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# **The 3D approach and counterinsurgency**

***A mix of defence, diplomacy and development***

**The case of Uruzgan**

Master Thesis

Mirjam Grandia  
So437697

Prof. Jan van der Meulen  
Dr. Sergio Catigani  
June 2009

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*- A mix of defence, diplomacy and development and the insurgency in Uruzgan -*

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# Introduction

## The 3D approach

- *A mix of defence, diplomacy and development and the insurgency in Uruzgan –*

Modern conflicts are increasingly becoming complex political emergencies. The current crises include elements of insurgency, organised crime, and terrorism. The interrelationship between security and development has therefore become a broadly discussed issue in both academic and policy discourse. The politicised context of peacekeeping or peacemaking missions demands greater awareness of other international actors. Once warfare is connected to both development and diplomacy, strategic and tactical military decisions can have a lasting impact on long-term objectives (Travers and Owen, 2008).

As a result, the world of modern warfare is undergoing a lot of changes. The main challenge for well trained and equipped armies is currently to counter the threat of terrorists and insurgents. A threat that cannot simply be fought and won with modern technology. Hard - military- power needs to be combined with soft - diplomatic - power. In countries like Afghanistan the multinational military force has learnt the hard way that they need a new approach. Ever since various names for in fact more or less the same concept have been circulating: comprehensive approach, 3D-approach, three-block warfare, four- block warfare. All have articulated one issue, the human factor has become increasingly important for military operations. This human factor is crucial in counterinsurgency were both the insurgents as well as the military are fighting for the support of the population. Without their support neither of them will be able to win.

Various governments have faced the new realities of modern peacekeeping and designed various concepts such as joint strategies for the development and security of post-conflict countries. Amongst others, the Dutch government has come up with a strategy called the 3D concept: Defence, Diplomacy and Development. This concept combines the three pillars in the Dutch foreign policy and is implemented in countries where the Netherlands has deployed their troops such as Afghanistan. The embodiment of the 3D concept are the so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), civil military hybrids who address all three components of the integrated approach. The 3D concept and its implanting tools appear to be less 'new' than is expected. In fact, the Americans have used a similar approach in Vietnam known as CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program) which was based on the so-called Hearts and Minds theory.

The topic of my thesis will be the so called 3D (Diplomacy, Defence, Development) - approach and its effectiveness to counter insurgents in Uruzgan. I will provide a comprehensive literature overview about insurgency and counterinsurgency. Subsequently, I will analyse the 3D-concept. Afterwards, I will analyse the effectiveness of the 3D concept in the fights against insurgents, by conducting a single case - study of the Dutch PRT in Uruzgan, Afghanistan. I will use the results of this case-study to answer my main research question: *How effective is the 3D approach in the fight against the insurgents in Afghanistan?* More in-depth information about the methodology and the case study design will be given in part two of thesis.

The social relevance of this research is the fact that the problems of counterinsurgencies - like the one in Afghanistan - are currently major issues for Western powers like NATO. Many investments are made to assist the government of Afghanistan in their fight against the insurgents. Afghan lives and lives of the international troops are at stake and strategies like the 3D approach are introduced to possibly alter the current situation. Therefore, the potential of this concept should be researched. The academic relevance of this project is based on the view that old theories seem to be adopted 'new' strategies like the 3D concept. 3D is introduced as a new phenomena to counter insurgencies while in fact it is an old concept. The current topic in the field of (counter) insurgency seems to be the eternal quest for a counterinsurgency recipe book. In this quest concepts and general assumptions about (counter) insurgency remain uncontested and new strategies incorporate theories without proper analysis. I would like to contribute to science by providing insights in the development of modern counterinsurgency approaches and their possible flaws.

# Part one: The theories of Insurgency, counterinsurgency and 3D

## Chapter I. Theory of Insurgency and counterinsurgency

*“Counter-insurgency campaigns are won not by body counts, but by the absence of killing and satisfying citizens' hopes”, Greg Mills*

### 1. Introduction

In this chapter I provide an outline of the most common findings in contemporary writings about insurgency and counterinsurgency. I present some of the ‘best practices’ and the discussion amongst scholars and practitioners. Furthermore, I look at the specifics of the Afghan insurgency in general and the insurgency in Uruzgan in particular.

### 2. Insurgency and counterinsurgency

The topic ‘insurgency’ and ‘counterinsurgency’ is well and broadly researched not only by academics but also by militaries and journalists. However, one could argue that all this research has not necessarily led to better and new insights. Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate the never-ending difficulties of fighting insurgencies despite the so-called lessons learned of the past. In this literature study I will first elaborate on the topic and subsequently I will describe the current discussion about (counter) insurgency.

The most commonly used definitions of an insurgency do not differ that much. It is often the American definition from the counterinsurgency manual which circulates most. According to this manual an insurgency is *‘an organised, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control’* (US Army, 2006). Metz describes an insurgency as a combination of continuity and change and as an enduring essence. Protracted through asymmetric violence, political, legal, and ethical ambiguity, the use of complex terrain, psychological warfare, and political mobilization and a shifting nature. It occurs when the gap between political expectations and the opportunities of a certain group has become unacceptable for them and they believe this can only be solved by the use of force (Metz, 2007:1).

It was the well-known RAND corporation who was heavily involved in the formulation of the two major theories of how one should view the battle space in counter insurgency(COIN): the population. The first theory, commonly called the ‘hearts and minds’ or HAM, argues that the impact of development and modernity on traditional societies causes the fragmentation of old institutions before new institutions are in place. This institutional gap creates problems, which can give rise to insurgency. The prescription for success is therefore to win the public’s support (their ‘hearts and minds’) for the government by ameliorating some of the negative effects of development while speeding up the provision of modernity’s benefits. RAND analysts felt that even if the actual provision of benefits lagged, the key was providing security to the population and convincing it that government was operating for its benefit. Other researchers at RAND, steeped in economics and

systems analysis, responded to this first theory by arguing that what mattered was not what the population thought but what it did. The key to the population was therefore to provide it with selective incentives to cooperate with the government and disincentives to resist the government. In response to this 'cost/benefit' theory, other RAND scholars pointed out that coercive methods could actually stimulate the insurgency, leading to spiralling escalation between insurgent and counterinsurgent, a spiral that might be unwinnable by modern democracies with moral and political limitations on the use of force (Long, 2006).

The central characteristic of an insurgency is the reliance on population for active support or at least its passive acquiescence. This support, whether from affinity with or coercion from the insurgents (often a mix of both) provides the insurgents with personnel, supplies, and, critically, an information advantage over the counter insurgent force (Long, 2006; Ahmend, 2008; Kilcullen, 2006a). Populations in many insurgency studies are viewed as rational actors that would respond in more or less predictable ways to incentives and sanctions from the competing systems of insurgent and counter insurgent. Ultimately, what matters is not the population's attitudes but its actions (Leites and Wolf, 1970; Mason, 1994). One of the main principles of counterinsurgency theory is the separation of the insurgent from the populace. This has a physical and 'kinetic' dimension, but counterinsurgency rests primarily in the cognitive realm, commonly known as the 'battle to win the hearts and minds'. The population must be persuaded to withdraw physical and moral support for the insurgent (Ryan, 2007). As Davis has put it : "Small wars are wars over people. They are contests in achieving psychological ascendancy, not fire superiority"(Davis, 2006).

Fighting an insurgency is not just a job for the military. Experiences from previous and present insurgencies have shown that the other actors have to be included in a successful campaign against insurgents. A variety of measures including political, economic and developmental play a significant role in gaining progress and success in what can be called state-building. In Afghanistan, the term 'comprehensive approach' has been used to underline the need for a more cross-ministerial interagency approach when fighting the insurgency (Thruelsen, 2008). Galula already stressed the importance of integrating military and political strategies by citing a famous line from Mao Zedong "*A revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political*"(Galula, 1964). Also the famous insurgency expert Kitson has written that "*There can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity*" (Kitson, 1977). Western counterinsurgency doctrine recognizes the fact that military operations must be subordinate to the political campaign. This in fact requires two skills that are not required in conventional war fighting, namely one must be able to see issues and actions from the perspective of the domestic population and one must understand the relative value of force and how easily excessive force can undermine popular support (Aylwin-Foster, 2005). Furthermore, it must also be understood that foreign military forces are no substitute for effective and legitimate local governance, including critical public services and indigenous security forces. Statistically, the factor most critical to COIN success is able and accountable government. According to Gompert and Gordon, the ability of local government to deliver public service is a better indicator of military effectiveness than eliminating insurgents (Gompert and Gordon, 2008: 34). Data collected from some 90 insurgencies since World War II show that insurgencies nearly always fail against governments that are representative, competent, and honest in the eyes of their citizens. Three functions are identified to be especially critical for a government to perform in a counterinsurgency: job training and placement of ex-combatants, efficient and fair justice systems (e.g., laws, courts, and prisons), and accessible mass lower education (Gompert and Gordon, 2008).

Today's insurgencies differ significantly – at the level of policy, strategy, operational art and tactical technique – from those of earlier eras. They have a different strategic context, structure, and dynamics than earlier insurgencies who were mostly a result from post-colonial power-struggles

(Kilcullen, 2006a), notwithstanding the fact that some of the features of the post-colonial insurgencies can be found in modern insurgencies as well .

Contemporary insurgencies are rooted in complex conflicts which involve what Metz calls 'third forces' (armed groups which affect the outcome, such as militias) and 'fourth forces' (unarmed groups which affect the outcome, such as international media), as well as the insurgents and the regime (Metz, 2007:15). Metz argues that the causes of today's insurgencies are nested within deeper and broader struggles than just the issue of power - which he describes as the cause for the insurgencies during the Cold War - and lists economics, services, and social identity as the reasons for the current insurgencies (Metz, 2007:12). However, I would argue that the causes during the insurgencies during the Cold War are oversimplified by Metz since many insurgencies like the ones in for example Latin America were mainly about economics, services and social identity. By stating that these countries were just a playground for the two world powers ignores the complexity of these conflicts. Nevertheless, the current complexity by third and fourth forces has increased.

Even though modern insurgencies are increasingly more complex than their predecessors, an enormous amount of classical counterinsurgency remains relevant (Kilcullen, 2006b; Kalev I, 2005) since many aspects and characteristics - like the issue of distribution of power and means and identity - have remained the same. Furthermore, the context of the method and some elements of the method may have changed, but the fundamentals of counterinsurgency have not (Long, 2007). The latest *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* for that matter draws heavily from classic counterinsurgency texts of the 1960s such as David Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* and has much more in common with older theories of revolution than recent research in political science (Kalyvas, 2008).

Even though insurgency remains to be a highly political form of warfare, it is argued that its character, not its nature, has changed (Alderson, 2008:35) and the nature of insurgencies dictates that institutional change cannot keep pace with the threat (Kopets, 2005:5). In COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts faster usually wins. Counterinsurgencies have therefore been referred to as 'learning competitions' (US Army, 2006:10). It is not that simple to keep up with the current insurgency tactics. Modern insurgencies are characterised by their complex and global nature. Unlike past insurgent forms that aspired to shape national politics, these movements espouse larger thematic goals and operational territories (Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, 2007; Gompert et al, 2007). Modern counterinsurgents face complex enemies with differing motivations and approaches. This is a result of the fact that insurgents are often linked through dispersed networks, taking advantage of new media to generate support and spread propaganda (Crane, 2007).

All scholars and experts whom have written about COIN - contemporary and from earlier times - seem to agree that the success of any counterinsurgency campaign requires a combination of military, political and economic efforts (Galula, 1964; Gompert et al, 2007; Kalvev I, 2004; Kitson, 1971; Long, 2006; Metz, 2007). However, the current discussion amongst scholars and militaries focuses on the question whether it is possible to ever come up with 'a recipe book' for successful COIN. Some - like many analysts at the RAND cooperation and several militaries - seem to pursue the search for the ultimate recipe. The RAND publication '*On 'Other War' Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research*', is based on the premise that insurgency and counterinsurgency is a general phenomenon. Many of the alleged differences between past and current COIN are overstated according to the RAND study (Long, 2006:10). However, one of the main lessons learned over the years has been that, the character of counterinsurgency is not fixed. According to Kilcullen, it is shifting and it evolves in response to changes in insurgency. He states that there seems to be no constant set of operational techniques in counterinsurgency and that modern insurgencies belie the binary approach of insurgent versus counterinsurgent since there are often multiple competing insurgent forces fighting each other as well as the government. Besides, the strong government which is needed to fight the insurgents is not always in place resulting in the assistance of foreign military forces. However, the 'supported' government's interests may differ in

key respects from those who came to its aid which might even further complicate the internal conflicts<sup>1</sup>(Kilcullen, 2006b:122).

In order to solve current insurgencies like in the ones in Afghanistan and Iraq, many analysis are made and attention is focused on lessons learned and best practices. Some lessons of COIN are that there is no substitute for legitimate and able local government (Gompert and Gordon, 2008:13) and according to RAND's COIN specialist Jones, the analysis of 90 insurgencies since 1945 indicates that the success and failure of counterinsurgency depends on the capability of indigenous security forces (especially police), the local governance and the external support for insurgents (including sanctuary) (Jones, 2001:11). Based on lessons from past insurgencies Kilcullen proposes an easily grasped mental model that helps individuals and agencies cooperate. This model contains two parts: the first is a description of the 'conflict ecosystem'<sup>2</sup> that forms the environment for 21st century counterinsurgency operations and the second is a tentative framework for whole-of-government counterinsurgency in that environment (Kilcullen, 2006a:2). Another finding about the potential success or failure of COIN operations is that the organisation for COIN must be improved. The Provincial Reconstruction Team model is named as a civil military model that should be expanded and made the basis for current and future COIN effort <sup>3</sup>(Long, 2006).

Scholars like Shafer do not believe one will ever be able to come up with the ultimate solution since insurgencies differ. Eleven years ago Shafer already recognized the fact that (American) policy makers misunderstood past insurgency situations, prescribed inappropriate solutions to them and overestimated its role in the process. According to Shafer they did so because of the impact of widely shared and unquestioned assumptions concerning the sources, nature, direction, and potential consequences of political change in the Third World. The resulting inaccurate diagnoses of insurgencies in turn led policy makers to pursue inappropriate, often counterproductive policies while closing off other courses of action not consistent with them. Shafer predicted that the continuity of this flawed diagnosis and the related misprescriptions are unlikely to improve much in the near future (Shafer, 1988:80). The counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that Shafer might be right. An interesting finding of Metz in fact underlines Schafer's opinion. He states that most effective posture for outsiders is not to be an ally of the government and thus a sustainer of the flawed socio-political-economic system, but to be neutral mediators and peacekeepers, even when the outsiders have much more ideological affinity for the regime than for the insurgents (Metz, 2007:55). However, this approach is not taken in most current COIN operations.

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<sup>1</sup> An example of this is the current debate about negotiations with the Taliban. The international community (including most of the countries who have sent their troops to Afghanistan) does not support this idea.

<sup>2</sup> Kilcullen describes this 'conflict ecosystem' as "*many independent but interlinked actors, each seeking to maximize their own survivability and advantage in a chaotic, combative environment. Pursuing the ecological metaphor, these actors are constantly evolving and adapting, some seeking a secure niche while others seek to become "top predator" or scavenge on the environment. Some actors existed in the environment before the conflict. They include government, ethnic, tribal, clan or community groups, social classes, urban and rural populations, and economic and political institutions. This new state of the environment also produces new actors. These include local armed organisations, and foreign armed groups drawn into the conflict from outside.... In addition, the conflict produces refugees, displaced persons and sometimes mass migration. It creates economic dislocation, leading to unemployment and crime, and creating armed groups such as bandits, narcotics traffickers, smugglers, couriers and black marketers*" (Kilcullen, 2006a).

<sup>3</sup> This is what Austin Long wrote in his book 'Another War' (Long, 2006). However in an interview with the author he stated that the effectiveness of the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan has not lived up to the expectations he held of this concept two years ago.

### 3. Afghan Insurgency

Four of the strongest statistical predictors of successful insurgency are present in Afghanistan: populations excluded from politics and estranged from the state authoritarian, unresponsive, inept, and corrupt government, insurgents committed to destroying such government and significant popular sympathy for the insurgents (Gompert and Gordon, 2008: 13-14).

As a result of lawlessness, various militant groups are fighting for power. The insurgents in Afghanistan comprise of various groups: the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami, the Haqqani network, foreign fighters, criminal groups (often drug related) and various tribal militias. Sometimes the actions of the insurgents are coordinated but often they are isolated. Furthermore, it is believed that the Afghan insurgent groups exert a presence that is growing in light of the upcoming national elections in September 2009 (FASIC, 2008; Giustozzi, 2008; Jones, 2008). The distinction between these insurgent groups is that the Taliban is seeking political power, groups like Hezb-i-Islami, the Haqqani network and the foreign fighters - such as Al Qaida - are mainly there to fight the Western 'infidels', and the criminal groups and the militia are fighting to maintain the status quo in order to ensure their income and power basis. However, temporarily coalitions are made between several of these groups and forces are bundled. This complicates the design of the counterinsurgency strategy, since various groups and issues need to be addressed.

In the Afghan insurgency, the competence - and, in some areas, incompetence - of the indigenous government and its security forces have been critical factors. Also the legitimacy of the state has been questioned by many Afghans (especially the insurgents) due to the direct intervention by foreign forces who have installed the central government in Kabul. The weakness of state administration, excessive tribal-based government patronage and intense corruption among the Afghan police and military forces another government institutions and administrators has alienated large segments of the population and provided a breach for the Taliban to penetrate (Long, 2006; Giustozzi, 2008). Furthermore, the Taliban has been able to adapt fast and has become a learning organisation. Its adaptability has enabled it to gain the upper hand among the population in a number of key provinces (Giustozzi, 2008). The fact that major Western military organisations are not able to learn and adapt as fast as insurgents such as the Taliban creates a major disadvantage in their counter insurgency operations.

### 4. Uruzgan Insurgency

The Afghan insurgency in the South - thereby also in Uruzgan - can be divided into two groups. The first group consists of the Taliban leadership, their key commanders and several hundred other military and political commanders. They are motivated by radical Islam and see the insurgency as a fight against Western infidels and the 'puppet government' of the Western powers in Kabul. The second group represents thousands of local fighters and their support network consists mainly of young men from rural villages who are paid to execute subversive activities such as setting up roadside bombs and launching rockets. Their main motivation is the fact that they are unemployed, frustrated with the lack of change since 2001 or angry because a local villager was killed or wounded by Afghan or NATO forces. Most of them have no ideological commitment to the insurgency (FASIC, 2008).

There are three main factors of importance which contribute to the conflict in the province of Uruzgan: a long history of tribal conflict, conquest and expulsion, a lack of good governance in the province for almost a century and the presence of anti-government elements or 'spoilers' from within and outside the province who find fertile ground for further destabilisation (De Boer, 2008). De Boer states that only a provincial government could be successful in combating the insurgency

by broadening the tribal inclusion into the government. The insurgency currently seems one step ahead in creating a broader base of tribal support than the government. Prominent in the role of anti-government elements or 'spoilers' are drugs lords, the Taliban and criminal elements (De Boer, 2008).

Like in the other provinces in the South of Afghanistan, the Taliban movement in Uruzgan is not a homogenous movement. An important part of the Taliban fighters are in fact - like stated earlier- the local population who does not support the movement out of ideological reasons but for pure opportunistic reasons. Since natural resources like land and water are scarce, these are often the foundation of the conflicts. Furthermore, few people trust the local governance - due to corruption - and therefore put more trust in the Taliban and their ability to take care of them. Due to the fact that conflicts about natural resources are often resolved through tribes who have connections at the provincial level, other parties - who might not have these connections - are not able to promote their interests. This vicious circle of revenge and hatred can result in lining up with the Taliban. The Taliban at their side use these conflicts and revenge issues between the local tribes to commit these tribes for their cause (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). The insurgency in Uruzgan has a regional dimension since it is also influenced by the support of Pakistan. Border security is an important factor in the successful defeat of insurgents. Border crossings should be restricted to deny insurgents a sanctuary and to enhance national sovereignty (Kalev, 2005). However, the control of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is difficult if not impossible.

# Chapter II. The 3D concept

## 1. Introduction

The 3D concept is also known as the comprehensive approach or the whole of government approach. These terms are commonly used to describe an integrated approach towards (post) conflict states or so-called fragile states. Various organisations such as NATO, OECD, the UN and various nations who have deployed both troops, diplomats and committed funds to the development of post-conflict states such as Afghanistan, have all applied these concepts. The terminology differs but the concept remains the same: an integrated interagency effort to the stabilisation and reconstruction of post-conflict states focusing on the three components of defence, diplomacy and development. The 3D concept is in fact an approach to post war reconstruction. These programs are rarely designed to merely reconstruct. Most entail significant institutional overhaul, whether called for in the peace agreement, in accompanying UN resolutions or in the programs promoted by international donors and the international financial institutions in situations defined as 'post-conflict'. Such programs typically include provisions for building transparent, effective and accountable states. Usually this entails promoting the rule of law (including human rights and gender issues), liberal democratic institutions (above all elections), civil society and an open economy with market-based economic growth (though modified by measures for poverty reduction). The programs have become increasingly standardised, reflecting cumulative experience that has been codified as 'lessons learnt', 'best practices' and guiding principles collectively endorsed by central institutions in the international aid community. The underlying model of these reconstruction and modernisation programs is based on Western experiences of liberal political development and economic growth (Suhrke, 2007:1292).

The 3D approach has been promoted and practiced in Afghanistan by countries such as Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom since 2006. The 3D concept explores which Development, Diplomacy, and Defence initiatives are most likely to be effective and faithful to Afghanistan values (Bot, 2006b; Schmitz, 2004; UK government, 2006). The 3D approach is a multi-track strategy. It involves a joint analysis intensive international cooperation and investment of sufficient resources and people. It furthermore, requires long-term political commitment, support from parliaments and other countervailing powers, and on-going assessment of state performance (Koenders, 2007). Of course, there are differences between countries who are using the comprehensive approach: the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands all regard fragile states as both a development and security challenge, but they differ in the weight they give these challenges. Motivations and objectives of the various countries fall along two extremes: policy coherence for *national security* versus policy coherence for *development*. For example, Sweden treats global development as the centrepiece of its international engagement. On the other side of the spectrum, the United States is mainly motivated by the global war on terrorism. The United Kingdom, Canada and the Netherlands fall somewhere in the middle (Patrick and Brown, 2007: 2; Bot, 2006).

However, the importance of the 3D concept is underlined by other agencies such as the Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic Council. Both draw the same conclusions and state that the policy of the international community needs to be adjusted by adopting a comprehensive campaign plan and strategy which encompasses all efforts with regard to security, development and governance (Kamerbrief 295, 2008).

## 2. Theoretical Foundations of the 3D concept

The theoretical foundations of the 3D can be traced back to the so-called Hearts and Mind (HAM) theory which is developed by researchers from the RAND corporation. During my search to find the theoretical framework of the 3D concept one of my assumptions became reality: the policymakers of the Dutch 3D concept had not based their policy on any theoretical analysis. Could I then pose the statement that the 3D concept is based on the HAM theory? If we take a close look at the theory itself, one finds striking similarities. However, I discussed my findings with one of RAND's COIN specialist, Austin Long. He agreed that 3D draws heavily on HAM theory. '*The operational concept 3D is a way to implement the theoretical concepts of HAM*' (Long, 2009).

The COIN theory came to be known as 'winning the hearts and minds of the people', by Sir Gerald Templer who introduced this term during the Malayan Emergency (Long, 2006). The theory however was developed during the Vietnam war, when the United States asked the RAND to assist them in developing counter-insurgency measures. For hearts and minds analysts, the first problem is protection of the populace from insurgent thus the government in need must receive assistance to strengthen their armed forces (security). Furthermore, hearts and minds theory suggests that insurgency-threatened countries ought to attack the two basic political problems behind insurgency: bad administration and lack of administration. Therefore reforms are essential, the rule of law should be enforced and distributional, ethnic communal and corruption problems should be addressed and the quantity and quality of government should be improved to enforce the reforms (governance). The final issue that needs to be addressed according to the HAM theory, is the unrest which is caused by bad living conditions or rising expectations. Especially, if the legitimacy of the government is poor, HAM theory argues that economic aid will help persuade the population to support the government instead of the insurgents (development). The theory dictates that all three aspects of this strategy should be managed all simultaneously. What is required is a coordinated effort by military, political, and administrative leaders to insure balanced action on all fronts and at all levels (Schafer, 1988: 62-64).

The Hearts and Mind theory stresses development over security (Schafer, 1988:62) but one of RAND HAM theorists Guy Pauker doubted the actual extent of improvement in living standards experienced by the people in successful COIN efforts, but argued for the importance of "reawakening the people's confidence and hope through convincing evidence that the government did care about their welfare" (Pauker cited in Long, 2006: 23).

It is important to address some of the critiques against the HAM theory since it can provide further insights in possible difficulties of the use of the 3D concept in Afghanistan. The most known opponent of the HAM theory is the already earlier mentioned Cost and Benefit theory which was developed at RAND as well. This theory questions the validity of one of the central precepts of the HAM theory by arguing that popular support is far from necessary for insurgents in lesser-developed countries. Not popular support, in the sense of attitudes of identification and allegiance matter but the actions of the population matter. By altering the population's preferences (which could initially be neutral or even favourable to the government) repressive measures could change the marginal cost of the inputs to the systems of insurgent and counterinsurgent (Wolf, 1965: 5; Leites and Wolf 1970: 8-16). The difficulty with the cost-benefit theory is that it cannot take preferences as a given. It assumes that the population is completely indifferent to insurgents and counterinsurgents, so whichever side provided the better set of incentives and disincentives would prevail. The examination of the debate between HAM and cost-benefit, shows that humans actually follow both logics simultaneously. Incentives clearly do matter to humans, driving many decisions in daily life. However preferences - particularly those that involve the legitimacy or illegitimacy of an action - quite obviously affect decision-making as well (Long, 2006: 31).

A less known but interesting critical analysis of the HAM theory, is provided by Schafer . According to him the hearts and minds prescriptions amount to three great oughts: governments ought to secure the population from insurgent coercion, they ought to provide competent, legal, responsive administration and they ought to meet rising expectations with higher living standards. Schafer states that is not realistic to expect a fragile state manage all three aspects of this strategy let alone simultaneously. He also criticised the HAM's theory practitioners' misassessments of Third World governments, their population, the sources of insurgency and an outsider's ability to intervene. He states that there are often constraints on leverage with regard to intra governmental limits on reform by the foreign organisations and troops and the nature of relations between government and populace and between insurgents and populace (Schafer, 1988: 62).

The current concept - the 3D or comprehensive approach - of the HAM theory builds on the same premise: by providing security and basic needs to the population, the support is taken away from the insurgents . However the three oughts as addressed by Schafer are still part of the current concept. The assumption that the (fragile) state will be able to (with support of foreign troops and organisations) provide basic services and security and economic prosperity seems to be uncontested. The expectations towards the performance of the (fragile) state - in this case Afghanistan - are high and even with support of the international community it remains to be seen if it will be able to perform the required actions.

### **3. The Dutch 3D concept**

The Dutch 3D approach has been effectuated in formal policy in 2005. The concept became known in relation to Afghanistan although it accounts for the Dutch foreign policy in general. The former minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Bot, referred to the 3D approach as the trinity of politics, security and development - in reference to the Clausewitzian trinity of army, people and government-. *'In places where we are trying to strengthen democracy and the rule of law, our military efforts should support and be seen to support this overall effort. Where we are trying to win over the population for a more peaceful and stable order, our developmental instruments should support and be seen to support the overall effort'* (Bot, 2006a).

#### **3.1 History**

The foundations of the Dutch 3D concept were laid in the late eighties and early nineties by the former minister of Development Cooperation, Pronk. He initiated the close cooperation between the two D's of Defence and Development and started a debate about a more integrated foreign policy towards (post) conflict nations. *"Together with the former minister of Defence – Ter Beek – we have introduced the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) fund<sup>4</sup>. Little amounts of money coming from the funds of development aid and were given to the military to spend it on the well-known 'hearts and minds' activities on missions such as the ones in Cambodia and Bosnia. In the beginning the civil servants of development Aid were quite sceptical. The military however were happy and used the funds to help the population in the areas where they operated"* (Pronk, 2009).

Various events have led to the further integrated approach between the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Cooperation. First of all, the reorganisation of the departments for International Cooperation and Political Affairs of the ministry of Foreign Affairs - which became one

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<sup>4</sup> The funds provided from this CIMIC fund later became known as the so-called 'Pronk- funding'.

organisation - led to coordination and integration of both ministers and their civil servants on country and regional strategies. Hereby the bilateral development aid no longer took a project approach but became a sectoral and program-support approach. In order to enable the implementation of regular foreign policy the Stability Fund was established in 2004. This financial instrument comprises regular foreign policy and development budgets and finances all kind of activities regardless if it accounts for official development aid. Furthermore, two white papers - the Policy Framework for CIMIC (2003) and the Memorandum on Post-Conflict Reconstruction (2005) - were presented to parliament. The first paper provided the means and tools for the ongoing CIMIC activities in Iraq and Afghanistan and the second paper provided an inventory of what the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Economic Affairs were capable of in the context of reconstruction efforts and how this could be integrated in a comprehensive approach. However, practical implementation of this policy perspectives was limited to the creation of the positions of a military advisor at the ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004) and a development advisor at the ministry of Defence (2006) and an interdepartmental Steering Committee for Security Cooperation and Reconstruction (2005). The existing structures of the ministries were maintained, this in contradiction to other countries who have implemented the 3D/Comprehensive approach such as Canada and the United Kingdom. Both of them have created standing units with multidisciplinary expertise (Van der Gaag – Halbertsma et al, 2008: 32-33)

### 3.2 Current Model

The Dutch mission in the South of Afghanistan can be seen as the true beginning of the implementation of the 3D approach. The three ministries (Defence, Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation) worked closely together in the formulation of the goals of the mission. Various joint visits to Afghanistan were executed and they worked closely together on the creation of a civil assessment of the province of Uruzgan. The Dutch government used both its assets from the embassy in Kabul and military personnel - some of them were embedded with the American PRT in Uruzgan which was to be taken over by the Dutch<sup>5</sup> - to collect information about the situation in Uruzgan. The Dutch 3D policy accounts for three levels, namely the national governmental level (The Hague), foreign policy (international level), operational (Uruzgan). All three ministries jointly carry political responsibility for the execution of the mission in Uruzgan. The so-called Article 100<sup>6</sup> letters and reports about the mission are presented by the three ministers (Kamerbrief 295, 2008).

The Dutch government is convinced that integrated foreign policy is the only way to successfully assist the Afghan government in providing peace and stability to its citizens. A central theme in the Dutch Strategy is '*Afghanisation*': working methods need to be adjusted to the Afghan context even though it might affect the speed of the development. Afghan ownership should contribute to the sustainability of the development efforts. The belief of the Netherlands is that the international assistance mission to Afghanistan can only be successful when Afghan authorities increase their effectiveness and reliability on all fronts and when they become more independent and act on the basis of Afghan policy (Kamerbrief 315, 2008). A critical note must be made with regard to Afghan

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<sup>5</sup> The author herself was embedded with the US PRT in Uruzgan in July and August 2006. She was sent from RC South - where she was posted as a CIMIC planner - to collect data about the situation in Uruzgan.

<sup>6</sup> Article 100 of the Dutch constitution states that Dutch forces shall not be employed outside their territory other than pursuant to an Act of Parliament. In an 'article 100 letter' the government informs the parliament about its intention to deploy the Dutch forces.

ownership of the development activities. In various publications and conferences about the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, the importance of 'local ownership' and 'the Afghans in the driver's seat' was underlined. However, Afghan critics argued that this is not a very realistic picture when one realises that the development programs are written in Western capitals, donors provide the frameworks of the programs and foreign experts are in the back-seat (Suhrke, 2007: 1305). Also the huge lack of human capital in a country where the majority of the population is illiterate complicates – to put it mildly – local ownership.

The 3D concept of the Dutch in Uruzgan is in line with the comprehensive approach of NATO in the whole of Afghanistan (NATO Comprehensive Approach, 2008). The focus of NATO is the establishment of so-called Afghan Development Zones (ADZ). This strategy was taken from the well-known 'ink blot' strategy which has been used in previous COIN campaigns as well (for example Vietnam and Malaysia). It contains pacifying a given area establishes its presence in a location where the population is most supportive of its efforts, or where an area of key strategic importance can be secured. It uses its military effort for securing key centres and improving conditions hereby eliminating support for the insurgents. Afterwards the success is supposed to spread slowly outwards as if from an expanding ink spot (Mills et al., 2006). This inkblot strategy is the official Dutch strategy in Uruzgan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006).

#### **4. Implementing tools: Provincial Reconstruction Teams**

All three nations who are implementing the 3D concept in the South of Afghanistan, use their Provincial Reconstruction Teams as implementing tools. These PRTs are broadly discussed and evaluated but before I will turn to these discussion and describe their role in 3D and COIN, I will briefly describe the background of the concept and the purpose of the PRTs.

The PRT- concept has been introduced in 2001 by the Americans in Afghanistan and NATO has taken the concept and used it for its mission in Afghanistan as well. There is no blue print for the PRTs in terms of size, composition and operational style but they do however share a number of common features: they are joint teams of civilian and military personnel consisting of 50-300 personnel, they are generally made up by military personnel (90-95 per cent of total), political advisors and development experts. The civil military configuration of the teams was designed to improve civil military coordination and enhance the quality of the military 'hearts and minds' campaigns by drawing on civilian expertise and facilitating the dispersal of government funds for relief and reconstruction projects and security sector reform. The level of civil-military integration varies between the PRTs and each PRT has been tailored to the mission requirements in their respective regions to ensure that they have the capabilities suited to the local situation. The purpose of the PRTs is to expand the legitimacy of the Afghan central authority to the various provinces and rural areas of Afghanistan. In order to achieve this goal the PRTs have to improve the security in the provinces by promoting the rule of law and to facilitate and support the (re) construction process. The first three PRTs were launched between December 2002 and March 2003 (Jakobsen, 2005: 11-12) For an overview of the structure of the Dutch PRT see annex D.

PRTs have become an integral part of both the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, they have been criticised for their mixed effectiveness, over-emphasis on military objectives and priorities, differences in staffing and mission and the worst sceptics of the concept have called them 'Public Relations Teams' intended to demonstrate that 'something is done' (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008; Jakobsen, 2005; Grandia, 2008). Another point of criticism to the PRT concept is the fact that they do not necessarily execute activities and projects in line with the plans designed by the central Afghan government. However, the Dutch are named as an exception to this critique because the Dutch government redirect its funding for PRT reconstruction activities directly to the Afghan central government, mainly through United Nations and World Bank channels. Dutch officials note the

contrast with the American approach - who undertake reconstruction projects using American manpower and equipment. The Dutch argue that the Karzai government itself must undertake responsibility for planning and implementation of projects to rebuild the country. Only in this way, the Dutch believe, can the Afghans learn good governance and management of their own affairs. This perception stems from the development aid lessons they have learned. Some US officials believe that the Dutch practice of providing assistance funds directly to the Afghan government, has led to the money being spent on other governmental purposes or landing in the pockets of corrupt Afghan officials (Dutch and American officials cited in Gallis, 2008:16).

Regardless the criticism, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the governments who have deployed the PRTs view them as a success story. They describe the civil military hybrids as effective, flexible, low-cost instrument that can easily be adapted to other conflicts (Jakobsen, 2005:7). The 'success' of the PRTs however is not based on facts. Therefore an important issue in the discussion about PRTs and their effectiveness is the facts that metrics to assess the success and impact of current PRT models are lacking in national PRT strategies (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008: 5; Grandia, 2008).

How do the PRTs relate to counter insurgency? The PRT concept is in fact in support of counterinsurgency theory and military doctrine which underlines the need of counterinsurgent forces in cities and villages to protect the population. Furthermore, counterinsurgency doctrine argues that the military must undertake significant efforts to provide political, social and economic benefits to the population, including undertaking aspects of the rebuilding. (Lopez, 2007: 205; US Department of the Army, 2006). The PRTs mission is to undertake all this activities in the name of the government, thereby increasing the legitimacy of and trust in the government by the local population. Hereby, the influence of the insurgents can be diminished.

The use of civil military hybrids is not new in counterinsurgency operations. A similar concept called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) was used in Vietnam in the struggle against the Vietcong. Through CORDS the United States consolidated the pacification efforts of multiple civilian agencies and military units, placing it within the military chain of command. It achieved a high level of integration of American and South Vietnamese efforts towards the pacification of the countryside and it has been successful in largely decreasing the effectiveness of the communist insurgency in the overall conflict. The Americans consolidated the pacification efforts of multiple civilian agencies and military units, placing it within the military chain of command (Sauvé, 2008). Sauvé argues that integrated approach in Afghanistan has many parallels with the US progression in the early stages of the Vietnam War. However, he also states that the current level of integration of the 3D approach in Afghanistan has not yet achieved the level that proved successful with the CORDS strategy (Sauvé, 2008: 2). It must however be noted that the 3D concept has only been introduced recently in Afghanistan (2006) and the complexity of donor funding, multinational forces in a NATO setting and the complexity of the Afghan insurgency, does differ from the Vietnamese insurgency. Hence, it makes the Afghan case far more difficult in terms of concerted efforts and integration. Despite the apparent support for the PRTs, and their fit with the counterinsurgency literature, Lopez points at the danger with the greater presence of PRTs. She argues that this would put less pressure on the Afghan forces to expand and challenge the guerrillas (Lopez, 2007: 251). Another point of caution is raised by COIN specialist Long. He believes the PRTs are unable to embody all three D's which in his opinion leads to the conclusion that 3D is fine as an overarching concept but appears to have little practical application in Afghanistan. *"When I wrote the Other War piece in 2005, I had great hopes that PRTs would actually embody the concept at a tactical and operational level ... conversations with Afghanistan experts, including several that spent time on PRTs, has made me much gloomier. It is my impression that operations in Afghanistan very seldom embody all three Ds- they either focus on development/diplomacy or on defence, not both as an integrated approach"* (Long, 2009).

## 6. 3D and Counterinsurgency

Afghanistan has been notably quoted as a test subject for the 3D policy to combat the insurgency and all problems related to it. The concept - as outlined in the previous paragraphs - contains various elements of best counter insurgency practices; the mix of economical, political and security components in one concept, the civil military hybrids who implement the strategy and the focus on strengthening the local governance and security forces, just to name a few.

The main aim in counterinsurgency and the 3D concept is to foster a development that will create a local host nation administrative capacity, capable of providing security and basic needs and services in a manner which is perceived as legitimate by the local population. At this point in time the concept is seen as the best approach to counter insurgencies in (post) conflict countries by both the practitioners in the field - like the various PRT commanders, political advisors, development advisors and NGOs whom I have interviewed - and the policymakers.

All PRT commanders which have been interviewed (PRT 1 – PRT 6) have underlined that a purely military solution will not be the answer to the insurgency in Uruzgan. *“It is not about eliminating the insurgents but about diminishing their influence on the local population”*, states the commander of PRT 6 (Hamelink, 2009a), or as the commander of PRT 3 said and was repeatedly quoted upon in the reports to parliament: *“making the insurgents irrelevant”* (Van de Voet, 2009).

Some of them have stated that they believe the 3D concept is in fact the future for all modern conflict and operations (Van de Voet, 2009; Hubregtse, 2009). *“In any type of operation the three D’s are dimensions that should be addressed in an integrated manner”* (Hubregtse, 2009). Some go as far as stating that *“the 3D approach is now programmed in my genes. I have learnt not to limit myself to kinetic solutions. A conversation with a tribal elder might be more useful than a combat action”* (Koot, 2009).

The commander of PRT 4 notes that the Dutch do have an easier task to implement the 3D concept than for example the British in Helmand and the Canadians in Kandahar, since the main effort of the insurgents is on these two provinces. *“If we would have to deal with so many insurgents attacks we might have had a more kinetic focus as well”* (Rietdijk, 2009).

It is noted by most of the PRT commanders that the 3D concept was mainly alive in the minds of the PRT staff and some of the civilian advisors (not all). The majority of the Taskforce staff and the battle group were mainly pursuing kinetic solutions against the insurgents (Tak, 2009; Koot, 2009; Van de Voet, 2009; Hamelink, 2009a) and some development advisors were primarily occupied with their activities disregarding the integrated approach (Van de Voet, 2009; Koot, 2009). The commander of PRT 2 stated that during his time the PRT worked relatively isolated and was not integrated in the efforts of the Taskforce. *“Our main effort was the local population but the taskforce focussed on eliminating the Taliban. The understanding that the Taliban could be dealt with through the local population was a hard concept for them to grasp”* (Koot, 2009). Even four rotations later, during PRT 6, the concept of dealing with the insurgents through the population, thereby diminishing their influence was not yet commonly understood (Hamelink, 2009a). Nevertheless, all PRT commanders and their civil advisors firmly believe in the concept and its potential in counterinsurgency operations since it addresses all factors that are needed for stability, thereby limiting the influence of the insurgents on the local population.

The synergy between counter insurgency and the 3D concept is also underlined by the Dutch government. It states that reducing the influence of the insurgents on the civilian population is one of the central themes in the implementation of the mission of the Dutch in Uruzgan. It is interwoven in all its 3D efforts: all activities in the areas of defence, diplomacy and development are focused on diminishing the power and influence of the insurgents (Kamerbrief, 321, 2008).

## 7. 3D Criticism

An important critique raised against the 3D concept, is the fact that it is a Western model. It does not take the host nation into consideration but the concept as such is not developed by the nation who should be stabilised and reconstructed. It could therefore be argued that the concept would lack legitimacy and thereby acceptance of the local population since it is introduced by foreign troops. The perception of legitimacy of the foreign troops currently present in Afghanistan differs in the regions. Especially in the South of Afghanistan where the insurgents control various areas the legitimacy of these forces is questioned, to put it mildly. The troops do not only install foreign western ideas of democracy and the rule of law, they are also trying to extend the power of the central government of Kabul. A government which is not accepted by the insurgents and it is argued that it generally lacks legitimacy amongst its people. Mansfield and Snyder argue that external actors only have a limited impact on domestic nation building processes. They state that the best the international community can do is to develop reform strategies that minimise the risks associated with reforms by providing threatened elites with incentives to give up power and to support a free and responsible exchange of ideas (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995: 91).

The integrated Dutch approach has received criticism from international coalition partners such as the United States, Canada and Australia. They have criticised the Dutch for their apparent lack of offensive posture and actions against the Taliban. In a letter to the parliament the Dutch minister of Defence has stated that even though there are some critical voices about the 3D approach, he notices that the logic behind the 3D concept has resulted in a lot of international recognition and support. He furthermore underlines that the stabilisation of the Southern provinces in Uruzgan can not only be achieved through combat mission, but is even more dependent on the strength of local governance which should therefore be strengthened (Kamerbrief 252, 2007). Recently, the criticism of countries like the United States has faded and have in fact even made a shift: The Netherlands and their 'Dutch Approach' has been named in a report to the American Congress. The report states that in areas such as Regional Command South in Afghanistan, security cannot be established or maintained and the full military, governance, and economic spectrum of the COIN strategy cannot be implemented with the result that insurgents retain their hold on the local Afghan population. However, Uruzgan province is named as an exception to this finding and the Dutch are reported to have had significant success with implementing their COIN strategy (Report to US Congress, 2009:8).

The 3D concept is also criticised on the national level. In a column the director of the Interchurch and Peace Organisation (IKV /Pax Christi ) states that the Dutch 3D policy is unclear about the purpose of the Dutch military in (post) conflict countries for national security purposes - international terrorism- or for the aid of the population of these countries. He claims that 3D might look like a logical solution and an official policy but he describes the political practice of it as difficult and names the uncertainty about goals as the major issue. According to him the goals of the Dutch 3D policy in Afghanistan are unclear since the policy refers to both national security of the Dutch and commitment and involvement with the Afghan people (Gruiters, 2007). Also the former development advisor of the Dutch PRT 1 and 2 poses the question whether the Dutch are there to help the Afghan national security forces and local communities deal with security threats, or to act as an anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency force, fighting a perceived enemy with all the means necessary (De Boer, 2008). Both Gruiters and De Boer pose this binary question but fail to see the possibility that the answer might lay in a combination of the two: the Dutch presence in Afghanistan adheres to national security purposes and the protection of the local population in Afghanistan.

Former minister of Development Aid -Pronk- criticises the current 3D approach of the Dutch government due to the lack of guidance from the ministry of Foreign Affairs. *“There is no unified coherent strategy and there is a lack of a political vision, especially when it comes to Afghanistan. Until this time we cannot see any form of improvement in Uruzgan. It is therefore my opinion that we have sent out both our military and development workers with a mission impossible. The government should be able to state what the achievable results in Uruzgan should and could be. Unfortunately, my time in politics has learnt me that most politicians know little, copy the stories of others and make decisions based on poor information. The government does not have its own voice when it comes to Afghanistan. It echoes NATO and the United States and calls the Afghan Central government legit and democratic when in fact the country can hardly be called a democracy. The country is run by warlords and we accept the current power structures ”*. He furthermore states that sustainable development projects which are only designed to contribute to enhance security, will not contribute to the society. Development should facilitate internal processes of the country one operates in. He also underlines the importance of the fact that development activities by nature do not distinguish between parties and argues that the Dutch government does make a distinction since it does not fund anything which is related to the Taliban. Pronk believes that this will only result in more frustration and friction in the society (Pronk, 2009).



# Part two: The Case of the 3D approach in Uruzgan

## Chapter III Research Design and Methodology

### 1. Introduction

In the introductory remarks I have outlined the double purpose of this study. Firstly I want to the theoretical foundation of the 3D approach and its relation to counterinsurgency. Secondly, I want to test the effectiveness of the 3D concept by using the Stability Assessment Framework (SAF). I want to apply this framework in an empirical analysis to be able to make a better judgment on the feasibility of the main hypothesis. The following hypothesis will be tested:

*A weak state and a foreign military force will not be able to solve an insurgency with the mix of defence, diplomacy and development.*

A weak state will be defined as follows<sup>7</sup>:

A state who does not control all parts of its territory, nor is it able to guarantee the security of its citizens since it does not have the monopoly on the use of violence and is only to a limited extent able to maintain the rule of law and provide for the delivery of public services for its inhabitants.

A note should be made about the fact that one of the limitations of this study - the relatively short time of two and a half years in which the 3D concept has been put into practice in Uruzgan - will be of major influence on the sustainability of the measured effectiveness and thereby on the plausibility of the main hypothesis. It could very well be that during this short time of measurement the hypothesis might be contested but after a longer period of measurement the hypothesis might be correct, or vice versa.

In the literature overview I have presented some of the best practices of COIN and their relation to the Dutch 3D concept. The aim of this chapter is to specify the research tools I have used for the analysis of the 3D concept and to outline the analytical framework of the case-study. Accordingly, I will start by justifying why I have chosen a case-study design. Afterwards, I will introduce the research tools in my research design.

### 2. Case study design

In this section I will justify the case-study design of the study by shortly addressing the concept of process tracing as a useful tool to analyse the proposed hypothesis. Due to the time and information limitations I have chosen to do a single case study analysis of the success of the 3D concept in the fights against the insurgents in Uruzgan, Afghanistan.

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<sup>7</sup> This definition is based on the definition of failed states by the Advisory Council for International Affairs (AIV). I have slightly adjusted it since a failed state implies that every aspect of statecraft has failed which is not the case in Afghanistan. For the definition of failed states of the AIV, see FALENDE staten: een wereldwijde verantwoordelijkheid. - Den Haag : Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken [AIV], mei 2004 (In Dutch).

## **2.1. Issue of causality and correlation**

Conducting a case study and searching for and identifying sources of variation in outcomes can lead to richer models than a quantitative research strategy that “can easily use controls and randomization to build a wall separating a larger causal mechanism from a small number of variables of immediate interest”(McKeown, 1999:174). Some authors even point out that the process of constructing a case study is superior to other methods for the task of theory construction, because completing a case study requires the researcher to decide what exactly something is a case of and exactly how causation works(McKeown, 1999: 175).

Due to the fact that I was both limited in time and resources, I have chosen to only study the use of the Dutch 3D concept in Uruzgan. The advantage of a single case study is that it provides a good opportunity to carefully examine what worked and what did not, sometimes referred to as ‘process tracing’ (George and McKeown, 1985: 35-36). This process tries to identify the intervening causal process between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable. It is an important tool for theory testing and theory development because the observations within is case have to be linked in certain ways to constitute an explanation of the case (George and Bennet, 2005: 206-207). Furthermore, within - case comparison (as I will do with this study) are critical for the use of small N analysis (Collier cited in George and Bennet, 2005:205).

Also, single case studies are ideal for discovering the details of how certain events have developed. Furthermore, they identify plausible causal variables and bring to light anomalies that current theories cannot accommodate. In doing so, they contribute to building and revising theories (Geddes, 1990: 149). Conducting a single-case study allows me to infer and test explanations of how and why Dutch capabilities and strategies affected insurgency efforts.

The great problem of case studies - especially single case studies - is their limited external validity (King, et al. 1994; Geddes, 2003) and Pierson (2004) underlines that single cases often have great difficulties to identify the role of structural facts. I have addressed this problem by using the trend assessment tool of the Stability Assessment Framework. The analysis serves only as a first test of the theoretical considerations and my aim should be seen in the exploration “systematising the information in descriptive case studies [... for] descriptive or causal inference” (King, et al. 1994:45). In consequence, I will propose further research in the concluding chapter.

In sum, I would stress that a (single) case-study design is in place in order to the effectiveness of the 3D concept in the fight against the insurgents in Uruzgan. I have introduced the concept of process tracing as a useful research tool for a case study analysis.

## **3. Case selection**

In this section, I will introduce the general criteria for case selection and explain the selection of the case of Uruzgan.

### **3.1. Research objective and criteria**

The primary criterion for a case selection is its relevance to the research objective of the study (Bennett and George, 1997). Since I want to study the Dutch 3D concept in relation to counterinsurgency, only one case can be selected: the case of Uruzgan. Uruzgan is the test case for the Dutch 3D approach which has not been put into practice in such an integrated manner ever before.

### 3.2. Justification of the case selection of 3D approach in practice

The required variance of the independent and dependent variable is present in the case of Uruzgan: the independent variable is the 3D concept and the dependent variable is stability. I have chosen to focus on the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Uruzgan because they embody the 3D concept (see tools for implementation chapter 3).

### 4. Research design

In this section I present the Stability Assessment Framework as a tool in order to allow for the proposed process tracing analysis. The SAF methodology for assessing stability and the trends that affect stability, is drawn from the conceptual and methodological work of The Fund for Peace. The SAF was developed by the Conflict Research Unit (CRU) of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' at the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Stability Assessment Framework, 2005). The SAF is developed for assessments on national level but can easily be used for regional level assessments as well. I have chosen to limit the use of SAF's to the use of its Indicator Trend Analysis. This trend analysis measures stability by using indicators in the areas of governance, security and socioeconomic development.<sup>8</sup>

The framework is most suited to analyse the effectiveness of the 3D concept since it looks at all three areas of the 3D concept. In the area of governance the SAF looks at the performance of the (local) government in terms of its legitimacy, the public service delivery, rule of law and human rights and leadership. In the area of security the SAF focuses on the security apparatus and the regional setting (in this case the location of Uruzgan and the influence of Pakistan). The last area the SAF looks at in order to be able to assess the stability in a region is the socio-economic development. The indicators will provide a comprehensive sketch of the situation and help identify concerns and trends. The first part of the mapping and analysis stage establishes an indicator trend line for the – in this case – province under study. This helps assess developments over time as well as the ability of major institutions and political actors to influence these developments. It furthermore helps identify structural features of instability and their mobilising and destabilising potential. It also identifies where changes are most needed. The rating illustrates the *relative* nature of the assessment. Gradual changes often go unnoticed in daily practice, but when depicted in a graph they come to stand out and show that changes are taking place. Small changes over time can in the end be as threatening as sudden jumps in ratings and therefore should not go unnoticed (Stability Assessment Framework, 2005).

It must be noted that I have made a small change - which does not change the method or design of the framework – namely I have used a rating from 1 to 5 (1 being very bad and 5 very good) instead of 1 to 10 where 1 meant nonexistent and 10 represents the level of the greatest intensity. The case has been divided in the rotations of PRT 1 (which will be used as a baseline) starting in August 2006 until PRT 6, ended March this year. All these time periods are related to the appearance of the independent variable of stability.

Stability will be defined as follows:

A situation wherein:

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<sup>8</sup> In an interview (The Hague, 10 March 2003) with one of the developers of the SAF – Luc Van de Goor – it became clear that the SAF can be used for evaluation purposes as well. In fact if it would be used for the analysis of the operation in Afghanistan, one could actually not only evaluate the achievements and needed improvements, but it could also lead to an integrated assessment of the effectiveness of the operation.

1. The state upholds the rule of law, uses its public sector for equal distribution of (social) service delivery to its citizens, and is therefore ultimately perceived as legitimate [*governance*];
2. The state holds the monopoly on violence, using democratically controlled security forces that are able to guarantee the security of its citizens throughout its territory and are capable of holding off threats from external actors [*security*];
3. Economic development, natural resource management, and basic social services (healthcare, education, etc.) are provided for [*socioeconomic development*] (Stability Assessment Framework, 2005).

The situation in Uruzgan as found in August 2006 by the first PRT will be dealt with more extensively than the following rotations. This is due to the fact that this data is to be seen as the baseline. All twelve indicators of the SAF (as presented in annex B) which are connected to the stability in the region will be dealt with. During the description of the following cases I will not repeat already presented information about these indicators if the situation remains unchanged. I will only address the situation in the overall areas of governance, defence and development. If there are however significant changes with regard to specific indicators, I will highlight them.

## 5. Data collection

Both for the collection and the analysis of the data I have used the trend assessment indicators and questionnaires<sup>9</sup> from the so-called Stability Assessment Framework (SAF). The questionnaires were filled in by the PRT commanders, development and political advisors, embassy personnel and the coordinator of the Dutch consortium in Uruzgan. Furthermore, I have interviewed all Dutch PRT commanders who have served in Uruzgan from September 2006 until March 2009. I have also interviewed some of the political and development advisors of the PRTs. I was however not able to interview all of them due to postings abroad. Subsequently, I have collected and used all parliamentary reports<sup>10</sup> of the Minister of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation about the mission in Uruzgan since its beginning in September 2006. Also I have used the yearly polls which have been executed by the Asia Foundation in Afghanistan. Even though these surveys are not specified to particular province level, it does provide useful information about the situation in the country and the regions. General tendencies can therefore be used for the analysis of Uruzgan. Since September 2006 serves as the baseline of this study, I have put especially much time and effort in the collection of data about the situation in Uruzgan at that time. It must however be noted that

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<sup>9</sup> For the trend assessment indicators and questionnaires see ANNEX B

<sup>10</sup> A note should be made about the parliamentary reports. In sum, the reports mainly listed the amount of activities, organisations present, casualties and facts and figures about the Afghan national army, the police and the local government. Few (if any) analyses or assessments were made of the implications of these activities and the relation between the activities and the overall strategy of the Netherlands to diminish the influence of the insurgents. Furthermore, the reports did not contain any strategic assessment of the situation in Uruzgan, the way ahead and possible needed adjustments to the prior formulated goals. Only during the evaluation of the first two years of the mission – which was done in preparation for the extension of the mission - an assessment was made. However, the conclusions were vague and no indicators of possible progress were presented. Nevertheless, these reports were one of the few unclassified sources which could be used for this study.

there are limited data available about the situation in Uruzgan in 2006 from both from the central government of Afghanistan, as from several international organisations such as United Nations Mission in Afghanistan and the ASIA Foundation. In fact the Asia Foundation who conducts yearly polls in Afghanistan to measure the opinion about the developments in the country was not able to include Uruzgan in their poll in 2006 due to the fact that it considered the province to insecure to deploy its researchers (Asia Foundation, 2006). Unfortunately, the various reports from Taskforce Uruzgan (including the PRT) were classified. Therefore, it was not possible to use them for the data collection

All collected data from both the questionnaires, rating sheets and the interviews have been analysed and weighted. The result of this are the trend analysis graphics and institutional capacity lists. These lists will be presented at the end of the following chapter.



# Chapter IV The Case of Uruzgan

## 1. Introduction.

The Dutch mission in Uruzgan is an integral approach in which efforts in the fields of security and stability, diplomacy and good governance, and reconstruction and development - the 3Ds- strengthen one another (De Boer, 2008). Both the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ministry of Defence carried out extensive preparations for mission to Uruzgan. As a result of many reconnaissances, talks, meetings and research, a civil assessment - which addressed all three D's - was produced by the Netherlands Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. Apart from a social analysis of the region, the assessment also identified projects which would need to be executed in order to quickly establish the reconstruction effort. The civil assessment is to be seen as the guiding document for all military and civilian activities for both the Taskforce and the PRT (Kamerbrief 295, 2008; Kamerbrief 212, 2006). Even though there was no integrated 3D plan formulated by all three ministries, the two plans that were drafted took into consideration the other D's. Furthermore, the three ministries worked closely together. The Dutch 3D concept was introduced on the battlefield and the PRT was its implementing tool. A civilian component of political, development and tribal advisors was attached to the Provincial Reconstruction Team in order to ensure that all 3Ds were represented (Kamerbrief 295, 2008). The Dutch government had presented its goals for the (initially) two year mission with a sense of realism. In the 100 article letter to parliament, it was underlined that it would not be realistic to expect that there would be a secure and stable situation with economic growth in Uruzgan without foreign assistance. It would however – according to the government – be feasible to contribute to a situation where in the Afghan authorities can expand their influence and authority and are progressively capable of providing for their own security and improve the living standards for its people (Kamerbrief 193, 2005).

## 2. PRT 1 (Augustus 2006 – November 2006)

The first PRT can be described as pioneers. They were the first to deploy and their preparation was extensive. Several reconnaissances were executed by both the civilian and military elements, a campaign plan was developed and they met with the tribal elders and the governor several months before they deployed. The Provincial Reconstruction Team was also familiar with the 3D concept and was in close contact with the civilian counterparts who would deploy with them. Expectations were high but the situation on the ground was extremely complex (Tak, 2009; De Boer, 2009; Pronk, 2009). The ministerial report of November 2006 - three months after the start of the mission - stated that the developments of the last months were not as positive as expected. This was mainly a result of the worsening security situation. The situation was therefore described as fragile, because the road to stability was still not irreversible (Kamerbrief 242, 2006). However, the commander of PRT 1 states that *“the start of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan was good, especially because there were not many fights with the insurgents and good relationships were established with the local population”* (Tak, 2009).

### 2.1. Defence/Security

The security apparatus largely operated as a state within a state when the Dutch arrived in Uruzgan. The governor tried to keep control, but this was difficult due to the fact that the control of the security apparatus was fragmented. The National Directorate of Security (NDS) – a centrally controlled organisation - answered to Kabul. The Afghan National Army (ANA) was controlled through Combined Services Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in Kabul and the Afghan National Police was more regionally organized. The Afghan Highway Police (AHP) was organised at

the local level and closely related to former governor Jan Mohammed Khan. During the second half of 2006 some improvements were made, partly through a more balanced approach by the governor, partly through a more effective approach by the new Chief of the National Department for Security (NDS) (Tak, 2009; De Boer, 2009).

The main representative of the government - the police - was involved in criminal activities and abuses of the local population. The police force had a poor reputation and was badly trained. The Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP)<sup>11</sup> had been deployed to assist the Afghan National Police (ANP) due to the fact that they were limited in numbers and it was hoped that hereby the security situation would improve. The governor of Uruzgan had already recruited the ANAP agents who would be trained by the Dutch PRT since Uruzgan had no training facility. The PRT conducted joint patrols with the ANAP hereby being able to monitor their functioning as well (Tak, 2009; Kamerbrief 242, 2006).

The security in Uruzgan was heavily influenced by its regional influence. Although Uruzgan has some problems and dynamics of its own, it is part of the larger Southern region with Kandahar city acting as the political and economic gravitational centre for the whole zone. The tribal, political, economic and other networks which shape loyalties and the political landscape, including both the insurgency and the narcotics trade, are regional in nature (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). Many insurgents<sup>12</sup> are supported by the Pakistani intelligence service and some of them are in fact living in the border regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The cross-border activity of insurgents was increasing since the arrival of the Dutch troops (Tak, 2009; De Boer, 2009).

## 2.2. Diplomacy/Governance

The level of governance in Uruzgan was assessed to be poorly by the first PRT and its advisors. The state was perceived illegitimate and did not look after its people (Tak, 2009; De Boer, 2009; Pronk, 2009). Formal government structures and the traditional social and political structures were based on tribal conventions continue to exist side by side in Uruzgan. This greatly contributed to the complexity of government in the province (De Boer, 2008).

The governor, the elected Provincial Council and the Provincial Development Committee - consisting of the heads of government ministries and main stakeholders in the province - were the main institutions of the formal government structure. At the time, these did not sufficiently represent the ethnic and political composition of the province and therefore have limited influence (De Boer, 2008).

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<sup>11</sup> The use of the ANAP has been criticised because they are militia's who would gain legitimacy by operating in formal structures. Weak vetting and questions over command structures raise concerns that the new force will be little more than militias (De Swart, 2007). According to a report of the International Crisis Group 'short-term measures such as reliance on ill-trained and poorly disciplined militias, harsh, ad hoc anti-terrorism legislation and discredited power brokers from past eras will only undermine the long-term goal of building sustainable institutions (International Crisis Group, 2006).

<sup>12</sup> Throughout the case study I have used the term *insurgents* instead of the term *Taliban* as used in the parliamentary reports, news paper articles or other publications. Due to the fact that the insurgency – as described in the chapter about the insurgency in Uruzgan – is complex it is my personal opinion that it should not be simplified to the existence of one group: the Taliban. Various people have taken up arms for various reasons and many of them do not adhere to the ideological motives of the Taliban, but do however hold serious grudges against the government and foreign troops. However, when the Taliban is clearly addressed - for example – in relation with negotiations or the reconciliation program, I use the term Taliban.

A province in Afghanistan is the basic unit of local administration and represents all branches of the central government ministries. All decisions on provincial staffing are made in Kabul by the parent ministry, in negotiation with the Office of Administrative Affairs and with oversight by the head of the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006).

At the start of the mission, the power basis of the governor of Uruzgan – Munib – was limited. He replaced the former governor – Jan Mohammed Kan (JMK) – who was forced to resign due to his poor record of human right violations as a war lord. However, JMK remained to be influential in the province and was famous for his battles against the Taliban. Furthermore, he had a direct line to president Karzai who is a member of the same tribe (NRC Handelsblad, 2006). Munib was not widely accepted as the new governor due to his background as state secretary of tribal affairs during the Taliban regime. However, he participated in a rehabilitation and reconciliation program and claimed not to be connected to the Taliban anymore. Nevertheless, his name remained on the United Nations list of alleged terrorists (NRC Handelsblad, 2007). According to the commander of PRT 1 - who invested a lot in the establishment of a relationship of trust with the governor - the governor was sincere and this was underlined by the political advisor as well (Tak, 2009; Pronk, 2009).

The public service delivery was stagnant during the beginning of the mission (Tak, 2009). The Dutch initiated many projects in the areas of health and education, since the local government was not able to provide for its people (Kamerbrief 242, 2006, De Boer, 2009). A factor hampering the delivery of basic services is the limited and poor capacity of the civil servant system of the ministries and districts. Most civil servants are illiterate and do not possess enough knowledge and capabilities to execute their task in a proper manner which complicates the job of the governor even more. There is hardly any intellectual elite present in Uruzgan to develop proper institutions and structures. (Tak, 2009; De Boer, 2009; Pronk, 2009; Kamerbrief 242, 2006). The use of functional specialists (reserve officers with a certain civilian expertise) in the areas of irrigation and health was useful to the support of various ministries and for the identification of projects (Tak, 2009; Kamerbrief 242, 2006; Pronk, 2009).

The rule of law was basically non-existent in Uruzgan and human rights were widely violated. In the absence of a central government, local shuras<sup>13</sup> (village council) and tribal elders developed an informal legal system that incorporated a wide range of Islamic and customary laws. People still adhere to this informal legal system since the formal system is corrupt and unfamiliar to them (Jones, 2008; 32; Tak, 2009; De Boer, 2009). Information gathered for the civil assessment by elders and government representatives indicated that the level of service delivery in field of the judiciary was even lower than the national provincial average. The predicament of the judiciary was undermined by the rule of the former governor, who was notoriously prone to overlook legal procedures and reportedly kept private jails. The new governor started rectifying the most blatant problems in the judiciary by reportedly requesting that people would not be detained without a minimum of due process (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). The PRT commander requested civilian expertise in the area of security sector reform in order to address these issues (Tak, 2009).

The tribal and clan elites in Uruzgan were increasingly factionalised, however this has been the case since many decades. At all levels power struggles were present and in order to balance power in ones favour, cleavages are promoted. The governor of Uruzgan had limited power amongst the various tribes and clans (Tak, 2009; De Boer, 2009; Pronk, 2009) and in areas where the insurgency became

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<sup>13</sup> 'A shura (village council) is comprised of village elders and influential people in the community. It makes decisions regarding important issues in villages. Shuras are longstanding features of Afghan political society. They are convened on an ad hoc basis and are rarely permanent bodies with identifiable members. Shuras of ulema (Islamic scholars) and of elders are usually found at provincial level, though there are often competing local shuras and commander-run shuras at district level (De Boer, 2008:229).

as strong as or stronger than the government, drug-related criminals sought protection from local insurgents groups. These criminals seemed to have a vested interest in the present arrangements. This complicated the stabilisation strategy of the governor which involved the appointment of more professional district sub governors and police (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006).

The task of the first PRT was to strengthen the local and provincial government by facilitating various activities such as meetings with various tribes and village elders. It was important to increase the influence and support for the governor in order to achieve a level of stability and development. Some months after the arrival of the Dutch troops, it was reported to parliament that governor Munib - with the support of the PRT - was making great efforts to engage the local population of Uruzgan in the peace- and development process. Shuras were held in four districts and after four months of planning and preparation the first Provincial Development Council (PDC) - a forum where representatives of the local government, the national line ministries and the PRT discuss the developments plans for the province - took place. Security, the productive sector and social development were marked as priorities. The Afghan Solidarity Programme (NPS) recruited the first employees of the Afghan team that facilitated the work of the PDC by analysing the development plans (Kamerbrief 242, 2006). A special effort was made with regard to the district of Chora. Three months of integrated effort in the district of Chora led to a dialogue between the tribes and subsequently the security in the area was enhanced. The result of this was a shura in which 50 elders participated. The intensive contact and meetings with the elders in Chora led to the identification of several programs. Also the first projects were launched and possibilities were created for further reconstruction and sustainable development (Tak, 2009; Kamerbrief 242, 2006).

## 2.3 Development

Demographic pressures were mounting because there was a lot of migration to larger – safe – towns where there are economic opportunities. There was a continuous movement of refugees, and the threat of being expelled from Pakistan puts pressure to find new areas for refugee settlement. The movements of internally displaced people as a result of the fighting, took place on a limited scale. There was a reduction in the rate of emigration due to the deteriorating situation in Pakistan (Tak, 2009; De Boer, 2009).

The legacy of vengeance-seeking among groups lead to widespread group grievance in Uruzgan (Tak, 2009; De Boer, 2009, Pronk, 2009). The former governor, who used tribal politics to further his own interests with the result that his tribe -the Popolzai<sup>14</sup>- was in conflict with important segments of all of the other tribes of the province often pushing these potential government allies closer to insurgents who were the main opponent of the former governor. His policy is named to be responsible for the present virulence of the insurgency (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006).

Uruzgan has always been underserved by central government in terms of education, health, transport and other basic services. This was a result of limited administrative control of the government over the province as a result of the security situation and the poor accessibility. The educational system however, was to some extent distributed over the province but many schools were closed during past years. Education was discouraged by the Taliban and seen as an attempt by the international community to instil western norms and values in Afghan youths. According to the Taliban, building schools is a political statement and teachers were targeted by the Taliban. Healthcare was mainly in hands of NGO's and some private practitioners (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

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<sup>14</sup> For a thorough analysis of the tribe and clan structure and issues in Uruzgan see the civil assessment of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, [http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/kamerbrieven-bijlagen/2006/10/0\\_368-bijlage-2.pdf](http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/kamerbrieven-bijlagen/2006/10/0_368-bijlage-2.pdf)

2006:11). Uruzgan was the last province to start the National Solidarity Program as a result of the security situation. The program was launched in Tarin Kowt but it is unlikely to expand to new districts unless a significant change occurs in the overall security situation. According to government sources, the program roll out was problematic, yielding very limited results to date (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006).

The analysis of the economy in Uruzgan in 2006 was complicated due to the large existence of the illicit economy, which had considerably downsized most other economic activities in the province. Agriculture and animal husbandry are the key economic activities in Uruzgan, with poppy as an increasingly dominant crop. Apart from traditional agricultural activities, small enterprises, cottage industry, trade, revenues accruing from poppy, marble and remittances, no other economic activities were observed in Uruzgan. The limited economic opportunities made it easier for the insurgents to successfully recruit their fighters (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006:5). However, as a result of foreign investments in security and reconstruction <sup>15</sup> the economy started to grow.

## **2.4 Preliminary assessment Stability during PRT 1**

The situation as found in 2006 was very unstable. The governor had limited legitimacy and power, government institutions were not fully in place, basic services were hardly delivered, the police was not functioning, the rule of law was non-existent and the insurgents had joined forces with the criminal elements. Various activities were undertaken to address all these issues but the timeframe was too limited to be able to change the instability. The PRT commanders stressed that even though the situation was called unstable relatively little fights took place and good relationships were established with both the (tribal) elders and the local population (Tak, 2009).

## **3. PRT 2 (December 2006 - March 2007)**

Even though this PRT could build further on the experiences and activities of the previous PRT they are to be seen as pioneers as well since the tour of the predecessors was only four months. Four months is just a fraction if compared to the time needed to achieve both sustainable security and development. Therefore, the situation had not changed that much which was underlined by the commander of PRT who stated that *“the starting level of PRT 2 did not differ that much from PRT1”* (Koot, 2009). The Dutch government stated that the lack of a clear picture about the situation in Uruzgan was complicated by the lack of information about the implications of military actions. As a result, so far it is difficult to assess the impact of the Dutch military mission on the influence of the insurgents in Uruzgan (Kamerbrief 252, 2007). The commander of PRT 2 stated that there was a heavy kinetic focus on the elimination of the insurgents (Koot, 2009).

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<sup>15</sup> The use of the term ‘reconstruction’ can be questioned. The mission to Uruzgan was promoted as a reconstruction mission to the Dutch parliament but one could pose the question what was going to be reconstructed in Uruzgan. It has been a remote area for hundreds of years, the concept of central government has never gained ground due to the tribal and clan structures and the people were living by and resolving their disputes by the Pastunwali. So in my opinion ‘construction’ of a new order would be the correct terminology in the case of Uruzgan.

### **3.1 Defence/Security**

There was still hardly any police in Uruzgan. The police mainly operated by internal directions of the commander of the ANP but there was no political guidance nor accountability. The governor tried to get some influence - mainly in the area of the appointment of the chiefs of police - but he did not provide them with guidelines. The influence of the commander of the regional police was limited. It was not clear whether this limited influence was due to a lack of interest or incapability (Koot, 2009). About 100 auxiliary police (paid militias) agents were deployed to the province of Uruzgan. The militias were mainly used to man patrol bases and checkpoints hereby realising an enhanced presence of Afghan security forces within and outside the Afghan Development Zones (ADZ). However, just some months after the deployment of the auxiliary police the funds were stopped. As a result the governor hardly had any means to provide for security in his province: limited amount of military forces and police and no more militias. Furthermore, the salary system for the police led to major frustration amongst the police force which only added to the already existing corruption (Koot, 2009; Kamerbrief 248, 2007).

The ANA however, was one of the security forces of Uruzgan's security apparatus which functioned relatively well. They were still poor in number, but the training went well and their legitimacy was relatively high – especially when compared to the other security forces (Koot, 2009; Kamerbrief 248, 2007).

The influence of Pakistan on the region remained high although it was difficult to assess whether the influence is increasing or decreasing. It was assumed that as a result of the Dutch presence in a remote region which has been the harbour of many insurgents does in fact trigger more cross border activities in order to support the insurgents (Koot, 2009; Messerschmidt, 2009).

The main focus of the insurgents during this PRT rotation were the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar however, since December 2006 and the first months of 2007, an increasing number of violent attacks against both ISAF and the Afghan security forces. Most of these attacks took place mainly outside the ADZs in the central and north-western part of the province. It was assessed that the insurgents might increase their activities in the central part of Uruzgan. Within the ADZs the Dutch Taskforce could relatively easy execute their reconstruction efforts in which progress is made. Daily patrols were executed in order to stay in close contact with the local population. The security in Uruzgan was heavily depended on the patrols of the Dutch Taskforce due to the lack of sufficient Afghan security forces. Hereby most of the security provided by the Taskforce was limited to the ADZs (Kamerbrief 248, 2007).

### **3.2 Diplomacy/Governance**

The legitimacy of the government remained unchanged in comparison with the previous measurement. The gap between the local population and the local government continued to be large. The inhabitants of Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod were reported to have a negative opinion about the (local) government. The rest of the inhabitants in the province hardly noticed or saw anything positive from the government. The representation of the tribes within the provincial council was limited, nevertheless they did strive to have so form of balance (Koot, 2009; Messerschmidt, 2009). Even though the cooperation between the Netherlands and the governor of Uruzgan was good and even named productive by the Dutch government, the general situation in the field of governance was deteriorating. Munib had spoken several times with Karzai about issues which were hindering his functioning like the lack of funds (Kamerbrief 248, 2007). According to the commander of PRT 2 who had established good relations with the governor described him as a sincere administrator,

*“Munib never had a fair chance since he received no support from the central government in Kabul”* (Koot, 2009).

The representatives of the provincial ministries in Uruzgan were intensively involved in the planning of development for the province. The representatives were divided amongst three committees - productive, social and security - in which they discuss the needs of the local population and the development plans. In this manner they are not only involved in the development of the province but they also learn skills like planning and management. The support of the provincial departments was of importance in order for the Afghans to take the lead. Only some departments - like the ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) - were functioning relatively well. However, most of the departments did not have enough educated personnel which hampered their functioning. These departments were supported by the PRT with information and coaching in order to learn to plan effectively. Also a Provincial Development Team of five Afghans led by the governor was assisting the departments (Koot, 2009; Kamerbrief 248, 2007).

There was still hardly any delivery of public services in Uruzgan at the time of PRT 2. However, there was a limited growth. The line ministries of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Irrigation and Health, did function throughout the province as where the rest hardly functioned at all (Koot, 2009).

The rule of law remained a foreign concept in Uruzgan. A positive development was the fact that the secret service became more transparent about its activities. As a result of a request made by PRT 1 a legal advisor was temporarily assigned to the PRT in order to assess the judiciary in Uruzgan (Koot, 2009).

### **3.3 Development**

No demographic pressures and no major refugee movements were reported during this rotation and there was limited resettlement. The resettlements that did take place were coordinated by the ministry for Refugees. The population mainly remained where they were because they are closely connected to the places where they were born and generally do not leave these places (Koot, 2009).

Disputes about power were tribe-related and remained to be a daily issue. At the same time there was reconciliation with the use of Pashtunwali, but not every conflict was resolved. The fact that important posts still belonged to the Popolzai and the important power brokers remained to be Popolzai fuelled the clashes between the tribes (Koot, 2009).

According to the PRT commander there were no major differences between the tribes when it comes to economic resources (Koot, 2009). However, since one can describe Uruzgan as a patronage-client system, it is assumed that the resources are not equally distributed. Furthermore, many clashes which occurred between the tribes were about scarce resources.

The economy was described by this rotation as hardly existent. No improvements were observed by the PRT (Koot, 2009) which was anticipated. The Dutch embassy in Kabul facilitated the execution of national Afghan programs in the province of Uruzgan in order to stimulate economic growth. The inclusion of Afghans to ensure ownership, implied adjustment to the Afghan way of practice (Kamerbrief 248, 2007). The mission teams of the PRT were constantly executing CIMIC and reconstruction activities in order to facilitate economic growth and development (Koot, 2009).

### 3.4 Preliminary assessment Stability during PRT 2

The indicators for stability have not changed significantly compared to the first rotation. This in itself is not a surprise since the mission had only started recently and no major changes were to be expected in such a time frame. The PRT commander stated that the main focus of the Taskforce was still on kinetic options and the integrated effort which was designed to bring stability was not yet commonly understood and accepted by both the military and the civilian components of the Taskforce (Koot, 2009).

## 4. PRT 3 April 2007 – September 2007

The situation in Uruzgan deteriorated due to the fact that governor Munib had lost its willpower and will to reform. This was due to the fact that he had limited access to central funds, there were frictions with Kabul about appointments - like the one of the chief of police - and there was disagreement about counter-narcotics policy. Furthermore, governor Munib had not been that much in the province. This led to criticism, especially from the members of the council who were loyal to the former governor. As a result the development of the provincial government and the dialogue with the various tribes stagnated (Kamerbrief 254, 2007). The PRT commander described Munib as corrupt with zero credibility and no access to the tribal structures.

A central motto was introduced by the PRT commander : *“do not fight the insurgents make them irrelevant”* (Van de Voet, 2009). He tried to accomplish this through direct talks with the local population and through close relations with the mullahs, one of the most influential leaders in Uruzgan (Van de Voet, 2009).

### 4.1. Defence/Security

The training and monitoring of the army was going well. The ANA had far more credibility than the police due to the fact that there was less corruption and better training. The situation with regard to the police remained the same but the Dutch government funded various initiatives which had to contribute to the improvement of the police force in Uruzgan such as the realisation of police checkpoints, police training centre and a security coordination centre (Kamerbrieven 254, 2007; Van de Voet, 2009).

The instable situation around Chora in May 2007 led to a bigger presence of the Dutch Taskforce in the district. The Taskforce delivered great efforts in order to keep the Afghan police operational in Chora and this remained to be a matter of great concern. The inhabitants of Chora district expressed their satisfaction with the presence of the Dutch units because this led to a greater sense of security. The increased security resulted in a greater number of children who went back to school. The situation in Chora however remained to be tensed and the pressure of the insurgents remained to be high as well. The new district leader made a good start but his power throughout the province remained limited. After an increasing amounts of fights with the insurgents and various military operations which had to prevent that the insurgents would take over the district of Chora, led to the known battle of Chora. (Kamerbrief 254, 2007; Kamerbrief 272, 2007).

In order to gain legitimacy and trust for both itself and the local government, the PRT conducted various shuras in Chora before and after the battle for Chora. The first held shura included the five most important tribal elders in Chora. They complained about the lack of interest of both the authorities in Uruzgan as the central government in Kabul and asked for a permanent presence of the Afghan army in the district and sustainable manning of the police posts. (Van de Voet, 2009; Kamerbrief 254, 2007; Kamerbrief 272, 2007). The PRT had also informed the elders in Chora about the upcoming battle so people would have time to evacuate. After the battle another shura was held

with the elders. *“They expressed their satisfaction about the fights which were delivered in order to keep the district out of the hands of the insurgents”* (Van de Voet, 2009).

## 4.2. Diplomacy/Governance

The legitimacy of the local government was still poor, mainly because the population could not identify itself with the local and national government. Furthermore, the local government was still not able to provide basic service to its people. This was mainly the result of lack of institutional capacity in the province. The fact that there are various judicial systems in use in Uruzgan (formal system based on the constitution, the Sharia and Pastunwali) complicated the introduction and development of the rule of law. Another complicating factor was the fact that the formal law was corrupted. The PRT commander stated that various sources have told him that one can ‘buy a verdict’ for 2000 dollars (Van de Voet, 2009).

The power of Munib remained limited due to the fact that the loyalties of the local population were directed towards the tribe and clan they belong to. According to the PRT commander the governor had no access to the tribal structures and allegedly missed any sense of ‘tribal feel’. He was also seen as a ‘puppet from Karzai’, who had connections with the Taliban (Van de Voet, 2009; Messerschmidt, 2009).

In the area of governance the improvements stagnated. During the first months of the mission (PRT1) some progress was made: the district council had been strengthened, the ties with the tribes were reinforced and governance was reintroduced in the ink spots around Tarin Kowt en Deh Rawood. However, further improvements stagnated due to the fact that governor Munib had lost his power to enforce administrative measures. The Netherlands tried -on several levels - to exert its influence in order to improve the circumstances for execution of governance. The Dutch government asked for the appointment of a capable chief of police and put pressure on the issue of operational funds - which were stopped - for the governors. It was decided by Kabul that these funds were to be restored in order to finance tribal representative activities and the reconciliation program<sup>16</sup> (Kamerbrief 254, 2007; Kamerbrief 272, 2007).

The government in Uruzgan primarily remained weak due to a lack of capacity. Furthermore, corruption was named by the commander of PRT 3 as one of the biggest challenges (Van de Voet, 2009). By the end of the PRT 3 rotation, President Karzai appointed Assadullah Hamdam to be the new governor of Uruzgan. Hamdam stated that his policy would focus on rural development and dialogue amongst the various tribes. The effectiveness of the new governor was to a large extent depended on the support he received from the central government. A complicating factor was the remaining power and influence of former governor JMK (Kamerbrief 254, 2007; Kamerbrief 272, 2007; Van de Voet, 2009).

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<sup>16</sup> ‘ The programme ‘Takhim-E Solh’ or ‘Strengthening Peace’, grants amnesty to mid- and low-level insurgents who agree to stop fighting and peacefully enter into civil society. This programme aims to break the cycle of violence that plagues Afghanistan by assimilating former Taliban combatants into democratic society and thus enabling the country to build a more safe and prosperous future. Only mid- and low-level insurgents are eligible for the program. High-level Taliban and individuals accused of war crimes are deliberately excluded. Takhim-E Solh petitioners must pledge loyalty to the government of Afghanistan and renounce violence against Afghan and coalition forces’ (Reliefweb, 2007).

### 4.3 Development

According to the Minister of Development Cooperation a good start was made with the several reconstruction efforts. A combination of both CIMIC activities and development activities led to an overall improvement of the basic healthcare throughout the whole province. In the area of education improvements have been made as well since the national education program EQUIP started its activities in the province. (Kamerbrief 254, 2007; Kamerbrief 272, 2007).

The Dutch Embassy at central level and its development staff in Uruzgan at provincial level were steadily pursuing the reconstruction efforts. The conditions in Uruzgan remained to be severe: limited absorptive capacity and the security situation limited fast progress of the process. A support infrastructure was to be set up by 2008 consisting of government, NGOs and international organisations, which could jointly promote national programs to be effectively deployed in Uruzgan. Also the Netherlands stated that the delivery of public services in the priority sectors health, education, justice, agriculture and infrastructure in progress should become more visible. To achieve this objective, two instruments were deployed: Quick and Visible Projects (QVP), promotion of national roll-out programs by expressing a preference for regional engagement funds in Uruzgan. (Kamerbrief 254, 2007; Kamerbrief 272, 2007).

The CIMIC activities of the PRT had their main focus on increasing the presence and influence in the area Dehrafshan (north of Tarin Kowt), supporting the provincial administration to prepare and implement of the Sub National Consultations (SNC). Also the PRT increased its presence in Chora to contribute to the implementation of projects and repairs in the region and improved the contact with the local population (Van de Voet, 2009). Functional specialists were deployed to advise and assist farmers in Uruzgan in the transition to alternative forms crops. The development of agriculture is an essential component in the efforts for poverty reduction in Uruzgan (Kamerbrief 254, 2007; Kamerbrief 272, 2007; Van de Voet; 2009). The projects that were implemented by the PRT were not presented a 'Dutch' but as 'Afghan' for two reasons: *"first of all to ensure their sustainability because if they were presented with a 'foreign flag' it would be likely the insurgents would destroy the projects and second of all to ensure that the people would start to trust in the ability of their local government to take care of them"* (Van de Voet, 2009).

### 4.4 Preliminary assessment Stability during PRT 3

No major progress has yet been achieved with regard to the stability in Uruzgan. The security situation is still the main obstacle for economic progress, however the first initiatives contributing to economic growth have started. Also the lack of good governance, the legitimacy and power basis of the governor and corruption, severely hampers the stability in the region. However, the security situation does slowly improve since the insurgents are no longer capable of large scale attacks but limit their attacks to the use of improvised explosives. The insurgents do however try to influence the population to stay on their side by limiting their attacks on the local population.

## 5. PRT 4 October 2007 – March 2008

During the deployment of PRT 4, the so-called article 100 letter was sent to parliament to prolong the Dutch mission in Uruzgan. In this letter, the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Aid produced the first balance of the mission (November 2007). They stated that the security situation developed differently as expected since there is still not a major improvement (Kamerbrief 279, 2007). However, the security did not seem to be the major issue for the local population itself. In the yearly national poll conduction by the Asia foundation it was reported that only nine percent mentioned security as a major problem at the local level. It is development-related issues that were identified as the major problems by the population at the local level (Asia Foundation, 2007).

Some progress was made in the areas of development (various projects and the role out of national programs), the level and performance of the Afghan army and the acceptance of the presence of ISAF with the local population. The development of the local Afghan capacities - for example in the area of governance- remained at a poor level both in quality and quantity (Rietdijk, 2009; Kamerbrief 279, 2007). Even though the parliament stated that the expectations which were formulated in the article 100 letter of December 2005 were realistic, the reality on the ground in Uruzgan was far more complicated (Kamerbrief 279, 2007).

### 5.1. Defence/Security

A formal relation was established between the police, the army and the governor. However, the informal lines remained to be more important and dominant. The informal relations of the security apparatus still consisted of ties and connections with warlords. The security apparatus – apart from the police – was now considered to be well trained and monitored by the international forces. Their progress and development became visible. The development of the capacity of the local government lacked behind with the development of the security forces was assessed to form a possible danger for the near future (Rietdijk, 2009).

According to the report to parliament (Kamerbrief 279, 2007) about fifty percent of the population in Uruzgan (the amount of people living in the ADZs) benefited from the increased security. The ADZs as such were not yet extended during PRT 4 but the security and development within the zones did increase (Rietdijk, 2009). *“One can observe progress piece by piece, bit by bit. People begin to see the advantages of cooperating with us”* (Rietdijk, 2009).

### 5.2. Diplomacy/Governance

The legitimacy of the local government remained to be poor. There was no reason for the local population to trust the government and its authorities. The tribal structures took care of the people and eliminated the reasons for change (Rietdijk, 2009). The new governor - Hamdam - and the new chief of police - Gul - were said to be dedicated to a pragmatic balance between the various tribes and informal powerbrokers in Uruzgan and they would focus on the improvement of the security situation in Deh Rawod, Deh Rawshan en Chora. Despite the new appointments, structural problems in the field of governance remained like the poor level of the administration, the limited amount of qualified advisors for the governor and the poor and limited functioning of government institutions. The Netherlands supported the governance in Uruzgan by providing funds for all national and international capacity building activities for the provincial government in Uruzgan.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Various organisations like GTZ, UNDP and FAO have started activities in Uruzgan to support the local government in Uruzgan (Kamerbrief 279, 2007).

The PRT commander pointed out that the development of the local government was insufficient and hardly any initiatives were launched. He furthermore addressed the issue of a lack of expertise about good governance and capacity building within his PRT (Rietdijk, 2009). A positive development with regard to government was the newly launched 'Independent Directorate for Local Governance' (IDLG) in August 2007. The directorate is mandated to improve governance and achieve stability and security through improved governance (Afghan National Development Strategy, 2007). The directorate was developed by the government with the assistance of the Asia foundation (Kamerbrief 279, 2007).

The delivery of public services was still hardly existent but slow progress was reported. The program for the development of rule of law in Uruzgan was the least developed program. Even though there was a formal judicial the population of Uruzgan people still preferred their own Pashtunwali system which is in line with the tribal systems and sentiments (Rietdijk, 2009).

### **5.3 Development**

There were some internally displaced people as a result from the flooding in Deh Rawod and the fighting. However, most people returned to their houses after then fights and the flooding and about 20% decided to leave their area and move either to the provincial or regional capital (Rietdijk, 2009).

A small group of tribal leaders was seen to profit most from the new economic influx. A major increase in the economic development was reported in comparison to the extreme low level of the economy at the time of the deployment of the Dutch. The economic growth however was based on external aid and support and only a few agricultural initiatives were self-sustaining (Rietdijk, 2009). The local government was still not able to provide the basic services to its people and relies on the aid from NGOs and the Taskforce. Nevertheless, the development within the ADZs increased as a result of the foreign aid and CIMIC activities (Rietdijk, 2009).

### **5.4 Preliminary assessment Stability during PRT 4 <sup>18</sup>**

The security had increased during the time of PRT 4 since the insurgents had put their main effort on operations in Kandahar and Helmand. Slow progress was made towards more stability, at least within the Afghan Development Zones.

## **6. PRT 5 April 2008 September 2008**

The evaluation of the integrated approach by the 3D ministries as presented to parliament (September 2008) concluded that progress in Uruzgan is limited and hampered by several complicating factors such as poor governance and the limited capabilities of the police (Kamerbrief 321, 2008). The minister of Development Cooperation stated that there is no reason to be overall satisfied with the achievements but he underlined that the Dutch approach created some form of confidence since more and more civil organisations - including the UN – came to work in Uruzgan (Kamerbrief 321, 2008). The reports to parliament stated that the progress in Tarin Kowt were becoming visible. Construction activities and access to electricity did increase and the local markets

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<sup>18</sup> Most of the reports to parliament at the time of PRT 4 were looking back at the achievements made so far. This had to be presented to parliament during the decision making process of the prolongation of the mission in Uruzgan.

were functioning again (Kamerbrief 315,2008; Kamerbrief 321, 2008). The security increased and the PRT – in comparison to the other rotations – was able to conduct many patrols (Hubregtse, 2009). These findings were supported by the outcome of the yearly poll conducted by the Asia Foundation. The report showed that in the central Hazarajat (which includes Uruzgan) an increase is measured in the level of security as perceived by the local population (Asia Foundation, 2008).

With regard to the mission itself, an important development was the increase of civilian staff. At the start of the mission in 2006, only a political adviser a tribal advisor and a development advisor were attached to Taskforce Uruzgan. This number was increased to thirteen during this rotation. The increased civilian presence in Uruzgan is the first step to the planned civilian leadership of the PRT (Kamerbrief 321, 2008).

### **6.1. Defence/Security**

Compared with other provinces in the South, the security situation in Uruzgan was relatively peaceful during PRT 5. The fighting was relatively low compared to last year and as a result of the arrest or elimination of a number of insurgent leaders, the capacity for larger-scale, coordinated insurgent actions diminished. Although the situation remained fragile, the Afghan government - with support of ISAF - covered a larger part of the province than last year around this time. The relative calm in Uruzgan - particularly in Tarin Kowt - did however not imply that the influence of the insurgents' actions on the population declined. The local population and administration were still put under pressure through intimidation and violence. Furthermore, the insurgents still had relatively freedom of movement in areas where Taskforce had no security presence and the activities of the insurgents in Deh Rawod increased (Kamerbrief 325, 2008).

The presence of the ANA in the province had grown and its employability was improving. Afghan soldiers participated in the vast majority of operations and were increasingly capable to operate independently. As the Afghan forces and police became better trained and are able to provide security, the security will get more and more 'an Afghan face'(Kamerbrief 321, 2008). An illustration to the effectiveness of the ANA is the fact that the commander of PRT 5 did no longer depend of force protection from the Dutch Battle group, but used ANA troops for protection (Hubregtse, 2009).

The development of the police force still seriously lagged behind the development of the Afghan army. The leadership remained weak, the training was limited and corruption was still a major issue. Strengthening the police force in Uruzgan was a priority for the Netherlands who deployed the Police Mentoring Teams (PMT) which were used to train and mentor the Afghan police (Kamerbrief 321, 2008; Hubregtse, 2009). The American Focused District Development (FDD) program started training about 267 police officers from Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod. After this training, the agents were supervised by the Dutch Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs). Further progress was made in the payment of police salaries through better registration and surveillance (Kamerbrief 325, 2008).

### **6.2. Diplomacy/Governance**

The legitimacy of the state and the local government remained – like in all the other rotations – poor. The Netherlands reported that despite its efforts in the area of administration and governance the results were still disappointing. Especially, the appointment of capable administrators at provincial and district level lagged behind expectations. Several districts in Uruzgan were without formal appointed and qualified district governors and police commanders for quite a long time, which had a negative impact on the local stability (Kamerbrief 321, 2008; Hubregtse; 2009). The IDLG started to coordinate the line ministries and several projects in the area of capacity building. Also advisors were recruited to support the local government. A small success was the election of the district chief in Chora. The elections were organised by the governor and about 2600 voters casted their vote (Kamerbrief, 315, 2008).

The civilian staff, the PRT and the Afghan authorities focussed on identifying conflicts between the tribes and a dialogue is established and maintained with all parties. In consultation with the local population, projects were selected taking the local dynamics into account. In this way it was hoped that the confidence of the tribes could be won (Kamerbrief 321, 2008; Hubregtse, 2009). The governor was seen to have acquired more credibility and power amongst the local population (Hubregtse, 2009).

### 6.3. Development

Since the beginning of the mission, many new partners came to work in Uruzgan. This contributed to a bigger civilian effort of the stabilisation and development. National sectoral programs of the ministries of education, health, agriculture and livestock development, rural development and deployment were rolled out. International non-governmental organisations implemented programs and the UN became more actively involved in Uruzgan as well. Afghan NGOs operated in areas which were difficult accessible for the government and ISAF<sup>19</sup>. These activities - executed by the Afghan NGOs - are so-called 'Track 2' activities (see annex C for more information). The province of Uruzgan still had a very limited absorption capacity which greatly influenced the tempo of the reconstruction (Kamerbrief 315, 2008). A positive sign was that schools - which were closed due to the security situation - were reopened. Also the access to health care in Uruzgan was improved, partly due to the broad support for the Afghan organisation that implements the basic health care program. The National Solidarity Program (NSP) - a national program focused on community development supported by the Netherlands - became active in Tarin Kowt and Khas Uruzgan and extension to Chora, Deh Rawod and Char Chino was approved. The National Area Based Development Program (NABDP) carried out a large several major activities in the field of sustainable rural development and capacity building of the provincial government, supported by the Netherlands. Furthermore, the first team of the German NGO *Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ) arrived and opened their office in Tarin Kowt. Also, an Afghan organisation - with the support of the British DFID development department - specialising in the field conflict analysis and tribal relationships, opened an office in Uruzgan (Kamerbrief 315, 2008). Four of the five Dutch NGOs constituting the Dutch Consortium for Uruzgan II (DCU-II)<sup>20</sup>, were now permanently represented in the province and launched a number of small activities such as training in the field of mental health (Kamerbrief 321, 2008).

### 6.4 Preliminary assessment Stability during PRT 5

The level of stability in Uruzgan is slowly increasing. Especially, the delivery of public goods and the increasing trust in the leadership and the decrease in tribal group based hostilities are responsible for this trend. Even though the public goods are mainly delivered through the NGOs who have come to Uruzgan does not seem to matter. The fact that slowly but steadily more organisations are coming to work in Uruzgan does in support the claim of increasing stability in the region.

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<sup>19</sup> Conflict theory identifies track 1 and track 2 approaches. Track 1 represents open support through government, civil society organisations or NGOs and track 2 refers to covert action and activities through actors close to the local communities and not directly identified with government or the international community (De Boer, 2008 p 235).

<sup>20</sup> The Dutch Consortium is coordination and cooperation body for all Dutch NGO efforts in Uruzgan initiated by the Dutch government. Currently five NGOs are participating in this consortium. The consortium is led by an Afghan who is stationed in Kabul (Ros, 2009).

## 7. PRT 6 October 2008 – March 2009

PRT 6 was the first PRT of the renewed Dutch mission in Uruzgan. The Dutch government had stated in their article 100 letter to parliament that the main focus of the renewed mission would be the reconstruction efforts of the Afghan government and the non-governmental organisations would be supported with more means and the support and training of the local administration would be intensified. Also the training and mentoring of the Afghan security forces would be enhanced in order to guarantee their effective control over the most important areas (such as the ADZs) and main routes. PRT 6 was furthermore the last PRT under military command. The Dutch government stated in its report to parliament that due to the progress that had been made in 2008 “a more civilian face can be given to the mission” and the civilian control over the PRT was accelerated (Kamerbrief 330, 2009). The report to parliament does not address what progress is meant and in which areas. An interesting note to this statement of the Dutch government is the fact that the civilian lead over the PRT was already planned to take place in March 2009 half way through 2008 (Hamelink 2009b; Van den Boogaard, 2009) and was not - as stated in the report to parliament - a result of an analysis conducted in early 2009.

A major success during this rotation and an illustration of the integrated approach in practice was operation Tura Ghar which took place in the first month of 2009 in the Baluchi Valley. The aim of the operation was to reduce insurgents’ presence in the area between Tarin Kowt and Chora and to enhance the freedom of movement of the local population and start development activities. Prior to the military operations, the PRT had established contact with the tribal leaders in the local community. They appeared not to be against the Afghan government, but felt threatened by the Taliban and feared reprisals if they would cooperate with the government. As a result of these talks a permanent presence of the Afghan army on a newly built patrol base ensured the safety of the local population. Furthermore, reconstruction activities were prepared in order to guarantee continuation of smaller projects which had been developed in the past (Hamelink, 2009a). Operation Tura Ghar was reported a success due to the fact that the Afghan army played an important role and the local population contributed with valuable information about roadside bombs and locations of insurgents’ shelters. The patrol base remained to be in use by the Afghan army and the Dutch troops in order to monitor the safety and reconstruction efforts in the area. Furthermore, shuras were held by the PRT with representatives of the Afghan government and local representatives to discuss the wishes and complaints of the local population (Hamelink, 2009a; Kamerbrief 330, 2009). *“It was vital that the local population believed that the security forces would maintain their presence and that the improved security situation was permanent. Some inhabitants of areas outside the development zones cautiously approached us since they saw the benefits of cooperation with the Afghan government and ISAF”* (Hamelink, 2009a).

### 7.1. Defence/Security

There was insufficient progress in reducing the insurgents in South Afghanistan, however Uruzgan was named to be the exception. Uruzgan was the only southern province where the number of security incidents against ISAF and the Afghan government in Uruzgan in 2008 had decreased. This relative calm provided the Dutch a good opportunity to move forward with reconstruction and to extend the area by the Afghan government with the support of ISAF is covered (Kamerbrief 330, 2009). However, one needs to be cautious by causally linking the Dutch approach to the decrease of incidents. The decrease could have had several reasons like the focus of the insurgents of other areas

– such as Helmand and Kandahar- , the non-offensive posture of the Dutch troops and the fact that the insurgents were not engaged outside the development zones. The suicide attack in Tarin Kowt in February - killing twenty Afghan police officers - illustrated the relative calmness and safety in the ADZs. The insurgents were not yet defeated (Kamerbrief 330, 2009).

The security actors - ANA, ANP and the NDS - and the governor met on a weekly basis to share information and to improve coordination on joint efforts. They were receptive to the governor's control. The situation with regard to the police remained the same, the quality and performance was still poor. Improvements are expected as a result of the deployment of the Police Mentoring Teams (Hamelink, 2009a; Kamerbrief 330, 2009).

The quality and conduct of the Afghan army continued to be of a high level. Further progress was made in developing the planning capacity of the Afghan army. The staff of the Taskforce and the Afghan brigade synchronised their activities on a weekly basis. Almost all operations were jointly planned and executed and some operations were successfully led by the Afghans. The intensive training and supervision by the military OMLT programs, remained an important part of the Dutch military contribution to ISAF. During the last months of the rotation units of the Afghan army were increasingly taking the initiative to solve local security problems (Hamelink, 2009a; Kamerbrief 330, 2009).

## **7.2. Diplomacy/Government**

With regard to the legitimacy of the local government no significant changes occurred. The local population did not consider the state and its representatives on the local level to be their partner for progress since the distribution of public services was poor and most services were delivered through the assistance of the Dutch troops and local and international NGOs (Hamelink, 2009a). The capacity of local government in Uruzgan remained poor. Support of local government by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), the Asia Foundation, GTZ and UNDP required continuous involvement and coordination (Kamerbrief 330, 2009).

The human rights situation maintained to be worrisome during PRT 6. People were still detained on dubious grounds and held in custody without a proper trial. Due to the fact that the international community is watching, human rights abuses were less openly committed but this is not to say that they did not take place (Hamelink, 2009a).

Governor Hamdam saw reconciliation as an important part of his work. More than a thousand representatives from across the province participated in the 'Peace Jirga' in Tarin Kowt which was organised by the governor. Various issues and problems of the local population were discussed. The governor sought to establish contact through special envoys with groups in various areas of Uruzgan and tries to persuade them to a dialogue. During a shura in the Baluchistan Valley - after the earlier mentioned operation Tura Ghar- over 100 local representatives participated and governor Hamdam offered a helping hand to groups that previously acted against the Afghan government. With these initiatives the local authorities sought to improve the cooperation between the various groups in Uruzgan and to engage them in the provincial administration issues (Hamelink, 2009a; Kamerbrief 330, 2009). *"We introduced the 'District Council on Tour'. This meant that we included Afghan administrators in everything we did"* (Hamelink, 2009a). Furthermore, the PRT commander had his mission team commanders monitor the district chiefs. *"Governance was one of my priorities even though I realised that the military cannot be responsible for this, something needed to be done"* (Hamelink, 2009a).

### **7.3 Development**

There were no significant changes with regard to the demographic situation and movements of internally displaced people. They were mostly taken care of by family, so it is difficult to assess the real numbers. There were some refugees who would like to return from Pakistan to Khas Uruzgan. They wanted to be assured that they would not be captured by coalition forces. The provincial authorities looked into this issue and offered possibilities for return if these returnees participate in the reconciliation program. There were still some clashes between tribes and clans but most hostilities were directed to the international and Afghan security forces. The reconciliation effort of the governor remained and some groups from former 'hostile' areas sought contact on their own initiative and joined the program (Hamelink, 2009a).

The development and aid efforts by the international community were balanced, striving for equal distribution of aid through the Afghan authorities. Due to the improved security situation, there was more economic activity, mainly small scale entrepreneurs. A positive sign was the opening of the market in a village which used to be an insurgent stronghold (Shurk Murgab). However, structural programs are still required to create employment and sustainability in the province (Hamelink, 2009a). According to the Dutch government the construction programs in Uruzgan were doing well: education and basic health sector programs were reported to be on track (Kamerbrief 330,2009).


The Dutch mission in Uruzgan strived to get a more civilian face during the rotation of PRT 6. The civilian staff was further extended and training programs for the local government were initiated. The Dutch government noted that the expectations regarding these programs should be realistic since the level of the governance in Uruzgan is very poor and the tempo of these programs is low. The official opening of the office of UNAMA in Tarin Kowt was delayed again until the end of March (Kamerbrief 330, 2009) but at the time of writing UNAMA still had not opened an office in Uruzgan.

### **7.4 Preliminary assessment Stability during PRT 6**

The increase of the level of stability which started during PRT 5 is progressing during PRT 6 with a slight change in the refugee situation, since some refugees would like to return from Pakistan. The poor level of the local government and the police remained and are worrisome.

## **8. Overview of the trend indicators and institutional capacity rating sheets**

The tables and graphics below show the trends and ratings with regard to diplomacy/governance, defence/security and development from PRT 1 (August 2006) till March (2009). Also the effectiveness, legitimacy of the most important institutions such as the police and provincial council are mapped out below. These ratings are based on the questionnaires and rating lists which were filled in by the PRT commanders, development and political advisors, the coordinator of the Dutch consortium and the data collected from the parliamentary reports.



i. The period of measurement is divided into the rotations of the PRTs.  
 Rotation data: PRT 1 August- December 2006, PRT 2 January - April 2007, PRT 3 May 2006- October 2007, PRT 4 November 2008 – April 2008, PRT 5 May 2008 – November 2008, PRT 6 December – March 2009.

ii. The ratings in this matrix are based on the rating sheets which were filled in by the PRT commanders, political advisors, development advisors, embassy personnel and the coordinator for the Dutch Consortium in Uruzgan. The given ratings are based on the gathered rating sheets and on the information collected from the ministerial reports to the Dutch parliament.

### Institutional Capacity Overview Table PRT 1

Actor	Effectiveness	Legitimacy	Tendency
Military	Low	Fair	Improving
Police and corrections System	Low	Low	Stable
Civil Service	Low	Low	Improving
Judiciary	Low	Low	Stable
Provincial Government	Low	Low	Improving

### Institutional Capacity Overview Table PRT 2

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Actor	Effectiveness	Legitimacy	Tendency
Military	Fair	Fair	Improving
Police and corrections System	Low	Low	Stable
Civil Service	Low	Low	Improving
Judiciary	Low	Low	Stable
Provincial Government	Low	Low	Improving

### Institutional Capacity Overview Table PRT 3

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Actor	Effectiveness	Legitimacy	Tendency
Military	Fair	Fair	Improving
Police and corrections System	Low	Low	Stable
Civil Service	Low	Low	Stable
Judiciary	Low	Low	Stable
Provincial Government	Low	Low	Deteriorating

### Institutional Capacity Overview Table PRT 4

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Actor	Effectiveness	Legitimacy	Tendency
Military	High	High	Improving
Police and corrections System	Low	Low	Deteriorating
Civil Service	Low	Low	Stable
Judiciary	Low	Low	Stable
Provincial Government	Low	Low	Deteriorating

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## Institutional Capacity Overview Table PRT 5

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Actor	Effectiveness	Legitimacy	Tendency
Military	High	High	Improving
Police and corrections System	sdLow	Low	Improving
Civil Service	Low	Low	Improving
Judiciary	Low	Low	Stable
Provincial Government	Low	Low	Improving

## Institutional Capacity Overview Table PRT 6

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Actor	Effectiveness	Legitimacy	Tendency
Military	High	High	Improving
Police and corrections System	Low	Low	Improving
Civil Service	Low	Low	Stable
Judiciary	Low	Low	Stable
Provincial Government	Low	Low	Improving

### 9. General findings case study

Analysing the collected data from the various cases, it becomes clear that some progress is made with regard to the stability in Uruzgan albeit unbalanced and fragile. Also its sustainability is to be questioned since the increased stability is heavenly dependent on the presence of the international community. However, a period of two and a half years is too short to achieve and measure any form of sustainability.

Various trends have come to light in the case study. First of all, an - albeit small - increase of the legitimacy of the state can be observed since PRT3 which has remained constant since then. It is assessed that the activities in the province which are presented with an 'Afghan face' have contributed to this trend. However, the trend with regard to the provincial government has only recently (during the last two rotations) been indicated to improve but both its effectiveness and legitimacy have remained low. Also the civil service scored consistently low on effectiveness and legitimacy and no improving trend is indicated. However, the delivery of public services has shown an increasing trend since the last two rotations, but this is most likely connected to the increase of NGO activities in the area since the local government is still not able to independently provide these services to its people. After a long negative score (four rotations) the leadership has shown a small

increase. The governor seems to win terrain and seems to be able – assisted by the PRT – to reach out to the various tribes. This initiatives seem to have success since the tribe related group hostilities have decreased and that trend has remained constant during the last two rotations. Also the reconciliation program which is promoted by the governor seems to gain terrain.

The three most positive trends are observed for the security apparatus and the economic opportunities and growth. Especially the trend with regard to the security apparatus has steadily increased since the beginning of the mission and it is assessed to keep growing. The increasing trend is mainly ascribed to the Afghan army. They have performed very well and in the last two reports both their effectiveness and legitimacy are reported to be high. An impressive score that no other institution in Uruzgan has received or is likely to receive any time soon. The other important component of the security apparatus is the police force. Their scores are – like the civil service – low but the last two rotations have indicated that they are improving. However, both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the police are still perceived to be poor.

The regional setting of Uruzgan which is connected to the influence of Pakistan on the stability in the region has remained the same during all six rotations. It was assessed that the Pakistani intelligence service remained to support the insurgents in the region but clear indicators could not be established in the field.

Both the demographic pressures and refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) movement have not risen to dramatic levels but have been fluctuating a bit due to the fighting and natural disasters such as the flooding of Deh Rawod. Generally, the trend in this area was rather positive.

The most consistent trend with no improvements at all is viewed in the area of rule of law and human rights. It has received the lowest score and has not increased even slightly during either rotation. It is assessed that the existence of the informal legal system - the Pashtunwali - remains to be more influential. The concept of human rights is new to a province such as Uruzgan and will most likely not take root any time soon.

Summarising, the data collected in the case studies points to a slow but progressing improvement of the stability in Uruzgan. It is however alarming that both the local government, its civil service and the police have not yet made any progress. They are important players for sustainable stability in the province and are identified as crucial variables for successful counterinsurgency in best practices COIN studies (Jones, 2008: 15).



## Chapter V Conclusion

In this chapter I discuss the case study and its theoretical repercussions. Drawing conclusions from the case-study analysis, I will address the effectiveness of the 3D concept in Uruzgan and the main hypothesis regarding the ability of a weak state and a foreign military power to effectively counter an insurgency. Secondly, I will indicate further factors that surfaced during the case study. Lastly, I want to assess on a more general notion the value of the SAF in measuring the effectiveness of the integrated approach.

### 1. General findings

The theoretical roots of the 3D concept have been traced back to the Hearts and Mind (HAM) theory. Even though it is widely accepted and agreed that an integrated approach between the fields of defence, diplomacy and development as prescribed by the HAM theory is needed to provide sustainable solutions for insurgencies, the question remains if the concept as such is not too demanding for fragile states like Afghanistan. With a severe lack of capabilities and capacities a lot is demanded from them and this lack results in a strong dependency on the support of the international community. Therefore, an important limitation to the success of the 3D concept in Uruzgan seems to be the capacity and willingness of both the national and local government (also addressed by Schafer, 1988: 62-64) to launch national development programs and enforce the needed reforms in the various institutions such as the police and the civil service.

Governance in general is an issue in Afghanistan which makes it even more difficult to improve the situation in Uruzgan. In fact some scholars question the possibility of governability in countries like Afghanistan due to its fragmentation along extreme tribal ideological and ethnic lines (Grimm and Merkel, 2008: 467). Others state that the government itself has been observed to be the main hindrance to restoring internal national order in Afghanistan due to the fact that the international community requires it to transform to a liberal democratic state and perform the ascribed duties of such a state (Afsah and Guhr, 2005:395).

The case study leads to the observation that the lack of good governance, capable administrators and a functioning legitimate police force are major issues in Uruzgan. Even though both the lessons from past insurgencies and the latest COIN strategies dictate that strengthening (local) governance and police is of the upmost importance for successful counterinsurgency operations, it seems that even with these two poor performing institutions a certain degree of stability - albeit fragile - has taken form in Uruzgan. Of course, it should be stated that this stability is limited to the Afghan Development Zones within the province, but given the fact that the majority of population is living within these zones it is an important achievement.

The recent successes of the Dutch in the Baluchi Valley (operation Tura Gahr) has shown that the popular support can be won by demonstrating progress in the development zones. The Baluchi Valley is named as proof for the success of the Dutch approach and is even highlighted in international media such as the Economist: *“ the Dutch forces fought a long battle in the valley in late 2007, built patrol bases at either end of it and then stood back for a year, content to study the complex dynamics of the area from afar. They were then able in late 2008 to occupy the whole valley without serious opposition. Grudgingly, local people concede there has been some improvement. Haji Zal, a tribal elder in Tirin Khot, the provincial capital, points to better security and new roads, and judges things*

“10%” better than a year ago” (The Economist, 2009). In fact the Dutch approach underlines the HAM prescription that development should be stressed over security.

As underlined by one of the PRT commanders: “ *the 3D concept is the best we have got but it can be improved since it lacks a strategic vision about the goals which should be achieved in Uruzgan. As a result we improvise and experiment which has led to relatively positive results, but does however not contribute to the sustainability of our success* ”(Rietdijk, 2009).

## **2. Assessment of the increase or decrease in stability since the introduction of 3D in the fight against the insurgents**

As outlined in the methodology chapter I have related the success of the 3D approach in the fight against the insurgents to the increase or decrease in stability. Stability was defined as a situation where in the state upholds the rule of law, uses its public sector for equal distribution of (social) service delivery to its citizens, and is therefore ultimately perceived as legitimate [*governance*], it holds the monopoly on violence, using democratically controlled security forces that are able to guarantee the security of its citizens throughout its territory and are capable of holding off threats from external actors [*security*] and economic development, natural resource management, and basic social services (healthcare, education, etc.) are provided for [*socioeconomic development*] (Stability Assessment Framework, 2005).

Following the proposed process tracing methodology, I have tried to determine the plausibility of my main hypothesis by analysing the process as a stream of smaller events. The presented graphic of the stability in Uruzgan shows an increase in stability. Therefore, the findings of the case study do not support my hypothesis that a weak state and a foreign military force will not be able to effectively fight insurgents. This hypothesis was based on the criticism of Schafer on the Hearts and Mind theory.

Even though the sustainability of the increased stability can be questioned - since it is heavily depended on the support of the international community in both military troops, development workers and massive funding - the sustainability of the stability was not the topic of this study. It is important though to be very cautious with any form of positivism with regard to these preliminary findings. As already stated in the previous section, the critical factors for a successful counterinsurgency - the capability of the police and the effectiveness and legitimacy of the (local) government - are still underdeveloped and performing dramatically poor and the trend indicates no major changes.

The fact that the defence component of the 3D approach has achieved better results than the diplomacy/governance component might be a result of the prioritisation of the missions conducted by the Taskforce. It is stated in the letters to parliament that the primary task of the Dutch Task Force is to facilitate and support the activities of the Provincial Reconstruction Team but one of the findings during the interviews with the PRT commanders was that security operations were often prioritised over PRT operations due to the heavy burden in terms of manpower to provide the PRT with force protection (Koot, 2009; Van de Voet, 2009; Rietdijk, 2009; Hamelink, 2009a). The civilian component of the mission could not provide for its own transport and protection which was a heavy burden for the military component (Pronk, 2009). Furthermore, it seems that good governance programs were limitedly initiated (Rietdijk, 2009; Toevank, 2009) and even during the prolongation of the mission,

the renewed goals for Uruzgan did not emphasise the need for good governance programs even though it has been widely recognised that this is urgently needed.

The conclusions need to be cautiously formulated. This study was only a first step and involved a preliminary study of one single case. Many factors, such as regional influences (Pakistan), the opinion of the local population and the influence of the insurgents on the population behind the scenes could not be sufficiently studied and are very likely to influence the effect of the 3D approach beyond the scope I have determined. The value of this study is to analyse the preliminary findings of the use of the 3D approach in counterinsurgency campaign in Uruzgan. The first fundamentals for stability in Uruzgan have been laid but the stability is fragile and cannot yet be called sustainable. Only by strengthening the local government and the police to the same extent as was done with the Afghan army, will provide Uruzgan with the necessary means to be able to protect itself from the insurgents.

### **3. Issues for further research**

The sustainability of the increased stability in Uruzgan needs to be addressed in a follow up study. A longitudinal study could be conducted, using the findings of this study, conduct a new measurement of the stability in Uruzgan at the end of the Dutch mission and subsequently measure the stability several years after the troops have left.

A gap in the data collection for this study were the opinions of the population in Uruzgan about the 3D concept and its ability to successfully counter the insurgents. Their perspectives would be very interesting for the validation of the 3D concept. Hardly any unclassified data is available and the data that was available from organisations such as the Asia foundation was too general. Therefore, a field research collecting data from the population would be highly desirable in order to be able to verify the findings of this study.

During the interviews with the PRT commanders and the political and development advisors, many interesting facts came about the implementation of the 3D approach at the tactical level and, the cooperation between the battle group and the PRT and the 3D mindset during the planning and execution of the operations. Especially from a military point of view it would be interesting to further investigate the implications of the 3D concept for military operations and capabilities.

It would furthermore be interesting to take this study a step further and conduct a comparative case-study analysis of the use of the 3D concept by three nations in South Afghanistan and their experiences with the concept in the fight against the insurgents.

### **4. Utility of SAF and Measures of Effectiveness**

The Stability Assessment Framework was initially designed as a planning tool on national level. It is a tool that should not be seen as a blueprint and can easily be adjusted to the regional, provincial and district level. It is a process tool which can be used for evaluation purposes as well and can be tailor made to any mission in a (post) conflict country. Accordingly, I propose that the SAF – if adjusted to the context - can be applied to the whole universe of evaluating integrated strategies in post-conflict states. In fact it is my personal believe that more needs to be done in the field of measurements of effectiveness with regard to missions like Afghanistan.

Even though money and personnel<sup>21</sup> is spend on assessing the effects, very little is done with these assessments. The most disturbing factor which came to light - but is in fact not part of this study - is the fact that neither the ministry of Foreign Affairs, nor the ministry of Defence seem to be interested in the effects and progress of the mission on the long term let alone make strategic

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<sup>21</sup> The ministry of Defense has deployed so- called operational analysts to Uruzgan to measure the effects of the various goals which were set for the mission.

assessments of the effects on the long term goals or use the effects to adjust their goals. In fact several sources confirm that the measurement of the mission has no priority (Toevank, 2009; Van den Boogaard; Van de Goor, 2009) at either department since the measurement of possible successes and failures do hold the risk that departments will be held accountable. The initiatives for measuring the effects were initiated in the field and were not guided by the Hague. The commander of PRT 4 started developing the so-called vocal paper on his own initiative. This paper was further developed by the company TNO (Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek) into the 'Uruzgan Campaign Plan'. The fact the ministry of Foreign Affairs did not want to sign this paper (which is interesting from an 'integrated approach perspective' as well) because it did not want to commit itself to the goals which were set in this paper (Rietdijk, 2009; Van den Boogaard, 2009) illustrates the difficulties with the measurements of effectiveness.

## **5. Afterword.**

It has been an interesting but intense year. Initially (in September 2008) I did not think I would be able to complete my master since the academic year started with the birth of my daughter Zoë. The care of such a young little baby took a lot of time, so there was not much time to study. However, little Zoë decided to be a very sweet and easy baby which gave me more time to study. She even came along to various classes and was present during all the interviews I had to conduct for this thesis. So, if it had not been for her peace and quiet I would have never been able to complete my master. Therefore I have to firstly thank her. She is an amazing little creature which gives more pleasure to life than I could have ever imagined.

Second of all, I would like to thank all the PRT commanders, development and political advisors who have taken the time to be interviewed and who have filled in the questionnaires. All of them hold important and busy functions but nevertheless took the time to contribute to this study. I would like to especially thank LTC Hamelink who took the time to talk to me only four days after his return from the mission in Uruzgan and also completed the questionnaire during his leave.

During the data collection phase of this study I have collected quite some data through various interviews and reports. Unfortunately, - due to the limitation in the amount of words - I have not been able to use all the data. Especially, not all data collected in the interviews has been used to the extent I intended. The data however is not collected for nothing, since this research will be part of my PhD research.

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## **ANNEX A**

### **List of interviews**

1. Austin Long, 06 January 2009, Santa Monica/Münster
2. Colonel Tak, 26 February 2009, Utrecht
3. Lieutenant colonel Rietdijk, 10 March 2009, The Hague
4. Marten De Boer, 10 March 2009, The Hague
5. Luc Van de Goor, 10 March 2009, The Hague
6. Jan Pronk, 27 March 2009, The Hague
7. Colonel Van de Voet, 27 March 2009, The Hague
8. Rochus Pronk, 27 March 2009, The Hague
9. Lieutenant Colonel Hamelink, 30 March 2009, Bavel
10. Colonel Koot, 30 March 2009, Utrecht
11. Lieutenant Colonel Hubregste, 31 March 2009, Wezep
12. Marinke Ross, 07 April 2009, Utrecht
13. Freek-Jan Toevank, 01 May 2009, Breda



## ANNEX B

(Source: stability assessment framework, institute Clingendael)

Indicators of (In)stability	Trend Assessment Questions
<b>Governance</b>	
<b>Legitimacy of the State</b>	Is the state viewed primarily as illegitimate or criminal, or as a legitimate actor representative of the people as a whole?
<b>Public Service Delivery</b>	Is public service delivery progressively deteriorating or improving?
<b>Rule of Law and Human Rights</b>	Are human rights violated and the rule of law arbitrarily applied or suspended, or is a basic rule of law established and are violations ceasing?
<b>Leadership</b>	Are elites increasingly factionalized, or do they have national perspectives? Are leaders capable of winning loyalties across group lines in society?
<b>Security</b>	
<b>Security Apparatus</b>	Does the security apparatus operate as a 'state within a state', or is a professional military established that is answerable to legitimate civilian control?
<b>Regional Setting</b>	Are destabilizing regional cross-border interventions increasing or reducing?
<b>Socioeconomic Development</b>	
<b>Demographic Pressures</b>	Are pressures mounting or easing?
<b>Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Situation</b>	Is there massive movement of refugees and IDPs, creating humanitarian emergencies, or are these resettled and resolved?
<b>Group-based Hostilities</b>	Is there a legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance and paranoia, or is there reconciliation and a reduction of hostilities?
<b>Emigration and Human Flight</b>	Is there chronic and sustained human flight or a reduction in the rate of emigration?
<b>Economic Opportunities of Groups</b>	Is there uneven economic development along group lines, or are such disparities reducing?
<b>State of the Economy</b>	Is there sharp or severe economic decline, or is the economy growing?

Nr	Indicators of (In)stability	Rating Sheet
		Please rate from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good)
1	Legitimacy of the State	
2	Public Service Delivery	
3	Rule of Law and Human Rights	
4	Leadership	
5	Security Apparatus	
6	Regional Setting	
7	Demographic Pressures	
8	Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Situation	
9	Group-based Hostilities	
10	Emigration and Human Flight	
11	Economic Opportunities of Groups	
12	State of the Economy	

# Institutional Capacity Rating Lists

## Institutional Capacity of the Civil Service

<b>Effectiveness</b>	<i>Include remarks that indicate level of effectiveness as well as the factors explaining the findings and the tendency.</i>	<i>Tendency</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stable</li> <li>• Improving</li> <li>• Deteriorating</li> </ul>
<b>Legitimacy</b>	<i>Include remarks that indicate level of legitimacy as well as the factors explaining the findings and the tendency</i>	<i>Tendency</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stable</li> <li>• Improving</li> <li>• Deteriorating</li> </ul>

### Guidance Questions to Assess Effectiveness

- Is the civil service under- or oversized?
- Are civil servants adequately trained?
- Are certain sectors of service delivery underperforming?
- Are public services delivered to all parts of Uruzgan?
- Are public service policies effective in avoiding emergencies?

### Guidance Questions to Assess Legitimacy

- Do all groups in society have equal access to public services or are services limited to specific groups?
- To what extent is the civil service perceived as operating autonomously in relation to government, or operating independently from factions in society?
- Is the civil service perceived as corrupt?
- Are (electoral) promises on public services delivered upon?

## Institutional Capacity of the Military

<b>Effectiveness</b>	<i>Include remarks that indicate level of effectiveness as well as the factors explaining the findings and the tendency.</i>	<i>Tendency</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stable</li> <li>• Improving</li> <li>• Deteriorating</li> </ul>
<b>Legitimacy</b>	<i>Include remarks that indicate level of legitimacy as well as the factors explaining the findings and the tendency</i>	<i>Tendency</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stable</li> <li>• Improving</li> <li>• Deteriorating</li> </ul>

### Guidance Questions to Assess Effectiveness

- Does the military have the necessary expertise to fulfill its functions effectively?
- Does the military guarantee internal stability and order?
- Do monitoring and evaluation of performance occur?
- If performance is poor, are the problems addressed?
- Is the role of the military based on a wide-ranging assessment of the country's internal and external security environment?

### Guidance Questions to Assess Legitimacy

- Does the military respect the democratic political process and accept the need for accountability to civil authorities? Is the military democratically controlled?
- To what extent is the military considered to operate autonomously, operating independently from factions in society?
- Does the military respect human rights?
- Are formal policies and plans guiding the defense sector?
- Does the military seek undue influence over policy development? The allocation of resources? Decisions about the use of force?

### Institutional Capacity of the Police and Corrections System

<b>Effectiveness</b>	<i>Include remarks that indicate level of effectiveness as well as the factors explaining the findings and the tendency.</i>	<i>Tendency</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stable</li> <li>• Improving</li> <li>• Deteriorating</li> </ul>
<b>Legitimacy</b>	<i>Include remarks that indicate level of legitimacy as well as the factors explaining the findings and the tendency</i>	<i>Tendency</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stable</li> <li>• Improving</li> <li>• Deteriorating</li> </ul>

### Guidance Questions to Assess Effectiveness

- Are the police dealing with the priorities as perceived by the public (e.g. public safety and security)?
- Are the police adequately equipped and trained to execute their tasks as mandated?
- Are there clear divisions between the roles of the police and the military?
- Are there problems of corruption within the police/corrections system, and if so, what are the reasons?
- Do the police and corrections system have appropriate internal oversight mechanisms, and do these function adequately?
- Are resources being used adequately?

### Guidance Questions to Assess Legitimacy

- Do the police respect the democratic political process and accept the need for accountability to the civil authorities? Are the police democratically controlled?
- Do the police and prison officials respect the basic human rights of individuals?
- Are all members of society treated equally by the police/corrections system?
- Are there acts, codes, and statutes that legally govern police behaviour? Are there ways to hold the police accountable for their actions and violations of the rule of law?

## Institutional Capacity of the Judiciary

<b>Effectiveness</b>	<b><i>Include remarks that indicate level of effectiveness as well as the factors explaining the findings and the tendency.</i></b>	<i>Tendency</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stable</li> <li>• Improving</li> <li>• Deteriorating</li> </ul>
<b>Legitimacy</b>	<b><i>Include remarks that indicate level of legitimacy as well as the factors explaining the findings and the tendency</i></b>	<i>Tendency</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stable</li> <li>• Improving</li> <li>• Deteriorating</li> </ul>

### Guidance Questions to Assess Effectiveness

- Are there indications of corruption within the judiciary?
- Are there sufficient juridical facilities in Uruzgan?
- Is access to justice guaranteed for all citizens?
- Is there a back-log in cases?

### Guidance Questions to Assess Legitimacy

- Does the judiciary operate on the basis of constitutional rules and regulations?
- According to what procedure are judges appointed?
- To what extent does the judiciary operate independently from factions in society?
- To what extent does the judiciary operate independently from political and/or economic powers?

## Institutional Capacity of the Provincial Government

<b>Effectiveness</b>	<b><i>Include remarks that indicate level of effectiveness as well as the factors explaining the findings and the tendency.</i></b>	<i>Tendency</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stable</li> <li>• Improving</li> <li>• Deteriorating</li> </ul>
<b>Legitimacy</b>	<b><i>Include remarks that indicate level of legitimacy as well as the factors explaining the findings and the tendency</i></b>	<i>Tendency</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stable</li> <li>• Improving</li> <li>• Deteriorating</li> </ul>

### Guidance Questions to Assess Effectiveness

- Is the provincial government polarized or based on changing coalitions?
- Are political parties, party coalitions, and voting patterns programme-based or personalized, or rather ethnic or identity group-based?

### Guidance Questions to Assess Legitimacy

- Is the provincial government directly chosen by the people or (partially) appointed by the regime?
- To what extent is the provincial government operating independently from pressures from the regime?
- Are the members of the provincial government viewed as corrupt?
- Do political parties represent only elite groups, or do they have broad popular support?



## ANNEX C

### Tracks 1 and 2 within a 3D approach


(Source: De Boer, Marten (2008). 'New perspectives for conflict transformation *Development and diplomacy: implementing a cautious and fully balanced approach against the odds in Uruzgan*', in *A Rich Menu for the Poor*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague: 229-240)

Track 1	Defence	Diplomacy	Development
Mainly Afghanistan Development Zones	Active duty / regular duty military, battle group, manoeuvre unit	Official government and international efforts to settle a dispute or conflict through dialogue and mediation	Long term development/ sustainable, national programmes (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, Education Quality Improvement Programme, Basic Package of Health Services, etc.), international NGOs, local or national NGOs
Track 2			
Mainly 'insecure areas'	Special Forces	Unofficial confidence building meetings and actions in support of Track 1, often private efforts by non-state actors (e.g. opinion leaders, tribal elders, religious leaders, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Conflict transformation, short term, stabilization oriented community activities</li> <li>– Building of institutional capacity at community and district level for 'roll out' of national programmes and activities of international and national NGOs</li> <li>– Impletation of Quick Visibility Projects through <b>local and locally based NGOs.</b></li> <li>– Support to and facilitation of local peace initiatives</li> </ul>



## ANNEX D Organisation Chart Taskforce Uruzgan and PRT

(Source: Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 2008)



*PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team*

*BG – Battle Group*

*MP – Military Police*

*SF – Special Forces*


*PSE – Psyops Support Element*

*ISTAR – Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance*

*LOG – Logistics*

*RTF AUS – Reconstruction Taskforce Australia*

*GN – Engineers*



*CIVREP – Civilian Representative*

*OS(T)AD – Development Advisor (and Tribal) Advisor*

*FSA – Functional Specialist Agriculture*

*FSI - Functional Specialist Infrastructure*

*FSH - Functional Specialist Health*

*FSJ - Functional Specialist Justice*

*FS - IDEA –Functional Specialist International Development of Entrepreneurial Activities*

**Not part of the NL PRT but aligned on working level:**

*DynCorp - US-organisation for training AN(A)P*

*PEP - Poppy Elimination Programme*

*PMT- (US) Police Monitoring Team*

*USAID - US Agency for International Development*

The organisation of the PRT of Taskforce Uruzgan consists of a command group and a staff, four mission teams (MT) and a military police element. The various CIMIC capacities are not concentrated in one *CIMIC Support Element* (CSE), but have been integrated in both the staff and the mission teams. Each PRT rotation has implemented organisational changes but the chart as presented above serves as a blueprint. The organisation of the PRT as listed above was valid until March 2009.



