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
19 August 2022

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SUBJECT: **AM 86-1-1 CIMIC TACTICS TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES**

REFERENCES: A. ACO MANUAL (AM) 86-11 (ACO CIMIC Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) CUSTODIANSHIP _ "CECIL" Minutes 10 Oct 12, dated 24 January 2013.
B. ACO CIMIC & CMI SC 21-01 RoDs, dated 24 June 21.

1. In accordance with Reference A and reconfirmed in Reference B, Multinational CIMIC Group (MNCG) have assumed custodianship of ACO Manual 86-1-1 CIMIC Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from 01 Dec 21.
2. JFCBS, with support from the NATO Command Structure, NATO Force Structure, CIMIC Centre of Excellence and the Multinational CIMIC Group have all supported the updated TTPs.
3. The current revision now reflects a more accurate and informative document to support the CIMIC user.
4. The enclosed ACO Manual 86-1-1 TTPs supersedes the version of TTPs dated July 2012.



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ACO MANUAL 86-1-1
CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC)
TACTICS TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES (TTPS)

FINAL

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CHAPTER 1 CIMIC ASSESSMENT (TTP1)

REFERENCES

- A. ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive version 3.0 (COPD V 3.0), dated 15 Jan 2021.
- B. ACO CIMIC Functional Planning Guide (FPG), dated 20 Jul 22.
- C. AJP-3.19 - Allied Joint Doctrine for CIMIC, dated 09 Nov 2018.
- D. AJP-3 EDC V1. Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, dated 4 Feb 2019.

1-1 INTRODUCTION

a. General

- (1) The present Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) document is the first of a series that constitute the development of the references, especially of Ref. C which states:

“[...] is supported by an Allied Command Operations manual (AM 86-1-1) which gives additional amplification, including details on tactics, techniques and procedures that would be inappropriate in an Allied Joint Publication (AJP)”.

- (2) Thus, as the last echelon of doctrinal development, the present version constitutes an update of the AM-86-1-1 version of 2012, revised for an enhanced joint approach amongst other improvements such as better referencing for future updates.
- (3) Resilience through Civil Preparedness (RtCP), although an important current issue, has been barely undertaken, as far as it is still in the area of policy and not incorporated into higher Joint NATO doctrine yet.

b. CIMIC Assessment

- (1) Assessment is a NATO agreed term meaning:

“The process of *estimating* the capabilities and performance of organizations, individuals, materiel or systems¹”.

- (2) In the context of the CIMIC joint function, the CMI group of activities and these TTPs, assessment it is to be understood as advice to the commander of a military operation. In this regard, to allow the commander to take accurate decisions he requires a complete picture of the Operating Environment (OE), defined as:

¹ AAP-06 Ed 2019. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. Page 15. The term is also used in a broad sense in many different areas and in very different senses throughout NATO doctrine and policy documents.

“A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander².”

Within the OE, CIMIC and CMI activity is mostly concerned with the civil environment³:

“The political, economic, social ethnographic, cultural, infrastructure and information elements of the people with whom a military force or a government agency operates⁴”

- (3) CIMIC personnel generally contribute with their assessments in all stages of an operation in support of the commander’s understanding of the civil side of the OE. This contribution can be summarized in two major areas:
 - (a) CIMIC estimate. It is the product that CIMIC undertake and develop during the planning process of an operation⁵.
 - (b) CIMIC contribution to Operations Assessment (OA). Its purpose is to contribute to the progress of the mission during its conduct phase with assessments about the civil situation⁶. This type of assessments can be tailored for special interests, specific situations or requirements, and are linked to reporting procedures during the execution of an operation.
- (4) This understanding of the civil environment requires a comprehensive approach through Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) activities executed by staff functions other than CIMIC, both in planning and in execution of operations. Further SOP/SOIs will develop tools to implement the necessary comprehensiveness.
- (5) Lastly, the contributions of the maritime, air, space and cyberspace operational domains that affect the civil picture have also been addressed.

1-2 AIM

The aim of this TTP document is to provide specific tools, techniques and procedures to produce CIMIC assessments as considered in the documents of reference. This is done in support of NATO JTF⁷ and their commanders in conducting CIMIC and CMI activities while planning and conducting any type of NATO operation or exercise at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations.

1-3 SCOPE

- a. This document focuses on the provision of specific tools for CIMIC personnel in the practical application of the planning activities described in references A (COPD) and

² Ibid. 93.

³ Ref. C. 3-8.

⁴ Ibid. C. 1-8.

⁵ Ref. B. B-1.

⁶ Ref. D. 4-1.

⁷ including Maritime TFs with amphibious forces and SJO (L) based on a NFS Land HQ.

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B (CFPG), as well as the conduct of operations in all phases, regarding the assessments related to the CIMIC function.

- b. This TTP will also be useful to personnel involved in CIMIC activities that although not being CIMIC-specialised, as it will help them to produce assessments of the civil environment within their own areas of expertise.
- c. The several formats provided in this TTP are always subject to change or adaptation to the means to present them (written document, audio-visual briefing, VTC, etc.), and also to the formatting of the HQ in which the assessment is produced.

1-4 KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF AN ASSESSMENT

Any assessment must be:

- a. **Accurate.** It is understood that the validity and usefulness of any assessment or reporting will be reliant upon its accuracy. If the accuracy of information or the source of that information is questionable, then it must be stated in the report. It must be remembered that inaccurate information may be more dangerous than no information at all.
- b. **Consistent.** An absence of consistency will hamper the identification of key capability gaps and areas of potential concern.
- c. **Timely.** For the assessment and reporting to be of any use, it must be provided in a timely manner and must be synchronized with the planning process. If time is limited, it may be necessary to prioritize the information requirements and focus on the key factors.
- d. **Relevant.** Every effort should be made to determine which factors and what information is relevant. Those not affecting the mission should not be included in the assessment. This is essential for effective allocation of resources.
- e. **Continuous.** Whether the assessment is prior or after the conduct of an activity changing the conditions, it must be responsive to change and as such, be continuous. Therefore, there must be a mechanism or capability factored into the process that will enable staff to monitor and provide updates as necessary. In particular, emphasis should be placed on identifying progress and concerns relating to the most critical information requirements.
- f. **Cooperative.** Military commanders, staff and units should attempt to utilize civil sources of information (Host Nation, IOs, GOs, NGOs) as mandated through Direct Liaison Authority (DIRLAUTH). Alternatively, it may also be of benefit for the military to share information of mutual interest with the relevant civil entities.

1-5 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIMIC ESTIMATE

- a. The CIMIC estimate is the product that CIMIC staff, as a Knowledge Developer (KD), undertakes and develop during the Operations Planning Process (OPP) and includes the outset of each of its phases. It is a living product and at the early stages it aims to assemble as much raw data as possible, and should be based on a ground

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reconnaissance and supported by information and data drawn from all sources, both open and classified⁸.

- b. The CIMIC estimate is largely described in references A and B, and this paragraph is mainly intended to help the CIMIC planner develop his participation in the JOPG (Joint Operations Planning Group) sessions when conducting the initial phases of the operational design of a NATO operation. Moreover, it is also useful for CIMIC personnel to understand the process and concepts involved.
- c. At **operational** level, J9 CIMIC has to assess the civil environment in the Area of Interest (AOI) of a JOA (Joint Operations Area) and even outside of it when required, in the engagement space⁹. It bases the understanding of the civil dimension and its impact on the operations.
- d. At **tactical** level, during execution CIMIC contributes to the assessment of the civil environment of the superior echelon (by CIMIC reporting, see TTP 4 CIMIC reporting) and support the commander by assessing how the civil situation picture is in the Area of Interest (AOI) of the AOO (Area of Operations), how it could have an impact on the conduct of tactical operations and how, as a consequence and in the worst case scenario, it could affect the joint operations. Likewise, the impact is assessed of these tactical operations on the civil environment.
- e. The main tools, techniques and procedures to operationalise the CIMIC estimate are:
 - (1) CIMIC Contribution to the Comprehensive Understanding of the Operating Environment (C3OE).
 - (2) CIMIC contribution to Operational/Component Estimate.

1-6 CIMIC CONTRIBUTION TO THE CUOE (C3OE)

See Ref. B chapters 1 and 2.

- a. General.
 - (1) The CUOE is a crisis-specific cross-headquarters process, led by the intelligence/knowledge staff (J2/KD), to develop a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment including associated potential threats and risks, in support of planning and conduct of a campaign¹⁰. It is started at the Planning Phase 1 (Initial Situational Awareness of a Potential/Actual Crisis) by the superior echelon in order to develop an initial understanding and monitoring of the crisis, and finishes before the start of the Planning Phase 3a that undertakes the operational estimate.

⁸ Ref. B. B-1.

⁹ Ref. A. 1-3 (footnote 3). "The part of the strategic environment relevant to a particular crisis in which the Alliance may decide, or has decided, to engage."

¹⁰ Ref. A. 1-10. Comprehensive *Understanding* of the OE (CUOE), and Comprehensive *Preparation* of the OE (CPOE) are often used synonymously.

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- (2) As part of the CUOE, the C3OE is an intermediate product and can take written and/or slide deck form depending on the requirements of the staff processes of the HQ where the CIMIC joint function is carried out.
- (3) The C3OE is not to be confused with the intelligence-oriented JIPOE, inasmuch as CIMIC, as a joint function, should not be perceived as doing intelligence on allied non-military actors¹¹. However, synergies between both processes can greatly enhance the commander's comprehensive view of the civil environment, and information gaps can be avoided.




Figure 1. Graphic depiction of the relationship between intelligence and information, regarding the civil environment.

b. Purpose of the C3OE:

- (1) The CIMIC contribution to the CUOE (C3OE) provides the commander with a picture of the civil environment including the identification of relevant non-military actors' centre of gravity, their end state, strategy and objectives, as far as these influences the future definition of the campaign objectives and decisive conditions.
- (2) Furthermore, the civil situation will permeate several parts of the OPLAN main body and annexes. The harmonisation of these contributions can greatly support a comprehensive view to the commander. Annex B lists the main parts of the OPLAN that may reflect the civil situation from a broad CIMIC and CMI perspectives.

c. Steps of the C3OE:

- (1) Due to the fact that the CUOE is a J2/KD-led process, for OPP synchronisation purposes, the C3OE should follow the three steps¹²:
 - STEP 1. Describe and evaluate the civil environment.

¹¹ Ref. C. 2-3.

¹² AIntP-17. EDA V1 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the operating Environment (JIPOE), 2-1. Despite the radically different aims and methods of the joint functions of CIMIC and intelligence, the use of a common methodology for analysis, each in its field, offers great benefits for creating a Common Operating Picture.

- STEP 2. Evaluate actors in the civil environment.
 - STEP 3. Determine non-military actors' courses of action (COA).
- (2) The following paragraphs elaborate tools useful for the CIMIC planner and CIMIC personnel in general, that are not described in sufficient deepness in the CIMIC referenced documents.
- (3) The main sources from which the civil environment can be assessed are:
- Superior echelon's OPLAN (see Annex B).
 - Deployed Operational Liaison Reconnaissance Team (OLRT).
 - Own HQ CMI contributions from other branches.
 - In Art 5 operations, Host Nation information sharing and NFIU¹³ reports.
- d. Maritime, Air, Space and Cyberspace contributions to the C3OE:
- (1) In a joint operation, situational awareness of the civil environment in the maritime, air, space and cyberspace domains needs to be addressed, in as much as it is key to operating in the joint operational level of conflict. The different approaches and timings of operations in each of these domains have, as well as the highly technical nature of the information systems that each domain uses (namely maritime and airspace) demand a truly joint and operational mindset to effectively coordinate civil-military interaction in all domains¹⁴.
- (2) Stakeholder expertise enables fluent relationships of the commander with all the engagement-approved non-military actors related to any of the domains (merchant shipping regulation and tracking, civil air traffic control and civilian telecommunications management, etc.)^{15 16}.
- (3) In the maritime domain, it is essential that the relationship with merchant shipping is properly considered. In this regard, NATO Shipping Centre (NSC) at MARCOM is the single point of contact (SPOC) for merchant ships, and should be involved early in the planning of operations. It is at this level that Naval Cooperation And Guidance System (NCAGS) function must be closely coordinated with Naval CIMIC function, because the Maritime Component is responsible to provide the operational (JFC/JTF¹⁷) commander with their contribution to the CUOE¹⁸. Also, amphibious forces contribute to CIMIC in JTF operations in a Maritime Domain JTF (M/E¹⁹).

¹³ NATO Forward Integration Units. NFIU perform CIMIC function, amongst others.

¹⁴ ATP-02 Naval Cooperation and Guidance for shipping (NCAGS) (feb 2017). Also, Ref C. 3-5 to 3-9.

¹⁵ FRONTEX, EUROCONTROL, EUROPOL and many others, both international and regional.

¹⁶ MARCOM delegated authority to FRONTEX, AIRCOM delegated authority to EUROCONTROL. Bi-SC Directive 086-003. Relations to non-military actors. C-1.

¹⁷ Joint Force Commander / Joint Task Force.

¹⁸ ATP-02 Naval Cooperation and Guidance for shipping (NCAGS) (feb 2017). 9.

¹⁹ Maritime / Expeditionary.

- (4) In the air domain, the AIRCOM provides the contribution to C3OE about the possible use of airspace by civilian aircraft, national and international agencies, governmental and non-governmental organizations, and other participating entities²⁰. At the operational level, this contribution is done through the Joint Air Component Command (JFAC).
 - (5) In the space domain, contribution to the C3OE is made through Space Situational Awareness (SAA) bearing in mind that some space based capabilities may be under governmental and even commercial governance or control, complicating planning and utilisation of space products or services (dual use)²¹. At operational level, the JFC/JTF will generally take advantage of the established available space-related capabilities with regard to the civil environment.
 - (6) In the cyber domain, the HN within whose territory an operation takes place, will require the utilisation by the forces and non-military actors of the civil CIS infrastructure and a contested electromagnetic spectrum²². As for cyberspace, it allows commanders to establish information links with civilian counterparts and other civilian audiences upon cyber-attacks. JFC/JTF J6 will provide the necessary assessments to feed the C3OE in support of the commander.
 - (7) The C2 structure for the operation will convey the channels through which this information will flow in order to achieve the necessary comprehensiveness of the civil environment for the commander (see TTP 2). In general, the channels through which this contribution can be conveyed are:
 - (a) Liaison Officers or teams deployed to the HQ JFC / HQ JTF by the Single Service Commands HQs to facilitate planning from the start of a crisis or conflict²³ (also see TTP 3 CIMIC Liaison).
 - (b) Functional relationships between J/X²⁴-9 directorates at the different levels of planning involved in the operation. These relationships can take place either directly or through CIMIC and CMI representatives at JOPG, at Joint/Tactical Operations Centres (JOC/TOC) and their J9 appointed personnel, or through CIMIC and CMI WGs.
- e. PMESII/ASCOPE system analysis methodology:
- (1) The C3OE uses PMESII²⁵ system analysis methodology, as the NATO standard²⁶. Furthermore, its use facilitates the analysis, treatment and sharing of information between different levels (vertically) and staff functions

²⁰ AJP 3.3. Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space operations (Apr 2016). 1-8.

²¹ *Ibid.* 5-3.

²² AJP-6 Allied Joint Doctrine form Communications and Information Systems (Feb 2017).C-1.

²³ Such as the Maritime and Air Command Coordination Elements (MCCE, ACCE) to a JFC.

²⁴ 'X' is an informal abbreviation to designate all Ground (G), Naval (N), Air (A) and, if appropriate, Staff (S) directorates of a tactical HQ.

²⁵ Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructural, Informational.

²⁶ AJP-5 EDA V2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Planning of Operations.

(horizontally)²⁷. According to this methodology, the OE is structured into the PMESII domains, areas or factors, which give name to the acronym^{28 29}:

- (a) **Political.** Any grouping of primarily civil actors, organizations and institutions, both formal and informal, that exercises authority or rule within a specific geographic boundary or organization through the application of various forms of political power and influence. It includes the political system, parties and main actors. It must be representative of the cultural, historical, demographic and sometimes religious factors that form the identity of a society.
 - (b) **Military.** The armed forces, paramilitary capabilities and supporting infrastructure, acquired, trained, developed and sustained to accomplish and protect national or organizational security objectives. This also covers the internal security aspects of a country.
 - (c) **Economic.** Composed of the sum total of production, distribution and consumption of all goods and services for a country or organization. It includes not only economic development of a country, but also the distribution of wealth.
 - (d) **Social.** The interdependent network of social institutions that support, enable and inculcate individuals and provide participatory opportunities to achieve personal expectations and life-goals within hereditary and nonhereditary groups, in either stable or unstable environments. It covers the social aspects such as religion, a society's structure, the legal and judicial system, policing and supporting infrastructure, humanitarian, history, etc.
 - (e) **Infrastructural.** The basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community, organization, or society. Includes logistics, communications and transport infrastructures, schools, hospitals, water and power distribution, sewage, irrigation, geography, etc.
 - (f) **Informational.** The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. Encompasses the information and communication media.
- (2) **ASCOPE**³⁰: It is an additional analytical methodology consisting of six factors that should be considered when conducting C3OE. It is typically used in conjunction with the PMESII; each of the PMESII domains can be cross-examined through the ASCOPE domains to produce a better understanding of the civil environment. ASCOPE places greater emphasis on the cultural

²⁷ The PMESII/ASCOPE system analysis method is also usually used for the description of countries (country books).

²⁸ AJP-2. 5-2. AIntP-17. JIPOE. 3-3.

²⁹ AIntP-17. JIPOE. Annex C offers a more detailed description of each of the factors.

³⁰ Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events.

and human part of the environment, and thus is more suitable for collection purposes³¹. The ASCOPE factors are³²:

- (a) **Area:** Area factor includes: districts, market places, picnic areas, irrigation networks, parks, squares, cities, and rural areas.
 - (b) **Structure:** Structure factor includes: prisons, police headquarters, banks, churches, courts, roads, cell towers, municipal buildings, supermarkets, and tollbooths.
 - (c) **Capability:** Capability factor includes; dispute resolution, recruiting, access, means of justice, maintenance, financing, governance, policing, and disaster relief.
 - (d) **Organization:** Organization factor includes: government organizations (GOs), NGOs, HN forces, bankers, religious leaders, builders, and criminal organizations.
 - (e) **People:** People factor includes: governors, HN security forces, bankers, gangs, and contractors.
 - (f) **Event:** Event factor includes: elections, kinetic events, drought, weddings, funerals, and festivals.
- (3) The relative importance of the factors is mission dependent. CIMIC personnel should determine, in close coordination with the intelligence branch and other relevant CMI contributors, which of those factors should be considered for planning purposes due to their relevance for the mission and availability of means to gather the information required. Special interest is required in the analysis of the civil environment with a hybrid adversary, as it will use unconventional means that mix amongst the civilian population. Knowledge developers should make sure that no factors or non-military actors are neglected in the overall assessment of the OE.
- (4) Annex C provides further PMESII/ASCOPE sub-domains to facilitate and standardize the analysis of all factors involved in an operation.

f. Critical Factors at Tactical Level:

- (1) Especially during the early phase of an operation, it is of utmost importance to identify problems that could have a direct impact on the execution of the mission. Most of them are related to basic needs of the population. There are five identified critical factors, which require thorough consideration, for a lack in this area will put an additional burden on the force. These factors are as follows:
- (a) Water
 - (b) Food

³¹ AJP-2 EDB V1. Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security.

³² AIntP-17. JIPOE. 3-3. A more detailed analysis can be consulted in its Annex D.

- (c) Health
- (d) Energy
- (e) Sanitation.

The Sphere Handbook can help in drafting assessment in these areas.

- (2) It is important to stress that not all of the above factors will be critical in all operations but are situation dependent. On the other hand, factors not included in this may be critical. A good example of this may be shelter that is likely to be critical in many humanitarian operations and in scenarios where large numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Refugees and Evacuees are present.
 - (3) The checklist at Annex C, provides a tool to assist CIMIC staff in the assessment of critical factors. It does not attempt to provide a fully comprehensive list but rather to act as a stimulus to assist when examining the factors.
- g. Factor analysis methodology:
- (1) The relevance of some factors over others is mission dependent. The CIMIC staff should determine, in close coordination with the intelligence branch and other knowledge developers, which of those factors are key due to their relevance for the mission and the availability of means to gather the information required. Special attention is to be given to the hybrid environment, to make sure that no factors or actors are neglected in the overall assessment of the civil environment.
 - (2) Factor analysis forms the basis of the analytical work within the JOPG or any other bespoke team analysis, and drives the thinking for the rest of the planning process of any activity. This requires specific techniques to better develop conclusions, within the broad operational environment and especially of the non-military actors, with their capabilities, requirements vulnerabilities and relationships to determine their impact on operational success. It considers the effects of the OE on the main actors as well as on NATO forces as they interact in time, space and the information sphere. The conclusions gained from this analysis are critical to setting the boundaries and the "realm of the possible" within which solutions must be developed³³.
 - (3) Throughout the planning process, and specifically in system analysis (determination of nodes and links), conclusions are more easily extracted using the three-column format³⁴, synthesizing the implications for the allied forces and the received mission or commander's needs. This analysis should focus on the implications to the mission.
 - (4) The information is organised in a Factor Analysis Summary Sheet shown on the figure:

³³ Ref A. 4-48.

³⁴ *Ibid.* 4-53.

<u>FACTOR ANALYSIS SUMMARY SHEET (three-column format)</u>		
<u>FACTOR</u> (What?)	<u>DEDUCTION</u> (So what?)	<u>CONCLUSION</u> (now what?)
A significant factual statement of information known to be true that has operational implication.	The implications, issues or considerations, derived from fact(s) that have operational significance.	The outcome or result reached that requires action in planning or further analysis.
1 <u>Factor #1</u>	<u>1.1 Deduction #1</u>	<u>1.1.1. Conclusion</u> <u>1.1.2. Conclusion</u> <u>1.1.3. Conclusion</u> <u>1.1.4. Conclusion</u>
	<u>1.2 Deduction #2</u>	<u>1.2.1. Conclusion</u> <u>1.2.2. Conclusion</u>
2 <u>Factor #2</u>	<u>2.1 Deduction #1</u>	<u>2.1.1. Conclusion</u> <u>2.1.2. Conclusion</u>

The numbering system helps convey visibility of the logic flow from factors to conclusions via deductions.

- (5) Once extracted, conclusions are to be directly linked with their specific use in the OPP or other planning assessments, to make sure they are conveniently conveyed further in the planning process through the said necessary logic flow. The figure below provides a listing of usual categorizations of conclusions along with their associated abbreviations³⁵:

³⁵ Most of the terms are defined in Ref A (3-51, 4-2, 4-63, 4-64, 4-123, K-1, L-12, L-13).

Conclusions from your factor analysis must advance the planning effort. Mark each of your conclusions with one of the following abbreviations. For Example:	
CC - Critical Capability	CCIR - Commanders Critical Information Requirement
CR - Critical Requirement (CoG)	A - Assumption
CR - Critical Requirement (CoG)	OR - Operational Risk
CV - Critical Vulnerability (CoG)	IR - Information Requirement
DC - Decisive Condition	OL - Operational Limitation
CE - Condition to be Established	ROE - Rules of Engagement
OE - Operational Effect	PS - Precondition for Success
OA - Operational Action	CRM - Crisis Response Measure
FC - Force Capability	C2R - Command & Control Requirements
CNMA - Complementary Non-military Action	SC - Strategic Communication
DP - Decision Point	Other

Due to the fact that this process is abstract in nature and thus subject to multiple cognitive biases, Annex D provides best practices and examples for its correct application.

- (6) Conclusions are further refined with the use of additional planning techniques (COG analysis, risk analysis, Ops Framework development, etc.) to more definitely determine if they are relevant for the overall plan.
 - (7) CIMIC personnel will focus on those conclusions which affect CIMIC function directly, cognisant that these will constitute the essence of the CIMIC contribution to the operation, and will guide the rest of planning and execution with regard to CIMIC.
- h. Center of Gravity (CoG) Analysis of non-military actors:
- (1) See AJP-5 Joint Doctrine for Planning of operations (B-1) and Ref. A.
 - (2) In the analysis of the civil environment, importance should be given to those non-military actors that can influence mission accomplishment. The CIMIC planner supports the development of CoG analysis of each of the non-military actors, based on the system analysis previously conducted in the C3OE. Other CIMIC personnel should also be able to follow the rationale used in it.
 - (3) See Annex E for an example of CoG analysis of non-military actors.

1-7 CIMIC CONTRIBUTION TO STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT AND OPERATIONAL/COMPONENT ESTIMATE

Ref. A (Phases 3 Operational Estimate and Phase 4 OPLAN Development).

Ref. B (Chapter 2 Operational and related Annexes B, CIMIC Estimate and C CIMIC input to an OPLAN).

- a. CIMIC contribution to the operational/component estimate (phase 3 of OPP) is of utmost importance, as it contributes to influence the operational/component solution from the start. Any consideration not included in the process, risks not being considered as important further in the operation.
- b. Most of the considerations done with regard to the CIMIC Command and Control relationships and troop-to-tasks analysis are mainly done at the strategic level. They are started in this phase linking further with CONOPS development. Due to the specialisation of the concepts involved, the whole issue is addressed in TTP 2 CIMIC Command and Control and Assets.
- c. **Design of CIMIC Concept**
 - (1) The design of the CIMIC concept is done under the understanding that planning until this moment has been predominantly a process of analysis, which is the process of separating the issue into its constituent elements, in order to understand them, into conclusions. The CIMIC concept on the contrary is that of a synthesis; a combination of components or elements to form a connected whole. The conclusions and products of planning have to concentrate in a few lines that really encapsulate what CIMIC is about in the operation, or how CIMIC supports the accomplishment of the mission as a whole. It should neither be too vague as to repeat doctrinal assumptions without really addressing the overall mission, nor be too concrete or focused in particular situations or phases as to loose scope. The configuration of the CIMIC concept has to logically flow from the planning products already developed by considering:
 - (a) Preconditions for success in the civil environment.
 - (b) Civil conditions to be influenced by CIMIC.
 - (c) Civil requirements to be supported/protected.
 - (d) Objectives and complementary non-military activity that impact own mission.
 - (e) How to best gain civil support by minimising unwanted effects on the civil environment and maximising support to the military effort.
 - (f) Civil capability gaps that might need to be –temporarily or permanently– filled by military capabilities.
 - (g) Requisites for transition.

The CIMIC concept constitutes the culmination of the CIMIC estimate, and determines the critical issues for inclusion in the next phases of the OPP.

- (2) A good approach to its design is to address it through blending the overall process of preparation-execution-transition of the operation with the three CIMIC core functions (civil-military liaison, support to the force, support to non-military actors and the civil environment), for the level of command considered (strategic, operational or tactical).
- (3) The CIMIC concept is intended to comprise just one paragraph, but other may be added to clarify and complement the main one, in secondary considerations.
- (4) Annex F shows an example of a CIMIC Concept development graph.

d. **The CIMIC related Effects Matrix**

- (1) NATO uses the estimate-based planning approach to articulate the commander's mission and objectives. Objectives are achieved through effects that bring about changes in the physical or state of a system, for example maintaining the support of a particular set of non-military actors for a particular course of action, or establishing freedom of action for a set of them in a Joint Operations Area (JOA) or Area of Operations (AOO).
- (2) Critical to CIMIC being effective is the need for commanders and staff to understand what CIMIC related effects can be generated, and that by integrating CIMIC activities they will achieve a desired outcome (to create a favourable and enduring situation). Planners should seek to combine CIMIC related effects with other physical and psychological effects as part of an integrated planning process. These will contribute to effective operational design and assist in generating the necessary decisive conditions and lines of operation in a commander's operation plan. The effects are registered in Annex OO of the OPLAN/OPORD (Operations Assessment).
- (3) The factor analysis will reach conclusions as previously shown, and this will trigger the specific CIMIC planning activity to identify CIMIC related effects, actions and tasks, and their follow-up and measurement.
- (4) These CIMIC related effects will determine the actions/activities to achieve them and will influence the Force Design to accomplish the tasks, based on the subordinate units (that can be specifically CIMIC or not) or at the operational level by other component commands or joint enablers.
- (5) There is a list of effect-related terms in Annex G.
- (6) While contributing to the operational/tactical estimate, CIMIC can develop an effects matrix³⁶ to help articulate the connection between objectives, desired effects, actors to receive the effects, means to produce the effects, and the measurement of effectiveness tailored for CIMIC purposes, as shown below. It includes Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)³⁷, as well as the CIMIC actions and tasks to produce these effects and their corresponding Measures of

³⁶ AJP- 3.19. Ch 3.

³⁷ Ref A. 5-3. A metric used to measure a current system state, for the purpose of operations assessment.

Performance (MoP)³⁸. The CIMIC related effects matrix is thus implemented as shown in the following template:

CIMIC and CMI EFFECTS MATRIX							
COMs objectives (Note 1)	CIMIC effects (Note 2)	Target groups /audiences (Note 3)	Measures of effectiveness (MoE) (Note 4)	Means (Note 5)	Actions (Note 6)	Measure of performance (MoP) (Note 7)	Who (Note 8)

The aim of the effects matrix is to list the desired CIMIC related effects, linking them to the commander's objectives in priority order. Identifying the activities/actions that will create the effects and how they can be measured and any coordination requirements with other functions.

- (a) Note 1. Commander's objectives as extracted from the operational design.
 - (b) Note 2. CIMIC effects relate to effects created in the civil environment/domain by CIMIC activities that contribute to the commander's objectives. (note: a CIMIC effect can contribute to several objectives).
 - (c) Note 3. Any interaction between a military force and the civil environment is an activity that will create a desired or undesired effect in the civil environment, namely groups or audiences to which they are directed.
 - (d) Note 4. The specific indicators that will show whether change has occurred in the group/audience.
 - (e) Note 5 .The selected unit/s or agents to convey the desired effect.
 - (f) Note 6: The actions or tasks intended to produce the effects.
 - (g) Note 7: The way to evaluate if the action has been performed as planned
 - (h) Note 8 The capability or function directed to collect the information to feed the MoE/MoP indicators.
- (7) The CIMIC planner has to give careful consideration to ensure that activities designed to create these effects can be accurately and effectively measured through MoE, MoP or normality indicators. Failure to do so may result in inaccurate assessments and may mean that less effective direction is given to subordinates and thus negatively impact the use of CIMIC capabilities.

³⁸ Ibid. A measure used to measure the accomplishment of actions.

AM 8 6-1-1

- (8) A CIMIC Data Collection Plan should be established to properly measure the actions, and/or properly requested through reporting during the execution of an operation (See Paragraphs 9 and 10 below).
- (9) Annex H shows an example of further templates involved in the practical implementation of this paragraph.
- (10) Planner should pay special attention for CIMIC to be properly recorded in Annex OO of the OPLAN/OPORD, so the contribution for the operation is clear and can further guide the planning and execution efforts.
- (11) Whilst any single action can be evaluated in terms of performance, a single effect is usually supported by several actions which quite often are joint actions. Therefore, the MoP which is linked to the single action can be evaluated also by the tactical level performing the action whilst the MoE is usually led by the Operational level and supported by the tactical level.

1-8 CIMIC and CMI CONTRIBUTION TO OPLAN DEVELOPMENT

- a. CIMIC contribution to OPLAN development is the packing of the consideration made in Ref. A and B, as well as in the previous paragraphs of this TTP in the OPLAN/OPORD. This paragraph only complements these references.
- b. As CIMIC has a leading role on CMI, Annex A provides a broad view list of the parts of an OPLAN that deal directly with civilian aspects of the operation, so consistency of the overall document can be better coordinated. CIMIC personnel can use it to coordinate cross-functionally to make sure that the OPLAN does not incur in contradictions or unnecessary repetitions.
- c. Having this in mind, the following guidance to convey CIMIC in the OPLAN:
 - (1) For clarity purposes, the main body of the OPLAN should only contain the essential CIMIC information that decision makers and main staff members (Commander, COS, other branches, unit commanders) need to know. This is so because due to an OPLAN extension, many non-CIMIC personnel will not necessarily consult Annex W CIMIC, although they certainly need access to it. Many of the inputs may only need to be direct references to Annex W, to be consulted if needed.
 - (2) The Annex W CIMIC must contain the information that all CIMIC personnel (and secondarily, CMI contributors) must know, especially in the subordinate echelons.
 - (3) Similarly, Appendixes to Annex W should contain the detail that is not to be kept in Annex W, for the sake of clarity.
- d. **Appendixes to Annex W CIMIC.**

Following Ref. A and B, Annex W CIMIC by default contains the following appendixes:

(1) **Appendix W-1 Civil Assessment:**

See Ref. A (C-3) and Ref. B (C-4).

- (a) Appendix W-1 to Annex W CIMIC of the OPLAN/OPORD will contain a description of the main features of the civil environment, relevant to the CIMIC and CMI for the operation. Although it is focused primarily on the influence of the civil environment on the force's mission, but also secondarily and to keep comprehensiveness and a CMI perspective, on more general aspects of the civil environment, with a view to support of the force to the civil environment.
- (b) It is a comprehensive description, synthesis of the main features conducive to the rest of considerations done in the Annex W CIMIC in particular, and for CMI in general. It focus on the Area of Interest or engagement space of the level of command considered (theatre, JOA, AOO, etc.).
- (c) The considerations made in Appendix W-1 must be harmonised with the considerations about the civil environment included in the paragraph 'Situation' of the main body of the OPLAN/OPORD, as well as with the rest of references to the civil environment in other annexes to the OPLAN/OPORD (see Annex C).
- (d) When the civil assessment is not large enough, it may be included as the paragraph 'Situation' of the Annex W CIMIC.

(2) **Appendix W-2 CIMIC C2.**

See TTP 2 CIMIC C2 and Assets.

(3) **Appendix W-3 Key Civil Organisations/Actors.**

- (a) This appendix is a list of relevant, authorised non-military actors, including a description of their aims, roles, responsibilities and mode of contact. The information to develop it is extracted from the conclusions from the C3OE and the PMESII/ASCOPE system analysis of the civil environment.
- (b) Appendix W-3 should be harmonised with the Liaison Coordination Matrix (LSM) of the OPLAN/OPORD (see TTP 3 CIMIC Liaison), and can be seen as a development of it for CIMIC purposes.

(4) **Appendix W-4 CIMIC sites of significance.**

- (a) A CIMIC site of significance (CSS) is a mainly civilian place, building or infrastructure of such value that if destroyed, damaged or in some way effected upon, either by adversary or own forces, it would potentially affect the mission negatively, and are thus subject to protection at the strategic, operational or tactical level considered. This consideration is done without prejudice with other protections, other than those related to the NATO operation, to which the site might be entitled to according to Law of Armed Conflict / International Humanitarian Law (LOAC/IHL).
- (b) The selected sites are eligible for special treatment and protection from the effects of combat by friendly forces, including own unintended

targeting actions, as well as from those of the adversary. The latter might target these sites to destabilize the society, such as stirring tensions, provoking awe, or affecting the welfare of the population.

(c) CIMIC sites are selected during the planning of the mission, and are reflected in Appendix W-4 of Annex W CIMIC. Each level of operations (strategic, operational, tactical) selects CIMIC sites of significance to their mission. Subordinate commands must always include the CIMIC sites of significance defined by the higher echelon, adding those that may be only significant at its own level.

(d) There are two distinct categories of CIMIC Sites:

- **Sites of Major CIMIC Significance (SMCS).** These sites are of such operational significance (for the entire spectrum of reasons) that if destroyed or damaged would either:

- Gravely undermine the forces or its related mission.
- Seriously threaten the post-operation recovery of the involved country.
- Inflict widespread and indiscriminate impact on key civil life support that would affect civil population.
- Affect the forces as a whole.

Typical SMCS are:

- Oil rigs, power plants/substations that can cause man-made disasters.
- Dams and reservoirs.
- Water treatment/processing and distribution plants/installations.
- Hazardous industrial or commercial installations (chemical, nuclear, etc.).
- Key historical cultural or religious monuments or sites (places of worship, museums, etc.).
- UNESCO sites, and sites specifically under the protection of LOAC/IHL.
- Locations of vulnerable populations (Internally Displaced Persons –IDP–, refugees, etc.).
- Prisoner of War (POW) Camps.
- Embassies, hospitals, schools.

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- Communications infrastructure (affecting all domains air and space, maritime, cyber,

SMCS are typically considered for inclusion in:

- Targeting activities: No-Target Lists (NTL),
- Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) activities: Critical Assets Lists (CAL).
- Coordination measures, such as No Fire Areas (NFA), Restricted Fire Areas (RFAs), and others.

- **Sites of CIMIC significance.** These are CIMIC sites considered to be of sufficient significance that their destruction or damage would either:

- Alienate smaller elements of the civil population.
- Limitedly impact on a civil population's key life support or governance.
- Affect the forces limitedly.

If not included as SMCS, typical Sites of CIMIC Significance are:

- Places of worship.
- Community based civil administration infrastructure (i.e.; town hall, community centres, etc.).
- Healthcare infrastructure (hospitals, clinics, emergency service capability).
- Water Sites (smaller scale distribution networks and infrastructure).
- Power (town/city power distribution lines).
- Sanitation (town/city sanitation processing capability).
- Cultural sites of historic or religious importance.

- (e) Targeting activities typically include SCS in no-target lists (NTL) or Restricted Target Lists (RTL).

(5) **Appendix W-5 CIMIC Reports and Returns.**

See TTP 4 CIMIC Reports.

1-9 CIMIC CONTRIBUTION TO OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT (OA)

- a. The contribution of CIMIC to the OA during the execution of an operation is guided by its inclusion in the decision cycle and battle rhythm of the HQ in which it conducts its assessment cycles. This is done mainly through cross-functional boards, working groups, etc.³⁹. In the battle rhythm CIMIC shares information and coordinates CMI activities with the rest of the HQ. SOPs and SOIs will implement the ways in which CIMIC contributes to the execution of operations.
- b. The aim of OA is to inform the commander if the operation is being executed as planned, and if the operation is achieving the desired results⁴⁰. OA uses a bottom-up approach, as opposed to the top-down planning process seen in previous paragraphs (See figure 1).
- c. Due to the broad common ground between assessments and reports in the scope of CIMIC contribution to OA, for the purpose of these TTP assessments are considered as one-time products, whereas reports are periodic. This paragraph deals with the specificities of CIMIC assessments only. For the sake of extension, CIMIC reporting has been secluded to TTP 4 CIMIC Reports and Symbols.




Figure 1. Overview of CIMIC flow of assessments and reports, and its relative importance for the command levels.

- d. The linkage between planning and executive actions needs to be stressed: there needs to be a continuity between the analysis done in the planning process (conducive to the development of the OPLAN/OPORDER), with the execution phase

³⁹ Ref D. 3-11 to 3-20.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 4-1.

of the operation. In order to enable such continuity, the CIMIC contribution to OA can follow two different schemes: overall or specific.

e. **CIMIC overview of civil environment**

- (1) CIMIC overview is overall assessment used at the different command levels (strategic/operational) during execution, to provide a broadest assessment of the situation of the civil environment in the JOA/AOO of an operation. This is to be seen as a continuation of the CIMIC assessment of the civil environment done in the OPLAN (Appendix W-1 to Annex W CIMIC; see previous paragraph 8.1). The difference of the assessment of the CIMIC directly related to the planning of the operation and that of reporting in execution is not conceptual but only of degree: deepness of system analysis, closeness to the problem, and moment in which it is conducted, amongst other differences.
- (2) CIMIC overview takes different visual or written formats, with varied degrees of extension, ranging from a visual synthetic assessment, point papers or deep dive studies, to a lengthy area studies. They could be:
 - (a) Bespoke, CIMIC standalone requirements by the command at a given moment of execution.
 - (b) Part of wider, cross-functional assessments, of which the CIMIC assessment is one amongst others.
 - (c) Included in CIMIC reports (see TTP 4 CIMIC Reports and Symbols).
- (3) The internal structure of CIMIC overview can also vary greatly depending upon the requesting body. However, it is usual for operational and tactical HQs to decide the general structure of the overview to properly convey information in an organised, coherent manner, within the direction received from the higher echelon. Different schemes of groups to convey information can be used (one of the following criteria, or a combination thereof):
 - (a) The objectives of the operation to which CIMIC contributes, including the decisive conditions, effects, actions, and their related measures of performance and effectiveness.
 - (b) The PMESII/ASCOPE system analysis categories (domains, areas and sub-areas), or a selection thereof, as the NATO standard cross-functional system analysis approach.
 - (c) The Lines of CIMIC activities adopted from the CIMIC estimate for the operation⁴¹.
 - (d) The three doctrinal CIMIC core functions (CIMIC liaison, Support to the force, Support to non-military actors and the civil environment)⁴².

⁴¹ Lines of CIMIC Activity trace the critical paths of CIMIC activities in their pursuit of the CIMIC objectives, and Provide a directional orientation of CIMIC activities of an operation. Ref. B. C-2.)

⁴² Ref. C. 2-5.

- (e) Geographical or political divisions within the JOA/AOO.
 - (f) In collective defence operations, the overview may be directed to depict the Seven Baseline Requirements (7BLR) for resilience through civil preparedness (RtCP).
 - (g) In crisis response operations (CRO), the overview may require specific groups that match the focus for CIMIC during the start of a Crisis Response Operations (humanitarian, stabilization, etc.), and its main themes (Return of DPRES, Humanitarian Aid, Reconstruction, Human Rights, etc).
 - (h) In any operation, for standardization of information with the civil environment (IO/NGO/HN), information may be organised following civil-based themes and standards such as the Sphere Project or others, as long as the civil perspective does not omit any relevant factor to the military domain.
- (4) These criteria can be combined to better convey information through paragraph, sub-paragraph, annexes and appendices. For example:
- (a) Paragraph by country, sub-paragraphs by PMESII, and Annex for 7BLR.
 - (b) Paragraph by CIMIC core function, sub-paragraph by UN-defined themes of the UN mandate.
- (5) The wider assessment that provides the best picture of the civil environment and is seen as a substantial starting point is the CIMIC Tactical Overview.

f. **CIMIC Overview**

- (1) This product provides a clear overview of the assessed situation across the AOR over CIMIC areas of tactical/operational interest evaluated using the PMESII/ASCOPE system analysis methodology (M – Military – has not taken into consideration because the need is to assess the “civil” environment). The standard format of the product is attached as Annex J.
- (2) The CIMIC Overview includes five domains with their areas and sub-areas and all of them represent the standard default information focus for CIMIC during Crisis Response Operations and Art. 5 Operations. The reporting domains might - based on the operation and the HQs SOPs - be reflected in the (CIMIC) Lines of Activity or separately. The system is flexible enough to be adapted to the specifics of any mission. By adapting the guidance sheets (see annex B) for the reporting areas, the reporting requirements of the Commander can be met. The five reporting domains (with areas and sub-areas) are:
 - (a) **P – Political:** Public Administration, Law Enforcement, Healthcare, Police System, Prison System, Borders and Customs, Civil Defense and Civil preparedness (CEP);
 - (b) **E – Economic:** Economy, Banking and Labour, Water, Food;

- (c) **S – Social:** Uncontrolled Large Scale Movements of Population, IDPs, Refugee and Evacuee Assistance Centres, Shelter, Humanitarian De-Mining, Vulnerable Population’s Protection Security;
 - (d) **I1 – Infrastructural:** Road Transport, Rail Transport, Air Transport, Maritime and Inland Waterway Transport, Energy, Sanitation, CIMIC Sites of Interests;
 - (e) **I2 – Informational:** Communication Infrastructure.
- (3) Should a formation see the need to report on another function that is not represented on the generic monitoring tool, an additional column should be used in the appropriate domain to record their concerns. CIMIC Sites, even if not present in PMESII/ASCOPE system analysis methodology areas, is part of Infrastructural domain because it is of outmost importance for the CIMIC assessment. The five Critical Factors are highlighted in order to pay special attention on them.
 - (4) CIMIC Tactical Overview also forms the basis on which the “CIMIIC Briefing Tool” is packaged. The latter represents one of the aids with which the J/X-9 CIMIC representative provides the commander with the CIMIC contribution during Situational Update Brief (SAB), Commander’s Update Brief (CUB) or for contingent needs.
 - (5) Refer to TTP 4 – CIMIC Reports and Symbols – for details regarding the description and construction of the CIMIC Briefing Tool (Paragraph 4.2.4).
 - (6) CIMIC Overview is also part of CIMIC Briefing Tool (CBT); see TTP4 – CIMIC Reports and Symbols, Paragraph 4.2.4.

g. CIMIC special interest assessment

- (1) The purpose of CIMIC Special Interest Assessment is to provide the commander with a means to examine the status of a specific Area of Interest (Aoi) or Area of Responsibility (AoR) situation in order to identify critical shortfalls or capability gaps in the civil environment that may affect his mission, or that of the opposing force or forces.
- (2) The actual ways of producing CIMIC Special Interest Assessment will vary according to the organisation in which the CIMIC is inserted (superior echelon reporting system, own TF task organisation and HQ structure, etc.). The main effort, however, will be to make sure that the assessment effectively addresses the CIMIC specific issues required by the commander of staff body requesting it.
- (3) The most important special interest assessment that must be produced since the first stage of deployment of a mission is the Village Assessment.


- (4) The NATO CIMIC handbook⁴³ provides several assessment report templates (in alphabetical order):
- (a) Agricultural production assessment.
 - (b) Civil-administration situation assessment.
 - (c) Education assessment.
 - (d) Energy assessment.
 - (e) Food processing assessment.
 - (f) Food sources consumption assessment.
 - (g) Healthcare assessment.
 - (h) Labour force assessment.
 - (i) Port assessment.
 - (j) Public communication civil information assessment.
 - (k) Sanitation assessment.
 - (l) Transportation assessment.
 - (m) Village assessment.
 - (n) Water and sanitation assessment.
- (5) Lastly, the civilian Sphere Handbook can also be useful to better understand the work of IO/NGO in the matter, thus creating synergies where possible. It is important to highlight that similar organization of the information and its measurement can greatly save resources and time to all stakeholders.

- h. **Seven Baseline Requirements assessments** In Art. 5 Operations, CIMIC assessment is packaged by evaluating the Resilience through Civil Preparedness (RtCP) of the country involved. RtCP is the individual and collective capacity to resist and recover from military, civil, economic or commercial shocks, absorb damage and resume function as quickly and efficiently as possible⁴⁴. RtCP is conveyed through three core functions:
- (a) Civil support to the military.
 - (b) Continuity of government.
 - (c) Continuity of essential services.

⁴³ Templates - CIMIC Handbook (cimic-coe.org)

⁴⁴ Draft J9 Initial Guidance for operationalisation of Resilience through Civil Preparedness in ACO, date 12 Sept. 2019. 1-3 (proposed definition).

- (2) These core functions are analysed through the Seven Baseline Requirements (7BLR) with the purpose of assessing resilience of NATO member states. The 7BLR are:
- (a) 1. Continuity of Government.
 - (b) 2. Resilient Energy Supplies.
 - (c) 3. Uncontrolled Movement of People.
 - (d) 4. Resilient Food and Water Resources.
 - (e) 5. Mass Casualties Management.
 - (f) 6. Resilient Civil Communications System.
 - (g) 7. Resilient Transportation System.
- (3) They provide a cross-functional lens to observe the civil environment and generate a comprehensive understanding based on the assessment of military requirements. The Resilience assessment is conducted in close coordination and under the responsibility of the national authorities of the Host Nation(s).
- (4) At strategic and operational levels, assessment is done from peacetime in order to update advanced planning arrangements that seek understanding of the civil environment prior to a crisis. These assessments are done both in the framework of a planning process leading to issuing or updating a plan (Crisis Response Plan, CRP, Contingency Plan COP, or others) or during the conduct of an operation to assess the TF commander's or his staff's requirements. These assessments use the PMESII/ASCOPE approach adapted for RtCP purposes. Annex A relates these factors with the 7BLR.
- (5) The perspective of the tactical level is to provide "real time" or "ground truth" information, building direct relationship within HN functional specialists for civil emergency response activities and maintaining a pulse on key functions of the civil environment, normally through the deployed NFIUs and/or liaison structure of an operation.



1-10 NORMALITY INDICATORS

- a. Normality is the quality of being normal⁴⁵, which is commonly understood as conforming to a type, standard, or regular pattern, characterized by that which is considered usual, typical, or routine. Normality can vary between different societies or groups, with time, place and situation.
- b. Normality indicators must be taken into consideration to assess changes in the civil environment. To this end, CIMIC personnel identifies, based on superior echelon guidance and own knowledge of the area (own capability to recognize, “with the boots on the ground”, what is normal) which are the Normality Indicators so that significant changes in normal life that can represent a problem for local people and can hamper the mission, can soon be recognized. Reciprocally, the impact that the presence of military contingents have on social life should also be taken into consideration.
- c. In Art. 5 Operations, since the HNs remain responsible for sustaining the basic needs of the population, CIMIC personnel will usually receive guidance on the normality indicators about the local culture and population behaviours. CIMIC personnel can then translate or adapt that information into mission-specific aims, if adequate.
- d. Nevertheless, and unless stated otherwise for a particular operation, CIMIC personnel should use the metric for standardisation purposes, to assess current status of each of the normality indicators, as depicted coding as depicted in TTP 4 CIMIC Reports and Symbols. These indicators can also be used, in a general way, to measure progress through MoE or MoP or to assess the impact of the civil environment on the key conditions for the accomplishment of the military mission.
- e. Due to its inherent need to work with non-military actors, it is useful for the CIMIC personnel to be conversant with the Sphere Handbook⁴⁶, a standardised civilian reference for assessing the civil environment in a humanitarian crisis environment. It provides the minimum standards (key indicators) needed to leave with dignity for

⁴⁵ Merriam-Webster Dictionary. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/normality>.

⁴⁶ The Sphere Handbook – Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response – ed. 2018. <https://spherestandards.org/handbook-2018/>.

a given situation. It is a guide with the aim to improve the quality of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement humanitarian responses. Its understanding and translation into the military arena can greatly improve the interrelation between both bodies.

1-11 HUMANITARIAN ASSESSMENT BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

- a. CIMIC personnel, as the main interface between the military forces and non-military actors, can add value to the military forces by creating synergies in assessment by understanding and, wherever possible and convenient, share assessment methods with the international community with which the operation will be planned and executed.
- b. In this regard, assessment methods are not unified in many cases, and specific coordination is needed with each of these organizations. However, there are two main efforts of standardization in the civil environment with regard to civil assessment, that may be of help to CIMIC personnel in CROs:
 - (1) **United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) and its Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)**⁴⁷. They provide a humanitarian needs assessment framework, within their planning process under the term *programme cycle*. They also hold an indicator registry for humanitarian needs.
 - (2) **The Sphere Project**⁴⁸. Launched in 1997 by a group of humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, The Sphere Project is an initiative to define and uphold the standards by which the global community responds to the plight of people affected by disasters, principally through a set of guidelines that are set out in the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (commonly referred to as the *Sphere Handbook*).
 - (a) Sphere is three things: a handbook, a broad process of collaboration, and an expression of commitment to quality and accountability. Of special interest for the CIMIC planner and operator is how to read these standards.
 - (b) The standards are organized in five (5) large chapters:
 - Minimum Standards Common for all sectors, which mainly address how responders should work and organize themselves.
 - Minimum Standards in Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion.
 - Minimum Standards in Food Security, Nutrition and Food Aid.

⁴⁷ <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/>

⁴⁸ <https://spherestandards.org/>.

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- Minimum Standards in Shelter, Settlement and Non Food Items.
 - Minimum Standards in Healthcare Services.
- (c) The standards are defined as qualitative in nature and specify the minimum levels to be attained. For each standard, a set of Key Indicators is defined, which are 'signals' that show whether the standard has been attained. They provide a way of measuring and communicating the impact, or result, of programs as well as the process or methods used. The indicators may be qualitative or quantitative.
- (d) CIMIC provides the commander an assessment on capability gaps in the civil arena. To allow coming to a comprehensive assessment it is vital that CIMIC staff and CIMIC personnel in the field uses the same indicators as the humanitarian community, which can easily be accommodated to the PMESII/ASCOPE scheme depicted in Annex B. This is of utmost importance during all phases of the operation to address the needs efficiently.

CHAPTER 2 CIMIC ASSETS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL (TTP 2)**REFERENCES**

- A. ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive v. 3.0, dated 15 Jan 21.
- B. ACO CIMIC Functional Planning Guide, dated 20 Jul 22.
- C. Bi-SC Capability Codes and Capability Statements, dated 22 Jan 20.
- D. (NR) ACO Forces Standards Volume II – Land Forces, dated 02 Aug 21.
- E. (NR) ACO directive 090-098. Implementation Directive. Generating Joint Command and Control Capability from the NATO Force Structure, dated 08 Apr 13.
- F. (NC) 080-096 NATO Response Force, dated 24 Nov 2016.
- G. (NR) ACO Directive 080-020 Allocation of Forces and Transfer of Authority, dated 05 Jun 12.
- H. AJP-3 EDC V1. Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, dated Feb 19.
- I. AJP-3.19 - Allied Joint Doctrine for CIMIC, dated 09 Nov 18.
- J. Bi-SC 086-003 Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) And Civil Military Interaction (CMI) Directive, dated 09 Jan 19.
- K. MNCG Operational Concept 2022 edition.

2-1. INTRODUCTION

- a. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) 2 is a subset of TTP 1 “CIMIC Assessment” inasmuch as the Force Generation (FG) is part of the planning process referred to in the latter. However Command and Control (C2) and organizational considerations are better described in TTP 2.
- b. SHAPE is the main force generator and it is at this level that most of the decisions are taken, in close coordination with the Nations, regarding CIMIC composition and C2 relationships of a Joint Task Force (JTF) for an operation. Furthermore, SHAPE provides directions, guidance and support to the JTF Headquarters (HQ) in J/X499 planning and execution throughout the operation⁵⁰.
- c. NATO will use CIMIC assets allocated for operations within the NATO Response Force (NRF) package according to a pre-defined C2 relationship. Adding to it, the planning process of a specific operation has to identify further CIMIC requirements, and assign them to meet the requirements at all levels. Subsequently, it has to establish appropriate C2 structures and reporting chains compliant with the principles of NATO C2.
- d. Some C2 considerations cannot be adequately described in this TTP due to the classification of some of their aspects. Thus CIMIC personnel might need to consult the documents in reference to have a clearer understanding of the matter.

2-2. AIM

- a. This TTP provides CIMIC personnel with the basic knowledge about the NATO default C2 arrangements with regards to CIMIC capabilities during both planning

⁴⁹ 'X' is an informal abbreviation to designate all Ground (G), Naval (N), Air (A) and, if appropriate, Staff (S) directorates of a tactical HQ.

⁵⁰ Ref. E. 13.

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and execution of NATO military operations in any theatre at strategic, operational and tactical levels of command.

- b. It also provides a general description of the Multinational CIMIC Group (MNCG) and standardized CIMIC Units, in order to provide planners with guidance on CIMIC force generation.

2-3. **SCOPE.** This TTP defines the default C2 relationships and CIMIC organizations for a standard Joint Task Force (JTF) of a NATO operation. It provides common terminology to facilitate understanding and default arrangements for operations. This TTP requires working knowledge of the documents in reference, and does not re-state policies or doctrines.

2-4. **CIMIC CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT**

Ref. A. Force Generation 3-115 to 3-124.

- a. CIMIC assets are to fulfil the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) to meet the NATO Level of ambition (LoA) for an operation. Therefore, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), the Initial Follow-on Forces Group (IFFG) and Follow-on Forces Group (FFG) will embed their own CIMIC capabilities and assets with given Notice to Move (NTM) for deployment⁵¹.
- b. Once a clear picture of the Operating Environment (OE) is available and a thorough analysis of the mission has been done, the needs for CIMIC assets are defined through the CJSOR and other related documents, which are developed simultaneously with the Concept of Operations (CONOPS).
- c. The CJSOR is harmonized with the Operation Plan (OPLAN). It includes the level of command authority to be transferred to the designated NATO commander for each capability⁵². Nations and the Multinational CIMIC Group (MNCG) will confirm the participation of their assets during the FG. The CJSOR is reflected in Appendix C-2 to Annex C "Forces and Effects of the OPLAN of the JTF"⁵³.
- d. Furthermore, a Theatre Capability Statement of Requirements (TCSOR) will identify the CIMIC capabilities required for the entire Theatre based on troops-to-actions analysis and is approved at strategic, operational, and tactical levels⁵⁴.
- e. The Statement of Requirements is expressed in modular Capability Codes and Capability Statements (CC&CS) that provide a common language for capabilities⁵⁵. CC&CS include the definition to a certain level of the CIMIC capabilities of the forces to be employed (HQs, formations down to battalion level) and the statement of the capabilities of CIMIC assets. Although these are provided by different Nations during FG and they are often different in size and structure, they must comply with the CC&CS.

⁵¹ Ref. F. 5.

⁵² AJP 5. 4-41.

⁵³ Ref. A. C-1.

⁵⁴ AJP 5. 4-22.

⁵⁵ Ref. C. 1.

2-5. TYPES OF CIMIC ASSETS

- a. In every mission there will be a requirement for CIMIC assets to enable the commander to plan, conduct and assess CIMIC activities which will help achieve operational effects in support of the mission. CIMIC contribution to NATO operations will be achieved through CIMIC staff operating at all levels of command, CIMIC assets at operational and tactical level and CIMIC functional specialists. CIMIC staff composition as well as CIMIC forces' size and organization will be tailored to the mission and will have to be adaptable as the overall situation evolves⁵⁶.
- b. Despite the variety of national CIMIC assets in size, structure and naming, they meet NATO agreed Capability Codes and Capability Statements (CC&CS)⁵⁷. CIMIC assets can also be multinational, due to the possibility of them being formed by personnel coming from different nations (agreements between several nations, augmentation, etc.).
- c. The CC&CS related to CIMIC assets are:
 - (1) CIMIC Theatre Element (CIMIC TE), employed at operational and theatre level.
 - (2) CIMIC Units (CIMIC UNIT), employed at tactical level.
- d. CIMIC assets can be supported by Subject Matter Expert on special areas of expertise such civil administration, civil infrastructure, economy and commerce, humanitarian assistance, and cultural affairs⁵⁸. The associated CC&CS is CIMIC Functional Specialist.
- e. CIMIC assets are listed in Appendix C4 "Allied Disposition List (ADL)", Annex C "Forces and Effects" of the OPLAN for the operation and are defined by:
 - (1) The related capability code.
 - (2) The respective higher commander (receiving command).
 - (3) The level of command authority with which they are transferred (see paragraph 7).
 - (4) The Commander's Required Date (CRD) for transfer, and other additional data.
- f. CIMIC assets must be fully integrated into the battle rhythm and other processes of the TF or formation in all phases of an operation. To allow the Commander making the best use of them, the necessary authority should be granted by the offering nation, considering also the impact on the mission of possible caveats.
- g. CIMIC assets within NRF are divided in echelons (1st, 2nd, etc.) that deploy with the VJTF, IFFG or FFG in different phases. These assets are transferred through a TOA according to their deployment orders.

⁵⁶ Ref. I. Section 4 Assets and C2 relationships.

⁵⁷ See Ref. C for full capability descriptions.

⁵⁸ See Ref. C for details

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h. The default attachment of CIMIC staff elements, assets and FS is the following:

Level	CIMIC HQ directorate	CIMIC SE	CIMIC TE	CIMIC BN	CIMIC COY	CIMIC PLT	CIMIC TST	CIMIC FS
JTF	J9	X	X	X				X
LCC	G9	X	X	X				X
Corps	G9	X		X				X
Division	G9	X			X			X
Brigade	G9 / N9	X				X		X
Battalion	S9					X	X	X
Company	SO / SA / FS						X	

i. All levels of command from battalion upwards must be capable of establishing CIMIC centres⁵⁹ (See TTP 5 CIMIC centres).

(1) **CIMIC Theatre Element (CIMIC TE).** See ref C (p. 142).

- (a) The CIMIC TE or CIMIC Joint Element is a theatre-level combat support asset belonging to the Joint Theatre CIMIC Troops⁶⁰ of a JTF. Its responsibility extends to the whole of the JOA and focus on the execution of CIMIC/CMI tasks at the joint operational level. In case of activation of several JOAs it must be decided whether to employ one CIMIC TE for the entire Theatre of Operations or assign one CIMIC TE for each JOA.
- (b) Ideally, the CIMIC TE is transferred from the TCN OPCON to the JTF commander, via SACEUR. The JTF commander may reassign it as a whole to the Component Commands (CCs) or temporarily or permanently assign separate units under TACON to subordinate commanders in order to support the manoeuvre units with CIMIC tasks⁶¹.
- (c) Its composition is tailored for the operation, but must be interoperable with other theatre elements and CIMIC assets in the theatre.
- (d) NATO's CIMIC TE *par excellence* is the MNCG (see paragraph below).

(2) **CIMIC Unit (CIMIC UNIT).** See ref C (p. 141).

⁵⁹ Ref. C.

⁶⁰ At the same level as the Theatre LCC, MCC, ACC, Cyber, SOF, JLSG elements, and others.

⁶¹ Within limitations described by Ref. G Annex D.

- (a) A CIMIC UNIT is identified as a generic CIMIC asset which executes CIMIC/CMI tasks and activities in support a specific land or amphibious formation at tactical level. It has to be capable of carrying out the three CIMIC core functions⁶².
 - (b) Following delegation of authority, CIMIC UNITS may be reassigned to the different levels of command as they best support the accomplishment of the mission, throughout its different phases. They execute CIMIC tasks assigned by the Commander of the respective Area of Responsibility (AOR) under the direction and guidance of J/X-9 directorates and/or CIMIC SE.
 - (c) Size and structure of a CIMIC UNIT may be tailored considering:
 - Operational needs depending on the mission and the environment.
 - C2 structures and integration of enablers.
 - TCN policy, national caveats, doctrine and structure, as long as they are compatible with NATO policy and doctrine.
 - (d) Adding to the specified statements of capabilities, a CIMIC UNIT must also be able to:
 - identify local informal leaders and facilitate/establish liaison with them if required.
 - contribute to the visibility and legitimacy of the Force among the population.
 - identify, prioritize and propose CIMIC activities and projects to be executed whenever specific funds and resources are made available.
 - establish and operate CIMIC centres⁶³.
 - (e) Ranging from battalion to team, the Annex to this TTP further develops the type of CIMIC UNITS at different levels.
- (3) **CIMIC Task Force (CIMIC TF).**
- (a) A Task Force is a temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed to carry out a specific operation or mission⁶⁴.
 - (b) In the scope of NRF C2 structure, the JTF/LCC commander may form a CIMIC TF by task organising CIMIC units from NATO Nations under

⁶² Ref. I. Chapter 2, section 4. Civil-military liaison, support to the force and support to non-military actors.

⁶³ At Brigade and unit level, in the scope of their CIMIC units. See Ref. D. B-20.

⁶⁴ NATO agreed term.

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a centralised HQ for the purpose of carrying out specific CIMIC functional area task⁶⁵.

- (c) A CIMIC TF is not a CIMIC asset on its own, as it is not included in Ref. C as such.

2-6. CIMIC Staff Element (CIMIC SE).

- a. While "element" is not a NATO defined term, and it is used with various meanings throughout NATO doctrine, CIMIC SE refers the following definition of (staff) element: *an organization formed around a specific function within a designated directorate of a JTF HQ*⁶⁶.
- b. Thus, CIMIC SE of a HQ supports CIMIC/CMI under the lead of the J9 directorate. Therefore, CIMIC SE is not a capability by itself, but it is an enabler of the HQ and it is subject to the C2 of the HQ itself, as an integral part of it.
- c. CIMIC SE is tailored to the level and entity of the operation, and can be extracted from a HQ of the NCS, or for smaller operations⁶⁷ from a NFS HQ.
- d. CIMIC SE can also be augmented/supported by other CIMIC assets (CIMIC TE, CIMIC UNIT), by FS or by augmentees from the MNCG or the Troop Contributing Nations (TCN). This implies that C2 arrangements have been agreed with the offering organizations.

2-7. CIMIC FUNCTIONAL SPECIALISTS (CIMIC FS). See Ref C (p. 143).

- a. CIMIC FS provide expertise in specific civil functional areas to CIMIC assets. They may be civilians or reservists from the pool of civilian expertise at SHAPE, the NATO COMPASS mechanism or other sources. They can support with their expertise from outside the area of operation⁶⁸.
- b. CIMIC FS provide a pool to augment Brigade (BDE) HQ and CIMIC UNITS⁶⁹.

2-8. CIMIC C2 RELATIONSHIPS.

- a. C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission⁷⁰. In particular, the levels of authority of C2 are general statements which define the commander's capacity to assign missions/tasks and control assigned Units. C2 includes the responsibility for effectively using available resources to achieve the desired outcomes (see command levels of authority for operations in Ref. H (from 1-39 to 1-42) and Ref. E. Annex D).
- b. NATO C2 relationships are established during Baseline Activity and Current Operations (BACO) and Civil-Military cooperation is included. MARCOM and AIRCOM have, as domain advisors, delegated authority to liaise with civilian

⁶⁵ Ref. F. 15.

⁶⁶ Ref. H. 3-16.

⁶⁷ Ref. E. 5.

⁶⁸ Ref. I. 4-11.

⁶⁹ Ref. D. C-14.

⁷⁰ Ref H. 1-22.

organizations of their respective domain. The designated JFC/JTF will consider this delegated authority when establishing own C2 relationships in the maritime and air domains⁷¹. In particular, in the maritime environment at strategic and operational level, the MARCOM Naval Shipping Centre has the overall responsibility to SACEUR for all Alliance Naval Coordination and Guidance System (NCAGS) tasking and activities, which greatly overlaps with naval CIMIC function. At tactical level, the Maritime Component Commander (MCC) executes NCAGS functions⁷².

- c. Once the CIMIC assets have been established in the CJSOR/TCSOR, their C2 relationship needs to be defined. This is one of the outcomes of the planning process. In broad terms, the appropriate CIMIC C2 structure will be defined during the planning phase of an operation at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This C2 structure is reflected in Annex B Task Organisation and Command relationships to the OPLAN, and more specifically in Annex W CIMIC, Appendix W-2 CIMIC structure.⁷³
- d. As part of the Force Generation Process, CIMIC assets and FS are transferred from the nations to SACEUR primarily under Operational Command (OPCOM) or Operational Control (OPCON) through the Transfer of Authority (TOA)⁷⁴. Levels of authority can be delegated further down as specified in the relevant OPLAN/OPORD. Furthermore, CIMIC assets can be assigned Tactical Command (TACOM)/ Tactical Control (TACON) to another HQ. Finally, forces under TACOM or TACON can be further delegated under TACON.
- e. The specific C2 arrangements and options for employment for MNCG are stated in Ref K.
- f. In all cases, ACOS J9 of the JFC/JTF acts as the Coordinating Authority (CA)⁷⁵ over CIMIC assets across all components.
- g. The levels of authority of CIMIC assets have to be considered together with the Logistic Control (LOGCON) and Administrative Control (ADCON) relationships for them, most of which are retained by the nations⁷⁶, as well as the bilateral arrangements between the TCN and the HN in this regard.
- h. The formatted message of the Transfer of Authority (TOA) specify all the necessary details, including national caveats and limitations, for each transfer. The process is undone through the Reversed TOA (RTOA)⁷⁷.
- i. During the planning phase of an operation, the deployment of the Operational Liaison & Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) of a JFC/JTF may give additional opportunity to develop C2 requirements including CIMIC C2 relationship. The OLRT incorporates CIMIC elements in its mission of liaising and gaining early, first hand situational awareness in theatre from a wide range of sources and agencies⁷⁸. The

⁷¹ Bi-SC 086-003 Civil Military Cooperation and Civil Military Interaction Directive (09 Jan 19). Annex C.

⁷² ATP 02 NCAGS. 14.

⁷³ Ref. A. C-1.

⁷⁴ Ref. G. D-1-1.

⁷⁵ Ref. G.

⁷⁶ Ref. G.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* E-4.

⁷⁸ Ref F. 14. Also, see Ref. B for more details of employment.

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deployment of the OLRT takes place, when many important aspects of the operation are not yet decided. This stresses the importance of understanding its C2 relationship with the operational HQ that deploys it. The NRF C2 arrangements at the operational level provide direction in this regard.

- j. In the scope of Article 5 operations and NRF, coordination relationships are to be defined between the JFC/JTF, the Multinational Divisions (MND) and the NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU) within the JOA, especially at the inception of an operation. These helps the joint CIMIC function in the accomplishment of the assigned tasks⁷⁹.

2-9. **MULTINATIONAL CIMIC GROUP (MNCG).** See Ref. K. Chapter 2 Command and Control.

- a. The MNCG, based in Motta di Livenza (Italy), is a NATO Affirmed force to SACEUR⁸⁰. It is the main provider of CIMIC assets to a JTF or its subordinate formations in accordance with the standing MoU⁸¹. This document defines MNCG as: *a dedicated CIMIC capability to engage as directed in CIMIC activities, and to support during operations the chain of command to which is or may be assigned from SHAPE (Strategic Level) to Joint HQ (Operational level) and down to Brigade (Tactical Level), to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and serve as an essential forum for CIMIC consultations and as a centre of expertise for CIMIC related matters.*
- b. SHAPE appointed the MNCG as custodian of the CIMIC TTPs (AM 86-1-1).
- c. MNCG will be OPCON to SHAPE or a JTF, following statements in Ref. K, and the particular C2 arrangements for the operation.
- d. In the execution phase of an operation, MNCG or its generated tailored CIMIC asset can be further assigned from Joint HQ (operational level) down to Brigade Command (Tactical level).
- e. The MNCG is formed by:
 - (1) MNCG HQ staff (-) at regimental level (Commanded by an OF-5).
 - (2) One (1) HQ Company.
 - (3) A number of CIMIC UNITs and CIMIC FSs from the MNCG participating nations.

⁷⁹ (NR) ACO Directive 080-104 NFIU. A-4-1.

⁸⁰ Ref. K. 12.

⁸¹ Memorandum of Understanding between the MoDs of the Italian Republic, the Hellenic Republic, Hungary, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia and SHAPE, ed. 2022, concerning the establishment, financing, administration, manning and status of Multinational CIMIC Group HQ.

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f. MNCG is capable of:

- (1) Supporting up to one (1) major operation (MJO) as a CIMIC TE or CIMIC GRP with the support of the participating nations in rotations of more than six months.
- (2) Sustaining long-lasting operations as a diminished CIMIC GRP(-) in support of its parent HQ in the JOA/AOR through a CIMIC TE or a CIMIC UNIT. CIMIC GRP(-) can perform the same CIMIC tasks as the entire MNCG, but relies for logistic and CIS support from the parent HQ.

g. Lastly, other complementary ways of providing CIMIC capabilities to a JTF or its subordinate commands or units is by:

- (1) Augmenting the CIMIC SE.
- (2) Organising a CIMIC TE.
- (3) Organising one (1) or more CIMIC UNIT(s) at the tactical level.
- (4) Augmenting the CIMIC UNITS on the operational or tactical level with CIMIC FS⁸².

⁸² MNCG does not have a cadre of permanent FS. They are to be assigned from MNCG participating nations, on request.

CHAPTER 3 - CIVIL-MILITARY LIAISON (TTP 3)**REFERENCES**

- A. ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive Interim version 3.0 (COPD V 3.0), dated 15 Jan 2021.
- B. ACO CIMIC Functional Planning Guide (FPG), dated 20 Jul 2022.
- C. AJP-3.19 - Allied Joint Doctrine for CIMIC, dated 09 Nov 2018.

3-1 INTRODUCTION

- a. Liaison is defined as⁸³:

“The contact, intercommunication and coordination maintained between elements of the military and/or other non-military actors to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action”.

- b. It is one of the joint staff functions⁸⁴, and includes military-military as well as civil-military liaison. This Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) document will however only refer to the latter.

- c. Civil-military liaison is one of the three core functions of CIMIC as a Joint function⁸⁵ with the aim to:

*“establish and maintain liaison with non-military actors at appropriate levels. It is facilitating interaction, harmonization, information sharing and supporting concerted or integrated planning and conduct of operations”.*⁸⁶

- d. Early and continuous liaison will be a key part of the planning and enables the other CIMIC core functions. For this aim, CIMIC establishes a liaison structure.
- e. Furthermore, being a cross-functional facilitator of Civil-military Interaction (CMI), CIMIC uses its liaison structure for CIMIC and CMI purposes.

3-2 AIM

The aim of this TTP is to provide principles, guidelines and tools to implement military liaison with non-military actors by CIMIC and CMI personnel, in the planning and execution of NATO operation or exercise at the strategic, operational and tactical level.

3-3 SCOPE

- a. This TTP requires working knowledge of the reference documents, and re-states no policy or doctrine. It develops CIMIC and CMI liaison from the references, provides common terminology to facilitate understanding and default arrangements for operations.

⁸³ NATO Term.

⁸⁴ AJP-3 EDC V1. Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations 4 (Feb 19). A-8.

⁸⁵ Ref. C. 2-5.

⁸⁶ Ref. C. 2-5.

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- b. This TTP is mainly directed to CIMIC personnel in the development of its function, but may also be of help for other military personnel taking part in CMI activities.

3-4 PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL-MILITARY LIAISON

The following principles apply to liaison:

- a. **Right level and competence.** Civil-military liaison can provide the commander with visibility and thus receive support from the civil environment. In order to achieve that, liaison should address the right actors at the right level. It should also be seen as a credible source of information, be capable of reaching solutions and provide advice at the appropriate level to the non-military actors. In addition to that:
 - (a) Some high level civil bodies (e.g. ministries, governors, embassies) might require a high-ranking, experienced officer in order to be accepted;
 - (b) Liaison personnel must be conversant to speak with authority on relevant subjects, and have cultural awareness to facilitate engagements.
- (1) The appointment of personnel must take into account the context of the operating environment and possible biases of interlocutors, including cultural awareness competency, ethnicity, religious affiliation, nationality, political perceptions, race, gender and knowledge of Host Nation's (HN) history, language, customs and traditions.
- (2) Also, knowledge and understanding of civil organizations' missions, mandates and key activities, will help the liaison officer to establish the most appropriate approach to the non-military actors.^{87 88 89}
- (3) Liaison must be competent to the level of command that exercises it: Strategic, operational or tactical.
- e. **Continuity.** It takes time to cultivate trustworthy relationships between military and non-military actors. To this end, a degree of continuity facilitates mutual knowledge, trust and understanding. The military need to learn and understand the organizational structure of the non-military actors, their planning and decision-making processes, as well as their motivation. Non-military actors should be made aware of how effective liaison with the military can benefit their aims and goals.
 - (1) Liaison personnel should be assigned to their tour of duties for at least six (6) months or even longer. A suitable handover needs to be conducted to allow

⁸⁷ The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) issues a guide for military personnel that can be useful to better understand the UN civilian approach to their concept of Civil-Military Coordination (CM-Coord.): The UN-CM Coord. Guide for the Military 2.0. Open link at: [Guide for the Military v2.pdf](https://www.unocha.org/guide-for-the-military) (unocha.org).

⁸⁸ AJP 3.4.3 *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance* Ed A Vers. 1 (Oct 15) provides in its Annexes A to C useful information about the most usual civilian organizations, their basic aims and characteristics.

⁸⁹ In the Maritime environment, the main merchant shipping civil actors are described in ATP-02 NCAGS. Annex 1A

the transfer of valuable information and to preserve knowledge and personal acquaintances.

- f. **Bi-directional exchange of information.** To be effective, civil-military liaison must establish and sustain a fruitful exchange of information. It is important to be able to provide non-military actors with an appropriate level of assessment of the military perspective on common areas of interest, within the bounds of military security. This may include overviews of the security situation, the availability and usability of lines of communication, weather information or other mutual areas of interest. In each case, the information released to the civilians should be current, relevant and context-specific.
- (1) The authorisation to release information takes place under a need-to-know basis, and is regulated through NATO Security Policy for Information and Intelligence sharing (I&IS) to support operations and exercises⁹⁰.
 - (2) When liaising with a HN, the exchange of information should be backed by the Status of the Force Agreement (SOFA), Status of Requirements (SOR), or other means⁹¹.
- g. **Avoidance of duplication.** Non-military actors tend to have a structured approach to areas of responsibility through coordination mechanisms that are always context specific (e.g. the UN OCHA cluster system).
- (1) Repetitive approaches from different vertical levels of the military for the same information should be avoided. In this regard, the establishment of a liaison and coordination structure accepted by both the military and civilian communities minimizes interference, by providing a clearly defined and accessible structure.
 - (2) On a horizontal level, reciprocal liaisons between a military and a non-military organization may take place through the exchange of Liaison Officers (LO), one coming from each side. In order to avoid duplication, coordination between bodies is required. Typically, each liaison primarily follows the needs and priorities of the parent organization that detaches him/her.
- h. **Respect for Host Nation**⁹²: To the extent that NATO forces' presence is predicated on host nation consent, liaison must address domestic law and customs and the status of the force. In Article 5 operations, in which the HN is a NATO member, liaison is to be expected to take place only through HN institutions or channels explicitly approved by the HN. Typically, LOs only present their credentials to the body that the HN approves (HQ, unit, etc.).

3-5 CIMIC LIAISON CAPABILITY

In order to enhance the CIMIC Liaison capability, the following resources are required:

⁹⁰ See Document AC/35-D/1040-REV6 Supporting Document on Information and Intelligence Sharing with Non-NATO Entities (NNE). Annex 1. Appendixes 3 to 6.

⁹¹ AJP-4.3. Edition A. Version 1. Allied Joint Doctrine for Host Nation Support (HNS). 11-12.

⁹² Ref C. 1-9.

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- a. **Policy, doctrine and concepts.** Including those of the external bodies to liaise with, and a thorough understanding of the functioning of the organization (unit, HQ) that establishes the liaison.
- b. **The understanding and will to use doctrine and concepts.** Through education (specific CIMIC Courses), training (exercise participation), area expertise (induction training) and the necessary evaluations thereto.
- c. **Physical resources** in the form of selected, trained and competent CIMIC personnel. Who possess general (age, sex, etc.), military (rank, maturity, etc.) and personal skills, qualifications and knowledge, including the relevant working languages. Details are to be properly described in the job description of personnel involved in liaison. Liaison may also need to work through interpreters (see Annex O CIMIC Operators Guidelines for working with Interpreters).
- d. **Appropriate logistic support, equipment and infrastructure to ensure communication.** The equipment should be mission tailored and able to move to communicate effectively with all relevant partners. The following resources are deemed necessary:
 - (1) **Communications:** meeting attendance, visits, contacts, access to CIMIC centres, corporate email, access of open sources (e.g. humanitarianinfo.org, reliefweb.int, Humanitarian Kiosk app, Humanitarian ID, etc.), as well as collaborative tools (such as *Google Drive*, *WebEx*, etc.). If physically detached from HQ/CIMIC asset, LO should be self-sustaining through stand-alone means, such as Wi-Fi router, modem or satellite communications, thus not having to rely on host units or non-military actors. Some communication means might be provided by the non-military actors, if required.
 - (2) **Working documents:** CIMIC LO-reports (see Annex M) and databases ("Point of contact - database", see Annex N), business cards, etc.
- e. Liaison can be achieved through the following means, or a combination of:
 - (1) Direct personal contact by representatives of the liaising bodies (meetings, visits, etc.).
 - (2) Telecommunications means (bespoke systems, internet, mobile, VTC, etc.).
 - (3) Appointed LOs.
 - (4) CIMIC centres (See TTP 5).

3-6 CIMIC and CMI LIAISON STRUCTURE

- a. CIMIC liaison is **regularly conducted at political and strategic level** along with Peacetime vigilance and enhanced vigilance activities. At strategic level, NATO's Political Affairs and Security Policy Division and the Operations Division (IS-PASP/IS-OPS) retain overall responsibility for all liaisons with non-military actors. These liaisons also include those with civilian actors in the maritime, air, space and cyberspace domains.

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- b. **Also, in the scope of Art. 5 planning, regular liaisons are conducted through the Multinational Divisions (MND) and the NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU) with some HNs**, with regards to Resilience through Civil Preparedness (RtCP).
- c. Any other type of civil-military liaison may be established only when specific “Direct Liaison Authorised” (DIRLAUTH) for an operation is granted, by the relevant authorities⁹³.
- d. CIMIC/CMI liaison structure is a product of the planning estimate at the different strategic, operational and tactical levels. The reference documents and TTP 1 CIMIC assessment, together with TTP 2 CIMIC Assets and Command and Control, provide the necessary background to understand the inception of that structure. In this regard, J/X-9⁹⁴ CIMIC identifies the relevant non-military actors in JOA/AOO and plans a liaison network based on the context of the civil Operating Environment (OE). Furthermore, it facilitates the establishment of other liaisons in the scope of CMI.
- e. In the scope of enhanced NATO Response Force, the first liaisons of an operation may be conducted through the Operational Liaison & Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) of a Joint Force Commander (JFC) / Joint Task Force (JTF). The OLRT incorporates CIMIC elements to gain early, first hand situational awareness in theatre from a wide range of sources and agencies⁹⁵.
- f. In the maritime environment at tactical level, civil-military liaison takes place through the Maritime Component (MCC) CIMIC Staff and through the NATO Shipping Centre (NSC) personnel, who liaises with the shipping industry throughout the Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) organization and the Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System (AWNIS), during BACO. Deployed NCAGS Elements (DNE), may include LOs embarked on-board a merchant ship⁹⁶.

3-7 THE CIMIC and CMI EXTENDED LIAISON MATRIX (ELM)

- a. The CIMIC and CMI liaison structure is best conveyed through an ELM devised to assess cross-functional liaison responsibilities with the civilian environment at different levels of command. It has the purpose of ensuring that exchange of information with the non-military actors is efficient and complete, thus addressing the right actor on the right level. It also assigns liaison responsibilities and prevents duplication of efforts.
- b. J/X-9 is a major contributor to the ELM. This contribution is merged with other contributions from the HQ and it is reflected in the Operational Plan (OPLAN) or Operations Order (OPORD). This will typically be in Appendix B-4 Liaison to Annex B “Task Organisation and Command Relationships” and is formally called the Liaison and Coordination Matrix (LCM). When necessary, CIMIC-specific

⁹³ (NR) ACO Directive 080-020 Allocation of Forces and Transfer of Authority. 05 Jun 12. C-2, and TTP 2 CIMIC Assets and C2.

⁹⁴ 'X' is an informal abbreviation to designate all Ground (G), Naval (N), Air (A) and, if appropriate, Staff (S) directorates of a tactical HQ.

⁹⁵ Ref F. 14. Also, see CFPG for more details of employment.

⁹⁶ ATP-2 Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS). Edition (D), Version (2), dated Sep 18. 17.

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considerations may be reflected in Appendix W-2 "CIMIC structure" to Annex W "CIMIC", as well as in other annexes of CMI contributors.

- c. The operational and tactical level HQs receive the LCM with the OPLAN of the higher level of command. The Extended Liaison Matrix (ELM) is further developed to reflect liaison responsibilities and actors in detail adequate to the level considered. The CIMIC staff in consultation with higher and subordinate HQs should prepare the ELM. In the maritime environment, Engagement Matrix and Contact lists are also used⁹⁷.
- d. The complexity of the ELM is mission-dependent and is designated to adequately support the accomplishment of commander's objectives. It should be reviewed and updated to reflect the developments in the civil OE accordingly.
- e. Annex L provides an example template of an Operational LCM and a ELM more focused on the tactical level.

3-8 CIMIC LIAISON OFFICER (LO)

a. General

- (1) In order to inform the CIMIC activities and to ensure the proper coordination and prioritization of tasks, one of the main ways to convey liaison is to appoint specifically designated LO to relate with non-military actors in the JOA/AOO. The CIMIC LO is the trademark of the unit of origin to those actors. The main function is to serve as the focal point of contact (POC) in the scope of CIMIC and CMI.
- (2) CIMIC LO is hierarchically subordinated to the J9 CIMIC staff directorate, or from the CIMIC assets, depending on the specific role assigned to the LO (see TTP 2 CIMIC assets and C2).
- (3) When organizational, administrative or logistic reasons demand that several LOs be based in a physically separate location from their HQ/CIMIC asset, they can be grouped in a Detachment Liaison Officer (DLO) or in Liaison Teams (LT)⁹⁸.

b. LO tasks, activities and guidelines

Based on the key principles of civil-military liaison, the liaison officer should be prepared to implement the following guidelines, tasks and activities:

- (1) **Promote** unity of purpose, **coordinate** and **help to de-conflict** activities between liaising bodies.
- (2) In accordance with the mission (OPLAN/OPORD, FRAGO, other orders), the LO **establishes and maintains routine approved contacts** and ensures effective and constant communication with non-military actors.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ ATP-2 Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS). Edition (D), Version (2), dated Sep 18. 17.

⁹⁸ NATO Terms.

⁹⁹ See Annex A of Ref. C for a comprehensive list of non-military actors.

- (3) **Identify and reach all approved non-military actors.** LO establishes a liaison network by contacting the established non-military actors (e.g. the theatre representative of UN OCHA), regularly attends their coordination meetings and assess attendance by military personnel of the appropriate rank or function, as required. He/she sets proper conditions to be invited to the civilian-led fora.
- (4) **If appropriate, establish the first contact with non-military actors.** In some contexts, this first contact might need to be established through a specific lead agency (e.g. for humanitarian actors through UN OCHA). The CIMIC liaison officer has the necessary knowledge and understanding of the civil environment to gain the most appropriate access to non-military actors for other branches of the HQ and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), in direct application of CMI (e.g. legal advisor (LEGAD), political advisor (POLAD), logistics, medical, etc.).
- (5) **Approach non-military actors with dignity and respect.** Assume that non-military actors are well versed in their respective fields of expertise, and that they conduct independent assessments on their own. While the focus of their assessments may differ from those required by the military, it is nevertheless of great value to engage them and consider their assessments a possible relevant contribution to the military assessment process.
- (6) **Maintain close contact and build up a good working relationship** with the relevant non-military actors. The relationship between CIMIC liaison officers and non-military actors should be positive, sensitive, polite, respectful, open-minded, credible, flexible, patient, transparent, communicative, influential and proactive. He/she should also be trained in negotiation techniques and avoid personal projection of political views or personal preferences, that may negatively affect the link, and be aware of media developments that can affect his/her tasks.
- (7) **Maintain, expand and update the point of contact POC-list** (see Annex N). This list is based on the CIMIC liaison assignment and the extended liaison matrix (ELM), and is paramount for a successful handover with relieving LOs. It is the most accurate description of the liaison network.
- (8) **Exchange verified and releasable information** with non-military actors on security matters. LO must have sufficient and updated knowledge about own force activity (as long as releasable), location of insecure areas, population movements, destroyed areas, presence of landmines/unexploded ordnance (UXO) sites, etc., in order to properly exchange information with the non-military counterparts.
- (9) **Identify key capability gaps** in the civil environment that might impact the mission, or that can render advantages thereto. Based on the civil proposals and own assessment, recommend possible solutions to deal with gaps, convey opportunities and bring it to the attention of the appropriate directorates in the HQ through the J9 CIMIC directorate or CIMIC asset. In Article 5 operations, due respect to HN assessments must be paid.

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- (10) **Provide regular CIMIC updates** to the parent HQ J/X-9¹⁰⁰ to contribute to situational awareness, including information consolidated from the CIMIC centres and CIMIC teams, if necessary. Liaison activity uses CIMIC LO-report format (see Annex M).
- (11) **Contribute to assessments** on the civil environment by the parent HQ/CIMIC Asset, either for the planning or the execution of operations.
- (12) **Act as single contact point** for the represented body within the assigned tasks, to avoid lack of coordination and poor image at the represented non-military actor.
- (13) **Be aware of other liaison officers'** and CIMIC units' activities, as directed in the OPLAN/OPORD. If a situation arises where a conflict of interests is foreseeable, the CIMIC liaison officer seeks de-confliction through the chain of command.
- (14) **Promote commander's intent and master messages** according to strategic communications (StratCom, INFOOPS, etc.). The CIMIC liaison officer may have to propose, prepare and help to organise visits by the commander to the bodies the LO liaises with.
- (15) **Be capable of working through interpreters**, due to the different languages and dialects of the area. When using interpreters, their loyalty/background and the increasing complexity of communication via an interpreter have to be taken into account. Interpreters have also to be trained prior to their employment, to get used to the military behaviour and expectations. They have to be pre-briefed upon a meeting and de-briefed afterwards in order to get information that goes beyond the spoken words (see Annex O CIMIC Operators Guidelines for working with Interpreters).
- (16) **Be capable of using appropriate mediation and negotiation techniques** (see Annex P Negotiations and Mediations Guidelines).

3-9 CIVILIAN LO IN NATO HQ

In the scope of Article 5 operations and civil preparedness management, CIMIC staff at the strategic, operational and component levels of operations has to be prepared to receive LOs/elements from UN and EU agencies, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and others who have a role to play in coordinating civil-military interactions in civil emergencies¹⁰¹.

¹⁰⁰ 'X' is an informal abbreviation to designate all Ground (G), Naval (N), Air (A) and, if appropriate, Staff (S) directorates of a tactical HQ.

¹⁰¹ ACO Directive 080-090 Civil Preparedness Management. 06 May 21. Page 7.

CHAPTER 4 CIMIC REPORTS AND SYMBOLS (TTP 4)**REFERENCES**

- A. AJP-3 Edition C Version 1. Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations. Feb 19.
- B. AJP-3.19. Allied Joint Doctrine for CIMIC, dated 09 Nov 18.
- C. APP-11 Edition D Version 1. NATO Message catalogue. June 2015.
- D. Bi-SC Directive 80-3. Reporting Directive Volumes I to V. 1999.
- E. APP-6 Edition D Version 1. NATO joint military symbology. Oct 17.

4-1 INTRODUCTION

- a. Reporting is the mechanism of providing information with predetermined formal messages, insofar the receiving entity may analyse, assess and process, if required. The receiving entity is normally of a higher hierarchical status than the reporting entity.
- b. While the terms report and message¹⁰² may be used synonymously, this Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) document leaves aside the formal characteristics of messages as such, and focuses on reports, understood as detailed accounts or statements, made known to the proper authority.
- c. A report contains a complete set of data relating to a particular strategic, operational or tactical Information Exchange Requirement (IER), which determines its aim. The timely and succinct reporting of the IER provides critical support to the decision-making process. The determination of IER is a top-to-bottom hierarchical process, where higher echelons declare the IER for the directly dependent bodies. The lower echelons provide the IER with not only the objective facts, but also an assessment of priorities, successes and concerns of the signing authority¹⁰³.
- d. Due to the much common ground between assessments and reports (the use of both terms is often interchangeable), this TTP is a continuation of TTP 1 CIMIC assessment, especially with regard to the conduct of operation's phase, in which reports largely take place. The considerations regarding the key characteristics of assessments are also applicable to reports (see TTP 1 paragraph 4). While reports are periodic, assessments are one-time documents.
- e. CIMIC staff will continuously monitor the civil environment to estimate/assess the current situation and the impact on the operation. Information is received from different sources and must be evaluated and standardized by CIMIC staff and assets, distributed throughout the chain of command.
- f. The reporting mechanism must match the chain of command. That is why TTP 4 is linked with TTP 2 - CIMIC Assets and Command and Control.

¹⁰² NATO agreed term.

¹⁰³ Typically the Commander (COM), Chief of Staff (COS), ACOS J/X-9 or a CIMIC asset commander, depending on specific delegated authority for the operation.

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4-2 **AIM**

- a. The aim of this TTP is to provide guidance to CIMIC personnel on the CIMIC contribution to the routine Report and Return (R2) system of any HQ or formation, in NATO operation or exercise at strategic, operational and tactical levels.
- b. In addition, this TTP explains the use of the military map symbols in operations, either on physical or digital maps.

4-3 **SCOPE**

- a. This TTP focusses on the content of CIMIC reports, both internal (briefing the Commander, Chief of Staff or other functions) and external (to higher echelons, side formations, etc.).
- b. It does not cover the reports that CIMIC personnel may have to do which are not CIMIC related such as EVENTREP, CASEVAC, INCSPOTREP, after action report (AAR), etc..

4-4 **GENERAL ASPECTS OF REPORTING (CIMIC R2)**

- a. See Refs C and D for general aspects of NATO agreed formatted messages and reports.
- b. The CIMIC reporting requirements are determined in a top down approach by the highest HQ of the operation and reflected in the appropriate OPLAN/OPORDER. The main effort is not to report facts and figures, which are of course also needed, but to provide an assessment on the situation at each level. This requirement is reflected in the generic CIMIC reporting format, the CIMIC REPORT, attached as Annex W. While receiving all CIMIC Reports, the higher HQ composes an overall picture that will be made available for subordinate HQs as feedback (Return).
- c. As a general rule, when preparing a report, the general structure must be kept, even if no relevant information exists within a heading, field or set of fields. Conversely, if a new heading is needed to meet an IER, it can be created. This rule sets a balance between the need for standardization in reporting and flexibility. The "Appendix Q-6 - Format Message Traffic" of "Annex Q - Communications and Information Systems" of the OPLAN/OPORD, depicts the R2 system¹⁰⁴.
- d. Appendix Q-6 lists the IERs for an operation, based on agreed formatted messages. Appendix Q-6 reflects all the cross-functional reports for the operation, as well as the reports to be submitted to the higher echelon. Annex Q shows an example of a periodic message scheme (type, frequency and other aspects of the reports to be submitted). During the conception of this R2 scheme, CIMIC can offer its advice. However, reporting may need to start prior to the formal start of operation, due to early deployment of an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) in preparation of the operation (also see TTP 1 CIMIC Assessment and TTP 3 Liaison).
- e. There needs to be continuity between the analysis produced during the planning process (conducive to the development of the OPLAN/OPORDER), with the execution phase of the operation. With regard to the design of the content of the

¹⁰⁴ ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive V 3.0 (COPD V 3.0), dated 15 Jan 21, page C-3.

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different reports of this TTP, this process is called “reporting group configuration”, with the aim of organising the conveyance of information to fulfil each IER.

- f. The relevant reports for the joint function CIMIC can be divided in two broad categories: those to which J/X-9 contributes as a staff function (but do not own), and those led by J/X-9 staff.

4-5 CIMIC contribution to general reports

- a. CIMIC operational/tactical reporting will be tailored to the Battle Rhythm (BR) of the HQ. Frequency and focus areas of the CIMIC reporting will be mission-dependant.
- b. BR allows R2 coordination and coherence.
- c. CIMIC personnel must support the drafting of reports owned by other functions, in which CIMIC inputs are required. CIMIC contribution to non-CIMIC specific reports may take the form of overviews of the civil environment. For general guidance of these overviews, see TTP 1 CIMIC Assessment (paragraph 9.1). Furthermore, the inclusion of these overviews is developed in the next paragraph of this TTP.
- d. The main non-CIMIC specific reports CIMIC personnel will deal with are:

(1) Commander’s Assessment Report (ASSESSREP)

- (a) See TTP 1 CIMIC Assessment for general guidance, and especially with regard to the use of Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) and Performance (MoP).
- (b) ASSESSREP¹⁰⁵ is used by a commander to inform superior commanders about the situation/operations in his/her Area of Operations (AOO) to provide his/her assessment on the overall situation and his/her intended or recommended actions. It is normally released after an assessment cycle of the reporting formation.
- (c) CIMIC, as facilitator of Civil-Military Interaction (CMI), has the responsibility to contribute to the assessment of all the PMESII/ASCOPE domains.
- (d) Annex R provides the general structure of ASSESSREP.

(2) Situation Report (SITREP)

- (a) SITREP is used to make routine reports or to report unexpected changes to the current situation of the reporting HQ or formation¹⁰⁶. The SITREP covers key events, operations and activities in the JOA/AOO for an established time period of usually 24 hours. Joint Operations Centre (JOC) / Combined Joint Operations Centre (CJOC) / Operations Centre (OPSCEN) / Tactical Operations Centre (TOC)

¹⁰⁵ Ref C. Annex ASSESSREP.

¹⁰⁶ Ref C. Annex SITREP.

have the responsibility for the drafting; usually J/X-9 will contribute to the HQ SITREP by including the previous 24 hours situation.

- (b) Annex S provides the general format of a SITREP. Due to the relevance of the land environment to CIMIC and the specific reference to the civil environment on it, the SITREP (LAND) format is also included¹⁰⁷.

(3) **Situation Assessment Brief (SAB) and Commander's Update Brief (CUB)**

- (a) Although not included in Ref. C as NATO-agreed structured reports, SAB and CUB deserve to be mentioned in this TTP due to the fact that CIMIC staff usually attends both SAB and CUB. They can adopt written or visual formats.
- (b) The SAB is an update to the commander on short-term operations assessments. It is conducted on a regular basis and covers:
- Past activities (typically the last 24 Hrs).
 - Future activities (next 24-96 Hrs).
 - Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).
 - Updates from Component Commands (including CIMIC Theatre Element).
 - Any other relevant topics.
- (c) No formal decisions of the commander are expected out of SAB, but COM or COS may issue guidance on topics covered.
- (d) CIMIC contribution to the SAB is given by J/X-9 CIMIC representatives at the JOC/TOC. CIMIC staff will brief according to the commander's direction and guidance, always on matters of its competence and about three main topics:
- Relevant incidents/developments.
 - Overall overview of the civil environment situation, either in general or relevant to the mission. The use of dashboards may be useful to this aim (see annex Y).
 - Main current relevant issues.
- (e) The CIMIC Staff Officer, prior briefing at the SAB, will have to consider:
- topics that require the commander's attention and might have significant impacts on the mission;

¹⁰⁷ ATP-105 Edition A Version 1. Land Operational Reports. Jan 21. Page 112.

- previous knowledge of commander and staff, to avoid repetition; and
 - time available for briefing.
- (f) He/She can explain using pre-formatted slides or tools too, or part of them, like the CIMIC Briefing Tool (CBT) (see Paragraph 4.2.4).
- (g) Annex T provides a concise example of CIMIC contribution to SAB, tailored for collective defence purposes.
- (h) The CUB is similar to SAB in purpose and structure, but not specifically related to operations.

(4) **Periodic Mission Review (PMR) report**

In long lasting operations, PMR is drafted to report to the superior echelon the overall progress assessment on the mission. It usually covers a period of several months or even a year. There is not any agreed format for PMR, nor a format of the CIMIC contribution to it, but it can be considered a longer term version of ASSESSREP.

4-6 **CIMIC specific reports**

- a. Although specific to the CIMIC function, CIMIC personnel must always be aware that reports are signed or validated by the commander, unless formally or informally delegated to a lower authority. Also, bearing in mind that CIMIC is the main contributor to cross-functional CMI, prior coordination is required to produce a sound assessment or report.
- b. CIMIC-specific reporting addresses higher HQ IERs through vertical and horizontal information exchange on CIMIC activities and their effects between all the HQs, formations, and CIMIC assets that develop CIMIC function¹⁰⁸. CIMIC reporting is key to synchronizing military and non-military activities. Information generated at the tactical level may reach the highest strategic level. Possible SOP/SOIs may further standardize and provide guidance for the preparation of these messages.
- c. The format of CIMIC-specific reports may be tailored for purpose at the different levels (strategic, operational, and tactical), but common structure (paragraphing, annexes and appendices) must be maintained to facilitate the management of CIMIC information between relevant stakeholders, both horizontally and vertically, without disfiguring or neglecting the initial IERs. This standardization also ensures clarity and speed of processing of the information, while respecting each echelon's own IERs for their subordinate formations. Also, the coordination of information with non-military actors, within own aims, can help create synergies in info gathering and analysis, benefitting from those actors' experience in the treatment of mainly civilian-originated information.

¹⁰⁸ Such as the Component Commands (CC), the Multinational CIMIC Group (MNCG), the Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG) and others. For complete relation of capabilities conducting CIMIC function at operational and tactical levels, see Bi-SC Capability Codes and Capability Statements, dated 22 Jan 20. This should follow the control arrangements reflected also on "Appendix W-2 CIMIC Command and Control" to the "Annex W CIMIC" of the OPLAN/OPORD for the operation (See TTP 2 CIMIC C2 and Assets).

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- d. CIMIC-specific IERs not covered in Appendix Q-6 of the OPLAN/OPORD are covered in "Appendix W-5 - Reports and Returns" to "Annex W - Civil-military cooperation". This appendix is directed for CIMIC personnel and can be then best used to provide the subordinated echelons with further guidance for the reporting required.
- e. CIMIC reporting, intended for subordinate formations to collect, analyse and report IERs for the higher echelon, should constitute a clear and concise collection of reporting groups, not necessarily linked with system analysis done at superior levels. In all cases, the clear configuration of reporting information is a responsibility of the higher echelon at each level of command, and can be changed as the execution of the operation gives rise to new informational needs, and renders useless others.
- f. **Civil-Military Cooperation Report (CIMICREP)**
- (1) CIMICREP¹⁰⁹ is the most relevant CIMIC-specific report. It is the only one mentioned in Refs. C and D. Considerations of the previous paragraph fully apply to CIMICREP.
 - (2) The purpose of CIMICREP is to keep commanders periodically informed about CIMIC matters which affect, or could affect, capabilities and/or operations. The CIMICREP is a tool to inform the higher echelons about past, current, and future CIMIC activities, plans, events, as well as concerns and assessments on the possible impact of the civil environment on operations.
 - (3) Due to the wide array of operations in which NATO can participate, CIMICREP does not have a universal format. However, to convey information in a coherent manner, the configuration of the reporting groups can be done following the guidelines established in TTP 1 CIMIC Assessment with regards to CIMIC overview of civil environment (paragraph 9.1), as well as for CIMIC special interest assessments (paragraph 9.1.2).
 - (4) CIMICREP is a combination of a CIMIC overall assessment, followed by specific CIMIC assessments relevant to the mission, and other aspects of the civil environment.
 - (5) CIMICREP is organised as follows:
 - (a) header;
 - (b) main body;
 - (c) Paragraph 1. Executive Summary;
 - (d) Paragraph 2. Civil overall situation;
 - (e) Paragraph 3. Assessment by Reporting Groups;
 - (f) Paragraph 4. Detailed Areas of Interest;

¹⁰⁹ Ref C. Annex CIMICREP.

- (g) Paragraph 5. Other issues (if necessary);
 - (h) Paragraph 6. List of annexes (if necessary);
 - (i) Paragraph 7. Signatures;
 - (j) Annexes/appendices (if necessary).
- (6) When specific assessments need to be included in the CIMICREP separated from the main body, due to their size, classification or other reasons, additional annexes and/or appendices may be added (e.g. a list of uncommon acronyms is added to help the reader).
- (7) The following annexes facilitate the implementation of what stated above:
- (a) Annex U depicts an example and provides guidance of CIMICREP reporting groups based on a PMESII/ASCOPE system analysis approach;
 - (b) Annex V provides a basic format and guidance to writing CIMICREP;
 - (c) Annex W provides an example of CIMICREP configuration;
 - (d) Annex X provides an example of CIMICREP at Operational Level and Art. 5 operations.

g. Other CIMIC-specific reports

Although not reflected in Refs. C or D, other useful CIMIC-specific reports are:

- (1) **CIMIC liaison report:** See TTP 3 CIMIC Liaison Officer Report;
- (2) **CIMIC project report:** See TTP 6 CIMIC Projects.

h. CIMIC Overview

This is a tool to provide a visual overview of the key areas of CIMIC interest within the civil environment in a given Area of Interest (AOI). It uses colour coding and a traffic light system that categorises areas of interest in order to provide a broad assessment of the situation. It can be attached to the CIMIC REPORT. It is well explained in TTP1 – CIMIC Assessment, Paragraph 9.1.1.

i. CIMIC Briefing Tool (CBT)

- (1) This product consolidates the information provided through the CIMIC R2 and presents it in a structured manner that reflects the commander's requirements. The standard briefing will provide a broad overview for the commander on the key areas of operational interest within the civil environment and identify key concerns and capability gaps. This will be supported by an overall assessment by the CIMIC staff of the formation, which frames the information in context and provides advice as required. However, as already said, it shall be noted that every commander and any specific mission may determine different briefing requirements and formats.

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It represents one of the aids with which the J/X-9 CIMIC representative provides the commander with the CIMIC contribution during Situational Update Brief (SAB), Commander's Update Brief (CUB) or for contingent needs.

- (2) It is normally composed by three slides with which assessment is showed, except for the last two slides, by the traffic light system. The first slide makes up the "CIMIC Overview":
 - (a) **Slide 1:** CIMIC Overview.
 - (b) **Slide 2:** Summarises key operational risk(s)/concern(s);
 - (c) **Slide 3:** Provides an assessment placing the information previously shown and any other available to CIMIC staff in context with the military situation and delivers appropriate recommendations.
- (3) Annex Y provides CBT slides.

j. **CIMIC Data Base**

Having an accurate and relevant data base with all the pertinent Points of Contact (PoC) and all the related information is basic to perform needed liaison. It is equally important to have an orderly collection of all assessments produced and above all Village Assessments. It is critically important to keep it up to date. A dedicated database could be set up by the highest HQ of the operation for every operation and a CIMIC staff or unit could be given the responsibility to maintain this database for the lifecycle of the operation. This entity could also be responsible for the quality control of the displayed information.

4-7 **CIMIC SYMBOLS**

CIMIC personnel and other CMI contributors use the symbols related with their joint function as represented in Ref. E.

a. **Frame shape or affiliation**

- (1) See Ref. E (6-3) for frame shape or affiliation description.
- (2) As the majority of symbols relating to CIMIC involve civilian population and objects, the default recommended affiliation used is "neutral".

b. **Symbol management**

- (1) SHAPE J9 is responsible for relevant and agreed symbols to be reflected in Ref. E.
- (2) J/X-9 staffs are responsible for understanding and using the standardized symbols in digital and physical means of their concern.
- (3) GeoSpatial sections at strategic, operational and tactical levels are responsible for the application of symbols in their products, both digital and physical.

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c. **Non-military actors' symbols**

- (1) When interacting with non-military actors under a comprehensive approach, CIMIC personnel should be able to understand non-military actor's symbols, in order to better engage with them, as well as explaining the use of NATO military ones when necessary.
- (2) In this regard, most civil organizations align to the UN symbols system¹¹⁰ for representing their activities. Further guidance can be found on UN Guidelines on Field Map Production¹¹¹.

d. **Additional symbols**

- (1) J/X-9 staffs are responsible to propose new symbols to better reflect the civil environment, when needed. Creation of additional symbols is a responsibility of the relevant GeoSpatial Staff for that specific operation.
- (2) Symbols that are not represented in Ref. E, but can enhance the visual understanding of the civil environment, can be provisionally created in the NATO Common Operating Picture (NCOP) at the various levels of command, with a view to incorporate them in the future to Ref. E.

E. **Standard CIMIC colour coding**

- (1) A standardized colour code ("Traffic Lights System") allows for an easier and quicker understanding of assessments and reports.
- (2) CIMIC personnel are to use the following symbols with the following broad categories meaning:

	RED	CRITICAL STATUS
	AMBER	LIMITED STATUS
	GREEN	NORMAL STATUS
	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN STATUS. CIMIC staff may use it if the information requested is not available or is doubtful.

- (3) The letter within the circle allows for visualization in black and white printing.

¹¹⁰ <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/world-humanitarian-and-country-icons-2012>. Retrieved 15 Nov 21, 11; 19.

¹¹¹ <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/applications/tools/document/guidelines-field-map-production-and-dissemination>. Retrieved 15 Nov 21, 11; 19.

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(4) These indicators can be combined with arrows to indicate overall trends:



IMPROVING



STABLE



WORSENING / DETERIORATING

(5) This code is to be used to display the CIMIC perspective, although other arrangements for conveying information may be established.

CHAPTER 5 - CIMIC CENTRE (TTP 5)

REFERENCES

- A. AJP-3.19 - Allied Joint Doctrine for CIMIC, dated 09 Nov 2018.
- B. Bi-SC Capability Codes and Capability Statements, dated 22 Jan 20.

5-1 INTRODUCTION

- a. The term “centre”¹¹² is sometimes used in NATO to designate cross-functional integrating organizations. A CIMIC Centre is both a concept and a facility. The concept makes it a valuable tool in support of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) / Civil-Military Interaction (CMI), and the facility creates a suitable location for CIMIC and specifically CMI activities. The CIMIC Centre as a concept was also often an integral part of Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) set-up and finds its ideas at joint and high tactical level interagency centres.
- b. A CIMIC Centre is an important tool for the military force to attain a direct relationship with the civil environment and its actors. A well-positioned and well-resourced CIMIC Centre can be a valuable tool in support of force protection and acceptance.
- c. A CIMIC Centre must be mission tailored. It is more likely to be established in a failing state during a stability operation, than in a NATO collective defence operation.
- d. Establishing a CIMIC Centre must be a well justified decision by the commander and may not always be the best solution for interacting with the civil environment. Decision making must include the ability of a Host Nation (HN) to provide for its own people and its ability to function as a conduit between the military force and the civil environment, as it may undermine the credibility of a sovereign state. Next to that it should not interfere with already existing HN or international community structures for CMI.
- e. This TTP provides considerations and practical suggestions in case the decision is made to establish a CIMIC Centre by transmitting gained experience and best practices.

5-2 AIM

The aim of this TTP is to standardize the use of CIMIC Centre by NATO forces at the operational and tactical levels, as part of the civil-military liaison architecture in a NATO mission and to provide guidance in its employment.

5-3 SCOPE

¹¹² Not NATO Term.

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- a. This TTP is directed to CIMIC personnel and planning bodies to provide them with guidance to establish and resource CIMIC Centres in any NATO operation or exercise at the strategic, operational, higher tactical and tactical levels of operations.
- b. Furthermore, it is also of use to all CMI contributors from other military functions with a view to enhance their performance with the use of CIMIC Centre to convey their interaction with the civil environment. Lastly, it may be of use for the establishment of other non-CIMIC specific centres, as described in the introduction.

5-4 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

- a. **CIMIC Centre is** a coordination interface between military and non-military actors in any NATO mission at the operational and tactical levels¹¹³. It is a means to provide stationary or mobile locations where NATO forces can conduct CIMIC/CMI activities with non-military actors (civil population, civil authorities, Governmental Organizations (GOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs) and the Host Nation (HN)¹¹⁴). Theatre-level joint CIMIC may establish CIMIC Centres for interagency engagement at the operational level¹¹⁵. On the tactical one, CIMIC Centre can also serve as the forces' point of contact for the local population.
- b. CIMIC Centre is not a capability in its own right, but it is addressed as part of CIMIC and C2 capability all joint land and amphibious formations from battalion upwards. Activity of the CIMIC Centre is included in the **liaison** CIMIC core function and thus contributes to the overall forces' CIMIC liaison architecture (also see TTP 3 CIMIC Liaison). It must be closely coordinated with all other CMI activities by own echelon, higher and subordinate, such as the use of liaison officers, meetings, reports, etc.
- c. CIMIC Centre is **operated** by specifically appointed CIMIC personnel (see TTP 2 CIMIC Assets and C2).
- d. CIMIC Centres are typically **assigned** to an Area of Operations (AOO) or to a part of it (province, municipality, county, etc.). Also, the establishment of a Mobile CIMIC Centre may be the best option in large AOOs where a stationary one is not practical, or when scarcity of resources prevent the establishment of a network of stationary ones (see Annex Z, page A-3).
- e. The **roles, entity and scope** of the CIMIC Centre is mission dependent and will remain flexible to adjust to changing conditions and priorities. Therefore, CIMIC Centre can be designed to enhance liaison with:
 - (1) The international humanitarian community (UN civil-military coordination – UN CMCoord, clusters, etc.), mainly in the scope of crisis management operations.
 - (2) The HN and/or the emergency response community, in the scope of collective defence operations.

¹¹³ Ref B. 51, 69, 142, 228, 240, 249 and 252.

¹¹⁴ See complete list of possible non-military actors in AJP 3.19, Annex A.

¹¹⁵ Ref B. 142.

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- (3) The local population in general.
 - (4) A combination thereof.
- f. In this regard, CIMIC Centre will be responsible for ensuring a consistent approach across the AOO whilst remaining credible, legitimate and accessible for non-military actors.
 - g. CIMIC Centre will be integrated in its parent HQ or CIMIC asset contributing to the formation's **battle rhythm** through the Reports and Returns (R&R) process as reflected in the OPLAN/OPORD for the operation (see TTP 4 CIMIC reports). Physical separation will not diminish integration.
 - h. CIMIC Centre may enable the commander to gain visibility on the civil environment across the AOO.

5-5 ROLES

The roles of a CIMIC Centre can be summarized as follows:

a. **Facilitation of coordination and information exchange**

CIMIC Centre is a coordination and interaction hub that:

- (1) Facilitates harmonization and de-confliction of military and civil activities within the assigned area, either by collecting requests for coordination or hosting coordination meetings aimed at enabling CMI.
- (2) Allows non-military actors a direct access to the Force in order to discuss security / safety issues (Freedom of Movement, hazards, health issues, etc.) in the area and the need for coordination or assistance / help.
- (3) Acts as the unique point of entry for non-military actors, to project officers from different military counterparts dedicated to a particular area of expertise, minimizing the amount of focal points, possible duplication of efforts and determining clear liaison responsibility.
- (4) Allows delivering of STRATCOM messages.

b. **Monitoring**

The CIMIC Centre monitors the civil environment of the AOO in which it operates and contributes to the assessment of its possible impact on the operation. CIMIC Centres can also observe and report on cross-cutting topics.

5-6 REQUIREMENTS

CIMIC Centre is established according to the following criteria:

a. **Considerations for the need of CIMIC Centre**

- (1) During the planning process of an operation, the HQ assesses the need for CIMIC Centres (see TTP 1 CIMIC assessment). This is done simultaneously with the estimations of CIMIC liaison needs (see TTP 3 Civil-Military Liaison).

How to staff and equip a CIMIC Centre, needs to be assessed during the planning process as well.

- (2) To decide whether or not to establish a CIMIC Centre, the following questions should be answered:
 - (a) What activities will take place in the CIMIC Centre?
 - (b) Does **the civil population** have access to alternative mechanisms, networks, systems to interact with the Military Force and other CMI Stakeholders?
 - (c) Do **non-military actors** (IOs, NGOs, Local Authorities) have liaison mechanisms, networks or communal infrastructure in place that the military can benefit from, instead of interfering with them by setting a CIMIC Centre?
 - (d) What is the context of the operation and how can liaison be practically best achieved?
 - (e) Does the context of the operation allow for cooperation between military and non-military actors or only co-existence can be expected?
- (3) The planning HQ will consider if the liaison needs with non-military actors can be met through other CIMIC capabilities (i.e. direct liaison, appointment of liaison officers, etc.), a CIMIC Centre may not be necessary in economy of effort. Furthermore, reviews of the need for a CIMIC Centre should be done on a regular basis. When there is no longer need for a CIMIC Centre, the centre is closed to save economy of effort and avoid an image of inefficiency.

b. **Command and Control (C2) relationships.**

- (1) The command and control relationship between the CIMIC Centre and the parent Headquarters (HQ) they report to, needs to be clearly defined in the OPLAN/OPORD to ensure unity of command and efficiency. Tactical Command (TACOM) from the parent HQ/CIMIC asset will be the norm, but tactical Control (TACON) may also be conferred for geographical or practical considerations.
- (2) CIMIC Theatre Element (CIMIC-TE) may establish interagency centres for joint theatre-wide purposes such as specific inter-agency interaction, in coordination with the tactical formations in the area, and especially other CIMIC Centres at the tactical level.
- (3) The use of the CIMIC Centre by other military forces to convey CMI, needs to be regulated and clarified through SOP/SOI, to avoid misuse. Wherever possible, these should also be standardised across the entire AOO.

5-7 KEY FACTORS FOR ESTABLISHING A CIMIC CENTRE

Once the need for CIMIC Centre becomes clear, relevant factors to be considered for a successful establishment of a CIMIC Centre are listed below. Additional Factors can also be found at the checklist in Annex AA.

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a. **Location**

- (1) Choosing a location for a CIMIC Centre is a critical decision, since it will have to balance between the need for security (for the military) and for a sufficient accessibility (for the civilians). In order to determine the location of CIMIC Centre, the following factors need to be considered:
 - (a) Security and operational requirements in the AOO.
 - (b) Size of the AOO (more than one CIMIC Centre may be required).
 - (c) Population density in different parts of the focus area of the CIMIC Centre (the size of the CIMIC Centre may vary, based on the number of expected external visitors; also, a mobile CIMIC Centre may be an alternative option to a stationary CIMIC Centre).
 - (d) Available means of communication (telephone, email, internet) between civil and military actors, and their interoperability.
 - (e) Location of non-military actor's offices, and activity in general.
- (3) To be effective, a CIMIC Centre must be easily accessible for non-military actors. It should stay in the city centre and, generally, where there is a high density of inhabitants ("outside the wire" option). CIMIC Centres should preferably not be located within the military perimeter of any barracks or HQ ("within the wire" option).
- (4) When an "out of the wire" option is chosen, security and emergency support from the Military Force, should be carefully identified, assessed and planned.

b. **Personnel**

- (1) Physical isolation from the Force and interaction with a wide variety of non-military actors (see personnel requirements in TTP 3 Liaison) are the normal working environment for CIMIC Operators.
- (2) CIMIC Centre Staff need to be carefully selected for the intended functions.
- (3) Many desirable characteristics of personnel expected to be deployed to a CIMIC Centre are depicted in TTP 3 "Civil-Military Liaison".
- (4) Provision of enough personnel should also to meet the operational requirements as well as the operating hours of the centre, in order to match the civilian activity it targets (commercial hours, agency or civil service working hours, etc.).
- (5) The requirements may differ considerably for each operation or CIMIC Centre within the same AOO. CIMIC Centre Staff are expected to include male and female personnel.

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c. Communications

CIMIC Centres must be equipped with adequate means of communications. This includes the ability to maintain a continuous contact with its HQ/CIMIC asset as well as with the non-military actors through unclassified means of communication (24 hrs public phone, internet page, etc.).

d. Accessibility

A CIMIC Centre can only be effective in fulfilling its designated functions if it is easily accessible to external users.

e. Force protection

- (1) Force Protection measures have to be tailored to the threat assessment and should take into account the location of the CIMIC Centre (usually outside military bases and compounds).
- (2) The level of force protection directly influences the accessibility of the CIMIC Centre. Force protection planning will consider scenarios such as emergency evacuation or closure in the event of public disorders, terrorist threat and/or violent demonstrations, retaliatory attacks, etc.

f. Funding

Costs relating to CIMIC Centres might be significant and very different in concept with those of regular forces. Expenses will not only relate to the number of centres in general but also include costs of construction, hire, amenities, communications, vehicles, administrative and staff costs (in particular that for civilian staff such as interpreters, cleaning, maintenance, etc).

g. Infrastructure

Availability of infrastructure to meet force protection and security of information requirements may heavily influence the selection of suitable infrastructure to base CIMIC Centre, or the construction of one. For a detailed internal layout of a CIMIC Centre, as an example, see Annex BB.

h. Service Support

The ability of the Force to sustain the CIMIC Centre and its staff must also be considered during the planning process (meals, lodging, vehicles, etc.).

i. Transport

The CIMIC Centre must be provided with adequate transport means to meet the requirements of its operation either specifically owned or shared with other military forces operating in the area. CIMIC Centre must have safe and adequate parking space for them in their premises. Shuttle transportation to and from military bases with other liaison means operating in the area can be a practical way to achieve economy of effort and security considerations of those movements.

CHAPTER 6 - CIMIC PROJECTS (TTP 6)**REFERENCES**

- A. AJP-3.19. Allied Joint Doctrine for CIMIC, dated 09 Nov 2018.
- B. AJP-3.4.3. Ed A. Ver. 1. Military Support for Humanitarian Activities, dated Oct 15.
- C. AJP-3.4.5 Ed A. Ver. 1. Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction, dated Dec. 15.
- D. AJP 3.2.1.1. Ed A. Ver. 1. Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks, dated 13 Mar 14.

6-1 INTRODUCTION

- a. The conveyance of CIMIC function and CMI activities with regard to the CIMIC core function of support to non-military actors and the civil environment may take the form of specific projects in support of the Host Nation (HN), within the support of the military mission. These CIMIC projects may involve the funding of limited infrastructural projects as well as the conduct of activities of forces in support of the HN administration and civilian population. Examples of infrastructural projects are the repair or construction of roads or public buildings as schools or health centres by engineers or funding and tasking of contractors.
- b. Activities may also support host nation civil services by military capabilities, such as temporary support of local medical staff by military medics, or the treatment in military health facilities of civilian patients submitted by local health system. In all cases, the planning and conduct of CIMIC projects has to be aligned with host nation and international community plans and activities.
- c. Although the use of Military resources is possible, this should normally be considered the last option.
- d. Overall, CIMIC projects are expected to focus on critical sectors in the civil environment, to mitigate the risk of direct or indirect repercussions on the Military Force and its ability to execute its mission. Also, CIMIC projects are expected to support legitimacy and consensus of the Military mission. They may include donations of goods and services, coordinated through the Military Force.
- e. In the United Nations (UN) system, Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are small-scale, low cost UN-funded projects that are planned and implemented within a short timeframe¹¹⁶. However, NATO operations have carried out QIPs¹¹⁷ on its own, not necessarily funded by the UN. In NATO's perspective, Quick Impact Projects may be particularly valuable to reach their intended effect within a short time, ideally within the rotation cycle of the deployed Unit.

6-2 AIM

The aim of this Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) is to provide the framework to

¹¹⁶ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/quick-impact-projects-communities>. Also mentioned in Ref B (page 2-2) and D (page 2-27).

¹¹⁷ Not NATO agreed term.

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define, conceive, plan, execute and finalize CIMIC projects in NATO operations.

SCOPE

This TTP document provides guidance to carry out CIMIC projects in support of Commander's objectives. It is mainly intended for use by CIMIC personnel, however it can also be used by other Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) contributors, who may carry out projects related to the civil environment within their functional areas of expertise.

6-3 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

- a. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) projects are activities or specific tasks undertaken in support of the civil environment, in order to support the military mission.
- b. Although CIMIC projects can be carried out in any NATO operations, they are most likely to take place in Crisis Response Operations. Ref. B provides the most relevant grounding to this TTP document, in case of Humanitarian Assistance Operations. Moreover, Ref C and D provide further basis to best frame the context in which CIMIC projects best develop in Reconstruction and Stabilization. CIMIC projects conducted by the Military Force are particularly important where security prevents civilian agencies from deploying their resources.
- c. CIMIC projects are one of many tools in the hands of the Commander of the Military Force, to manage crisis related consequences, or to mitigate unexpected side effects of the Military Operations on the civil environment, or to support the Host Nation (HN)'s resilience. Once initiated, projects require proper governance, management and implementation to ensure beneficial results.
- d. The OPLAN/OPORD for the operation should provide guidance for the development of CIMIC projects. This should be done within Annex W Civil-Military Cooperation. If relevant, CIMIC project management may constitute an appendix of its own.
- e. Commanders must be cautious not to commit forces to projects and tasks that go beyond the tasked activities or duplicate the efforts of others¹¹⁸.
- f. CIMIC projects will be of less significance during combat operations, as they normally require a certain degree of stability to be effective. Nevertheless, their accomplishment may still be effective to increase consensus amongst the civilian environment, thus supporting the mission objectives and the legitimacy of the Military Operations¹¹⁹.
- g. CIMIC projects may be conceived and planned by use of a cross-functional approach; particularly, LEGAD advice may be relevant with regards to considerations on domestic laws, property, handover of infrastructures, etc.
- h. Also, CIMIC projects must comply with the different legal arrangements established by NATO and/or the Sending Nations (SNs)¹²⁰ with the Host Nation. This is particularly relevant with regards to infrastructural projects. Contracting local professionals (engineers / architects / subject matter experts), is one way for the

¹¹⁸ Ref B. Page 3-1.

¹¹⁹ Ref D. Page 4-109.

¹²⁰ NATO term.

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Military Force to handle legal obligations with the HN. Their work will usually monitored by own Functional Specialists.

6-4 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A CIMIC project relies mainly in three main key actors:

- a. **CIMIC Project Manager (PM):** The individual who is in charge of the planning and execution of CIMIC project. The PM will be responsible and accountable to the sponsor for staffing, monitoring and reporting the project from conception to completion. The PM has to be CIMIC trained or have CIMIC trained staff to ensure proper integration in the military operation and the civil environment.
- b. The PM may be a CIMIC Staff member, a Functional Specialist (FS)¹²¹, a Subject Matter Expert (SME), or any other person with the required technical ability, civil or military, for a successful development of the project.
- c. Depending of the entity of the project, the PM may have personnel under his responsibility.
- d. Normally, CIMIC personnel participate in the project, either as PM or as assistant of the PM, to ensure proper integration in the military operation and the civil environment. For the execution part, the PM may be assisted by a locally hired specialist (architect / engineer / etc.), whose work will usually be supervised by a Functional Specialist or Subject Matter Expert of the Military Force.
- e. **CIMIC Project Sponsor / Sponsor Group.** The sponsor or sponsor group is a person or entity who supports the project by resourcing it. This may be a CIMIC Staff member (with funding authority) or a donor.
- f. The sponsor may participate in / chair project meetings or request them, to monitor sponsored projects.
- g. **CIMIC Project approval authority** is the person who has the final decision on the execution of a project, or about the participation of military personnel in it. It may also entail the authority to designate the project manager and the project sponsor. The designation of approving authorities should be reflected in the OPLAN/OPORD for the operation, and is normally the Military Formation Commander in case of a purely military project, or the military participation in a civil-military project.

6-5 FINANCING

- a. CIMIC projects may be funded by NATO through grants assigned to operational/tactical level Commanders¹²², or more commonly by budgets of SNs, or even by third-party sponsors through them.
- b. It is essential that funding sources, including donor organizations or nations are identified as early as possible. Funds must be allocated to the mission in the planning phase prior to the execution of the operation¹²³. Also, the OPLAN/OPORD

¹²¹ See Bi-SC Capability Codes and Capability Statements. 22 Jan 20. Page 143.

¹²² Ref A. Page 5-4.

¹²³ Ref D. Pages 2-1, 2-22.

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for the operation should provide guidance for the financing of CIMIC projects. This should be done within Annex W Civil-Military Cooperation. CIMIC project management may constitute an appendix of its own.

- c. Given the involvement of financial resources, NATO personnel must strictly adhere to the building integrity principles in the execution of CIMIC projects¹²⁴.
- d. In all cases, J/X-9¹²⁵ acts as the Coordinating Authority (CA) over CIMIC assets across all components. Coordination by J/X-9 is expected to sustain an adequate distribution of CIMIC projects across the JOA (particularly when the financing comes from SNs). Uneven distribution of CIMIC projects across the JOA may result detrimental to the overall CMI and harmful to the intended objectives of CIMIC activities.

6-6 STAGES OF A CIMIC PROJECT

The lifecycle of a project can be broken down into the following stages:

a. STAGE 1: INITIATION

Projects can arise through multiple initiatives, coming from virtually any source to support a specific need or requirement. The basic requirement is that all projects are in support of the Force. Potential impact of each project on the civil environment and on the relation between the civil actors and the Military Force must be carefully assessed, prior to initiating the project. In principle, projects should not create dependency on the Military Force. During this stage, the project is defined, assessed for intended effects, potential collateral effects, feasibility, sustainability by the beneficiaries and convenience. Eventually it may be authorized for execution.

(1) Sub-stage 1.a: Project feasibility assessment

Projects are best assessed through the analysis of the five SMART criteria (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic/Relevant and Time Bound - SMART):

- (a) **Specific and Mission Oriented:** A CIMIC project must be clearly described and seek specific objectives in support of the Commander's mission.
- (b) **Measurable:** The success of the project must be measured through defined metrics. CIMIC personnel must coordinate, monitor, report and track the progress of projects. A dedicated tracking system should be available, to maintain situational awareness over different aspects of each CIMIC project, including: intended effects, Measurement of Performances (MOPs), Measurement of Effectiveness (MOEs), location, intended beneficiaries, contractors and other financial aspects. This data should be available to CIMIC operators in the long term and may be used to analyze results and effects.

¹²⁴ See Enclosure ON(2021)0007. NATO Code of Conduct. Agreed by the NAC on 18 December 2020.

¹²⁵ 'X' is an informal abbreviation to designate all Ground (G), Naval (N), Air (A) and, if appropriate, Staff (S) directorates of a tactical HQ.

- (c) **Achievable.** The project must have the necessary resources secured to meet the project objectives and its deliverables. Resources may come from civilian or military sources. The consequences of being unable to complete a project may result in a negative impact upon the Mission and thus should be strongly avoided. When projects are conducted in cooperation with other entities, the Military Force will try to be responsible for the last portion of it. This will minimize the risks that the project is not finalized, due to delays caused by other actors.
- (d) Required resources include:
- **Financial:** contracting must be conducted in close coordination with the CIMIC Project Sponsor, the J/X-8 and LEGAD staff, where necessary. In principle, CIMIC operators will rely on J/X-8 to handle the administrative part (bidding, contracting, payments) of any contracts / purchase related to projects. This should allow CIMIC operators to concentrate on the operational purpose of the projects and to minimize their direct involvement with contractors and beneficiaries. All disbursements and actions taken in the administrative management of the project should be coordinated in advance, between J/X-9 and J/X-8. A system for the disbursement of funds with agreed procedures and tracking systems should be in place before any agreement to sponsor a project. Untracked funding by third party (indirect) may lead to a loss of control with undesired effects, and thus must be avoided.
 - **Personnel and material.** Military participation and involvement must be kept to a minimum to foster HN and civilian primacy. It may be a good practice to conduct joint projects with the HN's authorities, based on a detailed knowledge (written statement recommended) of what are their intended objectives and the beneficiaries of the project. The contribution requested of the Military Force should be agreed upon in detail, to minimize the risk of misunderstanding.
- (e) **Realistic / Relevant.** The assessment of the project must consider its impact on the receiving community as well as their ability / capability to sustain and maintain the project. In principle, projects should not create dependency from the Military Force. Relevance must be assessed on terms of:
- **Cultural awareness.** Projects should follow and respect the cultural background of the respective society, under the "do no harm" principle, to avoid limited acceptance and utilization of the project.
 - **Other actors' intents.** Ideally, a CIMIC project is conducted in line with a HN's development plan or the aims of

equivalent civil authorities' intent. Also, actions and intents of relevant IOs, NGOs, should be taken in due consideration, since they also cooperate with the HNs' authorities, have a longer time horizon and larger funds. In the absence of a functioning government and state authorities, CIMIC projects need to be carefully analyzed for relevance and effect, as well as the utilization that those actors may do of the project for their own aims.

- (f) **Time Bound.** A timeframe must define the key milestones and when the project is to be achieved. Delay in completion of a project may be rather detrimental than beneficial. Timelines will support the measurement and progress of the project.
- (2) **Sub-stage 1.b. Project comparison / screening**
- (a) The feasibility assessment should be compared with other projects to ensure consistency with national development plans (if existing). The need for the project, in comparison with other options must be assessed before it is accepted / authorised. The PM must ensure the project remains relevant if the assessment stage has been lengthy, to prevent irrelevance or misuse of resources.
 - (b) In light of this, priority may be given to development of "know how" and to infrastructural projects rather than to the purchase of non-durable goods.
- (3) **Sub-stage 1.c. Authorisation / Acceptance**
- (a) All projects should be formally staffed and authorised by the relevant authority or authorities, especially if funding is required. CIMIC projects require by default superior echelon's commander's authorisation, informed by the J/X-9, as well as the financial advice by J/X-8, and legal advice by LEGAD, as well as other staff members relevant to the project (POLAD, JENG, JMED, etc.).
 - (b) Projects should not be driven by spare military capacity, subjective factors or personal interests. Most importantly, the project must be completed during the expected duration of the operation. Lastly, CIMIC projects should only be conducted with the HN approval and in close coordination therewith, in accordance with the legal arrangements established for the operation.
 - (c) The authorisation or acceptance of CIMIC project is done through a Project Initiating Document (PID, see format in Annex DD). SMART factors and project objectives should be properly reflected in the PID to ensure that projects have been thoroughly considered. A letter of commitment or request may be attached to the PID, describing what is the interest / participation of the HN's stakeholders in the project. The contribution by the Military Force in the project should be described in detail and possibly agreed upon by the intended recipient, in advance.

- (d) The milestones of the authorisation process of CIMIC projects should be reflected in the OPLAN/OPORD for the operation, and supported by SOPs or SOIs at the relevant level of command. A separate appendix to the Annex W CIMIC may be created in this regard.

b. STAGE 2: PLANNING

Once the project has been authorised, the PM develops a plan with the support of all participating stakeholders. The plan undergoes the following sub-stages:

(1) Sub-stage 2.a: Statement of roles and responsibilities

The roles and responsibilities for the execution of the project are clearly defined, to ensure an efficient division of work and accountability for undesired deviations from the authorised project. In this regard, projects can offer various opportunities for the local labour pool¹²⁶ (which should be preferred).

(2) Sub-stage 2.b. Administrative documentation

The PID is supported by additional documentation by the PM:

- (a) **Project governance.** To ensure oversight, the PM should organize a regular meeting plan with the sponsors and teams to brief progress and mitigate risks (see control paragraph below).
- (b) **Risk Management Plan.** PM identifies foreseeable risks. These include unrealistic time and cost estimates, customer review cycle, budget cuts, changing requirements and lack of committed resources. A monitoring system or risk management matrix can support the governance of projects. Project risk management may be part of the commander’s operational/tactical risk management plan.
- (c) **Overall schedule and milestones.** A visual graph such as GANTT charts are used to plan out tasks and visualize the project timeline. PM identifies high-level middle objectives that need to be met throughout the project, and include them in the schedule.




Figure 1. Example of GANTT chart for overall schedule and milestones.

¹²⁶ Ref. D. Page 2-25.

- (d) **Work Breakdown Schedule (WBS).** A visual representation may help to break down the scope of the project into manageable sections for the teams to achieve their tasks.




Figure 2. Example of GANTT chart for WBS.

- (e) **Communication Plan.** Project messaging is key particular with non-military actors; scheduled CIMIC meetings will communicate project progress based on deliverables and milestones with team members.
- (f) **Organization in areas.** Projects or their subdivisions may be grouped into areas or categories to assist coordination. These may follow Lines of CIMIC activity used for the planning of CIMIC for the operations; follow a UN Cluster Approach¹²⁷, or other relevant categories such as baseline requirements for national resilience.

¹²⁷ For more details, see [Cluster Approach](#). Also, See Ref. B. Page 1-11.

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c. **STAGE 3: EXECUTION**

During execution stage, deliverables are developed and completed. The main activities and tasks completed in the execution stage include:

- (1) **Sub-stage 3.a: Assignment of roles and responsibilities.** Upon execution, teams are formed and roles and responsibilities are assigned and explained.
- (2) **Sub-stage 3.b. Resources assigned.** Resources required should be available through the manager of CIMIC funds and the J/X-8, when necessary.
- (3) **Sub-stage 3.c. Execution proper.** The PM directs and manages the project execution and modifies the project plans as required.

d. **STAGE 4: CONTROL**

- (1) Control of the project is intertwined with the execution stage. It is carried out through planned status meetings and through reporting on status. Information should include updates on progress or delays thereof.
- (2) Performance of execution should be measured to ensure that execution aligns with the authorised project. This is done through key performance indicators (KPI). The PM will use KPI metrics to determine if the project is on track to meet its objectives. Typically, two of the following KPIs types can be used to measure project performance:
 - (a) **Project objectives:** By measuring the planned objectives to see if the project is on schedule and budget.
 - (b) **Quality deliverables:** By determining if specific task deliverables are being met.
 - (c) **Effort and cost tracking:** By accounting for the effort and cost of resources to see if the budget is on track to consider if a project will meet its completion date based on current performance.
 - (d) **Project performance:** By monitoring changes in the project by considering the amount and types of issues that arise, and how quickly they are addressed. These account mainly for unforeseen problems.
- (3) **PID reviews.** Also as part of the control of the project, the PM should consider justified alterations of the PID during the execution of a project. These need by default the authorisation/acceptance of both the PM and the sponsor/-s. The authority on the project must sanction any amendments to the project or its emphasis when they do not conform to the military mission. An alteration policy should also be reflected in the initial PID to account for transparency upon unexpected changes. Changes also involve reviewing the cost, quality, available resources, and monitoring a realistic timetable as well as establishing baselines or performance measures.

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- (4) Due to the nature of the environment CIMIC projects may not work, it may be necessary to return to a previous stage or that the project be redefined or cancelled altogether.

e. **STAGE 5: CLOSURE**

- (1) As the final stage upon completion, it is essential that NATO forces wherever possible hand over the project to the HN to make them less dependent and trustworthy towards their own population¹²⁸. Projects should aim for self-sustainment and capacity building with the hand-over of projects to beneficiaries, at the earliest practical opportunity.
- (2) The main activities during this stage include:
 - (a) **Closing contracts.** Working contracts used specifically on the project are terminated at this time.
 - (b) **End of project meeting:** Upon completion, the PM should hold a meeting to evaluate results.
 - (c) **Lessons Learned process:** The reflection of what went well and what wrong in the project in order to identify observations for future projects, following NATO process of Lessons Learned (LL) at every relevant level up to the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center (JALLC). Monitoring of past projects may also be relevant to assess their impact and effectiveness in the long term. The results of these assessments may be relevant in future planning and prioritization.
 - (d) **Media/INFO OPS actions.** Positive feedbacks should be exploited to improve relations with the respective community. Information Operations (INFO OPS) and Media staff should be fully involved in the public ceremonies that may be held for this purpose. Try to involve local stakeholders, beneficiaries and the population in a final ceremony (so called "Inauguration Ceremony") for the delivery of the project to the Authorities of the HN.
 - (e) **Additional liability.** The PM ensures there are no additional hidden commitments acquired during the execution, and solves them properly. These may be maintenance costs or associated liabilities that may require additional resources in the future, affecting the long-term effect of the project in the population.
 - (f) **Outstanding activity.** The PM lists the tasks or unfinished minor issues that were not accomplished during the project, and work with team members in order to complete them.
 - (g) **Budget and project records.** It may be necessary to provide a final project budget and prepare a final project report. All project documents and deliverables must be stored as directed by the parent formation in which the project takes place.

¹²⁸ Ref. D Page 2-1.

CHAPTER 7 CIMIC GUIDELINES ON DE-CONFLICTION OF LARGE-SCALE POPULATION MOVEMENTS (TTP 7)

REFERENCES

- A. Military decision on MC 0668. Concept for the protection of civilians, dated 25 Apr 18.
- B. AJP-3 EDC V1. Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations 4, dated Feb 19.
- C. AJP-3.19. Allied Joint Doctrine for CIMIC, dated 09 Nov 18.
- D. AJP-3.4.3 EDA V1. Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance, dated Oct 15.
- E. ATP-3.2.1.1 EDB V1. Guidance for the conduct of tactical stability activities and tasks, dated 13 Mar 14.
- F. AJP-3.4.5 Edition A Version 1. Military contribution to stabilization and reconstruction, dated Dec 16.
- G. AJP-3.22. Ed A. Ver 1. Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing, dated Jul 16.

7-1. INTRODUCTION

- a. It is common in operations and exercises to find situations in which large-scale population movements conflict with military activities. It is also common for CIMIC operators to advise NATO commanders and staff members on how to effectively deal with these situations.
- b. For the purpose of this Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP), a large-scale population movement is defined as a *considerable assemblage or number of civilians moving in the Joint Operations Area/Area of Operations (JOA/AOO)*.
- c. Any NATO operation may deal with large-scale movement of population, such as refugees, migrants, evacuees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) or others. Large-scale population movements, if uncontrolled and not well coordinated with military forces, may disrupt military operations by affecting their Freedom of Movement (FOM). What the force may face during large-scale population movements is often unpredictable. Many different factors can influence the situation in the field, such as the capability and will of HN authorities, supporting IOs/NGOs, natural, social, economic and cultural circumstances, etc.¹²⁹.
- d. In order to gain a broad view of this issue, the main factors relevant to large-scale population movements are:
 - (1) the domestic law of the nation or nations in which the large-scale movements takes place, and the subsequent responsibility to protect the civilian population under international provisions¹³⁰, as well as its responsibilities that international law assign nations to regulate land, sea, air and cyber traffic through ministries of transportation, law enforcement bodies and civil protection organizations, among others. In these regard, specifically focusing on the maritime environment, the Law of the Sea and the consequent procedures of Search and Rescue, have always to be

¹²⁹ See TTP 1 for tools to analyze the operating environment.

¹³⁰ See 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document A/RES/60/1: <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml>.

considered in case of movements by sea;

- (2) the effective ability, resilience and will to cope with large-scale population movements by the various military and non-military actors involved, namely, the host nations (HNs) where the movement takes place;
- (3) the general or specific mandate(-s) of the international organizations involved in the large-scale movement, namely United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migrations (IOM), regional organizations with responsibilities in the area (EU¹³¹, African Union, etc.), as well as international traffic control-related organizations (International Maritime Organization, International Air Traffic Association, etc.);
- (4) the NATO mandate for the operation, its Status of the Force Agreement (SOFA) and the active Rules of Engagement (ROE)¹³². At the strategic level, ROEs should address large-scale movements of population, and specific guidance issued to help commanders on the ground, at sea or in air traffic control for that matter. Furthermore, in the scope of a NATO operation, the NATO Crisis response System (NCRS) uses Crisis Response measures to authorize certain actions with regard to the preparation and implementation of arrangements to deal with uncontrolled movements of civil population¹³³. These may be reflected in the OPLAN (Annex JJ)¹³⁴, or conveyed specifically.

- e. FOM for NATO forces is the operational application of the principle of joint and combined operations of freedom of action¹³⁵. It declares that commanders firmly and swiftly pursue to minimise restrictions and interferences, first through negotiation, and if necessary through more vigorous action, including the use of the force. FOM should also consider its specific application in the different environments: freedom of navigation, overflight and operating in cyberspace.
- f. NATO forces may use their capabilities to support the de-confliction of large-scale population movements: Command and Control, CIMIC assets, Movement Control Centers, transport capabilities, Military Police units, military engineers, etc.
- g. During planning of operations, both in Collective Defense and in Crisis Response Operations, the possibility/risk to face large-scale population movements should be taken into account.

7-2. **AIM.** The aim of this TTP is to provide guidance to CIMIC/CMI personnel for de-confliction of large-scale population movements in NATO joint operations within a JOA/AOO in which a JFC commander or lower has authority to intervene.

¹³¹ The main EU institutions dealing with population movements are EUROPOL and FRONTEX.

¹³² AJP-01 Edition E Version 1. NATO Allied Doctrine. 1-15, dated Feb 2017.

¹³³ (NR) NATO Crisis Response Manual 2021. Annex A.

¹³⁴ ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive Interim version 3.0 (COPD V 3.0), dated 15 Jan 2021. Annex C.

¹³⁵ Ref B.1-10, 1-13.

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7-3. **SCOPE.**

- a. This TTP offers a set of tools and scenarios to analyze from a CIMIC/CMI perspective, large-scale population movements in any NATO operation or exercise at the strategic, operational and tactical level.
- b. This TTP is limited to the immediate factors and ways to de-conflict large-scale population movements. It does not deal specifically with:
 - (1) international law deep considerations on the status of IDPs, refugees, evacuees, migrants or people in general involved in the large-scale movements, or of traffic control responsibilities;
 - (2) the collective responsibility to protect against genocide and other atrocities;
 - (3) the causes of the civil large-scale movements;
 - (4) the details of the control of the movement per se, inasmuch CIMIC is not the sole or even leading joint function to achieve such control;
 - (5) other specific collateral factors or events that influence or may influence the movement.
- c. Therefore, considerations by this TTP should be added to a broader comprehensive approach to the specific situation in each case.

7-4. **GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.** The main pillars on which military judgement confronting a large-scale population movements are:

- a. **Civilian primacy:** managing large-scale population movements is a demanding task that falls primarily under the responsibility of host nation (HN) authorities. Non-military actors (IOs, GOs, NGOs) may be involved according to their mandate. NATO forces participate only when it is required to accomplish the military mission¹³⁶.
- b. **NATO supporting role:** NATO sees its participation as a supporting role when confronted with large-scale movements of refugees, evacuees and IDPs¹³⁷. This is not to say NATO does not value this type of contingency. For example, in collective defence, NATO Resilience through Civil Preparedness (RtCP) concept declares the third of the seven Baseline Requirements as the "ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people". NATO forces will hand over the responsibilities to the appropriate authorities upon mandate, as quickly as possible.
- c. **NATO mission priority:** although the assigned mission is the priority, NATO forces are subjected to legal and ethical obligations, especially with regards to the effect of large-scale movements on the mission¹³⁸.

¹³⁶ Ref C. Page 2-2.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.* Page 3-10.

¹³⁸ Ref A. Page 16.

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- d. **State inefficiency**¹³⁹: in failed, unstable or fragile states that are unable to provide public services, and in combat areas or regained territories, NATO military forces could face temporary capability gaps of the legitimate local authorities and international partners in dealing with large-scale population movements, in the scope of stability operations and stability policing activities¹⁴⁰. These gaps may include dysfunctional official bodies, lack of skilled personnel, material resources and will to act. In this case, due to operational considerations for the accomplishment of the mission, NATO forces may actively de-conflict large-scale population movements and military operations, within means and capabilities, and under specific request by the responsible authorities or out of military necessity.
- e. **Protection of Civilians (PoC)**¹⁴¹: all actions regarding the de-confliction of movements must take into account PoC:
- (1) NATO takes all *feasible* efforts taken to avoid, minimise and mitigate the negative effects that might arise from NATO and NATO-led military operations on the civilian population and, *when reasonably possible*, to protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence or threats thereof by other actors, including through the establishment of a Safe And Secure Environment (SASE) and the enablement or direct provision of Humanitarian Aid (HA).
 - (2) NATO PoC policy is subject to the legal basis for the specific NATO operation, mission or activity, and to the specific Council-approved mandate, without prejudice to force protection and collective defence obligations¹⁴².
 - (3) Moral Obligation: NATO's approach to the PoC is based on legal, moral and political imperatives. NATO adheres to the rules and principles of Law of Armed Conflict/International Humanitarian Law (LOAC/IHL), while also understanding that there are other wider legal and ethical obligations¹⁴³.

7-5. MAIN CONTROL RESOURCES OF A LARGE-SCALE POPULATION MOVEMENTS

- a. The main resources useful to control large-scale population movements are¹⁴⁴:
- (1) **Civil population checkpoints (CP)**. This is the first coordination measure to adopt and they are aimed at gathering reduced civilian groups, in order to organize their next movement.
 - (2) **Civil population evacuation routes**. Whether through land, sea or air, they will be other than those employed by the joint military forces. They may be declared humanitarian corridors by the United Nations, the HN or the civilian agencies responsible for the movement.
 - (3) **Civil population gathering areas**. They are aimed at controlling movements

¹³⁹ Ref F.

¹⁴⁰ Ref G.

¹⁴¹ Ref B. Page 1-15.

¹⁴² Ref. A. Page 4, point 6.

¹⁴³ Ibid. Page 16, point g.

¹⁴⁴ Ref D. Page 2-3. / Ref E. Page 4-70

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and providing support to population in transit.

(4) **Civil population rest areas.** Depending on the distance to cover, some rest areas regularly distributed may be required.

(5) **Refugee, IDP or evacuee camps:** As possible immediate destinations of the movement. They can also be named as “settlement areas”.

b. The United Nations, the HN or the civilian agencies responsible for the movement may declare the above mentioned areas as “safe” or “demilitarized”, and the routes as “humanitarian corridors”.

c. The use of different terms for these resources by the different humanitarian or HNs will require an effort of finding common understanding for achieved shared goals.

7-6. **LARGE-SCALE POPULATION MOVEMENTS SCENARIOS.** In order to better address NATO involvement on the subject, two extreme situations are described to help gain a better view on what NATO forces may do in this regard:

a. **NATO low profile scenario**

(1) HN authorities and IOs/NGOs execute control of the movements and are able to respond to civilian needs. Collective defence operations in functional NATO countries could well be such scenario. An emergency management system is in place and will be able to cope effectively with all the large-scale population movements.

(2) However, in territories stressed by war, the ability of the HN to cope with mass movements might be below standards. Only in these circumstances NATO forces might have to play the referred supporting role to the HN and the international agencies. This should be addressed in advance during contingency and operation-specific planning.

(3) In this scenario the priorities are:

(a) HN is first responder and relevant IO/NGOs agencies are second responders (UNHCR, IOM, etc.). This includes regional organizations (e.g. EU), other IOs/NGOs and other non-military actors with a mandate thereto may also assume varying degrees of obligation depending on the capacity of the HN to respond to needs of moving civilians.

(b) NATO remains third responder¹⁴⁵ and will act only upon request. Military support to the civil environment will generally only be conducted if it is required to create conditions that support the accomplishment of the military mission. Support is done in coordination with the HN and the agencies stated above.

¹⁴⁵ To avoid misunderstanding: while operating in collective defense in a NATO country, NATO includes the NATO mandated forces and the HN military under NATO Command, excluding the (territorial) HN military.

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b. **NATO high profile scenario**

- (1) HN authorities and law enforcement and emergency agencies are not present, not willing or not capable to successfully deal with the large-scale population movements. This will usually be the case in crisis response operations. In such scenario, if a large-scale movement is expected to disrupt FOM, the forces will de-conflict movements with the available capabilities. Engagements with non-military actors are still to be maintained even during military direct intervention, facilitating their involvement through appropriate actions.
- (2) Even though the HN may not be capable or cannot access some of its terrain and population, it retains legal obligation and authority to address all aspects of the civil environment.

7-7. **CIMIC and CMI CONTRIBUTION TO DE-CONFLICTION OF LARGE-SCALE POPULATION MOVEMENTS.** The type and nature of the military operation will define the CIMIC responsibilities and dictates the way to communicate with the HN and non-military actors. Without prejudice with the tasks assigned to joint CIMIC function and assets in the OPLAN/OPORD for the operation, all three CIMIC Core Functions¹⁴⁶ are relevant for the de-confliction of civil large-scale movements.

- a. **Civil-military liaison.** Through the liaison already established or newly established for the situation with HNs, IO/NGOs and the civilian population, CIMIC facilitates information sharing and coordination towards an effective de-confliction of movements¹⁴⁷.
- b. **Support to non-military actors and the civil environment.** When NATO supports non-military actors to effectively de-conflict large-scale population movements, CIMIC personnel can:
 - (1) Allocate CIMIC assets to the forces with responsibility over support to the moving population or the agencies involved thereto.
 - (2) Convey the commanders' decisions, views to the civil environment, along with the StratCom messages for the situation, as well as any other joint function contribution to the support effort.
 - (3) When so coordinated, monitor and assess the needs of the moving population to meet their needs¹⁴⁸.
 - (4) Offer advice about the resources needed to organize the de-confliction.
- c. **Support to the force.** CIMIC may also be the main function in the de-confliction by contributing to the FOM of military forces¹⁴⁹ mainly through:
 - (1) Providing realistic assessment of the practical capabilities or will of the

¹⁴⁶ Ref. C. Page 2-5.

¹⁴⁷ See TTP 3 CIMIC Liaison, for more detail.

¹⁴⁸ Ref D.

¹⁴⁹ Ref C. Page 3-2.

non-military actors to de-conflict the movement. In this regard, CIMIC personnel are best equipped, due to their experience and knowledge of the non-military actors. This includes cultural sensitivity and awareness of the civilian environment.

- (2) Conveying to the commander and the forces the views and capabilities of the non-military actors, especially those of the moving population. In this regard, CIMIC enhances understanding that military forces have a moral obligation to protect civilians, but that they are also subject to wider legal and ethical obligations other than humanitarian ones.
 - (3) Monitoring large-scale movements and coordinate with the civilian authorities in order to prevent uncontrolled movements from disrupting military operations. In a hybrid environment
 - (4) Detecting possible adversaries hidden within the civilian population or trying to recruit supporters from them.
- d. **Participation in Working Groups and Boards.** CIMIC contributes to de-confliction during the following activities:
- (1) Planning: through the CIMIC representatives in the Joint Operational Planning Group (JOPG), or other planning bodies.
 - (2) Execution:
 - (a) Through the command function of the CIMIC Theatre Element and Units.
 - (b) Through the battle rhythm of the Joint/Component HQ:
 - The CIMIC representative in the Joint Coordination Board (JCB).
 - The CIMIC representative in the Joint Operations Center (JOC).
- e. **Participation of other functional areas in the de-confliction process.**
- (1) Legal Advisor (LEGAD), for establishing the legal base of NATO forces' role in de-confliction.
 - (2) Political Advisor (POLAD), for assessing the Political consequences of the movement and de-confliction.
 - (3) Joint Intelligence, to receive and provide information and intelligence for decision making.
 - (4) Joint maneuver and fires, to de-conflict with civilian large-scale movements and avoid collateral damage.
 - (5) Joint maneuver and/or sustainment functions, including the maritime, air and space and cyber components, depending on the environments in

which movements to be de-conflicted take place, or are expected to occur.

- (6) StratCom function, Joint InfoOps, PsyOps, public affairs, etc. to influence the civilian population towards a successful de-confliction.
- (7) Military Police and Military Engineer capabilities.
- (8) Others, as required.

f. **Movements Monitoring, Warning System and Relocation Plan.**

- (1) It should be considered during OPLAN/OPORD development, so that all actors, including those at the tactical level, can respond appropriately.
- (2) The Movements Monitoring and Warning System is expected to include:
 - (a) A Movements Monitoring System: this is fed by information provided by sensors in the field, who may include soldiers in the Area of Operation (patrols, logistic convoys, CIMIC operators, etc.), Local Authorities and personnel belonging to IOs and NGOs, etc.;
 - (b) A Warning Organization: this is a well-defined net composed by dedicated CIMIC personnel, Local Authorities and IOs and NGOs, who are in charge of processing the information collected by the Monitoring System and of assessing the need to activate the Plan.
- (3) The "Relocation" portion is expected to include relocation areas and the routes to reach them. These are pre-identified areas, suitable for hosting large numbers of IDPs, refugee, migrants, etc., usually located away from areas and routes that are of military operations interests.
- (4) As soon as any sensor realizes that a civilian movement is ongoing, they must alert the Warning Organization.
- (5) Within the Warning Organization, CIMIC personnel will liaise with the Local Authorities / IOs / NGOs who are responsible for activating the Relocation areas and for directing the flow towards the Relocation areas.
- (6) In addition, CIMIC personnel will contribute to information sharing aimed at the de-confliction of civilian movements with military activities.

COMPREHENSIVE CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION IN THE OPLAN

From a CMI perspective, it is useful for CIMIC personnel, as facilitator of CMI to have a broad understanding of all the civilian implications of the OPLAN, in order to best advise the commander, save efforts and detect inconsistencies in its preparation.

The perception of the civil environment as a final product of planning at the operational level may reflect in an OPLAN specifically but not restricted to Ref. A:

1. Main Body

Paragraph "1. Situation"

- Sub-paragraph b Strategic environment (2) friendly and Cooperating Actors and (3) Neutral Actors that influence mission.
- Sub-paragraph e Strategic Centres of Gravity (2) Friendly Actor's Strategic CoG.

Paragraph "3. Operational Direction". Sub-paragraph g Cooperation with Other Actors.

Paragraph "4. Execution". Sub-paragraph b Coordination Instructions (9) Civil Military Cooperation.

Paragraph "5 Service Support" Sub-paragraph d Host Nation Support Concept.

2. Annexes and appendixes

Annex F. Maritime Operations. App F-7 NCAGS and App F-9 AWNIS.

Annex H. Air Operations. App H-5 Air Control.

Annex I. Amphibious Operations.

Annex Q Communications and Information Systems.

Appendix Q-1 to Q4 Strategic, Maritime, Land and Air Communications.

Annex R Logistics

App R-7 Host Nation Support.

Annex S Movements

App S-3 to S-5 Designated APOD, SPOD, RPOD data and networks.

Annex W Civil-Military Cooperation

- App 1 Civil Assessment.
- App 2 CIMIC C2.
- App 3 Key Civil Organisations/Actors.
- App 4 CIMIC sites of significance.

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- Other, as required.

Annex AA Legal.

App AA-1 Guidance on Law and Order.

Annex OO Operations Assessment.

Annex QQ Medical.

Annex DD Space Operations.

App DD-2 Navigation Aids.

Annex FF Financial Support.

App FF-2 Contracting Support.

Annex SS STRACOM.

App SS-1 Information Environment Assessment.

Annex NN Knowledge Development.

App NN-1 Responsibility and Interest.

App NN-2 System Analysis.

Annex RR. Gender Perspective.

Annexes specific to NATO Cross-cutting Topics (CCTs).

TEMPLATE FOR SYSTEM ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL ENVIRONMENT

In order to assess every aspect of a civilian environment in a systematic way, a comprehensive list of factors is needed not to neglect any of them, and in the idea that it is always easier to simplify for specific need, than to create from anew. Furthermore, the use of the PMESII/ASCOPE allows continuation and deepening of the information already contained in country books, usually made using this same rationale. Furthermore, it provides a systematic way to guide the understanding, analysis or reporting of any new factor of an operation.

For standardization reasons, the same scheme is recommended to be used for other assessments and reporting, as far as possible.

1. DOMAINS AND AREAS OF INTEREST

The PMESII domains are further to be subdivided to make sure no area is left unstudied when using this method, and helps achieve proper staff workload. The whole array of non-military actors considered in this document are described in Ref. C¹⁵⁰. Information is organised in the following way:

- (1) **Domains** are named by their initial letter (PMESII), with a differentiation between Infrastructure I1 and Informational I2). Domains are divided in areas of strategic, operational or tactical interest, upon the level of planning conducting the analysis.
- (2) **Areas of strategic/operational/tactical interest**, named with subsequent numbers (P-1, M-1, etc.). Subareas receive subsequent numbering followed by a dot (Sub-area E-1.2, I1-2.3.5, etc.) as required. Each area and sub-area is analysed through guidance sheets.
- (3) **Guidance sheets**: They provide basic considerations for analysis and assessment by introducing the analysis of each ASCOPE domain. See next paragraph for guidance sheet format.

This hierarchy of information can be tailored for a specific mission by omitting irrelevant areas or subareas, or expanding the existing ones to produce specific analysis relevant to the mission as a whole. Each area and subarea c of them is also assessed according to defined normality indicators, following the standard CIMIC colour scheme (See TTP 4 CIMIC Reports and Symbols.

2. TEMPLATE LIST OF DOMAINS AND AREAS OF INTEREST

The template provides a comprehensive list of organised information relevant to any type of operation. The list is not comprehensive, and constitutes a base from which further studies can be conducted, by adding, omitting or further subdividing the domains into areas and sub-areas, as required.

In order to facilitate the standardisation of the information, a correspondence is established in the 'notes' column to relate the PMESII/ASCOPE domains with the 7 Baseline requirements for National Resilience as used in the framework of Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic

¹⁵⁰ Annex A.

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Area (DDA)¹⁵¹, which are a subset of them. This will make easy to make interoperable the PMESII/ASCOPE analysis with the 7BLR, or any other, and help de-conflict areas of analysis.

Not all areas and sub-areas have a developed guidance sheet. The rest of the remaining areas and sub-areas are still to be developed. Areas and sub-areas identified with a lowercase letter “x” are of appreciable CIMIC interest and can be object of development of further guidance sheets (IOs, GOs, NGOs are also part of CIMIC Data Base, useful to perform liaison activities).

CODE	ART. 5	CRO	DOMAIN, AREA, SUB-AREA	NOTES
P			POLITICAL	
P-1	X		Governance	
P-1.1		X	Public Administration	National, regional, local levels.
P-1.1.1			General System of Public Administration	
P-1.1.2			Structure of National Government	
P-1.1.3			Structure of Government at Other Levels	
P-1.1.4			The Armed Forces	
P-1.1.5			Political Parties	
P-1.1.6			International Affairs	
P-1.1.7			Host Nation Support	
P-1.1.8			Others.	
P-1.2		X	Law enforcement	Separation of powers, judiciary structure, formal and customary law, etc.
P-1.3	X	X	Healthcare	Public and private hospitals, infirmaries, evacuation means, etc.
P-1.4		x	Education	Private and state-owned, etc.
P-1.5	X	X	Police System	Police stations and presence, detention facilities.
P-1.6		X	Borders and customs	Crossing-points, illegal traffic, flow, taxes, etc.
P-1.7		X	Prison system	Prisons and detention facilities, security, prisoner rights, capacity, imprisoned public figures, etc.
P-1.8		X	Emergency services	Firefighting, equipment, etc.
P-1.9	X		Civil Defence and Civil preparedness (CEP)	Civil protection organisations, volunteer corps, etc.
P-1.10			Public welfare and finance	State resourcing, social benefits, etc.
P-2			Other non-military actors	
P-2.1	x	x	International organizations (IO)	UN, EU, African Union, etc. and their related agencies, UNOCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, ECHO, Europol, FRONTEX, Eurocontrol, etc.
P-2.2	x	x	Non-governmental organizations (NGO)	General, specialised, etc. Greenpeace, CARITAS, IDSB, etc.

¹⁵¹ The BL7 are specifically defined in document AC/98(IP)N(2016)0002. Factsheet on Baseline requirements for National Resilience and resilience guidelines.

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P-2.3	x	x	Governmental Organizations (GO)	Different form authorities and administration. Joint Stock Companies under control of the Government, reconstruction agencies, etc. USAID, UK Relief, AECID, THW, etc.
P-2.4		x	Civil society	Trade unions, cooperatives, political parties, universities, research institutes, private sector institutions, etc.
P-2.5			Private sector	Privately owned entities not considered in other paragraphs.
M			MILITARY	CIMIC only focuses on civilian implications for the military factor
M-1			Regular forces	Social status of military, veterans, conscription, relationship with industry, demining capability, paramilitary groups, etc.
M-2			Irregular forces and insurgents	Paramilitary, youth groups, etc.
M-3			Private military companies and other armed elements	Private security, etc. Blackwater, etc.
E			ECONOMIC	
E-1		X	Economy, banking and labour	Currencies, wealth, GDP, imports and exports, unemployment rate, central and private banking, credit availability, etc.
E-2	X		Key civil life support	
E-2.1		X	Water	Drinkable, irrigation.
E-2.2		X	Food	
E-4			Economic Development	Central and private banking, credit availability, etc.
S			SOCIAL	
S-1			History	Historical narratives social groups. Historical dates, locations, celebrations, etc.
S-2			Religion	Religions, sects, separation with temporal institutions, worship buildings, etc.
S-3			Culture	Languages, ethnic groups, etc.
S-4			Social System	Stratification of society, distribution of wealth, leading elements, lobbies, etc.
S-5			Vulnerable populations	IDP, refugees, evacuees, minority groups, freedom of movement (FOM), protection/ security, etc.
S-5.1			Minorities and vulnerable groups	
S-5.2	X		Uncontrolled, large scale movements of population	
S-5.3	X	X	IDP, refugee and evacuee assistance centres	
S-5.4		X	Shelter	
S-5.5		X	Humanitarian de-mining	

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S-5.6		X	Vulnerable population's freedom of movement	
S-5.7		X	Vulnerable population's protection security	
S-6			NATO Cross-cutting topics in the civil environment	
S-6.1			Protection of civilians (PoC)	How civilians are affected by operations.
S-6.2			Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC)	How children are affected by operations.
S-6.3			Women, Peace and Security (WPS)	How Women is affected by operations.
S-6.4			Cultural Property Protection (CPP)	How cultural property is affected by operations.
S-6.5			Building Integrity	Corruption-related issues.
I1	X		INFRASTRUCTURAL	
I1-1			Transportation Infrastructure	Public and private. General considerations
I1-0.1		X	Transportation infrastructure (general)	
I1-1.1		X	Road transport	
I1-1.2		X	Rail transport	
I1-1.3		X	Air transport	
I1-1.4		X	Maritime and inland waterway transport.	
I1-2			Energy	Power, gas, oil, nuclear, etc.
I1-3			Public Services infrastructure (Public/traditional/private)	Not described in other factors
I1-3.1		X	Emergency Services	
I1-3.2		X	Sanitation	
I2			INFORMATIONAL	
I2-1	X	X	Communication Infrastructure	Telecommunications and media. Radio, television, internet access, cabling network, etc.

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3. GUIDANCE SHEETS

The purpose of guidance sheets is to guide the CIMIC analyst or CMI contributor, at the level of command level considered, in the analysis of the issue described in the sheet. They provide important aspects to look for in the assessment.

In the guidance sheet, the PMESII domains are cross-examined with the ASCOPE domains, always leaving room for other considerations not dealt with by this subdivision plan. Finally, each sub-domain concludes with an assessment to be done by the three-column format, as well as a paragraph to record the implications for the allied forces in which the analysis is done.

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS (FORMAT)	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	<Letter>.
AREA	<Letter> - <Numeric designator>.
SUBAREA	<Letter> - <Numeric designator>. <Numeric designator>.
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	<Description of conditions of no significant impact on the situation>
AMBER	<Description of conditions of limited impact on the situation>
RED	<Description of conditions of significant impact on the situation>
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	<Scope of the analysis>
AREA	<Information relevant to the ASCOPE domain>
STRUCTURE	<Information relevant to the ASCOPE domain>
CAPABILITIES	<Information relevant to the ASCOPE domain>
ORGANISATIONS	<Information relevant to the ASCOPE domain>
PEOPLE	<Information relevant to the ASCOPE domain>
EVENTS	<Information relevant to the ASCOPE domain>
OTHER	<Information relevant not included in the ASCOPE domains>
ASSESSMENT	<Synthesis and conclusions>

Annex I provides already developed guidance sheets to help produce assessments at the operational and tactical level. Similar sheets can be tailored for the strategic and more detailed/tailored tactical levels, as required generally or for specific missions. These guidance sheets have only been developed in the scope of CROs.¹⁵²

¹⁵² These guidance sheets have been imported and adapted from the previous version AM-86-1-1 (2012). They were designed mainly for a Crisis Response Operation such as Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan.

TACTICAL CRITICAL FACTORS CHECKLIST

<p>Water</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Locations ✓ Facilities ✓ Serviceability ✓ Supply ✓ Availability ✓ Treatment ✓ Pollution ✓ POCs ✓ Shortfalls ✓ Civil Implications ✓ Military Implications <p>Sanitation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Locations ✓ Facilities ✓ Serviceability ✓ Treatment ✓ POCs ✓ Shortfalls ✓ Civil Implications ✓ Military Implications <p>Energy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Locations ✓ Facilities ✓ Distribution Network ✓ Serviceability ✓ Supply ✓ Availability ✓ Dependency ✓ Resources Requirement ✓ Human Resources ✓ Fuel Type ✓ Reserves ✓ Hazardous Issues ✓ POCs ✓ Shortfalls ✓ Civil Implications ✓ Military Implications 	<p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Locations ✓ Facilities ✓ Availability ✓ Diseases ✓ Human Resources ✓ Medical waste ✓ Hygiene ✓ POCs ✓ Shortfalls ✓ Civil Implications ✓ Military Implications <p>Food</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Availability ✓ Supply ✓ Distribution ✓ POCs ✓ Shortfalls ✓ Civil Implications ✓ Military Implications
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BEST PRACTICES ON USING THE THREE-COLUMN FORMAT

<u>THREE-COLUMN FORMAT</u>		
<u>FACTOR</u> (What?)	<u>DEDUCTION</u> (So what?)	<u>CONCLUSION</u> (now what?)
A significant factual statement of information known to be true that has operational implication.	The implications, issues or considerations, derived from fact(s) that have operational significance.	The outcome or result reached that requires action in planning or further analysis.
<i>What is the current state of affairs or trends?</i>	<i>So what is the significance of the factor?</i>	<i>So, what can or should be done?</i>

This Annex provides useful hints to be applied during an assessment of factors. Its application can help detect cognitive biases that contaminate logical thinking and the drawing of sound and critical conclusions. Although mainly written as an aid to apply Ref. A, it can also help planners in other levels and situations.

When considering factors, planners should consider the purpose of **planning at their level**. With the use of all of the information that the OPG or planning team has available to them, planners will need to appreciate those system-states (i.e. key factors) that they will need to change in order to achieve the system-states that the alliance desires based upon the tactical/operational objectives within the OPD/SPD. Thinking in this manner will lead planners to relevant factors that need to be analysed.

The initial information that planners will populate in the template will be the **factor/fact** itself. From them deductions are formulated, which follow by inference or deduction into conclusions. The relationship between the three has to be direct and natural. When doing so, many unknowns may arise.

When determining relevant factors or facts to be analysed, planners will need to ensure that they have actual **factual statements** about the OE (preferably, citing the source from where the information has been obtained). In order to determine relevancy of the factors, the Knowledge Development (KD) database and SACEUR's Strategic Assessment (SSA) are of utmost importance and KD SMEs will play a critical support role in assisting the OPG or the planning team with the determination of these factors.

Planners will need to ensure that their **factors are not hidden deductions** based upon their review of the facts within the material and resources they have to identify factors in the operational environment. If planners have developed a deduction as opposed to a factor (a factual statement), they will need to look for a particular factor that is leading them to that deduction and then place both, that factor and the deduction, in their appropriate column.

When **assumptions** need to be made about particular factors (in the absence of information), planners should look to register them as such into the conclusion column, and should not be analysed as if they were factors proper. However, very obvious assumptions about factors can be placed into the deduction column as a deduction.

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When looking at the **conclusions**, planners will need to consider what change should happen related to them: what should be known, asked, planned for, done, had, achieved, etc. Thinking in these terms when developing conclusions will assist in gathering more relevant information to form the basis of the early analytical work within the planning body.

When obtaining conclusions, It is usually helpful to think not only in terms of action but also in terms **inaction or omission**: 'what will happen if we do nothing'. The consequences associated with the latter can assist in thinking about alternative conclusions that planners need to consider.

The conclusions and their follow-up are the specific products that the JOPG or planning team will take away from this technique. Conclusions must be relevant and useful in determining military requirements and specific operational conditions that must be established with respect to forces/actors, time and space¹⁵³. In this regard, the JOPG will extract them out from the template used for factor analysis and use them to assist in the development of future products that will be used later in the planning process. Since the conclusions are separated from the rest of the factor analysis and used as individual statements, the JOPG will need to ensure that conclusions are properly written as standalone, easily understandable statements.

These stand-alone conclusions will ultimately have to be put into context when developing the operational framework, later on the planning process. They should be categorized into specific areas so that when future products are being developed, the conclusions can be easily sorted and selected.

Some conclusions may, instead of being written as 'standalone' statements, be transformed in some categories of conclusions such as:

- Operational actions (OA),
- Operational Effects (OE),
- Conditions to be Established (CE),
- Decisive Conditions (OC),
- Decisive Points (DP).

Some examples of these are the following, taking a conclusion such as:

Fact 21: Due to its geographic proximity to ENY country D, the population of urban region A from NATO country B receives most of its fresh food supply by road C from ENY country D. It takes average 10 days from initial warehouse storage in D to distribute it through the markets and local providers (source: Ministry of Agriculture of HN).

Fact 22: Most road transport used between countries B and D means are private, some 25% of them registered in country B, some 75% in country D (informal source and unconfirmed data from officials at the Municipality of urban Area D of HN region).

Fact 23: HNS of country B does not have standing transport resources, nor established nationalisation legal arrangements to substitute a lack of transport means in a period of 10 days (source: Ministry of transportation).

Deduction 21.1: A prolonged closing of the border due to ENY Country D decision or due to a raise of tension in the border at region A can cause transport companies registered in

¹⁵³ Ref. A, pg. 4-44, footnote 50

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Country D to cease supply, or selectively attend only the needs of proxy population in the region.

Deduction 21.2.

Conclusions:

Assumptions: Local population in urban region have little or no capability of self-sustaining upon a cut of fresh food supply after 10 days of cease of supply.

Conclusions 21.1.: With few alternative food providers for the civilian population of <region A>, ENY hybrid forces could use the lack of supply to easily stir civil unrest against NATO forces and advance the polarisation policy towards secession of region A from country B.

Assumption 23: Given the small size of the population of region A as compared with the overall population of country B, HN of B has the ability to provide food for the population of region A in case of cut of supply from ENY country D.

Info Requirement 65: How long (in days) can the population of region B hold without fresh food supply?

Up such conclusion some possible results be turned into Operational Effects such as:

OE 32: Support Civil Emergency Planning of HN B for region A.

OE 33: Convince HN to accelerate emergency legal arrangements to provide transportation of food to region A.

or Complementary non-military actions (CNMA):

CNMA 06: Coordinate with WFP regional office the provision of transportation means through their resources.

or into Operational Actions such as:

OA 32: Enable the support to HN B upon closing of the border with country D through contingency planning.

or Decisive Conditions such as:

DC 10: Basic needs of the population of region B assured.

or additionally, into an information requirements:

IR 25 What are the activities in the food warehouses in country D"

IR 26 How long will it take for WFP to provide minimum transportation means in 10 days in case of humanitarian food shortage crisis?

IR 27 What should we know, do, achieve, plan for, need to have' to be successful in this scenario?

NON-MILITARY ACTORS CENTRE OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS


CoG <HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATION X>

Aim: Ensure the basic needs of the affected population are met in an effective and efficient manner.	
Centre of Gravity (-s): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safe and unimpeded access to the affected population. 	Critical Capabilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quick Access and support to the <AREA>. • Wide field presence and local knowledge. • Comprehensive understanding of the humanitarian situation
Critical Vulnerabilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Instrumentalisation of HA. • Lack of secure access to <AREA>. • Competitive use of the LOCs/logistic assets. • Lack of security for humanitarian workers 	Critical Requirements: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimum harm to the civilians and to the environment (fast kinetic part). • Secure and unimpeded Access to the population. • Work with HN. • Coordination with other relevant actors
Conclusions: NATO supports SASE. Civ-mil coordination and interaction with the humanitarian organization	

Non-military Actor's CoG Analysis

Actors	CoG	Conclusions
Humanitarian agencies	Access to population	1. Support to the Safe and Secure Environment (SASE). 2. Civ-Mil coordination and de-confliction. 3. Understanding of the impact of military operation. 4. Promote conditions for post-conflict resolution. 5. Synchronize MIL efforts to other instruments of power. 6. ICRC and NATO agreed procedures should be followed. 7. ICRC special status should be recognised by all parties.
Development orgs / EU and Gos	Regional stability	
ICRC	Unique status and mandate of ICRC under international law.	

DRAFT CIMIC CONCEPT (EXAMPLE)



Paragraph (8) TF CIMIC Concept:

“CIMIC will support the JTF operations by enhancing close cooperation with HNs and key non-military actors. CIMIC will facilitate the coordination of military plans with HNs Civil Emergency Plans. CIMIC will also contribute to de-conflict military and non-military actions in order to preserve unity and efficiency of efforts, enable IO/NGO provision of humanitarian assistance if needed, and monitor and assess the negative consequences of military operations in the civil environment.

EFFECTS RELATED TERMS

According to Ref. C (3-1) and common experience, this annex provides a list of useful verbs that can be used to express effects and tasks in the development of the commander's intent for an operation. They help transform the will into concrete actions to be achieved or executed. The list, in alphabetical order, is not exhaustive, and are NATO agreed terms. Excessively vague terms such as 'achieve' or 'understand' are to be avoided as much as possible:

Assess: To estimate the capabilities and performance of organizations, individuals or systems.

Convince: Brought to belief, consent, or a course of action.

Coordinate. Bring functions, systems or entities operating in the same environment in proper relation in order to avoid counter-productive results such as duplication of effort or mutually negating actions.

Develop: Advance a friendly capability and competence.

Educate: An activity to teach the benefits or consequences of patterns of behaviour.

Emphasise. Add further credibility or information which will enhance effects of existing ops and further develop key messages and themes.

Empower. Promoted confidence, authority, accountability and responsibility in an individual or group(s).

Enable: Provide means, conditions or authority to make possible.

Enhance: To increase or improve in value, quality, desirability, or attractiveness.

Establish: To institute (something, such as a law) permanently, or to to make firm or stable, or to put into a favourable position.

Exploit. Take advantage taken of success, by seizing opportunities, and following up initial gain(s), or taken advantage of an individual or group(s) weaknesses or vulnerabilities.

Facilitate: To make easier, help bring about an event or situation.

Find. Detected, recognises, identified and/or located an opportunity, activity, situation, event or individual or group(s).

Maximise or minimise: to increase/decrease to a maximum/minimum or to make the most/least of something.

Prevent. Keep from happening, avert.

Promote. Advocate or advance awareness of an individual, organisation and/or courses of action.

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
Reassure. Restore confidence or dispel fear.

Reconcile. Restore friendly relations between people; make apparently incompatible groups able to exist together without conflict.

Sustain or support: Aid, complement another non-military actor, individual, or group (s).

CIMIC CONTRIBUTION TO OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT

Operational effects (extract). STATUS G+90



OE3, OE06 and OE07 are related to non-military effects, CIMIC should contribute to the MoE and MoP.

Possible MoE for OE11, and OE03

Code of MoE	Effect	Description of MoE	Threshold of success	Threshold of Failure	Unit of measurement	Periodicity of Measurement
OE11MOE01	OE11	Flow of workers from <COUNTRY> through ferry	70	20	% from peacetime levels same time of year	Daily
OE12MOE01	OE11	Cargo FLOW in ports of <PORT1> and <PORT2>	70	20	% from peacetime levels same time of year	Weekly
OE03MOE01	OE03	Appliances by former <ETHNIC GROUP> specialised operators granted by municipality.	50	30	% from pre-crisis PE	Monthly
OE03MOE02	OE03	Public statements in spt of <ETHNIC MINORITY>	1	0	%	Weekly
OE03MOE02	OE03	Public statements in spt of <ETHNIC MINORITY>			%	Weekly

GUIDANCE SHEETS FOR FACTOR ANALYSIS AT OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL LEVEL

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	POLITICAL
AREA	P-1 GOVERNANCE
SUBAREA	P-1.1 PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND ADMINISTRATION
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to the functioning of Civil Authorities within the AOI.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to problems associated with the functioning of Civil Authorities within AOI.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with lack of functional Civil Authorities which might require significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of the analysis.
AREA	Locations of governance.
STRUCTURE	Structure of Local Authorities within AOO.
CAPABILITIES	Resource requirement (Human). Capability gaps. Status of functionality.
ORGANISATIONS	Scale of dependency. Security/Protection issues. Sustainability.
PEOPLE	Key personalities. Attitude of Authorities. Even-handedness of authorities. Attitude of dependent population. Resource requirement (human). Specialist support.
EVENTS	Official celebrations
OTHER	
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	POLITICAL
AREA	P-1 GOVERNANCE
SUBAREA	P-1.2 LAW ENFORCEMENT
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems deriving from the Law & Order system and/or associated capabilities within AOI.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to problems deriving from the Law & Order system and/or associated capabilities within the AOI.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with the Law & Order system and/or associated capabilities within the AOI that causes significant risk or requiring significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of the analysis.
AREA	Judicial layout
STRUCTURE	Structure and system of Law & Order within AOO.
CAPABILITIES	Capability gaps. Resource requirement (materiel)
ORGANISATIONS	Status of functionality. Security/Protection issues. Effectiveness of Judicial system.
PEOPLE	Locations and key personalities. Attitude of judicial authorities. Attitude of dependent population. Resource requirement (human). Specialist support. Even-handedness.
EVENTS	
OTHER	Root cause/source of problems. Trends of problems/incidents.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	POLITICAL
AREA	P-1 GOVERNANCE
SUBAREA	P-1.3 HEALTHCARE
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems deriving from the healthcare infrastructure and associated issues as the level of supply (in quantity and/or quality) within the AOI.
AMBER	Level of functionality of the healthcare infrastructure and associated issues as the level of supply (in quantity and/or quality) pose a risk and have therefore a limited impact on the mission.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems with the healthcare infrastructure and associated issues as the level of supply (in quantity and/or quality) that pose an immediate risk or requiring significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of the analysis.
AREA	Locations/Type of facilities.
STRUCTURE	Structure and system of border control system within AOO. Infrastructure problems. Serviceability of facilities/network. Power supply problems. Mortuary infrastructure
CAPABILITIES	Capability gaps/critical shortfalls. Resource requirement (materiel) Medical waste management. Emergency life support (Standby generators for surgery/ICU)
ORGANISATIONS	Status of functionality. Security/protection issues.
PEOPLE	Attitude of healthcare workers. Attitude of dependent population. Scale of dependency. Resource requirement (human). Specialist support (surgeons, etc.).
EVENTS	Operational status (24 hrs capability?).
OTHER	Hazards. Potential route cause of problems (ethnic violence, organised crime, etc). Trends of problems/incidents. Information campaign.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	POLITICAL
AREA	P-1 GOVERNANCE
SUBAREA	P-1.5 POLICE SYSTEM
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with Police/Law & Order requiring military resources or affecting Allied Forces' interests.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to problems associated with Police/Law & Order as a functioning but in resources or spectrum of capabilities limited Police/Law & Order authorities leading to an increased involvement of military resources on law & order type activities/incidents.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with Police/Law & Order as severe capability gaps, increased levels of violence beyond control of police capability and/or requirements for significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of the analysis.
AREA	Station layout. Prime locations of trouble areas if identifiable.
STRUCTURE	Structure and system of Law & Order within AOO. C2 structure.
CAPABILITIES	Is there a functioning police capability within AOO? Capability gaps/critical shortfalls. Resource requirement (materiel) Are there any or sufficient riot control resources/capability?
ORGANISATIONS	Status of functionality. Security/Protection issues. Effectiveness of Judicial system. Are there any indications of corruption (specify scale)?
PEOPLE	Locations and key personalities. Attitude of police assets. Attitude of dependent population. Resource requirement (human) Specialist support (investigation, etc.). Even-handedness.
EVENTS	Is there any evidence of power vacuum or indications of escalation in organised crime?
OTHER	Potential route cause of problems (ethnic violence, organised crime, etc). Trends of problems/incidents. Information campaign.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	POLITICAL
AREA	P-1 GOVERNANCE
SUBAREA	P-1.6 BORDERS AND CUSTOMS
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with the functioning of borders and the customs system in place and in operation within the AOI.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to problems associated with border control, the customs system and/or immigration issues within AOI.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with border control and/or the customs system and/or immigration issues within AOI.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of the analysis.
AREA	Border both legal and illegal border-crossing points. Locations/Type of facilities. Trade routes/implications.
STRUCTURE	Structure and system of border control system within AOO. Infrastructure problems. Border crossing flow rate (by transport means).
CAPABILITIES	Armed (capability), Night Vision capability. Riot/crowd control measures/capability. Capability gaps/critical shortfalls. Resource requirement (materiel)
ORGANISATIONS	Evidence of a coherent policy toward immigration/custom/border control. Status of functionality. Security/protection issues. Effectiveness of border control system. Are there any indications of corruption (specify scale)?
PEOPLE	Attitude of Border guards. Attitude of dependent population. Resource requirement (human) Specialist support. Even-handedness.
EVENTS	Operational status (24 hrs capability?).
OTHER	Potential route cause of problems (ethnic violence, organised crime, etc). Trends of problems/incidents. Information campaign.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	POLITICAL
AREA	P-1 GOVERNANCE
SUBAREA	P-1.7 PRISON SYSTEM
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with the prison system within the AOI.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to problems/incidents relating to the prison system within the AOI.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with the prison system within the AOI (specify).
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of the analysis.
AREA	Locations of prisons and detention facilities.
STRUCTURE	Structure and system of prison system within AOO. Infrastructure problems.
CAPABILITIES	Capacity versus population of facilities. Riot control resources/capability. Accessibility. Capability gaps/critical shortfalls. Resource requirement (materiel)
ORGANISATIONS	Status of functionality. Security/Protection issues. Effectiveness of Judicial system. Are there any indications of corruption (specify scale)? Corruption.
PEOPLE	Locations and key personalities. Attitude of police assets. Attitude of dependent population. Resource requirement (human) Specialist support (riot control, escape contingency, etc.). Even-handedness.
EVENTS	
OTHER	Potential route cause of problems (ethnic violence, organised crime, etc). Trends of problems/incidents. Information campaign.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	ECONOMIC
AREA	E-1 ECONOMY, BANKING AND LABOUR (GENERAL)
SUBAREA	
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with banking or economy within the AOI.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to problems associated with banking and economy within the AOI.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with banking & economy within the AOI.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of the analysis.
AREA	Locations/Type of facilities.
STRUCTURE	Is there a functional banking system to manage public concerns (pensions)? Structure and system of border control system within AOO. Infrastructure problems.
CAPABILITIES	Capability gaps/critical shortfalls. Resource requirement (materiel)
ORGANISATIONS	Ability of civil authorities to deal/manage problem. Status of functionality. Security/protection issues. Is there any donor involvement? Is there evidence of corruption or organised crime?
PEOPLE	Attitude of authorities. Attitude of dependent population. Resource requirement (human) Specialist support (cameras, etc.).
EVENTS	Operational status (24 hrs capability?).
OTHER	Potential route cause of problems (ethnic violence, organised crime, etc). What can military do to assist or to disengage? Trends of problems/incidents. Short term impact and long term impact on economic stability of AOI. Impact of problem on civil environment and military mission. Is there an appropriate information/media campaign to inform/reassure public?
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	ECONOMIC
AREA	E-2 KEY CIVIL LIFE SUPPORT
SUBAREA	E-2.1 WATER
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems deriving from the water infrastructure and associated issues as the level of supply and disease control within the AOI.
AMBER	Level of functionality of the water infrastructure and associated issues as supply and disease control have a limited impact on the mission.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with water infrastructure that causes significant risk to healthcare or supply or requiring significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of the analysis.
AREA	Locations/Type of facilities. Distribution Network.
STRUCTURE	Structure and system of border control system within AOO. Infrastructure problems. Serviceability of facilities/network.
CAPABILITIES	Capability gaps/critical shortfalls. Resource requirement (materiel)
ORGANISATIONS	Status of functionality. Security/protection issues.
PEOPLE	Scale of dependency. Attitude of dependent population. Resource requirement (human) Specialist support (cameras, etc.).
EVENTS	Operational status (24 hrs capability?).
OTHER	Hazards. Potential route cause of problems. Trends of problems/incidents. Information campaign.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	ECONOMIC
AREA	E-2 KEY CIVIL LIFE SUPPORT
SUBAREA	E-2.2 FOOD
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems deriving from food supply and associated issues like distribution.
AMBER	Level of food supply (in quantity and/or quality) and associated issues like distribution have limited impact on the mission.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with the food (in quantity and/or quality) and associated issues like distribution or requiring significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of the analysis.
AREA	Locations/Type of facilities (markets, stores, etc.).
STRUCTURE	Structure and system of food distribution system within AOO. IO/NGO stockpile facilities/distribution network. Infrastructure problems. De-confliction of movement/logistic pipeline
CAPABILITIES	Serviceability of facilities/network. Capability gaps/critical shortfalls. Resource requirement (materiel). Logistic issues (storage, etc.).
ORGANISATIONS	Status of functionality. Security/protection issues. IO/NGO planning.
PEOPLE	Scale of dependency. Attitude of dependent population. Resource requirement (human) Specialist support (vet, etc.). Limitations on FOM.
EVENTS	Operational status (24 hrs capability?).
OTHER	Potential route cause of problems (ethnic violence, organised crime, etc). Trends of problems/incidents. Information campaign.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	SOCIAL
AREA	S-5 VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
SUBAREA	S-5.1 MINORITIES AND VULNERABLE GROUPS
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with minorities and vulnerable groups within the AOI.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to problems associated with minorities and vulnerable groups.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with minorities and vulnerable groups that require significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of the analysis.
AREA	Location of problem areas.
STRUCTURE	Structure and system of border control system within AOO. Infrastructure problems. Is there a forum to conduct integrated planning?
CAPABILITIES	Type of support (protection, engineer, logistic). Capability gaps/critical shortfalls. Resource requirement (materiel)
ORGANISATIONS	Status of functionality. Security/protection issues. Current or planned confidence measures.
PEOPLE	Attitudes of minorities and vulnerable groups to military and IO/NGOs. Level of information available to minorities and vulnerable groups. Attitude of dependent population. Key concerns of minorities and vulnerable groups.
EVENTS	Sustainability of minorities or vulnerable groups (consider seasonal implications).
OTHER	Level or trend of military support. Potential route cause of problems (ethnic violence, organised crime, etc). Trends of problems/incidents. Information/education campaigns to influence actions in a positive or negative manner.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	SOCIAL
AREA	S-5 VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
SUBAREA	S-5.2 UNCONTROLLED L.S. MOVEMENT OF POPULATIONS
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with IDPs, Refugees and Evacuees movement within AOI.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to problems related to IDPs, Refugees and Evacuees movements within the AOI.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with IDPs, Refugees and Evacuees movements within AOI, either conflicting with military FOM or LOC and/or requiring significant military resources to apply control measures to mitigate the impact on the military mission.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of the analysis.
AREA	Locations of IOP, Refugee and Evacuee concentrations.
STRUCTURE	Structure and system of border control system within AOO. Infrastructure problems. Is there any platform for integrated planning? Measures to ensure de-confliction of routes.
CAPABILITIES	IO/NGO/HN or civil authority capability gaps. Resource requirement (materiel)
ORGANISATIONS	IO/NGO/HN planning. Security/protection issues.
PEOPLE	Attitude of dependent population. Resource requirement (human) Specialist support (cameras, etc.).
EVENTS	Indications of likely or planned IDPs, Refugees and Evacuees movement. Seasonal implications (key life support).
OTHER	Potential route cause of problems (ethnic violence, organised crime, etc). What is likely impact on military? What can military do (specify) to minimise effect or to assist civil authorities? Trends of problems/incidents. Information campaign.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	SOCIAL
AREA	S-5 VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
SUBAREA	S-5.3 IDP, REFUGEE AND EVACUEE ASSISTANCE CENTRES
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with IDP, Refugee and Evacuee Assistance Centres within AOI.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to problems associated with IDPs, Refugees and Evacuees Assistance Centres within AOI.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with IDPs, Refugees and Evacuees Assistance Centres within the AOI.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of analysis.
AREA	Key Sites/Installations.
STRUCTURE	Structure and system of border control system within AOO. Infrastructure problems. Is there any platform for integrated planning?
CAPABILITIES	Capability gaps or critical shortfalls. Nature and scale of dependency.
ORGANISATIONS	Civil Authority contingency planning or functional status. Allegiance of Management. Security/Protection issues.
PEOPLE	Impact on civilian morale. Human resourcing. Specialist support.
EVENTS	Evidence of exploitation for hostile or negative effect (harbour terrorism etc).
OTHER	Obstacles/hazards. Impact of problem on civil environment and military mission. Impact on military operations.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	SOCIAL
AREA	S-5 VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
SUBAREA	S-5.4. SHELTER
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems deriving from shelter requirements and associated issues within the AOI.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to an increasing demand for shelter and associated issues within the AOI.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with shelter requirements and related issues or of such kind that require significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of the analysis.
AREA	Scale of damage to existing shelter within AOO. Planned or actual Collective Humanitarian shelter site locations. Shelter denial measures (Mines, UXO or obstacles). Isolated communities.
STRUCTURE	Key life support infrastructure for collective centres. Infrastructure problems. IOPs, Refugees and Evacuees Assistance Centres, support, disengagement.
CAPABILITIES	Capability gaps/critical shortfalls. Resource requirement (materiel)
ORGANISATIONS	IO/NGO planning, timelines, realisation of tasks/goals. Status of functionality. Security/protection issues.
PEOPLE	Attitude of population sheltered/unsheltered. Attitude of dependent population. Resource requirement (human) Specialist support (cameras, etc.).
EVENTS	Seasonal impact (Short & Longer term). Consider winterisation implications.
OTHER	Limitations in FOM. Potential route cause of problems (ethnic violence, organised crime, etc). Trends of problems/incidents. Information campaign.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	SOCIAL
AREA	S-5 VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
SUBAREA	S-5.5 HUMANITARIAN DE-MINING
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with HA de-mining within AOI.
AMBER	Level and nature of requirement to provide military resources for HA de-mining capability has a limited impact on the mission.
RED	Significant on the mission due to problems associated with HA de-mining and/or the level and nature of requirements to involve significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of the analysis.
AREA	Locations/Type of facilities.
STRUCTURE	Structure and system of de-mining actions within AOO. Is there a structured approach? Serviceability of facilities/network.
CAPABILITIES	Capability gaps/critical shortfalls. Resource requirement (materiel)
ORGANISATIONS	Status of functionality. Security/protection issues.
PEOPLE	Attitude of dependent population. Resource requirement (human) Specialist support (C-IED, etc.). Scale of dependency.
EVENTS	Operational status (24 hrs capability?).
OTHER	Hazards. Potential route cause of problems (ethnic violence, organised crime, etc). Trends of problems/incidents. Information campaign.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	SOCIAL
AREA	S-5 VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
SUBAREA	S-5.6 VULNERABLE POPULATION'S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (FOM).
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems of non-military actors' FOM within the AOI.
AMBER	Restrictions in non-military actors' FOM have a limited impact on the mission.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to restrictions in non-military actors' FOM and/or the requirement to involve significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of the analysis.
AREA	Are there any areas of non-military actors' FOM restrictions within AOO that are causing IO/NGO concern in critical life support for isolated communities?
STRUCTURE	Structure and system of border control system within AOO. Infrastructure problems.
CAPABILITIES	Capability gaps/critical shortfalls. Resource requirement (materiel)
ORGANISATIONS	Is there a sensible degree of IO/NGO/HN contingency planning to minimise impact of non-military actors' FOM restriction in short term? Is there a sound forum for the exchange of information relating to non-military actors' FOM issues (i.e.; liaison architecture, information campaign, road going, and security situation briefings for key civil actors)? Is there a forum to conduct integrated planning? Status of functionality. Security/protection issues.
PEOPLE	Attitude of dependent population. Resource requirement (human)
EVENTS	Seasonal implications for non-military actors' FOM.
OTHER	Potential route cause of problems (ethnic violence, organised crime, etc). Trends of problems/incidents. What is the trend for requested military support? Information/education campaigns to influence actions in a positive or negative manner. Likely media and political impact/interest.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	SOCIAL
AREA	S-5 VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
SUBAREA	S-5.7 VULNERABLE POPULATION'S PROTECTION/SECURITY
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems deriving from HA protection within AOI.
AMBER	Level of required military support to HA protection has limited impact on the mission.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with HA protection demands requiring significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Define scale of protection related tasks undertaken by military across JOA/AOO.
AREA	Locations/Type of facilities to be protected. Type of protection tasks (area security, patrolling, site security, installation or route protection, convoy protection).
STRUCTURE	Structure and system of security to vulnerable populations within AOO. Infrastructure problems (lack of reliable communications, etc.). Are there any confidence building measures in place or planned?
CAPABILITIES	Capability gaps within civil or IO/NGO/HN resources. Capability gaps/critical shortfalls. Resource requirement (materiel)
ORGANISATIONS	Status of functionality. Security/protection issues.
PEOPLE	Attitude of public to protection issues and military in general. Attitude of dependent population. Resource requirement (human) Vulnerable groups or issues associated with protection (ethnic or religious minorities, etc.).
EVENTS	Trends or patterns of protection related incidents. Evidence or indicators to suggest use of hostile or negative information campaign targeted at IO/NGO/HNs, military or specific civil communities.
OTHER	Potential route cause of problems (ethnic violence, organised crime, etc). Trends of problems/incidents. Are there any confidence building measures in place or planned? Information campaign. Likely media and political impact/interest.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	I1 INFRASTRUCTURAL
AREA	I1-1 TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
SUBAREA	I1-0.1 TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE (GENERAL)
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with public transportation within the AOI.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to problems associated with Public Transportation within the AOI.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with public transportation as a critical disruption to the FOM of the population or of such kind that requires significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Define scale of protection related tasks undertaken by military across JOA/AOO.
AREA	Locations/Type of facilities. Type of protection tasks (area security, patrolling, site security, installation or route protection, convoy protection).
STRUCTURE	Structure and system of border control system within AOO. Infrastructure problems.
CAPABILITIES	Capability gaps within civil or IO/NGO/HN resources. Capability gaps/critical shortfalls. Resource requirement (materiel)
ORGANISATIONS	Status of functionality. Security/protection issues.
PEOPLE	Attitude of public to protection issues and military in general. Attitude of dependent population. Resource requirement (human) Vulnerable groups or issues associated with protection (i.e.; key sites, installations).
EVENTS	Trends or patterns of protection related incidents. Evidence or indicators to suggest use of hostile or negative information campaign targeted at IO/NGO/HNs, military or specific civil communities.
OTHER	Potential route cause of problems (ethnic violence, organised crime, etc). Trends of problems/incidents. Are there any confidence building measures in place or planned? Information campaign. Likely media and political impact/interest.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	I1 INFRASTRUCTURAL
AREA	I1-1 TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
SUBAREA	I1-1.1 ROAD TRANSPORT
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems deriving from the Road Network within the AOI.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to problems associated with the Road Network within the AOI as disruption, capacity limitation, quality or connectivity.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with the Road Network within the AOI as disruption, capacity limitation, quality or connectivity or since requiring significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of the analysis.
AREA	Road layout. Damage to Road Network. Critical repairs.
STRUCTURE	Structure and system of road management system within AOO. Serviceability of bridges, embankments, key drainage and tunnels. Infrastructure problems.
CAPABILITIES	De-confliction of movement. Traffic Control capability and measures. Capability gaps/critical shortfalls. Resource requirement (materiel)
ORGANISATIONS	Status of functionality. Security/protection issues. Mines/UXO (unexploded ordnance)/denial measures. Civil Authority contingency planning or functional status
PEOPLE	Attitude of transport personnel. Attitude of dependent population. Resource requirement (human) Specialist support (cameras, etc.).
EVENTS	Seasonal implications.
OTHER	Obstacles/hazards. Impact on military and civilian movement Potential route cause of problems (ethnic violence, organised crime, etc). Trends of problems/incidents. Information campaign.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	I1 INFRASTRUCTURAL
AREA	I1-1 TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
SUBAREA	I1-1.2 RAIL TRANSPORT
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems deriving from the rail transport within the AOI.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to problems associated with rail transport within the AOI, as disruption, capacity limitation, quality or connectivity.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with the rail transport within the AOI as disruption, capacity limitation, quality or connectivity or since requiring significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of problem.
AREA	Rail layout by type. Reliability of rail services.
STRUCTURE	Damage to rail transport. Serviceability of bridges, embankments, key drainage and tunnels. Serviceability of rolling stock.
CAPABILITIES	Heavy lift capabilities. Passenger/freight capabilities.
ORGANISATIONS	Ownership. Security/Protection issues. Mines/UXO/denial measures.
PEOPLE	Civil Authority contingency planning or functional status. Human resourcing. Specialist support.
EVENTS	Seasonal implications.
OTHER	Obstacles/hazards. Impact on military and civilian movement. Impact on military operations.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	I1 INFRASTRUCTURAL
AREA	I1-1 TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
SUBAREA	I1-1.3 AIR TRANSPORT
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems deriving from the Civil Aviation Infrastructure within the AOI.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to problems associated with the Civil Aviation Infrastructure within the AOI as capacity limitation, quality, coverage or security.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with the Civil Aviation Infrastructure within the AOI as capacity limitation, quality, coverage or security or since requiring significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of problem.
AREA	Air transport layout by type.
STRUCTURE	Reliability services. Serviceability of Airport infrastructure. Serviceability Navigational aids and qualified personnel.
CAPABILITIES	Passenger/freight capabilities. Heavy lift capability.
ORGANISATIONS	Mines/UXO/denial measures. Security/Protection issues.
PEOPLE	Human resources.
EVENTS	Seasonal implications.
OTHER	
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	I1 INFRASTRUCTURAL
AREA	I1-1 TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
SUBAREA	I1-1.4 MARITIME AND INLAND WATERWAY TRANSPORT
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems deriving from the Waterways and Ports within the AOI.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to problems associated with the Waterways and Ports within the AOI as disruption, capacity limitation, quality or connectivity.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with the Waterways and Ports within the AOI as disruption, capacity limitation, quality or connectivity or since requiring significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of problem.
AREA	Port layout by type and characteristics
STRUCTURE	Serviceability of port infrastructure. Serviceability Navigational aids and qualified personnel.
CAPABILITIES	Cargo/Passenger Transportation capabilities. Heavy lift capability.
ORGANISATIONS	Mines/UXO/denial measures. Security/Protection issues.
PEOPLE	Human resources.
EVENTS	Seasonal implications. Tidal Implications.
OTHER	Pollution Hazards.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	I1 INFRASTRUCTURAL
AREA	I1-3 PUBLIC SERVICES INFRASTRUCTURE (PUBLIC/TRADITIONAL/ PRIVATE)
SUBAREA	I1-3.1 EMERGENCY SERVICES
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with the functioning of emergency services within the AOI.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to problems associated with emergency services within the AOI as limitation in coverage, capabilities or capacity.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with emergency services within the AOI as limitation in coverage, capabilities or capacity requiring significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of analysis.
AREA	Number, type and location of emergency facilities within AOI. Distribution area of emergency services.
STRUCTURE	C2 structure of emergency response and management.
CAPABILITIES	Capacity versus current population strength of assistance centres. IO/NGO or civil authority capability gaps or critical shortfalls. Alternate sites for contingency overflow. Serviceability of equipment. Surge capacity/planning. Nature and scale of dependency. Critical Shortfalls. Sustainability.
ORGANISATIONS	Is there any platform for integrated planning? Security/protection issues. Reliability of organisations.
PEOPLE	Attitudes of population towards emergency services. Human resourcing. Public/amateur Service. Specialist support.
EVENTS	Seasonal implications (key life support). Evidence of exploitation for hostile or negative effect.
OTHER	Obstacles/hazards. Impact of problem on civil environment and military mission. Impact on military operations. Information campaign.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	I1 INFRASTRUCTURAL
AREA	I1-1.3 PUBLIC SERVICES INFRASTRUCTURE (PUBLIC/TRADITIONAL/ PRIVATE)
SUBAREA	I1-3.2 SANITATION
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to sanitation problems and related infrastructure within the AOI.
AMBER	Functionality of sanitation infrastructure and associated issues as treatment or disease have limited impact on the mission.
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to sanitation problems that pose a major health risk on civil or military communities or require significant military resources to manage the problem.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of analysis.
AREA	Number and type and location of facilities within AOI. Distribution area.
STRUCTURE	C2 structure of sanitation.
CAPABILITIES	Capacity versus current population strength of sanitation. IO/NGO/HN capability gaps or critical shortfalls. Alternate sites for contingency overflow. Serviceability of facilities/network. Power supply problems Nature and scale of dependency. Critical Shortfalls.
ORGANISATIONS	Is there any platform for integrated planning? Security/Protection issues. Reliability of organisations. Resource requirement (Human and Materiel).
PEOPLE	Attitudes of population. Human resourcing. Public/amateur Service. Specialist support.
EVENTS	Seasonal implications (key life support). Evidence of exploitation for hostile or negative effect.
OTHER	Obstacles/hazards. Impact of problem on civil environment and military mission. Impact on military operations. Information campaign.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

GUIDANCE SHEET FOR CIMIC AREA ANALYSIS	
(1) HEADING	
DOMAIN	I2 INFORMATIONAL
AREA	I2-1 COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE
SUBAREA	
(2) ASSESSMENT DEFINITION	
GREEN	No significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with telecommunications/media within the AOI.
AMBER	Limited impact on the mission due to problems associated with telecommunications/media within the AOI as limited availability or minor subversive information media
RED	Significant impact on the mission due to problems associated with telecommunications/media within the AOI as limited availability or minor °subversive information media.
(3) ASCOPE ANALYSIS	
INTRODUCTION	Scale of analysis.
AREA	Key Sites/Installations. Broadcast/Publication Distribution Area.
STRUCTURE	Damage to communications infrastructure. Language of broadcast/publication.
CAPABILITIES	Key means of communication (landline/mobile telephone capability/TV/radio/internet). Capability of relay sites/points. Capability gaps or critical shortfalls. Serviceability of telecommunication equipment. Nature and scale of dependency.
ORGANISATIONS	Civil Authority contingency planning or functional status. Allegiance of Management. Security/Protection issues. Impact of problem on Civil Emergency Planning measures. Reliability of Broadcast/Publication sources.
PEOPLE	Impact on civilian morale. Human resourcing. Public/Amateur Service. Specialist support.
EVENTS	Evidence of exploitation for hostile or negative effect.
OTHER	Obstacles/hazards. Impact of problem on civil environment and military mission. Impact on military operations.
ASSESSMENT	<Text>

CIMIC OVERVIEW

Example of CIMIC Overview (AOR: Unakos):

CIMIC OVERVIEW								
AOR: UNAKOS								
P	PUBLIC ADMINISTR.	LAW ENFORCEMENT	HEALTHCARE	POLICE SYSTEM	PRISON SYSTEM	BORDERS AND CUSTOMS	EMERGENCY SERVICES	CEP
	G	G	A ↑	G	G	G	G	○
E	ECONOMY, BANKING AND LABOUR		WATER		FOOD			
	G		G		G			
S	UNCONTROLLED, LARGE SCALE MOVEMENTS OF POPULATION		IOP, REFUGEE AND EVACUEE ASSISTANCE CENTRES		SHELTER	HUMANITARIAN DE-MINING	VULN. POP.'S FOM	VULN. POP.'S PROTECTION SECURITY
	G		G		R	G	A	G ↓
I1	ROAD TRANSPORT	RAIL TRANSPORT	AIR TRANSPORT	MARITIME AND INLAND WATERWAY TRANSPORT		ENERGY	SANITATION	CIMIC SITES
	A	G	○	G		G	A	G
I2	COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE							
	G							

G No significant problems	A Limited/Increased problems	R Significant problems
○ No visibility	↑ Improvement	↓ Worsening

TYPES OF CIMIC UNITS

This annex further develops the articulation of CIMIC UNITS in order to standardise and provide the necessary granularity to articulate CIMIC capability theatre-wide, naming and employment. Furthermore, acronyms using the three-letter format used by the capability codes are given to the different CIMIC UNITS.

1. **CIMIC BATTALION (CIMIC BN) or CIMIC GROUP (CIMIC GRP).** CIMIC BN is a CIMIC UNIT usually deployed in support of a Corps-level and/or Land Theatre Component Command-level.

a. **Organization.**

- (1) A CIMIC BN consists of:
 - (a) CIMIC BN HQ ¹⁵⁴
 - (b) Several CIMIC COYs (companies).
- (2) There are CIMIC COYs or CIMIC PLTs (platoons) in a CIMIC BNs which may include also non-CIMIC assets.

b. **Employment.**

- (1) The Command Group of the CIMIC BN should be physically embedded in the supported HQ (Corps-level or above).
- (2) CIMIC COYs can be transferred TACOM or TACON to the subordinate levels of command.

c. **Additional capability statements.** Adding to the capability statements of a CIMIC UNIT, the CIMIC BN must also be able to:

- (1) Exercise C2 of its CIMIC COYs.
- (2) Integrate all products generated by the CIMIC COYs and provide a continuous analysis of the civil environment.
- (3) Identify and assess civil key indicators and sensitive factors having a critical impact on the success of the mission.
- (4) Recommend mitigating measures to minimize the impact of the military on the civil environment and vice-versa.

¹⁵⁴ Also known as CIMIC-HQ-GRP. Not a proper CIMIC asset, as the asset is the unit it supports, namely, the CIMIC BN or CIMIC TF. Reference to CIMIC-HQ-GRP is only found in AFS Vol II Land Forces. A-1.

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2. **CIMIC COMPANY (CIMIC COY).** CIMIC COY is a CIMIC UNIT usually deployed in support of a division-size unit.

a. **Organization.** A CIMIC COY consists of:

- (1) Command Section.
- (2) Several CIMIC PLTs.
- (3) Support Platoon.

b. The Support Platoon generally consists of:

- (1) Planning Section.
- (2) Operations & Assessment Section.
- (3) Communication and Information Systems (CIS) Section.

c. **Employment.**

- (1) The Command Section and Support Platoon of a CIMIC COY should be co-located with the Division HQ.
- (2) CIMIC PLT can be assigned TACON/TACOM to manoeuvre Brigades/Battlegroups of the Division.

d. **Additional capability statements.** Adding to the capability statements of a CIMIC UNIT, the CIMIC COY must also be able to:

- (1) make sure the Command Section is able to exercise C2 of the Support Platoon and assigned CIMIC PLTs.
- (2) make sure the Support Platoon integrates all products generated by the CIMIC PLTs and provides a continuous analysis of the civil environment at Divisional level, highlighting vulnerabilities which might affect the success of the mission and recommending mitigating measures.

3. **CIMIC PLATOON (CIMIC PLT).**

- a. CIMIC PLT is a CIMIC UNIT usually deployed in support of a manoeuvre Brigade/Battlegroup. It is the smallest CIMIC asset capable of conducting all three CIMIC Core Functions.
- b. The structure of a CIMIC Platoon (see figure below) is based on the need to establish a common framework, based on different experiences on the field, and provided that it may be the most practical entity to provide a CIMIC asset. However, it remains modular to adapt to mission requirements. Modularity allows nations to contribute with sub-units (teams/sections) capable of separate employment from the CIMIC PLT.

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c. If conditions deteriorate, the CIMIC PLT might need to be reinforced to be able to continue its duties. This may include, but are not limited to force protection (FP), medical and communications support.

d. **Organisation.**

(1) A CIMIC PLT consists of the following Sections:

- (a) Command.
- (b) Civil Assessment.
- (c) Liaison.
- (d) CIMIC Activities, with several CIMIC Tactical Support Teams (TSTs).




Figure 2. Modular CIMIC platoon

(2) The general tasks of each of the sections are:

- (a) Command Section
 - 1/ Plan CIMIC/CMI activities.
 - 2/ Plan and coordinate the employment of the platoon.

- 3/ Provide information and resources to the sections for the accomplishment of their tasks.
 - 4/ Ensure overall Situational Awareness (SA) of the platoon.
 - 5/ Monitor the overall situation in the assigned AOR.
 - 6/ Collate the reports of the sections to a consolidated report and convey it to higher echelons as contribution to their overall and functional SA.
- (b) Civil Assessment Section
- 1/ Conduct reconnaissance and assessment (CIMIC patrolling) focused on the civil environment.
 - 2/ Conduct CIMIC assessments.
 - 3/ Measure the effectiveness of CIMIC assessments.
 - 4/ Gather and updating information needed to complete a CIMIC database (as required).
 - 5/ Conduct Battle Damage Assessment (BDA, as required, and within capabilities).
- (c) Liaison Section
- 1/ Establish and maintain liaison to all relevant and approved non-military actors (local authorities, IO/NGO, other) in the AOR approved in the Liaison Matrix of the OPLAN/OPORD as authorised by the proper authority.
 - 2/ Establish and maintain contact to the local population and non-military actors in the AOR by setting up and running a CIMIC Centre¹⁵⁵ (as required, see TTP 5 CIMIC Centre).
 - 3/ Facilitate the exchange of information between the military and the civilian environment.
 - 4/ Prepare liaison reports (see TTP 3 CIMIC Liaison).
 - 5/ Collect CIMIC information in support of the CIMIC assessment and to the overall SA.
 - 6/ Initiate negotiations, as required.
 - 7/ Promote visibility and legitimacy of the force, as required.

¹⁵⁵ A CIMIC Centre provides a physical location where the military can interface with non-military actors.

(d) CIMIC Activities Section

- 1/ Execute all types of CIMIC/CMI field tasks and activities in all phases of the operation, including their proposal, implementation and closure.
- 2/ Act as primary interface between the military and the local population in the AOR.
- 3/ Gather complementary and updated information in support of CIMIC assessments and to the overall SA.
- 4/ Facilitate humanitarian assistance as required.
- 5/ Employ the CIMIC TSTs (see paragraph 4).
- 6/ Receive under its command by specific CIMIC Project Teams or CIMIC Inspection Teams.

e. **Employment.** CIMIC PLT should be physically based near the HQ / Command Post of the supported unit in order to increase efficiency in the accomplishment of its tasks.

4. CIMIC TEAM / TACTICAL SUPPORT TEAM (CIMIC TST).

a. CIMIC TST is not considered a CIMIC UNIT since it cannot perform, on its own, all three CIMIC Core Functions. It is designed to carry out CIMIC executive tasks in support of the manoeuvre of a Battalion or Company.

b. **Organisation.** CIMIC TST consists of CIMIC area specialists or CIMIC-specialised personnel. CIMIC team should possess organic equipment and vehicle(s) to accompany manoeuvre units within execution of tasks outside the supported unit's base. It should also embed interpreter support as required.

c. **Employment.** CIMIC TST should be physically embedded in the Command Post / HQ of the supported unit in order to increase the efficiency of task execution and ensure force protection.

EXTENDED LIAISON MATRIX MORE FOCUSED ON THE TACTICAL LEVEL (EXAMPLE)

Extended Liaison Matrix (ELM) Basic Matrix		Big 5	CG	JIC	LMT	PsyOps	G95	PMO	G4	G6	GMED	PAO	LEGAD	CULAD	Men Bn In their AOR	Link to Sub-Matrix	
			CHIEF	TEC													
1. Political Leaders																	
1.1	Mayors of Municipalities	X	X		★									X	X	ELM 3A 1.1	
1.2	Directors of Municipal Directorates		X		★						X				X	ELM 3A 1.2	
1.3	Village Speakers				★	○									X	ELM 3A 1.3	
1.4	Leaders of Parallel Structure	X	X		★	○								X	X	ELM 3A 1.4	
1.5	Leaders of Political Parties	X			★										X	ELM 3A 1.5	
2. Ethnical Minority Leaders																	
2.1	Goranian Leaders	X	X		★	○								X	X	ELM 3A 2.1	
2.2	Bosnian Leaders	X	X		★	○								X	X	ELM 3A 2.2	
2.3	Serbian Leaders	X	X		★	○								X	X	ELM 3A 2.3	
2.4	Turkish Leaders	X	X		★	○								X	X	ELM 3A 2.4	
2.5	RAE Leaders	X	X		★	○								X	X	ELM 3A 2.5	
3. Religious Leaders																	
3.1	Islamic Leaders	X			X	○								★	X	ELM 3A 3.1	
3.2	Serbian-Orthodox Leaders	X			X	○								★	X	ELM 3A 3.2	
3.3	Catholic Leaders	X			X	○								★	X	ELM 3A 3.3	
3.4	Other Religious Leaders	X			X	○								★	X	ELM 3A 3.4	
4. Cultural Leaders																	
4.1	Painters	X			X	○								★	○	ELM 3A 4.1	
4.2	Musicians	X			X	○								★	○	ELM 3A 4.2	
4.3	Others Cultural Leaders	X			X	○								★	○	ELM 3A 4.3	
5. International Community																	
5.1	UNHCR	X	X		★	○									△	ELM 3A 5.1	
5.2	UNMK	X	X		★											ELM 3A 5.2	
5.3	EULEX - Police	X	X		X		X	★							X	ELM 3A 5.3	
5.4	EULEX - Customs	X			★	X							X			ELM 3A 5.4	
5.5	EULEX - Jurisdiction	X			X								★			ELM 3A 5.5	
6. Major Development Agencies																	
6.1	OSCE	X	X	X	★										○	ELM 3A 6.1	
6.2	UNDP	X	X		★										○	ELM 3A 6.2	
6.3	ICO	X	X		★										○	ELM 3A 6.3	
7. NGOs																	
7.1	Kosovo NGOs		X		★										X	ELM 3A 7.1	
7.2	Foreign NGOs		X		★										X	ELM 3A 7.2	
8. Regional / Local Public Services																	
8.1	IK Sub-Offices		X		★	○									X	ELM 3A 8.1	
8.2	Kosovo Security Force	X					★								X	ELM 3A 8.2	
8.3	Kosovo Police		X				X	★							X	ELM 3A 8.3	
8.4	Kosovo Border Police				★			X							X	ELM 3A 8.4	
8.5	Firefighters				X	○			★						X	ELM 3A 8.5	
8.6	Emergency Health Care				X	○				★					△	ELM 3A 8.6	
8.7	Health Care				X	○				★					△	ELM 3A 8.7	
8.8	Social Network		X		★	X				X					X	ELM 3A 8.8	
8.9	Electricity		X		★	○									X	ELM 3A 8.9	
8.10	Water		X		★	○									X	ELM 3A 8.10	
8.11	Sewage		X		★	○									X	ELM 3A 8.11	
8.12	Disposal		X		X	○			★		X				X	ELM 3A 8.12	
8.13	Environmental Protection		X		X	○			★		X				X	ELM 3A 8.13	
8.14	Public Transportation				X				★							ELM 3A 8.14	
8.15	Mass Media (Print/Radio/TV/Net)					X						★				ELM 3A 8.15	
8.16	Telecommunication				X					★						ELM 3A 8.16	
8.17	Education		X		★	X				X				X	X	ELM 3A 8.17	
8.18	Clubs Associations				★	X									X	ELM 3A 8.18	
9. Economy / Industry																	
9.1	Major Enterprises	X	X		★	○			X	X				X	X	△	ELM 3A 9.1
9.2	Businesses Trade	X	X		★	○			X	X				X	X	△	ELM 3A 9.2
9.3	Agriculture		X		★	○								X		△	ELM 3A 9.3
9.4	Forestry		X		★	○								X		△	ELM 3A 9.4
9.5	Tourism		X		★	○								X		△	ELM 3A 9.5

Legend:

- ★ Designated Branch or Officer of Primary Responsibility (DBOPR)
- X Also allowed to laise ICCW DBOPR
- Also allowed occasionally for duty ICCW DBOPR
- △ Also allowed when invited ICCW DBOPR
- FS Factsheet

CIMIC LIAISON OFFICER REPORT

TEAM: AREA: DTG:
REPORT #:

DTG Report Sent:
CIMIC LO REPORT FROM: CIMIC LO TO: ACOS X9

PROPOSED STAFF INVOLVEMENT:

J-1		J-2				J-4		J-5		J-6	
J-8		J-9		ENG		ACC		J-3			
PSY OPS		PAO		MED		POLAD		LEGAD		INFO OPS	
				JVB		ACC		MCC		COM Office	

SUBJECT:

OUTCOME:

1. ORGANIZATION VISITED (incl. location):
2. PURPOSE OF VISIT / TOPIC OF MEETING:
3. NAMES AND FUNCTIONS OF PERSONS MET:
4. INFORMATION EXCHANGED (incl. issues not solved):
5. LO COMMENTS / CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS:

FUTURE TASKS (including required follow-up, next meeting):

Name, Rank, Date

ENCLOSURES (e.g. Agenda):

POINT OF CONTACT DATABASE (EXAMPLE)

Org.	Type	Position	Name	Tel.	Mobile phone	E-mail	Loc.	Date	Remarks
USAID	GO	Mission director	Mr.						
ICRC	ICRC	Head Sub-Delegation	Mrs.						
Ministry of Defense	HN	TBD							HN
Caritas	NGO	Info-Office							
UNHCR	IO	Deputy Chief Mission							
Oil&Gas Commerce JSC	JSC	Chairman							

CIMIC OPERATORS GUIDELINES FOR WORKING WITH THE INTERPRETERS

1. GUIDELINES FOR THE INTERPRETER

The interpreter is a vital part of CIMIC Operator and his/her job. He / she is an "interpretation aid" attached to CIMIC Operator's ears and mouth. CIMIC Operator gives the interpreter instructions before the meeting.

He/she must:

- act with a "non-visible" approach;
- be fully impartial;
- translate CIMIC Operator's sentences with the greatest accuracy;
- do not add anything to CIMIC Operator's sentences or try to explain his / her sentence;
- never participate in the discussion;
- never hold back information given by the source, because it may adversely affect the conversation.

2. GUIDELINES FOR THE CIMIC OPERATOR

The following tips are more than recommended to be taken into consideration when using interpreters:

General guidelines

- If the interviewees are officers, it would be better to have an officer or civilian act as interpreter. If the sources are enlisted, an officer interpreter might intimidate them and stifle participation and interaction.
- CIMIC Operator allows additional time for interpreters when planning communication. A normal 10 min conversation may take up to 30 min, depending on the interpreter's ability.
- An officer or professionally qualified civilian may be intimidating to a contact. Interpreters of this status may over-influence a meeting or discussion.
- CIMIC operator should try to use two-man interpreter teams. Fatigue comes quickly and one interpreter may assist what the other missed or forgot, especially during long meetings and official meals.
- A native speaker should always be preferred to a linguist.
- CIMIC Operator does not organize interpreters into "interpreter pools". This detracts from the ability react quickly to timely situations.
- Interpreters may not be completely trained. Periodic testing and evaluation should be conducted.
- Many interpreters, because of "cultural diversities", may attempt to "save face" by purposely concealing their lack of understanding.

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- CIMIC Operator controls the interpreter. Inform him/her to never ask questions of their own, and never paraphrase the interviewer's question or the source's answers.
- Control of the interpreter is increased if he/she knows that he/she is periodically tested for accuracy, loyalty and honesty.
- If the contact is older of age, the use of a more mature interpreter may be a more successful aid to discussion.
- The interviewer, in turn, never bullies, criticizes or admonishes his / her interpreter in the presence of the source. Criticism is made in private to avoid lowering the prestige of the interpreter, and thereby impairing his / her effectiveness.

Before an assignment

- Get to know the interpreter. CIMIC Operator's establishes a relationship with the interpreter. Find out about the interpreter's background. Show a genuine concern for his / her family, aspiration, career, education and so on. Without a cooperative, supportive interpreter the mission could be in serious jeopardy. The difficulty of establishing relationships stems most of the time from the lack of personal contact with the interpreter.
- Make them part of the team.
- Create a relaxed working environment.
- Brief the interpreter about the general topic which is to be covered, without giving too many details.
- Clarify the expectations (discuss with interpreter what the CIMIC operator wants to achieve from the meeting, the issues that are likely to be discussed and the specific technical terms that might need to be used. CIMIC Operator allows his / her input and advice on cultural issues and protocols).
- Clarify method of interpretation.
- Discuss difficult terms. CIMIC Operator prepares his / her interpreter for technical terms. The interpreter must know CIMIC Operator's subject area and translate his / her "meaning" as well as "words".
- CIMIC Operators should instruct his/her interpreter to mirror CIMIC Operator's tone and personality of speech.
- CIMIC Operators should instruct the interpreter not to interject his / her own questions or personality.
- CIMIC Operators establishes some basic rules (i.e. no paraphrasing, no intimidation of contacts, no expressing opinions, maintain neutral attitude).
- CIMIC Operators rehearses the likely types of situation (hostile, co-operative, etc.) in which they will work together (one to one conversations, meetings, conferences, etc.).
- Be careful with OPSEC. It is safe to assume that your interpreter's first loyalty is to his / her own country. Avoid discussing about operational information.
- Brief interpreter on any security / safety arrangements that will affect him/her.
- Manage the interpreter's use of his / her mobile phone, especially if sensitive conversations are expected.

During an assignment

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- Speak in the first person.
- Use simple, clear language.
- Look at the person you are talking to.
- While communicating, CIMIC Operators avoids such phrases as "Tell him that..." and "I would like to have you say....".
- CIMIC Operators does not look at the interpreter during discussion. He / she remains focused on the person with whom he / she is talking. He / she always directs the conversation towards the contact, not the interpreter, to see if the "non-verbal communication" appears to be in line with his / her sentence.
- CIMIC Operators break thoughts into small logical, translatable segments. He / she should establish a rhythm, he / she should not talk for so long that the conversation becomes disjointed.
- Maintains control. If an unprompted conversation takes place, CIMIC Operator asks what it was about.
- CIMIC Operator keeps the conversation simple, avoid idioms, jokes, military jargon and slang.
- Ensure emotions are accurately conveyed (disappointment, sympathy, reassurance).

After an assignment

- CIMIC Operator always conducts a debrief. This will allow CIMIC Operator to pick up on missed points and nuances, comment on any shortcomings and discuss areas for improvement. He / she will ask for the interpreter's impressions of the meeting. He / she will assess the cooperation with the interpreter and ask if anything might be improved. The debrief will also allow the interpreter the opportunity to convey if he / she was subject to intimidation.
- CIMIC Operator takes the interpreter's impressions into consideration. The interpreter will have a better feel for how CIMIC Operator's message was received.
- Lessons Identified (LI)/Lessons Learned (LL).

3. SOURCING OF INTERPRETERS

Interpreters may come from either the military or civilian side:

- national and NATO nations or coalition partners personnel (military, civilians);
- locally hired.

In order to choose the suitable interpreter the CIMIC operator must take into consideration a number of things:

3.1 Advantages in using national and NATO nations or coalition partners personnel (military, civilians) as military interpreters:

- reliability;
- familiarity with military environment (especially military) and availability for deployment at short notice;
- experienced planning skills;

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- military interpreters are not subject to working hours limitations as the civilian ones and follow the same RoEs;
- a military interpreter will be easier to screen for security purposes and usually has the security clearance;
- a military interpreter will have in exchange a better understanding of the military mission and terminology.

3.2 Disadvantages in using national and NATO nations or coalition partners personnel (military, civilians) as military interpreters:

- military interpreters are likely to have less understanding of locals;
- national caveats, limitations on the tours length, "incompatible" equipment, compliance with RoEs (NATO, UN, national, etc.);
- they may be intimidated e.g. in a situation in which they have to engage higher ranking officials of their nation.

3.3 Advantages in using locally hired interpreters:

- will have updated knowledge of local environment, culture, local personalities;
- will have the language capability to carry out the task;
- can be invaluable in making contacts and other arrangements;
- able to identify and advise local feelings and concerns.

3.4 Disadvantages in using locally hired interpreters:

- security clearances more difficult to obtain;
- security worries (vulnerable to pressure or threats);
- may be restricted at times by OPSEC requirements;
- susceptible to intimidation;
- employment scope may be restricted by ethnic/religious boundaries;
- may be targeted by hostile intelligence agencies;
- not subject to military law. May be difficult to control;
- locals may be reluctant to speak to another local for fear of reprisals;
- lack of military training (close protection concerns);
- limitations due to the use of female interpreters may arise in certain societies (ethnic and religious customs, social protocols and taboos).

NEGOTIATIONS AND MEDIATIONS GUIDELINES

1. BACKGROUND

The very nature of CIMIC activities often puts CIMIC operators in contact with people who have differences of opinion over what they can or cannot, should or should not do in specific situations. The CIMIC operator must be able to effect the actions of people to meet the mission objectives and coordinate issues with the civil actors.

When resolving disagreements between parties, CIMIC operators must be:

- Tolerant;
- Patient;
- Prepared;
- Innovative;
- Flexible;
- Resourceful;
- Able to take charge;
- Expecting change.

Before the CIMIC negotiator is entering the agreement process, he/she should know what a good agreement should consist of:

- Fairness, implies that all or both sides are treated alike;
- Efficiency, refers to producing the desired outcome with a minimum effort;
- Wisdom, refers to the right judgment;
- Durability, refers to the stability of the agreement or the ability of the agreement to last.

There are 3 basic methods one can use to reach an agreement: negotiation, mediation and arbitration.

Each method has its place in CIMIC operations, even though it is more likely that a CIMIC operator conducts way more negotiation than mediation or arbitration.

The technique applied in negotiation is essentially similar to mediation techniques. The most important difference is that in mediation, representatives for the opposing parties are present in the same location, whereas in negotiation they are not.

Arbitration is conducted by an impartial party that has the authority to take decision between the opposing parties. Normally, CIMIC personnel are not involved in arbitration.

The procedures described below, mention only negotiation. Readers should infer that these procedures generally apply equally to mediation, and may be applied appropriately in these circumstances.

2. NEGOTIATION

Many people approach negotiations positionally. That is, one party thinks about the outcome it wants and enters negotiation with the intention of convincing the other party to accept it. Meanwhile, the other party probably has an idea of what it wants, and enter negotiation with the same intention. Both parties set terms and conditions, push harder, strike a compromise or not, give in or give up and walk away after tension build up. It is therefore more advisable to approach negotiation with an *interest-based style*.

2.1 Interest Based Negotiation

In interest-based negotiations, parties approach negotiations with the realization that the positions they take are an expression of their underlying interests. Interests are made up out of their fears, hopes, concerns and goals. They are often intangible. Interests can be described by identifying the qualities parties are looking for in an outcome. What parties are really trying to achieve or avoid is symbolized but also masked by the position they take.

2.2 Positional to Interest Based Negotiation

Many negotiation books advise negotiators to start with positions, and then move to the underlying interests. However, a skilled negotiator attempts to move directly from issue identification to exploration of interests, bypassing and de-emphasizing position taking altogether. The reasons for this include the likelihood that position taking sets the negotiation in a competitive direction, creates an adversarial atmosphere, and that opening positions tend to be extreme and unrealistic; not really an indication of what the negotiator really hopes to achieve. However, it may be impossible to move on to interests without first exploring positions.

3. PHASES OF NEGOTIATION

3.1 Phase 1 – Preparation for negotiation

The most common guidelines when preparing for a negotiation are:

- know the history of the country, the conflict and the parties involved;
- understand the cultural and ethnic differences of the people negotiators are about to deal with. How emotional they are, how sensitive, what their style of communication is;
- understand the personalities of the individuals negotiators are about to deal with. Gather as much as possible information about recent negotiations;
- negotiators should know their own authority and limitations when it comes to deals. If in doubt, negotiator must confirm with their superiors what they may or may not offer. "One cannot promise what one cannot keep!" ;
- negotiator must brief his/her interpreter on what he/she is up to;
- think of security and communications;

- it is important that negotiator maintains a high level of personal dress and a positive/professional attitude during the negotiations.

Final Tactical Preparations before negotiator enters the negotiations. He/she must ask him/herself the following questions:

- What do I hope to achieve with this negotiation?
- What does my opponent want from this negotiation?
- What common ground do we share?
- What is the minimum result I have to achieve?

Negotiator finally has to prepare his/her BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). Once negotiator has identified what the opposing parties' potential interests are, he/she must also prepare a fall-back position should negotiations fail (BATNA) for him/herself and the opposing party.

3.2 Phase 2 – Conduct of the negotiations

Apply the following methods when negotiating:

- separate the people from the problem;
- focus on interest, not on positions;
- invent options for mutual gain;
- insist of using objective criteria.

To identify potential interest use CHEAP BFV:

- Concerns;
- Hopes;
- Expectations;
- Attitudes;
- Priorities;
- Beliefs;
- Fears;
- Values.

In the Opening Talks, negotiator has to:

- take his/her time and be patient;
- remember the customary salutations and exchanges of courtesies;
- introduce him/herself and his/her team;
- use uncompromising small talk to establish rapport and put everyone at ease;
- outline the plan for the meeting;
- offer or take refreshments.

The Main talks:

- follow the agenda;
- listen, don't interrupt;
- obtain agreement on facts or record differences;
- decide whether specialists are needed to provide expert advice;
- if incorrect statements are given, state the actual facts but do not argue;

- state his/her understanding of the issue at hand presented by the other side;
- state the mission point of view on the issue;
- in case of insurmountable different points of view, propose an investigation into the key issues to clarify things;
- make careful reminders about agreements, actual arrangements and past practices;
- if he/she cannot reach an agreement, try to agree on facts, the next step or at least another meeting;
- depending on his/her authorization, he/she can hint on the intention to escalate if necessary.

Ending the Negotiations

- summarize what was said and if possible confirm it in writing;
- coordinate time and place for a subsequent meeting;
- exchange pleasantries and chitchat to leave business and come back to a more personal level;
- when more than one party is present, see to it that everybody leaves the location at the same time.

3.3 Phase 3 – Follow up of the negotiations

Depending on the negotiation it might be useful to conduct an After Action Review right after the meeting ends. The purpose of this discussion should cover the following:

- organization and conduct of the meeting;
- review of the discussions and interactions, impressions on attitudes;
- what went well, what did not and why;
- how can there be an improvement.

4. REPORTING

Based on the negotiation and the above review, a report should be prepared. The format or required content is usually defined in the mission SOPs. In TTP 4 there is a choice of reports. In any case a report should consist of the following:

- Time, date, location, agenda;
- Names of the people involved;
- Key points risen during the discussion;
- Recommendations of actions to be taken.

HQ JFC PERIODIC REPORTS AND RETURNS (SAMPLE)

#	JFCB S OPR	Report	Reference Bi-Sc 80-3	Format	Frequency	Effective at	Due at HQ JFC/JTFHQ	Due at SHAPE	Remarks
1	CJOC	SITREP	Vol III, Sect 33		Daily/ If no ASSESSR EP is produced	1800Z	2100Z	2359Z	Produced daily by HQ JFC/JTFHQ. Based on CC ASSESSREP/SITREP and HQ JFC/JTFHQ staff input, if no ASSESSREP is produced
2	J 1	PERSREP	Nil	Annexes A & B to HQ JFC/JTF 402	Daily / Weekly	SUN, 2359Z	Daily NLT 1700Z	Weekly 0700Z	Weekly as part of Daily SITREP on Monday. For routine CRO, SOR units, NSE / NCCs and theatre logistic elements are to submit personnel reports via the chain of command to HQ JFC/JTFHQ using the PERSREP format.
3	J ENG	ENGSITREP			Daily	0700Z	1000Z	1300Z	
4	J 9	CIMICREP	Vol III, Sect 10		Weekly	THU, 0800Z	THU, 1100Z	FRI, 1400Z	
5	J 6	CISSITREP	Vol III, Sect 13		Event driven	as reqd	as reqd	as reqd	
6	J 2	GEOSITREP	Vol III, Sect 30		Event driven	as reqd	as reqd	as reqd	
7	J 2	INTSUM	Vol II, Sect 1		Daily	1800Z	2100Z	0600Z	
8	J 3	EWSUM	Vol III, Sect 43		Event driven	as reqd	as reqd	as reqd	
9	J AD	ASSESSREP	Vol III, Sect 6		Event driven by AB	AB Day-1, 1800Z	AB Day-1, 2100Z	AB Day, 2359Z	CC products used for Joint ASSESSREP to SHAPE
10	J MED	MEDASSESSREP	Vol V, Sect 3		Daily	0900Z	1100Z	2359Z	
11	J 4	LOGUPDATE	Vol V, Sect 2		Weekly	0900Z	1100Z	2359Z	Weekly on Tuesday unless otherwise directed
12	J 4	LOGASSESSREP	Vol V, Sect 1		Weekly	0900Z	1100Z	2359Z	Weekly on Tuesday unless otherwise directed

COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT REPORT (ASSESSREP)

HEADER	
TO:	FROM:
CLASSIFICATION	PRECEDENCE:
UNIT NAME	LOCATION:
OTHER:	REFERENCES:

1. STRATEGIC/OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL¹⁵⁶ OVERVIEW

- a. Political
- b. Military Strategic
- c. Theatre
 - (1) Political
 - (2) Military
 - (3) Economic
 - (4) Social
 - (5) Infrastructure
 - (6) Information

2. OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL¹⁵⁷ PICTURE AND ASSESSMENT

- a. OBJECTIVE 1-**
 - (1) Situation and analysis
 - (2) Activity and synchronization
 - (3) Assessment
 - (a) Operational assessment
 - (b) Campaign assessment
 - (c) Intentions
- b. OBJECTIVE 2-**
 - (1) Situation and analysis
 - (2) Activity and synchronization

¹⁵⁶ Referred to the immediate superior echelon to one's own.

¹⁵⁷ Referred to own reporting level.

(3) Assessment

- (a) Operational assessment
- (b) Campaign assessment
- (c) Intentions

c. ...

3. COMMANDERS SUMMARY//

4. RECOMMENDATIONS/REQUEST/REMARKS//

5. ADMINISTRATION/PERSONNEL MATTERS

- a. Personnel data
- b. Personnel Assessment

6. OVERALL ASSESSMENT - CONCERNS

PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

HEADER:

TO:

FROM:

CLASSIFICATION:

PRECEDENCE:

UNIT NAME:

LOCATION:

OTHER:

REFERENCES:

1. STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

a. Political

b. Military

2. OPERATIONAL PICTURE AND ASSESSMENT

a. OBJECTIVE 1-

(1) Situation and analysis

(2) Future activity

b. OBJECTIVE 2-

(1) Situation and analysis

(2) Future activity

c. ...

3. COMMANDERS SUMMARY**4. RECOMMENDATIONS/REQUEST/REMARKS****5. FUTURE INTENTIONS**

a. Recces/ Visits.

b. Briefings/ Meetings.

6. ADMINISTRATION/PERSONNEL MATTERS

Personnel data

Personnel Assessment

7. Overall ASSESSMENT - CONCERNS

PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

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SITUATION REPORT (LAND)

HEADER:	
TO:	FROM:
CLASSIFICATION:	PRECEDENCE:
UNIT NAME:	LOCATION:
OTHER:	REFERENCES:

A. Period of Time Covered:
B. Location:

OWN SITUATION. INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO:
C1. Location of Forward Elements:
C2. Location of Units, HQ and Boundaries:
C3. Location of Adjacent Units and Support Units
C4. Ops Update:
C5. Unit Capability:

THREAT. SYNOPSIS OF THE THREAT IF KNOWN OR RELEVANT. TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO:
D1. Identity of Enemy Force: D2. Threat Reserve: D3. Enemy Activity: D4. Estimate of Threat: D5. Conclusions (if any):

CIMIC SITUATION. SYNOPSIS OF THE CIMIC SITUATION IF KNOWN OR RELEVANT. INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO:
E1. Civilian situation in Area of Operations (AO):
E2. Significant Civ-Mil Events:
E3. Displaced Civilians (DC) concentration point and quantity of DC:
E4. Number and flow of displaced civilians (DC):
F. Administrative:
G. General:
H. Commander's evaluation:
I. Acknowledgement Instructions:

CLASSIFICATION:
MESSAGE END SITREPLAND

CIMIC CONTRIBUTION TO SAB (EXAMPLE)

The following example depicts CIMIC contribution to a SAB in an Art.5 operation at the operational level. It comprises two areas:

- CIMIC overview of the civil environment.
- CIMIC-specific assessment of Resilience through Civil preparedness.

CIMIC Update G+93



Current Situation

- Civil Situation:**
- ① Social unrest and protests continue to rise across much of ACNEUC.
- Resilience:**
- ② Cyber incidents have adversely affected several ferry vessels' operating systems in DIRDAM.

Assessment

Critical Civilian Factors	DIR	ACN	LEU	NATD	NATE	NATF
1 Assured continuity of government and critical government services						
2 Resilient energy supply	⚠		⚠			
3 Ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people			⚠			
4 Resilient food and water resources						
5 Ability to deal with mass casualties						
6 Resilient civil communications systems						
7 Resilient civil transportation systems		⚠				⚠

- Civil Situation:**
- Increased ENY activities within the civil environment undermine national authorities and Societal Resilience
- Resilience:**
- Energy instability impacts civil support to military and HNs stability
 - Degraded HNs civil communications increases opportunity for OCC sponsored social media platforms

ENY Hybrid activities are currently having greater impact on the nations' resilience than on JTF operations

G+93 Speaking Notes

Good morning sir,

As alluded to by other members in this briefing, the current Civil Environment situation in the JOA appears to be deteriorating. Social unrest is on the rise across much of the Region as hope among its citizens seems to be fading for any resolution to the growing crisis between NATO and ACNEUC. According to unsubstantiated reports, protests in ACNEUC are becoming an almost daily occurrence and have resulted in bloody clashes between protesters and the police. Hundreds of people have allegedly been arrested on various civil misconduct charges, others have been hospitalized, and there are even reported deaths as a result of injuries sustained during

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the violent demonstrations. A more in depth assessment of the situation is being conducted to assess the veracity of these claims.

It has also been reported that authorities claim LE diaspora are subversively behind many of the protests, which include boisterous, large-scale demonstrations in front of NATO airbases in Germany, wildcat labor strikes at key NATO port facilities, and vandalism in DIRDAM where there have been protests against fuel shortages brought on by GASOIL's decision to cut gas and oil imports from ENYA.

In some parts of LEURET, protesters have outnumbered the police and have temporarily occupied parts of Emerita and POMPAELO. The impact of the mass gatherings is impacting daily life; many people have resorted to panic buying and some businesses have been forced to close. With regards to Resiliency - There have been penetration attempts on DIRDAM transport control systems, transportation companies and harbour management systems which caused incidents on the lines of communication from south to north in DIRDAM. Ferry services were abruptly cancelled yesterday between AUGUSTA and TOLETUM due to cyber incidents created annoyance and discontent among the public.

In the bottom left quadrant of the slide, you will see the Resilience Impact Dashboard. It is very important to note that in yesterday's briefing, the dashboard depicted the HNs self-assessments of the risks across the seven baseline requirements for national resilience. The version of Dashboard presented to you today, and thus going forward, depicts the Resilience Impact Coordination Group's assessment of how the HN self-assessments could impact on NATO operations. Based on the incidents aforementioned, it is worth mentioning there is a potential impact on operations due to the reoccurring incidents on Dirdamean civil transportation systems.

The CIMIC team assesses that...

Sir, this concludes my briefing for today.

CIMICREP REPORTING GROUPS BASED ON PMESII

Although not mandatory, reporting groups of CIMICREP can be based on the PMESII/ASCOPE cross-functional system analysis tool and its associated categories (domains, areas subareas). The use of PMESII for CIMICREP has the advantage of integrating and benefitting of the tools and assessment used for the planning of the operation. This approach may be more relevant at the operational and higher tactical levels of command, where the information requirements are more abstract and general, but may need a more practical and specific approach at the lower tactical level.

To this end, the CIMIC IER for an operation may only need to focus on a selection of factors, the PMESII approach may only need to be used as a first comprehensive way to consider all the factors to tackle the civil environment, finally selecting only the relevant ones for reporting purposes. These categories can be amplified and subdivided as required, to meet the commander's specific needs of information about the civil environment.

1. REPORTING GROUPS AND AREAS OF OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL AREAS OF INTEREST

Should a formation see the need to report on another area that is not represented on the generic monitoring tool, the column "Other (specify)" should be used in the appropriate functional area to record their concerns.

2.1. Reporting Group POLITICAL.

- (1) Governance.
- (2) Law and Order.
- (3) Health.
- (4) Police system.
- (5) Borders and customs.
- (6) Prison System.
- (7) Other (specify).

2.2. Reporting Group MILITARY (civil implications thereof).

- (1) Regular forces.
- (2) Irregular forces.
- (3) Private military companies and other armed elements.
- (4) Other (specify).

2.3. Reporting Group ECONOMIC.

- (1) Economy, banking and labour.
- (2) Key Civil Life Support (Water, Food).

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(3) Economic development.

(4) Other (specify).

2.4. Reporting Group SOCIAL.

(1) History.

(2) Religion.

(3) Culture.

(4) Social System.

(5) Vulnerable populations.

(6) Other (specify).

2.5. Reporting Group INFRASTRUCTURAL.

(1) Transportation infrastructure.

(2) Energy.

(3) Public Services Infrastructure.

(4) Other (specify).

2.6. Reporting Group INFORMATIONAL.

(1) Telecommunications & media.

(2) Other (specify).

2. GUIDANCE SHEETS

Each of the areas of Interest of the reporting groups can be described in detail through guidance sheets intended to facilitate the work of the reporting bodies. At the operational level, TTP 1 Assessment Annex C provides the format of guidance sheet, and Annex J provides examples of guidance sheets.

FORMAT AND GUIDANCE FOR CIMICREP WRITING

In blue, the information to be completed by the reporting unit.
Borders reflected only for educational purposes.

UNIT /HQ /ASSET LOGO	<NATO CLASSIFICATION> <Reporting Unit> CIMIC <Location> (<COUNTRY>) <WEEKLY/MONTHLY> CIMIC REPORT	OPERATION / EXERCISE LOGO
-------------------------	---	------------------------------

HEADER	
DGT <DDMMYYYY> TO <REPORTED ASSET UNIT/HQ> PRECEDENCE: <TYPE>	ORIGINATOR: <REPORTING ASSET UNIT/HQ> SUBJECT: <WEEKLY/MONTHLY> CIMIC REP Reporting Period: <DTG> - <DTG>
Our ref: <XYZ/19/XXXX> Date: <DDMMYYYY>	Tel: E-mail:
MAIN BODY	
<p>1. <u>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</u></p> <p><Summarises (responsibility of J/X-9) and highlights CIMIC relevant findings which are described more detailed in the main body of the CIMICREP></p> <p>A. Leadership view of CIMIC: B. <Authority> concerns: C. <Authority> priorities: D. Other considerations:</p>	

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2. OVERALL CIVIL SITUATION

- <Describe the overall civil domain situation in the JOA, through:
- The working situation of CIMIC staff and major past events.
 - J/X-9 concerns and priorities.
 - Any other important business.>

3. ASSESSMENT BY <REPORTING GROUPS>¹⁵⁸

A. <TITLE OF REPORTING GROUP 1>

- (1) **SITUATION:** <Summarises the situation relative to the sub-paragraph by describing facts through clear statements what, where, who, why, how, etc., and describing the matters of concern>.
- (2) **DEDUCTION:** <Summarises the implications, issues or considerations, derived from fact(s) that have operational significance for the sub-paragraph, through assessment of the effects and impact on the mission>.
- (3) **CONCLUSIONS:** <Summarises the outcome or result reached that requires action in planning or further analysis, thorough clear statements of what, where, when, who, why, how, etc.>.
- (4) **OTHER ISSUES:** <Any other secondary issues relevant to the reporting group>.

B. <TITLE OF REPORTING GROUP 2>

(1) ...

C. ...

4. DETAILED AREAS OF INTEREST.

<Analysis if each of the areas and subareas of interest, not assessed in the previous paragraph with sufficient detail, that deserve consideration for the proper conveyance of information. This assessment may also constitute a separate annex to CIMICREP, due to its length, different classification as the body, or other practical considerations.>

A. <TITLE OF AREA OF INTEREST 1>
 (a) <Title of subarea 1>.

B. ...

5. OTHER ISSUES

¹⁵⁸. See main body of this TTP.

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<Summarises issues relevant to the overall report that do not qualify due to their small importance to be included in previous paragraphs, but that are nevertheless worth to be noted>

PURPOSE OF THE MESSAGE

<brief statement of the purpose (IER) of the message at its level>

LIST OF ANNEXES

ANNEX A. <TITLE>

...

ANNEX <LAST>. **GUIDANCE FOR WRITING CIMICREP**

DRAFTER

<NATO RANK> <Name> <SURNAME>
<Position>

VALIDATION

<NATO RANK> <Name> <SURNAME>
<Position>

APPROVAL

<NATO RANK> <Name> <SURNAME>
<Position>

ANNEX B. GUIDANCE TO WRITING CIMICREP

CIMICREP should be written following the guidelines below:

- A. CIMICREP is to be produced by all commands formally performing CIMIC staff function or CIMIC joint/tactical function at their level, either by having CIMIC specialist staff or embedding CIMIC assets (units, LOs, Functional Specialists).
- B. Paragraphs addressing information particularly relevant to the reported body should be specifically populated by the reporting Command/CIMIC asset.
- C. The paragraphs "General assessment" and "Other" allow for other relevant information according to the reporting Command/CIMIC asset.

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- D. Populate only the paragraphs relevant to the reporting command AOO/level. Paragraphs not relevant should be omitted without changing the paragraph numbering.
- E. When an information may have implications to more than one <reporting group>, should be included in the most relevant one, according to the reporting command/CIMIC asset, making a reference in the less important paragraphs that have not reflected that information (e.g. "See paragraph 1. Support to the JTF").
- F. Relevant paragraphs with no information to be reported, have to be filled with "Nothing Special to Report" (NSTR).
- G. Annexes must not repeat information already reflected in the main body.

EXAMPLE OF CIMICREP CONFIGURATION

CIMIC PLANNING PRODUCTS AFTER OPLAN DEVELOPMENT

1. Decision on Lines of CIMIC activity (or else based on CIMIC core functions, CRO relevant factors, political/geographical or a combination thereof, 7BLR, etc.)
2. CIMIC contribution to COUE:
 - Fact-deduction-conclusion scheme.
 - CIMIC overview at own planning level (strat/oper/tact).
 - Use of available guidance sheets at area/subarea level or develop new ones upon need.

DOMAIN	AREA	SUBAREA	GUIDANCE SHEETS
POLITICAL*	P1 Governance	P1.1. Public Admin	
		P1.2. Law & order	
		P1.3. Health	
		P1.4. Education	
		P1.5. Police	
		P1.6. Borders & customs	
		P1.7. Prison system	
		P1.8. Emergency Services	
		P1.9. Civil Defense	
		P1.10. Public welfare and finance	
	P2 Other Non-military Actors	P2.1. International organizations (IO)	
		P2.2. Non-governmental organizations (NGO)	
		P2.3. Governmental Organizations (GO)	
		P2.4. Civil society	
		P2.5. Private sector	

CIMICREP CONFIGURATION FOR EXECUTION

1. Reporting groups based on selected CIMIC Lines of Activity for the operation in the OPLAN/OPORD (or else based on 7BLR, CRO relevant factors or a bespoke selection, etc).
2. Reporting groups based on a *selection* of relevant factors for reporting in the operation.

POLITICAL	P1.1. Public Admin	Reporting needed.
	P1.2. Law & order	Reporting needed.
	P1.3. Health	Selected: More detail needed
	P1.4. Education	Excluded: Already covered in CIMIC lines of activity
	P1.5. Police	Reporting needed.
	P1.6. Borders & customs	Excluded: Not relevant for specific reporting
	P1.7. Prison system	Excluded: Not relevant for specific reporting
	P1.8. Emergency Services	Selected: More detail needed
	P1.9. Civil Defence	Reporting needed.
	P1.10. Public welfare and finance	Excluded: Not relevant for specific reporting
	P1.11. Ombudsman	Newly developed Need to be developed upon analysis of JOA/AOO

PRODUCT

CIMICREP

Paragraph 3. Overall CIMIC situation.

3.1. CIMIC LINE OF ACTIVITY #1
3.2. CIMIC LINE OF ACTIVITY #2
3.3. CIMIC LINE OF ACTIVITY #3
3.4. CIMIC LINE OF ACTIVITY #4

Paragraph 4. Detailed areas of interest.

4.1. Public Admin	
4.2. Law & order	
4.3. Health	
4.3.1. Hospitals	
4.3.2. Evacuation means	
4.4. Police	
4.5. Emergency Services	
4.5.1. Command & Control	
4.5.2. Firefighting	
4.6. Civil Defense	
4.7. Ombudsman	

Annex A. Area study of conflictive region <A>

* Note: This example only shows the case of the Political domain of the PMESII, but the same is applicable to the rest of domains

CIMICREP EXAMPLE FOR THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN A COLLECTIVE DEFENCE OPERATION



<Reporting Unit>

CIMIC

<Location> (<COUNTRY>)

<WEEKLY, etc.> CIMIC REPORT



DGT	<G+D>	ORIGINATOR: <Reporting Unit, J/X-9, etc.>
TO	<Reported body>	SUBJECT: WEEKLY CIMIC REPORT
PRECEDENCE: <R, P, etc.>		Reporting Period: <NN MMM YYYY G+D> - <NN MMM YYYY G+D>

Our ref: <ref.>	Tel: Ext. <NNNN>
Date: <NN MMM YYYY G+D>	Emai: <XXXX@XXX.XX>

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

<Text>.

2. SUPPORT OF THE CIVIL ENVIRONMENT TO THE JTF

NATO StratCom narrative not supported

INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND AIRSPACE

a. General assessment:

<Text>.

b. NATO StratCom narrative not supported:

<Text>.

c. Other issues:

<Text>.

d. Overall Assessment:

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<Text>.

NATO COUNRTY 1

e. General assessment:
<Text>.

f. NATO StratCom narrative not supported:
<Text>.

g. Other issues:
<Text>.

h. Overall Assessment:
<Text>.

NATO COUNTRY 2

...

NON-NATO COUNTRY 1

a. General assessment:
<Text>.

b. NATO StratCom narrative not supported:
<Text>.

c. Other issues:
<Text>.

d. Overall Assessment:
<Text>.

a. Overall Assessment:
<Text>.

...

3. LIAISON AND COORDINATION

INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND AIRSPACE
<Text>.

NATO COUNTRY 1
<Text>.

NATO COUNTRY 2
<Text>.

...

NON-NATO COUNTRY 1
<Text>.

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...

4. SUPPORT TO THE CIVIL ENVIRONMENT

NATO COUNTRY 1

a. General assessment:

<Text>.

b. Cyber incidents:

<Text>.

c. Bilateral Activities:

<Text>.

d. Civil Defense measures activation:

<Text>.

e. Communication to OCC diasporas:

<Text>.

f. Energy supply:

<Text>.

g. Role of National Armed Forces in security ops:

<Text>.

h. Demonstrations:

<Text>.

i. Organized crime:

<Text>.

j. Other issues:

<Text>.

k. Overall Assessment:

<Text>.

5. FUTURE PLANS AND ACTIVITIES

<Text>.

6. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

<Text>.

ANNEX A. RESILIENCE THROUGH CIVIL PREPAREDNESS

ANNEX B. GUIDANCE FOR WRITING CIMICREP

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DRAFTER
NATO RANK Name SURNAME Position
VALIDATION NATO RANK Name SURNAME Position
APPROVAL NATO RANK Name SURNAME Position

ANNEX A. TO REPORTING CIMIC ASSET CIMIC WEEKLY REPORT <DTG>
RESILIENCE THROUGH CIVIL PREPAREDNESS

REPORTING GROUPS

ASSURED CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT AND CRITICAL SERVICES
<Text/graph>.

RESILIENT ENERGY SUPPLY
<Text/graph>.

RESILIENT FOOD AND WATER SUPPLY
<Text/graph>.

ABILITY TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE UNCONTROLLED MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE
<Text/graph>.

ABILITY TO DEAL WITH MASS CASUALTIES
<Text/graph>.

RESILIENT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
<Text/graph>.

RESILIENT CIVIL TRANSPORT SYSTEMS
<Text/graph>.

CIMIC Briefing Tool (CBT)

Slide 1:

UNAKOS - CIMIC OVERVIEW

P	PUBLIC ADMINISTR.	LAW ENFORCEMENT	HEALTHCARE	POLICE SYSTEM	PRISON SYSTEM	BORDERS AND CUSTOMS	EMERGENCY SERVICES	CEP
	G	G	A ↑	G	G	G	G	○
E	ECONOMY, BANKING AND LABOUR		WATER		FOOD			
	G		G		G			
S	UNCONTROLLED, LARGE SCALE MOVEMENTS OF POPULATION		IDP, REFUGEE AND EVACUEE ASSISTANCE CENTRES		SHELTER	HUMANITARIAN DE-MINING	VULN. POP.'S FOM	VULN. POP.'S PROTECTION SECURITY
	G		G		R	G	A	G ↓
I1	ROAD TRANSPORT	RAIL TRANSPORT	AIR TRANSPORT	MARITIME AND INLAND WATERWAY TRANSPORT		ENERGY	SANITATION	CIMIC SITES
	A	G	○	G		G	A	G
I2	COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE							
	G							

G No significant problems A Limited/Increased problems R Significant problems
 ○ No visibility ↑ Improvement ↓ Worsening

Slide 2:

4


OPERATIONAL RISK/CONCERN

Issues:


	Slide 3:	
<u>ASSESSMENT</u>		
<u>RECOMMENDATIONS</u>		

CIMIC CENTRE LAYOUT


OUTSIDE THE WIRE



INSIDE THE WIRE




MOBILE CIMIC CENTRE



CIMIC CENTRE CAPABILITY CONSIDERATIONS CHECKLIST

Communications		Real estate contracts	
Accessibility		Personnel	
Force Protection		Training	
Information Security (InfoSec)		Transport	
Establishment / Provision of personnel.		Interpreters	
Infrastructure:		Office equipment/furniture:	
• Sanitation		• Desks	
• Drainage		• Chairs	
• Running water supply		• Cabinets	
• Electricity		• Refreshments facilities	
• Waste collection and disposal		• Presentation boards (white boards, board markers)	
• Air conditioning, heaters, fans		• Computers/ projectors	
Working Space:		• Stationery	
• Reception/front office		Finance	
• Meeting room		Arm racks (rifles, vests, helmets, etc.)	
• Interview room		Field safe or cash box	
• Conference room		Storage space	
• Interpreters room		Decoration / posters	
• Visitor's waiting room		Distribution network	
• Parking facilities		Advertising, brochures	
Living Space:		Medical equipment and support	
• Accommodation / dormitories		Back-up electrical power generation	
• Recreation areas		Food & emergency provisions	
• Eating areas / mess halls		Fire orders & Fire-fighting equipment	
• Food preparation areas / kitchen		Risk assessment	
• Showers		Unit sign (posting)	
• Toilets		Cleaning	
• Laundry facilities		Real Life Support	
Funding			
Force protection planning (emergency/evacuation)			

Detailed internal layout of a CIMIC Centre



The red bordered part is the Security Area dedicated to the Staff only

PROJECT FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT

MILITARY CRITERIA		
Question/Consideration	√/X	Comment
• Will the project support the commander's mission?		
• Will the project serve to gain local civilian cooperation for current/future military operations?		
• Will the project stimulate the flow of information required to support current/future military operations?		
• Will the project benefit the military in any other ways?		
• Does the project provide military operational/training value?		
• Can military participation be managed so as not to compromise local civilian authority and responsibility?		
• Can the project be carried out by anyone else?		
• Is the project possibly funded by another organization?		
• Will participation by the military avoid wasteful or needless duplication of functions and services of other agencies?		
• Will the project disadvantage the opposing force in any way?		
• Is the project essential?		
FEASIBILITY		
Question/Consideration	√/X	Comment
• Does it promote the commander's mission/intent?		
• Does the project affect the capability of the Force to achieve its mission?		
• Does it conform to local customs?		
• Is there sufficient funding for the project?		
• Are all necessary skills and work force available?		
• Are all necessary material resources available?		
• Is all the necessary resources and machinery available and prioritized across the AOO?		
• Can the project be completed in the given time?		
CONCERNS		
Question/Consideration	√/X	Comment
• Are there any legal or political implications?		
• Will the project provide maximum return on investment and effort?		
• Will the project raise the expectations of the local population that may lead to disappointment when the assistance is withdrawn / complete?		
• Does the project affect local commercial practice (i.e. does it take potential business away from the local populous)?		
• Will the project require future force maintenance?		

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the project susceptible to possible escalation of involvement by the force? 		
CIVIL FACTORS/CONSIDERATIONS		
Question/Consideration	✓/X	Comment
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will it improve civil-military relations throughout the local area? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will it have an immediate impact? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will it have a favorable psychological effect? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will it encourage stability? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will it encourage self-help? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will the population support it? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will it benefit a wide spectrum of the local population? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will the civil authorities support it? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Local ○ Regional ○ Central 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will the government support it? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will the government be willing and able to sustain it? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will it enhance the authorities/ government's image? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will it be fully coordinated with all the appropriate levels of authority? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is it in any way discriminatory - or could it be perceived or exploited as such? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will future maintenance be a drain on civil resources? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will it cause cultural/ethnic negative perception? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is it susceptible to public exploitation? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will other agencies support it? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will the non-military actors agree to work with the military? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is there a contract or agreement for a civilian organization or person nominated to be responsible for the project or completion of the project? 		
<p>Overall assessment of project feasibility</p> <p>Signed:</p> <p>Rank:</p> <p>Date:</p>		

PROJECT INITIATING DOCUMENT (PID)

	PROJECT INITIATING DOCUMENT	Srl No.	Unit
Measures / Specific	Sponsor ¹ :		
	Project Manager ² :		
	Stakeholders/Partner arrangements ³ :	Contribution / Interest	
	1. 2. 3.	1. 2. 3.	
	Project Description ⁴ :		
	Location ⁵ :		
	Objectives ⁶ :	Key Performance Indicators ⁷	
	1. 2. 3.	1. 2. 3.	
Achievable	Resources required ⁸	Supplied by	
	Money: Force power: Machinery: Materiel:		
Relevant	Local impact of the project ⁹ :		
Time bound	Timelines / Key Milestones ¹⁰ :		
Acceptance	Submitted By ²	Authorised ¹ :	
	Name: Rank:	Name: Rank:	
	Date:	Date:	

Footnotes:

1. The senior officer with the approval authority.
2. The person responsible for the day-to-day management of the project.
3. Include all Civ/Mil stakeholders and how they will contribute or are interested in the project.
4. Include who the project is for, what is going to be done and when it will be delivered.
5. Where the project is going to be done.
6. What is to be achieved? Number of objectives can vary.
7. How will the project progress be measured against its final success? E.g. number of wells created out of total expected.
8. The need.
9. How the project can benefit the local population.
10. The project implementation steps.