

## Seminar Series Societal Resilience – Meeting Minutes

<b>Format:</b>	Expert Talk
<b>Moderators:</b>	Major Baur, Major Szabo, CIV Stette
<b>Experts:</b>	Ms. <b>Friederike Dahns</b> (NATO HQ Chair Civil Protection Group) Prof. <b>Gunhild Hoogensen Gjrv</b> (UiT The Arctic University of Norway) Ph.D. <b>Nicholas Krohley</b> (FrontLine Advisory)
<b>Audience:</b>	Open to the public. Practitioners, experts, academics, and advanced students
<b>Date:</b>	16 Dec 21, 15:00 - 17:00 UTC+1
<b>Duration:</b>	120 min

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### Guiding Questions:

- What is Resilience in general and what is Societal Resilience in particular?
- What does it need to strengthen Allied Nations societies?
- How can NATO operationalise Societal Resilience?
- How can Civil-Military Cooperation contribute to strengthening Societal Resilience?

**Expert:** Ms. Friederike Dahns

**Title:** Building Societal Resilience through Civil Preparedness: a NATO Perspective

#### 1. Resilience at NATO: Political Foundations

- Brief history of the concept of Resilience in NATO and how it started in NATO with Art. 3 in 1949
- After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO renovated its understanding of resilience; resilience became an essential basis for deterrence
- At the Warsaw summit in 2016 where it committed to enhancing the Resilience of its Allied nations; commitment to enhance resilience against the full spectrum of threats
- At the Brussels Summit (2021) NATO committed to strengthening the alliance Resilience through a whole of government approach and whole of society approach

#### 2. Resilience through Civil Preparedness: 3 Core Functions and 7 Baseline Requirements

*3 Core Functions include:*

1. Civil support to the military
2. Continuity of government

### 3. Continuity of essential services

#### *7 Baseline Requirements*

1. Continuity of government and critical governmental services
2. Resilient energy supplies
3. Ability to deal with uncontrolled movement of people
4. Resilient food and water resources
5. Ability to deal with mass casualties
6. Resilient civil communication systems
7. Resilient civil transportation systems

### 3. Resilience & Civil Preparedness Toolbox

- Resilience advisory support teams and rapid reaction teams
- Civil crisis response measures
- Supporting projects in partner countries
- Guidance and exchange of best practises
- Training and exercise
- Euro-Atlantic disaster coordination centre (EADRCC)

### 4. CEPC Paper on Enhancing Societal Resilience

- Acknowledge the important role of civil society and citizens in effective preparation and response to crisis and emergencies
- Our citizens and societies are targeted by hybrid activities (hostile info activities, disinformation)
- Encourage Nations to include Citizens in support of national and collective defence

### 5. CEPC Report on COVID-19 Lessons Learned

- Identified long-standing vulnerabilities (medical supplies shortages, PPE, vaccines, therapeutics and testing capabilities)
- Demonstrated our dependence on foreign supply chains and interdependencies between critical sectors
- Recognized the importance of access by the civil sector of certain military capabilities
- Identified the need to diversify supply chains

### 6. 2021 Strengthened Resilience Commitment

- Resilience is essential for deterrence and defence
- Resilience is a national responsibility and a collective commitment
- To build resilience, we need to keep working with partners

## 7. Enhanced EU-NATO Cooperation on Resilience

- Coherence between NATO resilience work and the EU strategic compass for security and defence
- Coherence between EU critical entities' resilience directive with NATO's resilience baseline requirements
- Coherence between NATO's work on civil preparedness and the union disaster resilience goals
- Coordination between NATO and EU's emergency response centres

## 8. Future work strands

- Allies develop national resilience goals and implementation plans
- Allies appoint senior official for resilience in capitals
- Council to establish a new resilience committee

**Expert: Prof. Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørsv**

**Title: Academic Perspective on Societal Resilience**

-> overview of the academic perspective on the concept of resilience, and specifically, societal resilience

- Definition of resilience = resilience is the capacity of an individual, society, or state to address, respond and recover from a crisis
- COVID-19 crisis showed -> the most commonly accepted definition of resilience (bouncing back) is insufficient, as it is often not possible to go back to the state prior to the crisis
- resilience is about adaptation, where we strive to achieve a new normal state

Depending on the specific type of crisis or emergency, resilience can be fostered by a variety of actors pertaining to:

- governmental organisations
- non-governmental organisations
- civil-society organisations

-> Trust is a crucial element for building resilience, specifically trust in fellow citizens and trust in government and authorities.

- Resilience is the capacity of bouncing back from a crisis. The term suggests that to be resilient there must be a capacity at the individual, society, state to address and react to crises.
- There is a problem with NATO's definition: very rarely something bounces back after a crisis. COVID-19 is an example of how challenging it is to bounce back after a crisis.

- Resilience is essentially about adaptations. It suggests that we are making adjustments to respond to threats and crises. It is not about bouncing back to the initial state, rather it is about finding a new normal/balance.
- Depending on the type of crisis at hand, resilience is fostered in different ways from different actors. (GOV, NGOs, CITIZENS); however, the majority of actors involved are usually from the civil sector.
- A resilient society is built upon its citizens' trust and confidence towards the government and other fellow citizens.
  - The less the trust towards other people or the government, the lower is the overall resilience of a given society
  - The longer the crisis, the higher the chance that trust and confidence in authorities diminishes
  - The more politicised the crisis is, the more difficult is to foster trust and resilience
- The majority of actors involved in resilience are from the civilian sector

**Expert: Ph.D. Nicholas Krohley**

**Title: Re-Thinking Societal Resilience - a tactical snapshot from Ukraine**

#### 1. The Standard Narrative of Resilience

- In the standard military view, civilians are prospective victims who must be inoculated against malign external forces

#### 2. We Are Making Two Mistakes

- First, we are empowering the enemy (our focus on external meddling overstates and intensifies the agency of foreign actors)
- Second, we are missing the point (we are neglecting the civil dynamics and societal fault lines that have created vulnerabilities (and thus opportunities for our foes) in the first place)

#### 3. Reality-Check: "Hybrid War" in Donbas

- Russia is held up as a master of Hybrid Warfare and information manipulation
- The reality of events in 2014, however, does not support this view
- the Donbas campaign was a soft power disaster for the Russians, and Ukrainian civilians played a critical role in shaping the trajectory of violence (through actions and inaction)
- Our misunderstanding of 2014 Ukraine connects directly to our flawed view of societal resilience - civilians are actors in their own right, with power to exert.

#### 4. A Different View of Resiliency

- We need to reclaim Ownership and Responsibility

- Societal resilience campaigns should focus on our societies and build resilience from the bottom-up
- Now it is top-down or a opponent-centric paradigm, this needs to change

#### 5. Reality-Check: Lessons From Ukraine

- Ukraine needs to address its internal problems (governance, corruption, nation-building)
- Putin cannot be the universal scapegoat
- We need a localised and contextual understanding of events, rather than grand narratives at the strategic level
- The use of Disinformation / Misinformation is typically totalitarian, that is why NATO has struggled so badly to be effective in its counter-measures
- See the Russian threat for what it is (STUPID but DANGEROUS)

#### 6. What about CIMIC?

- CIMIC has an essential role to play as an intermediary between military and civil society
- Bottom line: someone needs to be conducting civil assessments and civil engagements within NATO borders
- CIMIC value proposition: collaborative assessment of features and fault lines in the human terrain
- To be effective, we will need robust, detail-oriented investigative frameworks – not ASCOPE PMESII