threats to humanitarians or the affected population is a primary information sharing need. Since the CIV-MIL goals do not align this environment is referred to as 'coexistence'.

## **2.2 Stakeholders.**

It is important to identify the main participants and their role in an operation/response. The three primary stakeholders in CIV-MIL information sharing are the affected state, the humanitarian community, and the military. There are times that this may expand to include foreign government agencies and host nations.

**2.2.1 Affected State:** This is the sovereign government. This term includes both national and regional governments and their associated departments and ministries. The affected state has ultimate responsibility to provide for and protect its population. Information sharing with humanitarians is particularly critical for any vulnerable population where the affected state is either unable or unwilling to assist in avoiding a larger crisis.

**National sovereignty must be observed throughout an operation. Foreign military forces operate with permission of the affected state. The authority (actual or perceived) of the affected state must never be infringed on during operations. This includes observance of affected state laws, regulations and customs. Foreign governments may advise the affected state, but ultimate authority resides with the affected state's government.**

**2.2.2 Humanitarian Community:** Consisting of independent international and local organizations that strive to reduce suffering, save lives, and improve the health, education, and life of a population. Humanitarian communities are a collection of independent organizations. They associate to collaborate, cooperate, and coordinate when it is in their interest to do so – otherwise they are fully independent organizations accountable to only the affected state, the population they support and their own management. Humanitarian organizations will dedicate substantial resources to sharing information with donor agencies and their private donor base, often at the expense of sharing operational information with external agencies.

**2.2.3 Foreign Military:** These are commonly armed or civil defense forces under the control of their national government authority, conducting operations in support their national policy. The military may be organized as a coalition or operate as independent forces based on national directive.

**2.2.4 Foreign Government Agencies:** There will be other agencies of foreign governments engaged beyond their military. This normally will include the diplomatic representatives in country and other agencies of the foreign office/state department of the responding nation's government.

**2.2.5 Host Nation:** Either due to limited access to the affected state, or the need to have logistic hubs outside the affected state – host nation support for the military operation may become necessary. Similar to the affected state, host nations exercise sovereignty and coordination with the host nation government and military will be necessary.

### **2.3 Operational Context.**

The relationship between the stakeholders and the amount of control placed on the sharing of information will dictate the information sharing arrangement. These dynamics are represented in section three, Use Cases/Scenarios.

**2.3.1** The military's concern with information sharing is multifaceted. Information gained from a classified system may disclose either a capability or a limitation of that system, or both. Information from other sources may place those sources at risk of compromise,

especially if it is a human source. Military forces protect their movement or future operational plans to prevent counter moves by opposing forces. Finally, the military community may not have the same trust that information shared will not be passed to other organizations or adversaries. Therefore shared information often has to be considered “for public release” since control of the shared information is not certain and may end up in the public domain.

**2.3.2** The affected state focuses on managing the problem within its borders. Politics could thus influence or constrain information sharing. Governments, like people, are reluctant to disclose negative information and attempt to manage information flow to its public.

**2.3.3** The humanitarian community concentrates on its specific efforts and will share information when and if it supports these efforts. The humanitarian organizations typically work to ensure the safety of its personnel and that of the affected population, which could delay, limit, or stop altogether the information provided to both the affected state and the responding military forces.

## **2.4 Policies, Assumptions and Constraints.**

**2.4.1 Policies:** Information sharing by the military in a common CIV-MIL operating environment can come from several levels within the military structure. Higher authority may retain release authority for most information sharing outside the FMN environment (i.e. with the affected state and with the humanitarian community). This can be done by delegating a limited list of subject items the deployed forces may share with non-FMN mission entities. This has the added benefit of freeing deployed forces to conduct operations, feeding information up the command chain for analysis and determining what to share and with whom.

The quantity and quality of information shared will affect trust. When information is shared, it ideally must be accurate, complete and timely. The recipient is looking for information to build situational awareness and support decision-making. The more dynamic the environment (i.e. the rapid onset of an unexpected natural disaster), the greater the need for information sharing to enable the responding organizations and the affected state to determine the best course of action to meet the population’s needs. With trust established information sharing will usually follow. Without trust collaboration is nearly impossible.

**2.4.2 Assumptions:** Information shared serves to support its owner’s mission. This is not meant to be disparaging, but rather a fundamental aspect of the information sharing dynamic. Assumptions enabling information sharing include:

- Members of the responding military will establish a Mission Network.

- CIV-MIL information sharing will be needed to conduct operations.
- Elements of trust will be developed among the CIV-MIL organizations through mutual training events and pre-crisis collaboration.

**2.4.3 Constraints:** CIV-MIL information sharing is based on higher authorities to include restrictions both on sharing specific information and with whom information can be shared. This will be situationally dependent based on the military mission (HA/DR or armed operations), the affected state (failed, weakened, totalitarian, monarchical, constitutional democracy), and the level of interaction between the military and the humanitarian community. **FMN will change how the military performs its mission but not how the humanitarian community or affected state conduct operations.**

## 2.5 Capability Description.

The multi-national military forces responding will form a FMN mission partner network able to share information among the membership. A key element of the FMN construct is a set of instructions for joining, membership, and exiting the network. FMN members use these instructions to establish, maintain and disestablish the federated network. Though not excluded from joining the FMN environment, the humanitarian community is not expected to join the network and thus maintain its independence. Non-FMN entities will not directly connect to the FMN environment but will share information through other means to include; internet websites, email with attachments, voice and text, bi-lateral cross-domain gateways, or face-to-face bi-lateral conversations with entities they have permission to share. Liaisons provide a critical face-to-face element that supports trust, interaction, and understanding. Liaisons to coordination elements such as the MNMCC or HuMOCC will conduct multilateral conversations. FMN will support military liaisons to centers of influence by providing connectivity between them and the military operations centers.

## 2.6 CMIS Employment in FMN.

A Mission Network will be created at appropriate classifications for the mission. **This will contain an unclassified space with connectivity to the public internet.** The flow of information from the Mission Network will be controlled to insure public release procedures are followed. The key difference in the configuration of information sharing environments is that in a cooperative environment information dissemination can be direct, whereas in a coexistence environment the information flow tends to be through a third party. The de-confliction environment is the hardest to establish due to the hybrid nature of the CIV-MIL information sharing dynamic. Greater coordination will be required in order to establish a mechanism that support the humanitarian principles, maintains trust while providing utility to the participants.

**2.7 Potential Impacts.**

CIV-MIL information sharing is not a new concept. The new element to this environment is the introduction of an FMN framework with associated common procedures and standards. The net result of FMN-enabled information sharing among the members and non-FMN mission entities will be increased unity of effort and reduced friction to facilitate coordination and cooperation among all parties. There will need to be a commonly defined approach to risk management for information security. This includes an approach for moving shared information between the Mission Network and the public internet.

## SECTION 3: USE CASE DESCRIPTIONS:

### 3.1 Mission Operations Scenarios.

This Operational Concept will be presented using three Use Cases based on the level of information sharing among the military and the civilian participants (Figure 4). The range of information sharing extends from 'cooperation' where for a majority of the CIV-MIL entities trust is high and information sharing is extensive. Environments where trust is low for the majority and information sharing is limited to only the essential required is represented by 'coexistence'. Between the two extremes, the Operational Concept recognizes the middle ground, 'de-confliction', which may be a peacekeeping and stability operational environment that could dictate the level of CIV-MIL interaction. (FMCM Use Cases are explained in detail in the FMCM Guidebook, Enclosure 3.)

Information sharing between humanitarian and appropriate military actors may include:

- Security information: information relevant to the security of both staffs (military and civilian) and the population at risk in the area of operation;
- Humanitarian locations: the coordinates of humanitarian staff and facilities inside military operating theatre;
- Humanitarian activities: the humanitarian plans and intentions, including routes and timing of humanitarian convoys and airlifts, to coordinate planned operations while simultaneously avoiding accidental engagement or interaction with humanitarian operations;
- Mine-action activities: information relevant to threats or current mine activities;
- Population movements: information on major movements of civilians;
- Relief activities of the military: information on relief efforts undertaken by the military;
- Post-strike information: information on strike locations and explosive munitions used during military campaigns to assist with the prioritization and planning of humanitarian relief and mine/unexploded ordinance removal activities.

In all three scenarios the resources, capabilities and information users are the same. The differences in the scenarios are what is shared and how it is shared. Besides the level of coordination, there are other factors affecting civilian organizational willingness to share information or even interact with foreign military forces. These include:

1. Overall outlook of the organization towards interacting with foreign military forces.
2. Determining if interacting with foreign military forces enables operational benefits for access and security in providing relief to the affected population.
3. Determining if interacting with foreign military forces will negatively affect their relationships with parties in other conflicts where the agency is working to project a credible image of neutrality and impartiality.




Figure 4

### 3.2 CMIS Operations Use Cases

**3.2.1 Cooperation:** This scenario represents a high potential for information sharing among all participants (civilian, military, affected state government). This is often found in a rapidly unfolding disaster in a benign environment. In such a scenario, critical information needed would include how the disaster affected existing physical infrastructures, along with the affected population’s immediate needs such as food, shelter, medical care, sanitation, etc. Information will need to be gathered (and shared) as quickly as possible. The Cooperation environment often contain the following assumptions:

- Due to the compatible objectives coordination, collaboration, and cooperation are high among the participants (military, affected state government, humanitarian community).
- Trust is high if allowed by the organization’s policy since the CIV-MIL association risk to the humanitarian staff and the affected populace is low.

- High level of direct communication between all the parties, through either face-to-face meetings, text messages, or emails with attachments, etc.
- Military units are usually more willing to share information derived from sources (classified and unclassified) to support ongoing relief operation.
- The humanitarian community is more willing to accept military assistance (logistics support, materiel movement, engineering support, etc.).
- Participants are willing to provide and accept liaisons as requested in order to facilitate planning.

**3.2.2 De-confliction:** This scenario represents the area between the extremes of “cooperation” and “coexistence.” Information sharing is based on the level of interaction between the CIV-MIL participants in an environment often characterized by limited hostile engagements and where sustained combat is not anticipated. This is common in PKSO missions. The military may have a role in providing a secure environment for humanitarian operations while not directly participating in the humanitarian operation. Any interaction between CIV-MIL individuals or groups may be low key and conducted in an independent setting not associated with either party if needed to establish trust and minimize the risk to PKSO participants. Though the CIV-MIL entities have different tasks, the overarching military goal of stability and the civilian (humanitarian) goal of recovery are inextricably linked requiring flexibility and adaptation to overcome aforementioned common individual organizational information sharing constraints. This environment commonly contains the following assumptions:

- Coordination, collaboration, and cooperation are conducted at appropriate level agreeable to engaged CIV-MIL entities based on the possible mix of de-confliction and coexistence as the situation dictates. Information sharing may be limited to establishing situational awareness for example using a common operating picture concerning threats and location of humanitarian operations.
- In order for the humanitarian community to demonstrate independence, communication with the military maybe conducted either at an independent location or through a trusted third party such as an interlocutor.
- The military is less likely to share information concerning ongoing or future operations, but may be willing to share more non-tactical information such as weather and past insurgent activity that is no longer of tactical utility.
- Military sharing of information with the humanitarian community about adversary activities during a conflict would contribute to maintaining the safety and security of humanitarians and the affected population.
- Web-based (i.e. portals and email) information dissemination are tightly controlled with very limited access by participants, and may be read-only to give anonymity to the source material provider. This protects both the sender and receiver from attribution if the information is disclosed to a hostile force.
- Liaison personnel to de-conflict operations are used as needed or requested.

**3.2.3 Coexistence:** This scenario is the other extreme of the information sharing with minimum open sharing of information and is often found in hostile environments involving

combat operations. In such an environment, trust is often low as major CIV-MIL participants strive to provide safety for their specific communities of interest. Their goals often may not coincide with those of other major participants. Absent a shared mission, these participants coexist yet seek to avoid direct interaction and contact in order to project independence. This environment commonly contains the following assumptions:

- Coordination, collaboration, and cooperation are restricted to only the degree that will not negatively affect operations.
- Humanitarian communities guard and assert their independence by rarely communicating directly with military organizations.
- Much, if not most, information sharing will be built on existing personal and institutional trust.
- The military is less likely to share operational information but may be willing to share information that is no longer of tactical utility, like weather and past insurgent activity, a common operational picture for situational awareness.
- To maintain independence the humanitarian community will most likely decline military assistance and avoid any appearance of cooperation with military forces.
- Web-based (i.e. portals and email) information dissemination are tightly controlled with very limited access by participants, and may be restricted to read-only to give anonymity to the source material provider. This protects both the sender and receiver from attribution if the information is disclosed to a hostile force.
- Participants utilize interlocutors in order to facilitate de-confliction.

## SECTION 4: FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES

### 4.1 Functional Abilities.

The tools to effect information sharing in the unclassified CIV-MIL environment are:

- Voice – this can include land lines, cell phones, and voice over internet protocol (VoIP)
- Text – commonly associated with smart phones but can be internet-based
- Email – internet mail with supporting software like Microsoft Office products (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) and Adobe PDF files
- Video Conferencing – Similar to VoIP, video and audio are shared between parties
- Face-to-Face – improves trust and discussions amongst participants
- Internet posting and access to upload/download information accessible by specific individuals with controlled access or shared with the general public without access control.
- Readable databases that can be accessed by specific individuals with controlled access, or shared with the general public without access control.
- File sharing with access control.

### 4.2 Mission Operations.

#### 4.2.1 Military Connectivity:

- A Mission Network will be created at the appropriate classification for the mission. This will contain an unclassified space with connectivity to the public internet.
- Military personnel fulfilling the duties and tasks of a liaison to other entities engaged in the area of operation may function externally to the Mission Network. These liaisons may be assigned to coordinate with non- Mission Network partner military forces, the affected state's government (national and regional), and with the humanitarian community. To be effective, liaisons need connectivity with the Mission Network and thus with their local commanders and other network members. This distributed connectivity allows the liaisons to function as the commanders' representative (whether a Joint Task Force Commander or an individual command's) to provide effective communication between the Mission Network commands and the associated organization the liaison is assigned to.

**4.2.2 Civilian-Military Connectivity:** The primary goal of this CMIS in FMN Environment Operational Concept is to establish a framework whereby the CIV-MIL entities in an operation can share information to facilitate each being able to fulfill its individual mission requirements while complementing one another for overall successful mission completion.

- Direct sharing is the shortest communications path between the CIV-MIL entities. This can be information that is pushed (shared without request) or pulled (answer to a query). There is no requirement within this Operational

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Concept as to what, if any, information must be provided. It simply recognizes that each party controls the content and access to any information disclosed to other parties. This might be accomplished at face-to-face meetings or via point-to-point correspondence.

- Indirect sharing – represents the use of a third party to convey information (e.g. interlocutor or the use of a third party portal).
- General sharing – represents the push or pull of information on uncontrolled internet portals where anyone can access the site. This information can be reused without controls by anyone who finds the content useful for their purposes.

**Reference:**

- A. Future Mission Network (FMN) Use Case – Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Operations, Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE (Haiti), dated 22 June 2012

# Types of Disasters

Hazard	Vulnerability Factors	Typical Adverse Effects	Common Post-Event Need
<p><b>Earthquake</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Location of settlements in seismic area.</li> <li>b. Rigid (unreinforced) structures vulnerable to ground motion.</li> <li>c. Dense collection of building high occupancy.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Casualties – Highest near epicenter or in highly populated areas. Fractures and crushing injuries are the most common. Secondary threat due to breakdown in sanitation and water services. Possible tsunami event following seismic event.</li> <li>b. Physical Damage – Common to key structures and infrastructure.</li> <li>c. Water Supply – Severe disruption due to damage to water system infrastructure.</li> <li>d. Displaced persons.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Search and rescue.</li> <li>b. Medical assistance.</li> <li>c. Disaster assessment.</li> <li>d. Provision of food, water, and shelter.</li> <li>e. Infrastructure repair.</li> <li>f. Protection of recovery supplies.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Landslides</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Settlements built on steep slopes, soft soil and cliff edges.</li> <li>b. Settlements built at the base of steep slopes and the mouth of streams from mountain valleys.</li> <li>c. Roads and communications lines in mountain areas.</li> <li>d. Buildings with weak foundations.</li> <li>e. Buried pipelines and brittle pipes.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Casualties – Fatalities or injuries due to earth and avalanche.</li> <li>b. Physical Damage – Anything on top of the landside or in its path.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Search and rescue.</li> <li>b. Medical assistance.</li> <li>c. Disaster assessment.</li> <li>d. Provision of food, water, and shelter.</li> </ul>

Hazard	Vulnerability Factors	Typical Adverse Effects	Common Post-Event Need
<p><b>Tsunami</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Settlements in low-lying coastal regions.</li> <li>b. Lack of tsunami resistant structures.</li> <li>c. Lack of timely warning systems and evacuation plans.</li> <li>d. Lack of public awareness of tsunami destructive force.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Casualties – Deaths principally by either drowning or injury from debris.</li> <li>b. Physical Damage – Force of the water surge and recession as well as flooding.</li> <li>c. Water Supply – Salt water contamination, debris, and sewage contamination.</li> <li>d. Crops and Food Supply – Crops, food stocks, livestock, equipment and fishing craft can be destroyed. Land may be rendered infertile due to salt water contamination.</li> <li>e. Displaced persons</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Warning and evacuation.</li> <li>b. Search and rescue (afloat and ashore).</li> <li>c. Medical assistance.</li> <li>d. Disaster assessment.</li> <li>e. Provision of food, water, and shelter.</li> </ul>

Hazard	Vulnerability Factors	Typical Adverse Effects	Common Post-Event Need
<p><b>Volcanic Eruption</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Settlements on the flanks of volcanoes.</li> <li>b. Settlement in historic path of lava or mud flows.</li> <li>c. Structures without roofs designed for ash accumulation.</li> <li>d. Presence of combustible material.</li> <li>e. Lack of evacuation plans or warning system.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Casualties – Death from pyroclastic flows, mud flows, lava flows and toxic gases. Injury from falling rocks, respiratory difficulties from gas or ash.</li> <li>b. Physical Damage – Complete destruction of everything in path of pyroclastic, mud and lava flows. Collapse of structures from weight of ash, flooding, blocking of ground lines of movement.</li> <li>c. Crops and Food Supply – Destruction of crops in the path of flows and ash accumulation. Loss of livestock from inhalation of gas or ash. Contamination of grazing pastures.</li> <li>d. Displaced persons.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Warning and evacuation.</li> <li>b. Search and rescue.</li> <li>c. Medical assistance.</li> <li>d. Provision of food, water, and shelter.</li> <li>e. Relocation of affected population.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Drought</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Arid areas in dry conditions increased by drought.</li> <li>b. Subsistence farming.</li> <li>c. Lack of seed reserves.</li> <li>d. Lack of agricultural inputs to improve yields.</li> <li>e. Area dependent on rainfall weather patterns.</li> <li>f. Area of low soil moisture retention.</li> <li>g. Lack of resources to cope with drought.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Casualties – Death principally from deterioration of nutritional status. Secondary threat of disease.</li> <li>b. Water Supply – Reduction in drinking water sources.</li> <li>c. Crops and Food Supply – Reduced income of farmers. Reduction in agriculture spending. Increase in staple food prices. Increased inflation. Loss of livestock.</li> <li>d. Migration.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Measures for maintaining food security, price stability, food subsidies and food distribution.</li> <li>b. Develop livestock replacement program.</li> <li>c. Develop supplementary feeding program.</li> <li>d. Develop complementary water and health programs.</li> </ul>

Hazard	Vulnerability Factors	Typical Adverse Effects	Common Post-Event Need
<p><b>Flood</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Location of settlements on floodplain.</li> <li>b. Lack of flooding hazard awareness.</li> <li>c. Non-resistant buildings and foundations.</li> <li>d. High-risk infrastructure.</li> <li>e. Unprotected food stocks, livestock, and crops.</li> <li>f. Tropical weather.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Casualties – Drowning and death/injury due to debris. Water borne diseases. Contamination of water supply and breakdown of sewage processing/storage.</li> <li>b. Physical Damage – Structural damage/destruction. Debris fields and landslides due to saturated soil.</li> <li>c. Water Supply – Contamination of wells and ground water.</li> <li>d. Crops and Food Supply – Crops and food stocks lost due to inundation.</li> <li>e. Displaced persons.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Search and rescue.</li> <li>b. Medical assistance.</li> <li>c. Disaster assessment.</li> <li>d. Evacuation/relocation of affected populace.</li> <li>e. Provision for short-term food, water, and shelter.</li> <li>f. Water purification.</li> <li>g. Epidemiological surveillance.</li> <li>h. Road clearing and bridge replacement/repair.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Tropical Cyclone/Hurricane</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Settlements in low lying coastal and adjacent areas.</li> <li>b. Poor communications or warning system.</li> <li>c. Lightweight structures or ageing/poor quality construction.</li> <li>d. Poorly protected infrastructure, fishing/maritime industry.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Casualties – Deaths from drowning/debris. Secondary threat of communicable diseases due to water contamination or breakdown in sewage treatment.</li> <li>b. Displaced persons.</li> <li>c. Physical Damage – Wind destruction or damage, storm surge and landslides.</li> <li>d. Water Supply – Ground water contamination.</li> <li>e. Crops and Food Supply – Destruction of standing crops, groves and food stocks.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Evacuation and emergency shelter.</li> <li>b. Search and rescue.</li> <li>c. Medical assistance.</li> <li>d. Water purification.</li> <li>e. Reestablish logistics and communications networks.</li> <li>f. Disaster assessment.</li> <li>g. Provisions for replanting.</li> </ul>

Hazard	Vulnerability Factors	Typical Adverse Effects	Common Post-Event Need
<b>Wildfire</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Location of fire prone areas.</li> <li>b. Seasonal wildfire threat.</li> <li>c. Climatic factors (wind, humidity, drought conditions).</li> <li>d. Community evacuation hazards in the face of fire movement.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Casualties – Smoke and burn victims.</li> <li>b. Physical Damage – Loss of building structures, limber, livestock.</li> <li>c. Recovery – Slow land recovery and reconstruction.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Provision for firefighting resources.</li> <li>b. Provision for temporary shelters and safe areas.</li> <li>c. Support to fire reporting.</li> <li>d. Evacuation.</li> <li>e. Medical assistance.</li> </ul>
<b>Chemical/Industrial Incident</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Proximity of population, structures, livestock, and corps.</li> <li>b. Environmental spread due to wind and precipitation.</li> <li>c. Lack of population threat awareness.</li> <li>d. Population reluctance to leave homes and livelihoods if threat isn't immediately apparent.</li> <li>e. Unpredictable threat direction.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Casualties – Death or injury due to toxic exposure.</li> <li>b. Physical Damage – Possible to structures and infrastructure.</li> <li>c. Contamination – Air, water, land, livestock.</li> <li>d. Displaced persons.</li> </ul>	<p>Highly variable but may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Medical assistance.</li> <li>b. Disaster assessment.</li> <li>c. Evacuation/relocation.</li> <li>d. Short term water and food supplies.</li> <li>e. Water purification.</li> <li>f. Epidemiological surveillance.</li> </ul>
<b>Mass Population Movement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Unwillingness of authorities to take measures to mitigate vulnerabilities.</li> <li>b. Populations inability to mitigate own vulnerabilities.</li> <li>c. Lack of international community engagement.</li> <li>d. Limited self-sufficiency.</li> <li>e. No supporting infrastructure.</li> <li>f. Limited means to generate income.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Casualties – Increased mortality due to poor food, sanitation and health conditions. Death due to secondary diseases.</li> <li>b. Local destabilization due to:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overburdened infrastructure.</li> <li>• Increased tension due to ethnic tension.</li> <li>• Civil unrest and inter-communal violence.</li> <li>• Impact on economy and staple food supply.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Provision of food, water, and shelter.</li> <li>b. Medical assistance.</li> <li>c. Support to host infrastructure.</li> <li>d. Amelioration of impact on host population.</li> <li>e. Medium term food security measures.</li> <li>f. Medium term feeding program.</li> <li>g. Medium term water and health program.</li> </ul>

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## CIV-MIL Information Sharing Planning Considerations

- a. Building Situational Awareness. Military planners and execution staff will tailor information sharing to meet the tasking demands. This includes forming an FMN with willing military partners.
  - **What is the nature of the emergency?** Staff planners can anticipate requirements based on lessons learned from past responses. Enclosure 4, *Types of Disasters*, provides areas of consideration for response planning.
    - What information is needed?
    - Who has release authorization?
    - What form is the information needed to be usable?
  - Information sharing planning must identify and navigate “sensitivity issues” concerning the affected population:
    - Political and Cultural Sensitivities: Are there any political/religious/ethnic or gender sensitivities prevalent in the affected areas?
    - What disaggregated or aggregated demographic information is available for the affected state (population density, age spectrum, language, dialects, education, employment/unemployment, religion, ethnic identity, etc.)?
    - What is the population’s outlook concerning the responding nations, especially if a former colonial colony or exposed to a civil war?
    - State of Civil Administration: What is the functional state of civil administration in the affected area and what help is required to restore them to effectiveness.
    - Foreign military forces should obtain assessments conducted by other organizations, analyze them and incorporate them as required in their planning process. If deployed early enough, foreign military forces may be requested to conduct infrastructure assessments (i.e. roads, bridges, ports, airports). Needs assessments require specialized skills that are not commonly available in military organizations.
- b. Identification of Key Participants & Centers of Gravity. General political knowledge and cultural awareness of the affected state’s government and its military, disaster response planning, humanitarian and anticipated state responders builds an understanding of the relationships and responsibilities of the critical authorities in a crisis response. Such understanding can establish a bridge for CIV-MIL information sharing.
  - Determine Relief Organization Requirements:

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- Has the Government or Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) requested the use of military assets?
  - Has the nation's civilian lead response entity requested the use of specific military assets?
  - What support will the military be requested to perform and where is the support needed?
  
  - Own Government Agency Identification:
    - Who is the lead government agency for the effort?
    - Have agency assessment teams been deployed?
    - Where are the assessment teams operating from?
    - What specific information sharing requirements has the assessment team placed on the responding military forces?
    - Identify national interest for the affected state and the region.
  
  - Affected State:
    - Is there an affected state institution, agency, or organization coordinating the response?
    - Is there a national disaster management office (NDMO) and where are the NDROs and regional government authorities located?
    - Determine if, and where, the affected state establish a Multinational Military Coordination Center (MNMCC). (See Chapter V, page 48.)
    - What is the relationship between the civil government and the military forces, to include the national police force if present?
    - What is the political climate of the government?
  
  - Humanitarian Community:
    - Has the affected state designated a coordinating mechanism and organization for the international response and CIV-MIL coordination?
    - Is there a UN Country Team or similar non-UN organization in place and has a Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator been appointed? If so, does the military have access to assessments?
    - Which organizations will be good sources of information regarding non-combatant and humanitarian sites and operations?
    - Which humanitarian community actors are responsible for key humanitarian clusters (e.g. water/sanitation, food and nutrition, emergency shelter, camp management, health, education, protection, logistics, early recovery, IT and communications) and where/when are the cluster meetings?
      - Will military liaisons have a role in supporting the clusters and other government/humanitarian operation centers without
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compromising the perception of neutrality and independence of humanitarian entities?

- Have the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement and/or International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO) set up alternate coordination mechanisms to the Humanitarian Country Team and clusters?
- Has the International Federation of the Red Cross Red Crescent (IFRC) deployed Field Assessments and Coordination Teams (FACT), or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) activated a Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU)? (Military planners may find that Red Cross assessments are of high quality for operational planning, and the IFRC or ICRC through the delegates to the armed forces network will tend to share the assessments.)
- Has the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA - [ochaonline.un.org](http://ochaonline.un.org)) established an in-country presence and has the UN activated any common services?
- Has the UN deployed an UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) mission? Does the military have access to their assessments?
- What web-based portals (e.g. Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Center (V-OSOCC), ReliefWeb, or HumanitarianResponse) will support the operation? (See Chapter V, page 52.)
- Has an UN On-site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) been activated? Where is it and will there be a request for military liaisons? (See Chapter V, page 47.)
- Will non-governmental civilians be working from the military headquarters and will these individuals need access to the internet?

Military staffs must seek out humanitarian coordination centers. There is no one single unifying humanitarian organization. All humanitarian organizations are independent entities supporting their own mission and seeking funding from nations, other organizations, and individuals.

Responding military staffs will encounter UN based organizations, the Red Cross movement and other well established organizations. It is imperative for crisis planning staffs to determine what organizations are in country and who is joining the response effort and recognize that no one institution, network or procedure will encompass even the majority of them. Major aid organizations prefer to work bilaterally and will form ad hoc sector teams as needed. Military commanders should conduct key leader engagement with the heads of major aid agencies essential for operational response in certain sectors.

The UN CIV-MIL Coord (UN CMCoord) can assist in establishing a dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors with a focus on protecting and promoting the humanitarian principles, avoiding competition for resources, minimizing inconsistency, and where appropriate pursuing common goals.

□ Foreign Governments:

- What is the relationship of the affected state to our government?
- What is the relationship of the affected state to other responding governments?
- What is the relationship of the affected state with neighboring states?
- Are other nations going to host the relief effort outside the affected state?
- Are other nations going to be used as logistics hub for personnel/cargo movement?

Simulations and exercises conducted with foreign governments, responding foreign agencies and the humanitarian community, both international and local, can build trust and understanding in future real-world events. It provides how participants conduct relief operations, share their operational culture, and establish organizational processes to address common tasks.

- Military:
  - Has the affected state designated and established an MNMCC?
  - Has UN CMCoord been contacted and provided staff contact information?
  - Has contact information been shared with?
    - Own government agency's assessment team?
    - Other foreign military responding to the crisis event?
    - Affected state military?
    - Other IGO, PVO, or INGO which may be playing a leading role in disaster and humanitarian response, particularly those with an organizing coordinating role.
    - Organizations establishing information systems, networks and services.
  - What IT support is needed by military liaisons to perform their mission?
  - Will the affected and assisting state's militaries form an FMN? Who will develop the Joining, Membership and Exiting Instructions (JMEI)?
- c. Planning for Mission Tasking. Anticipation of those tasks that can be expected allows the military planners to develop an executable information sharing course of action for the deploying forces.
- Assess Effects of Military Operations on Humanitarian operations:
  - How will military operations support affected state government and humanitarian agencies' efforts?
  - Does OCHA have a dedicated CMCoord focal point for de-confliction of responding military employment in support of the affected state? What is the CMCoord contact information and where are they located?
  - Will the UN utilize a Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Center (HuMOCC), and if so where will it be located? (See Chapter V, page 49.)
  - Are there other CIV-MIL coordination mechanisms set up by local and international aid agencies
  - Will the foreign military be expected to seek permission from the affected nation's government or military to release information concerning the response effort?
  - Does own government agency's assessment team have a dedicated CIV-MIL coordinator? If there is, has the contact information been shared?

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- Will military information be required to have permission by the embassy/agency assessment team prior to release?
  - Determine Logistics Issues:
    - Are the Clusters being established? If so where are they and what is the lead organization? How and with what frequency are meetings scheduled and can military liaisons attend them? (See Enclosure 5, page 5.)
    - Identify humanitarian assistance “hubs and spokes.” What supply routes are used by these organizations? Are there possible “bottlenecks” (restricting the flow of supplies)? What is the likelihood of civil disturbance during distribution?
    - Can the existing infrastructure (roads, bridges, airfields, ports, etc.) withstand and support aid deliveries? If not what affected infrastructure must be restored for rapid and effective logistics operations?
    - Who is managing the logistics flow into the country?
  - Determine CIMIC Unit Engagement:
    - Will CIMIC be included in the allocated forces for the crisis?
    - Do responding military forces share a common CIMIC understanding?
    - Has CIMIC been integrated in the planning process, and how well is it understood and resourced by responding military forces?
    - Are CIMIC personnel included in the deployment and operational planning process?
    - What are the deployment/campaign plan’s desired civil end states?
    - Are there adequate CIMIC personnel available to assist planners?
  - d. Information Sharing. What information, and how it is provided, often are the most critical items in military support to civilian entities. Trust is established when the military can provide timely, accurate information in a usable format. Within the disaster area, the affected state and the humanitarian community likely do not have the resources or time to conduct data analysis and generate reports. The information provided must be in a usable format and available to those responsible for planning and execution of humanitarian operations. These are covered in the next chapter, Best Practices.
  - Identify Interlocutors:
    - Do humanitarian organizations have a deployed civil-military coordination (i.e. UN-CMCoord) or liaison officers? If so, relationships should immediately be established among them.
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- At what level will willing humanitarian organizations accept or embed liaison officers?
  - Does OCHA have a dedicated CMCoord focal point identified in any of the 30 regional offices or in Geneva for the particular crisis?
  - Is there an organization or government entity (i.e. embassy) willing to serve as an interlocutor if needed?
  - Information Assembly:
    - Are Foreign Disclosure Officers engaged in the planning process and allocated to the information sharing release process?
    - What information sharing agreements exist between and among all the participants?
    - Are there consolidated documents/reports/plans describing the emergency and current/future efforts to respond (i.e. a consolidated appeal or flash appeal by the UN)?
    - The affected state's National Disaster Management Organization (NDMO) is responsible for initial assessments. Foreign military planners should request these assessments as soon as possible.
    - A rapid assessment of assistance requirements can be jointly undertaken by the foreign military forces and affected nation agencies. Foreign military forces can support the humanitarian community's assessment efforts (i.e. transportation, communications, satellite or aerial survey, security).
    - Are there existing civil reporting mechanisms that can provide up-to-date information (e.g. reporting to donors)?
    - Can the responding military attend informational/coordination briefings?
    - Initial disaster information can be found on HA/DR internet sites.
    - Military forces should attempt to obtain assessments from any available source (affected state government, other government's agencies or organizations, local first responders, vulnerable populations and the humanitarian community).
  - Information/Data Handover/Takeover (HOTO):
    - Prior to departure information gathered needs to be either handed over to the relieving force. If military operations are terminating authorization to transfer information must be determined prior to operations terminating:
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- Identification of will receive the information/data repository.
  - Signed agreement covering control and use of the information.
  - Authorization from higher authority to conduct HOTO.
  - Special handling of any information that comes within personally identifiable information is coordinated to prevent unauthorized disclosure.
- Environment:
- What organizations are involved in the operation? What is the relationship between affected state, assisting states and their military forces, and the humanitarian community?
  - Identify relief agencies' objectives, capabilities, and resources.
  - Leadership, key points of contact of affected state (civil and military), UN (OSOCC, CMCoord) and other ad hoc humanitarian CIV-MIL coordination mechanisms.
  - Determine the affected population's demographics, social, economic, cultural, language (dialects), religious and political background to include the relationship between the populace and their government.
  - Determine the status/capabilities/intent of the affected state's military, paramilitary and law enforcement agencies towards the humanitarian community and foreign military forces. Obtain their contact information.
  - Third country relationships. In the event that a country requesting HA/DR support does not have its own military/paramilitary, civil defense or law enforcement agency, they may rely on a third country for these services. If so then contact with that third country's military will be required.
  - Determine the willingness of the humanitarian community to interact (directly or indirectly) with foreign military forces and any obstacles to a viable relationship.
  - Estimate the impact of the crisis on the affected state:
    - Who will be affected?
    - What aspects of the affected state's infrastructure will be

impacted?

- What is the severity of the event on the affected population?
- Status of essential public services and infrastructure.
  - What is the status of the affected state's infrastructure?
  - State of Civil Administration: What is the functional state of civil administration in the affected area? What help is required to restore them, and by whom? When can they be made effective?

## Affected State Control

In the past affected states have exercised various degrees of control affecting relief efforts:

- ❖ Control of linguist hiring (low density/high demand) to ensure that the affected state had sufficient support for their own needs.
- ❖ Excluding those personnel with job titles working or supporting intelligence collection or analysis.
- ❖ Limiting the total number of personnel deploying.
- ❖ Requiring prior approval for each person entering the affected state.

- Legal limitations to multinational assistance to the Affected State should include:
  - Are there Affected State law that would constrain or limit CMIS and HOTO? (IFRC IDRL reference [http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/4123/1205600-IDRL%20Guidelines-EN-LR%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/4123/1205600-IDRL%20Guidelines-EN-LR%20(2).pdf))

**Competition for resources, de-confliction and cooperation with the relief responses of other nations and organizations will be important considerations during planning. Often the military is both faster and can pay a higher price than the humanitarian community for both space (i.e. warehouse, accommodations) and services (i.e. translators, trucks & drivers). This results in the humanitarians having to either find alternative solutions or to bid up their work. Military need to be aware of their impact on local economy.**

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## THE HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY

*“Bereft of outside agency input, the military will generally fill the void as it sees fit.”*

**USAID Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response, V4.0  
Page F-6, paragraph B.1.d**

### 1. Humanitarian Community

a. For the purposes of this guidebook the humanitarian community actor include direct providers of assistance and conform to the principles of humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian actor runs the gamut from those under the United Nations umbrella of organizations to individual charities or local organizations who function in a limited area. This chapter of the guidebook focuses on who the major humanitarian organizations are and the guiding principles common to this community.

b. Often the initial contact by military organizations with members of the humanitarian community is confusing. Many assumptions about the humanitarian community are derived from the expectation that the humanitarian community functions like any other organization. Several key features that military planners and operators should know are:

- The humanitarian community as a whole does not have a hierarchical structure outside their own organization. They are independent entities, often even within their own organization (i.e. UN agencies). Therefore there is no command structure with someone in charge.
- Humanitarian organizations collaborate, coordinate, and cooperate if it enables them to achieve their goals. Otherwise they function independently.
- Each organization will usually follow a set of principles, governing their work and conduct.
- Each organization is founded on an idea or theory and has an area of expertise, ranging from humanitarian aid to reconstruction, development, economic support, and education.
- The humanitarian community is adaptable, having ongoing operations 24/7 around the world.
- Each organization has its own guidelines concerning interaction with military forces, especially foreign military. Understanding each organization’s motivation and purpose can minimize friction when interacting with the military.

c. Experience has shown that the context of missions can vary markedly. A common feature is the complex assortment of actors engaged in both the immediate operating area and beyond. Beside the local population, and in the case of hostilities – the parties in the conflict, multinational military forces have to operate in complete consideration of the presence of other

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actors in the area. This can include media, diplomats, IOs, NGOs, and GOs. The number of humanitarian organizations alone is significant. ReliefWeb (<http://reliefweb.int/organizations>) provides a comprehensive Directory of **2,849 Humanitarian Organizations**.

CIV-MIL information-sharing will likely occur anytime the two entities are in the same operating area. The operational environment and the level of trust drive information-sharing. If trust is established, CIV-MIL information-sharing may follow. Without trust, collaboration is nearly impossible. From the humanitarian perspective, factors that may influence trust are:

- Organizational policy: Does the organization allow CIV-MIL information-sharing?
- Risk to the staff: Does information-sharing put the humanitarian staff at risk both locally and in operations in other nations?
- Risk to the supported population: Does information-sharing place the assisted population at risk? This includes both access and threats.
- Personal experience: Humanitarian field officers have considerable authority in information-sharing decisions.
- Benefit to the operation: What benefit is there to the humanitarian operation if information is shared?

For military personnel it is important to understand the fundamental precepts of the humanitarian community and their role in it. It is first best to discuss those organizations that the military is likely to encounter and then to outline the principles of their operation.

1. International Organizations (IOs). An IO is an intergovernmental, regional or global organization governed by international law and established by a group of states, with international juridical personality given by international agreement creating enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose of fulfilling a given function pursuing common aims. Notable examples include the United Nations (UN) and its many agencies, International Red Cross (to include both the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
  - a. United Nations (UN) agencies.
    - i. Depending on the nature of the crisis there will often be a senior UN representative who will facilitate coordination between the UN agencies. This may be a UN Resident Coordinator (RC), UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) or a UN Head of Mission. (Note: the key words are ‘facilitate’ and ‘coordinate’. The UN leadership is not in command in a military sense, but serves as an interface between the humanitarian community, the affected nation’s government, and foreign/coalition military forces when deployed.)

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- a) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA is the central manager of the humanitarian response tasked with coordinating the relief response.
  - b) World Food Program (WFP) is the UN's lead in humanitarian logistics focused on the movement and storage of food material. Supporting WFP is the UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC) and the UN Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS).
  - c) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is an agency of the United Nations that leads international efforts to defeat hunger. FAO is also a source of knowledge and information, helping developing countries and countries in transition modernize and improve agriculture, forestry and fisheries practices, ensuring good nutrition and food security for all.
  - d) UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is tasked to oversee situations when people cross national boundaries and enter another country.
  - e) UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) is tasked with programs that support child protection.
  - f) UN World Health Organization (WHO) is focused on medicine and conditions that impact health such as water and sanitation.
  - g) UN Development Programme (UNDP) is concerned with recovery operations to enable the affected populace to return to their normal lives.

**The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) is a global network of organizations that can be called on to provide common communications services in humanitarian emergencies. Services are deployed in defined 'common operational areas', i.e. areas approved by the Humanitarian Country Team in which the majority of United Nations (UN) agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are based. The ETC operates under the WFP and is called on only when local telecom structure is either significantly damaged or insufficient to meet the**

- b. The Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement is made up of several elements with different missions:

- i. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC):

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Lead coordinator for national Red Cross/Red Crescent societies in a non- conflict situation. The IFRC can be expected to be involved in disasters both manmade and natural.

- ii. National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies: provides specific capacities from within their national borders, i.e. American Red Cross, Indonesian Red Cross, and Malaysian Red Crescent.
  - iii. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): Lead coordinator of the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement in a conflict situation. ICRC was not established by intergovernmental agreement. Its authority was formed through a permanent mandate founded in international law; a worldwide mission to help victims of conflicts. The ICRC has a unique status as it fulfils a role conferred upon it by international treaties of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and additional protocols, to which virtually all countries in the world are party. The ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It partners with the IFRC to direct and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in situations of conflict and their aftermath.
- c. One of the primary IO that may be encountered as a result of conflict is the International Organization for Migration (IOM). IOM is the principal intergovernmental organization in the field of migration. IOM is dedicated to promoting humane and orderly migration for the benefit of all. It does so by providing services and advice to governments and migrants. Because of its close working relationship with the UN, the IOM has been granted the status of 'Related Organization to the UN'.
2. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO). These include major relief organizations that can range from international to regional and national to local that will often have long standing operations within an area. These organizations include OXFAM, Catholic Relief Services, and Medecins sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders) to name but a few. Often set up by ordinary citizens, NGOs may be funded by governments, foundations, businesses, or private persons. Some avoid formal funding altogether and are run primarily by volunteers. NGOs are highly diverse groups of organizations engaged in a wide range of activities and take different forms in different parts of the world. NGOs have a founding theory or idea, a cluster organization, with a different leader for each function/sector of intervention; therefore it is necessary to create specific links with each of them. They typically operate outside government authority and may be only accountable to a central governing

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board of their organization. It is not uncommon to encounter NGOs who have a long standing presence within a country and will long after the military departs and therefore may pass up short term support from the military in order to maintain and strengthen trust with the local government and populace if any association would risk this relationship.

3. Other Organizations.

- a. The European Union's (EU) lead department for disaster relief is the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), whose mandate is to provide emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict outside of the European Union. Additionally, the EU's Civilian Protection Mechanism facilitates the mobilization of support and assistance from Member States in the event of major emergencies. As part of this mechanism a permanent Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) is able to receive alerts and requests for assistance directly from a disaster-stricken country.
- b. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Doctrine for Disaster Relief is contained within Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3-4 'Non- Article 5 Crisis Response Operations' (NA5CROs). This document states that tasks in support of humanitarian operations should only be conducted 'by exception and upon request'. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) at NATO Headquarters is responsible for coordinating, in close consultation with the UN OCHA, the NATO disaster relief response of member and partner countries. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU) is a non-standing, multi-national force of civil and military elements, which can be deployed in the event of a major natural or man-made disaster in a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) country. For deployments outside the EAPC area, NATO Response Force's (NRF), due to their high readiness, are the primary source of capability from which NATO draws DRO force elements.
- c. There are national aid organizations that are government entities that conduct aid support on behalf of their government to the affected state. Examples of these organizations include; US Agency for International Development (USAID), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), European Aid Development and Cooperation, and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
- d. Regional Organizations have developed to help coordinate relief operations or specialize in supporting a geographic region. Examples of these organizations include; Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Committee on

Disaster Management (ACDM), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC).

## 2. UN Cluster System

In order to better coordinate services in a response, the UN has developed the Cluster system of responsibility. In Figure 1 are the typical organization assigned to facilitate a mission area. If in a given situation a more appropriate organization is identified, they may assume the lead position to manage the cluster element.




Figure 1

In any civilian-military interaction it is important to know which organization is responsible to provide specific support to the affected population.

## 3. Humanitarian Principles

- a. Military forces must understand the principles that the humanitarian community endeavor to follow. These principles and any conflicts that may adversely impact military operations should be addressed in mission planning and execution.

The core principles, found in the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct and in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182, are derived from the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, particularly principles I (humanity), II (impartiality), III (neutrality—in the case of the UN), and IV (independence).

The four humanitarian principles are:

1. **Humanity:** Alleviate human suffering wherever it is found and save lives. Particular focus on the most vulnerable in the population such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.
2. **Neutrality:** Humanitarian Actors must not take sides in conflicts or engage in controversies of a political, ethnic, religious or ideological nature.
3. **Impartiality:** Humanitarian assistance must be provided on the basis of needs of those affected by the particular crisis, taking into account the local capacity already in place to meet those needs. In delivering assistance, do not discriminate as to nationality, ethnicity, religious beliefs, class or political opinions.
4. **Independence:** Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

**The independence element of the key principles often is the issue with humanitarian organizations accepting assistance from the military. In their efforts to alleviate suffering and saving lives, if they accept assistance from the military are they compromising their principle of independence?**

**Military organizations by their nature are tools of their national interest, and therefore are not humanitarian entities, though they are frequently involved in humanitarian operations when the level of need exceeds what the affected nation and humanitarian community can provide.**

**For this reason there are humanitarian organizations that may choose to not associate or are prohibited from accepting assistance from military forces. Lately this has become situational based on the level of need and the availability of alternative resources.**

**The military needs to be constantly mindful that a humanitarian organization's association in one relief effort may have adverse consequences somewhere else where the humanitarian organization is conducting operations. This is especially true in conflict areas. This is just one of the possible unintended consequences of CIV-MIL interaction.**

- b. **Use of military assets.** The foreign military is generally referred to as the 'option of last resort' to fill a recognized 'humanitarian gap'. These principles are covered in the UNOCHA 'Oslo Guidelines'. The following explains the context of last resort:

1. There is no comparable Affected State or civilian alternative available when needed.

2. Only foreign military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need.
3. Use of foreign military assets should be needs driven, complimentary to and coherent with humanitarian aid operations and respecting the role of the Affected State. Thus, the foreign military assets must be unique in capability and availability, avoiding redundancy whenever possible both with the Affected State assets and the humanitarian community capabilities.

### **Commonly Requested Military Support to Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response**

1. **Airlift (Strategic & Local)**
    - a. **Aircraft – Heavy cargo movement**
    - b. **Helicopter – Cargo and personnel movement**
  2. **Airport & Seaport Recovery/Operations**
    - a. **Survey and repair of air/sea port**
    - b. **Airport/Seaport operations support**
    - c. **Cargo movement**
  3. **Damage Survey & Assessment (Air, Land, Sea)**
    - a. **Data gathering & analysis (geospatial based)**
    - b. **Information collation & sharing**
  4. **Engineering**
    - a. **Repair to needed infrastructure**
    - b. **Rubble clearance**
    - c. **Support to displaced person operations**
  5. **Medical**
    - a. **Field medical support**
    - b. **MEDEVAC support**
  6. **Search and Rescue (Land & Sea Search)**
  7. **Support to fill gaps in Planning, Management or Organization**
  8. **Communications Support and Internet Links**
- c. **Do No Harm.** Military actions need to be mindful of the implications of their effort to include second and third order effects. It is critical that the military does not establish a dependency relationship with either the humanitarian community or the affected populace. Military humanitarian operations generally are of limited duration, so when they depart they need to avoid creating a vacuum in the community. Also, the military needs to be mindful that aid to one community may result in animosity from other communities who did not get aid regardless of the need. Finally, just because the military can do something it may be inappropriate for them to do it. This is addressed in the parable of ‘Bridge, Truck, and Cookie’.

## Bridge, Truck and Cookie

1. **Bridge:** If the affected state is unable to repair a bridge needed to reach a population in need it is appropriate for the military to use their resources to repair the bridge so that traffic can flow to the area of need. Otherwise support to local engineering to repair/replace the bridge provides the locals income.
2. **Truck:** Using a military truck to deliver needed goods to the isolated populace deprives the local truckers an income to support their family, which would reduce their need for humanitarian aid and start the local economy back towards recovery. Use of military trucks should only be used if no other vehicles are available from local or humanitarian sources.
3. **Cookie:** Actual delivery of aid to the isolated population should be done by representatives of the Affected State or by the humanitarian community. By using the Affected State their government can demonstrate support to the affected populace. If the humanitarian community provides the distribution they serve their role as humanitarian responders. If the military distributes the aid it may be good public relations back home, but it crosses the line of the humanitarian principles and should be done only when no other alternative is available.

## Examples of Good Intentions Gone Wrong

1. Military driver loaded with aid supplies strikes and kills a water buffalo on the road. Owner claims it is the esteemed bull for the region and he is being deprived of many generations of prized offspring. Besides a monetary compensation the military had to provide him with an acceptable replacement animal. Solution was to hire local trucks and drivers and transfer the risk to them.
2. Military delivered a water truck to a village every day. The military controlled the spigot as families filled their water containers. After several days no one came to the water truck. A rumor had spread that the water was tainted and would adversely affect the men's virility. Realizing their mistake the military met with the local mayor and the next delivery was turned over to him. After taking a drink of the water and declaring it untainted the mayor's team controlled the spigot and filled the villager's water containers. Solution was to reestablish the authority of the local government to meet the needs of their populace.

- d. **Influence Activities.** Influence Activities during aid and transitional use cases should be included in the operational planning from the outset and include the following considerations:
1. Reassurance of the local population that the situation is under control, while ensuring that the national authorities can take the appropriate level of credit.
  2. Reassurance of the local population that military intervention does not have hostile intent.
  3. Encouragement of regional cooperation and involvement in reconstruction efforts.
  4. Dissuasion of criminal or destabilizing activity, for example looting or political opportunism.
  5. Delivery of relief activities information to news media to promote understanding and support for the military operations, within the context of the civilian led relief effort.
  6. Coordination of Influence Activities with other participating relief-delivering nations and organizations.
  7. Preparing Target Audiences to accept the exit strategy.
  8. Participation of CIMIC and Media Operations staff (Public Affairs) in engaging and liaising with embassy staff, media, local authorities, international organizations, and NGOs.

#### 4. Principles and Guidelines for Foreign Military Forces in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR) Operations

- a. **Respect for Affected State sovereignty.** Foreign military forces **must** maintain respect for Affected State sovereignty, and the government and affected population must observe that the foreign military forces respect the country's sovereignty. The UN Charter provides the right of the state to operate free from interference within their domestic domain. The Affected State remains the authoritative body within the country. The Affected State will oversee the relief effort. If the Affected State is unable or incapacitated, a caretaker organization (UN) will oversee the effort until the Affected State can resume their authority.

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- b. **Legitimacy of the mission.** To be successful military HA/DR missions must have legitimacy conferred by the Affected State, the UN Security Council or an internationally recognized regional organization or forum. Military operations conducted inside an Affected State without permission to enter may be considered an invasion vice a support effort.
  - c. **Perception of Foreign Military Forces HA/DR Actions.** The perception of impartiality by military forces is as important as it is to the humanitarian community and beneficiaries.
  - d. **Respect for Culture and Custom.** Respect and sensitivities must be maintained for the culture of the Affected State, this should include religion and ethnic associations. Foreign military leaders must understand the effects that their presences can have on cultural, social, economic and political aspects of the Affected State. It is important to the success of the deployed forces to understand the human environment that they are operating within.
  - e. **Unity of Effort.** HA/DR responses generally include the actions of military, diplomatic, and humanitarian organizations. Each organization has their own reason or agenda for responding to a crisis. These agendas may not support one another. Coordination and cooperation among all participating organizations is necessary in order to achieve the desired end state conditions of all responders. It is unlikely that a Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) would be established and result in a unified command and control environment. Therefore coordination and cooperation must be achieved by dialogue and consensus, but never by command. With some organizations and other deploying foreign military forces, each may only be able to share general information about their activities.
    - i. **Unity of command.** Unity of command is not appropriate among the actors in CIV-MIL operations. Unity of effort helps ensure HA/DR mission success. The Affected State's national disaster management organizations (NDMO) / local emergency management authorities (LEMA) should be the focal point for coordination of HA/DR responses. Each nation contributing military forces should assist in coordinating and validating tasks for their military contingent with the Affected State's government. If the Affected State has established a coordination mechanism (i.e. MNMCC, HuMOCC), it will improve unity of effort. The Affected State and the UN may conduct joint coordination.
    - ii. **Humanitarian Coordination.** Unity of effort is enhanced through coordination between the government and the humanitarian community to align efforts and resources along sector lines. Coordination will optimize the use of the relief resources and minimize the support
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requirements of relief agencies. It will also minimize the number of entities with which the foreign military forces need to interact on a regular basis. The RC/HC, supported by a Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) leads the key interaction and coordination with the Affected State government and other supporting entities. The responding multinational force (assisting states) will receive requests from the Government or RC/HC while detailed coordination occurs along sector lines. To enable the request and support process, the UN has established a “Cluster” system, managed by the HCT; with lead agencies assigned for various response “sectors” (refer to Cluster System in Section I). Foreign military planners should be aware of the humanitarian community and the cluster approach to enable planning and coordination.

- iii. **Information sharing.** Information sharing between all parties is critical to maximizing unity of effort. Foreign military forces must take the initiative to ensure maximum information sharing with the Affected State and humanitarian community (e.g. by providing unclassified information to include safety and threat information, information on critical incidents or developments). Exchanging unclassified information via machine-to-machine (i.e. the Internet or mobile media) should be a primary means in achieving this. Security concerns may preclude the foreign military forces from sharing complete operational information, but every effort to maximize two way sharing should be made. Conversely, some members of the humanitarian community may be reluctant to share information about their activities for fear of compromising their neutrality and independence, and therefore the security for their staff and beneficiaries.

## 5. Five Basic Activities of Military Support to HA/DR Operations


- a. **Security:** Security beyond own forces security is an activity of last resort. Security tasks may include providing security for the storage facilities as well as providing security for convoys and personnel delivering emergency aid. Foreign military forces might also provide security of camps established for internally displaced persons or refugees, including maintenance of security within the camps themselves, medical facilities, facilities for information dissemination, temporary shelter for displaced persons, and other coordinated HA/DR activities. The Affected State is responsible for security and escort if needed. The use of military forces to conduct convoy escort is covered in the ‘IASC non-binding guidelines for the use of armed escorts’.
- b. **Relief:** This includes prompt aid to prevent loss of life, destruction of property and alleviate the suffering of disaster victims. One important role is to assist or facilitate the Affected State government in its dissemination of relief information (e.g. where the distribution centers are located or location of medical services).

- c. **Affected Population Support:** This involves operations to support the return or resettlement of citizens of the affected state. Missions include camp support, basic construction and infrastructure. Provision of food, potable water, supplies, medical attention. Basic security concerns; and placement (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations). If required to support this type of mission foreign military forces should focus on providing unique capabilities to the Affected State, civilian agencies and the humanitarian community. Foreign military forces should avoid establishing and administering camps if at all possible.
- d. **Technical Assistance:** Short-term technical assistance in areas including, but are not limited to, communications restoration, relief supply management, medical care including pandemics, and provision of emergency transportation for persons of risk, high priority relief supply delivery, support to Search, Rescue and Recovery Teams and demining. Foreign military forces must establish implementing procedures and set priorities regarding technical advice and assistance to the affected area and relief agencies as soon as possible. The technical assistance policies should clarify what assistance may be provided as well as the source of authority for assistance.
- e. **Consequence Management (CM) Operations:** CM operations eliminate the negative impact of intentional or inadvertent release of weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials (CBRN)). CM operations involve those essential services and activities required to manage, mitigate, or reduce problems resulting from catastrophic events. Such services may include transportation, communications, public works, firefighting, rescue, information planning, decontamination, care of mass casualties, resources support, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, disposal of hazardous materials, distribution of food, and energy-related services.

## 6. Context of HA/DR Operations

- a. **HA/DR Phasing and Foreign Military Forces Operations.** The figure below depicts an overview of the phases of HA/DR and involvement by organizations.
  - 1) In general terms the timeline of the combined effort to support the affected population starts with the triggering event.
  - 2) Affected State first responders provide the initial response effort while local and national disaster management authorities start the assessment process. When the level of needed response exceeds what the Affected State can provide a request for assistance goes out to the humanitarian community. These needs can be classified into immediate and long-term needs.

- b. Immediate needs to be addressed are those required to save lives and mitigate immediate human suffering (emergency needs), including: search & rescue, water and sanitation / hygiene, food and nutrition, shelter, medical, security, safety of affected population and relief workers. There needs to be a distinction between emergency and chronic needs. Most developing countries have long-standing chronic social needs. Assessment teams must differentiate between what is normal for the affected community and what is occurring as a result of the disaster, so that the relief effort can be directed to those most in need. It is not within the scope of disaster relief to address chronic needs
- c. Long-term needs are those required to restore some sense of normalcy, including: rehabilitation, reconstruction and development.
  - 1) The humanitarian community conducts their own assessment and determines if they can provide effective and timely response to quickly mitigate suffering and save lives. If they determine that the scope of the response or the timeliness of the response necessitates additional support, the Affected State is advised to request assistance from other nations.



- a. Affected State agencies (if still functioning) and various humanitarian community organizations conduct needs assessments on the extent of the disaster/emergency and the needs/requirements. Assessments also include determining the

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capabilities & resources of various relief organizations, including foreign military forces, if they are part of the HA/DR effort. The following are examples of needs and capabilities assessed in this phase of the effort:

- i. Needs/Requirements - data on the affected population (numbers, location, health situation), identification of vulnerable populations, rescue requirements, damage to infrastructure (required for transportation, shelter, sanitation, health and other basic services, etc.), condition of life sustaining resources (water, food supplies, medical supplies, etc.), security situation.
  - ii. Capabilities/Resources - relief and other specialized (such as urban search and rescue) organizations; government agencies; coordinating mechanisms; availability of infrastructure, civil assets, military assets, relief supplies; etc.
- 2) Foreign national asset capable of rapid deployment and having unique capabilities that may aid the early relief effort is often the responding nation's military forces.
- i. Based on the requests of the Affected State and the capabilities of the foreign military forces nations - foreign military HA/DR operations will most likely be of short duration and limited scope. Foreign military forces will generally be involved in the emergency (immediate lifesaving) phase until the Affected State and international community can sustain the requirements and continue with long-term rehabilitation and reconstruction.
  - ii. Local communities, local and national agencies, to include the Affected State military, will be involved initially and will continue long into the recovery/development phase.
  - iii. International agencies and the UN will be providing assistance prior to arrival of the foreign military forces and will expand their capability through the response phase and generally remain for recovery and reconstruction after the foreign military forces depart.
  - iv. As the mission proceeds over time, the capabilities of the Affected State and the civilian relief community increase, thereby decreasing the need for the foreign military. The foreign military forces are then able to disengage from these tasks and transition to redeployment or other tasks.

- d. The humanitarian community uses the terms ‘needs, vulnerabilities and coping capacities’. ‘Needs’ are immediate requirements for survival (food, water, shelter, and medical) and are assessed after an incident has occurred. ‘Vulnerabilities’ are potential threats and factors that increase the risks to a population. Vulnerabilities can be assessed both before and during an emergency and are expressed in terms of their origins (physical/material, social/organizational or motivational/attitudinal). For example, water borne illnesses such as cholera and dysentery are a threat if sanitation and clean water are not reestablished post disaster. The means and resources that the affected population can mobilize to address their own needs and vulnerabilities are referred to as ‘Capacities’. An accurate assessment of needs and vulnerabilities against coping capacities provides a way of:
- 1) Preventing an escalation of the emergency in which today’s vulnerabilities become tomorrow’s needs.
  - 2) Focusing assistance to the most vulnerable groups.
  - 3) Supporting a sustainable recovery based on local resources and institutions.

<b>Initial Assessment Elements</b>		
<b>Disaster Type</b>	<b>Public Health</b>	<b>Power Supply</b>
<b>Secondary Hazards</b>	<b>Shelter</b>	<b>Communications</b>
<b>Weather</b>	<b>Water &amp; Sanitation</b>	<b>Search &amp; Rescue</b>
<b>Climate</b>	<b>Transportation</b>	<b>Law &amp; Order</b>
<b>Affected Area</b>	<b>Infrastructure</b>	<b>Force Protection Issues</b>
<b>Population Affected</b>	<b>Food</b>	<b>Initial Responses</b>

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