

NATO STANDARD

AJP-3.19

**ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE
FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION**

Edition B, Version 1

JUNE 2025



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION

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NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

13 June 2025

1. The enclosed Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.19, Edition B, Version 1, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION, which has been approved by the nations in the in the MILITARY COMMITTEE JOINT STANDARDIZATION BOARD, is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2509.
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Thierry POULETTE
Major General, FRA (A)
Director, NATO Standardization Office

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Record of specific reservations

| Chapter | Record of reservations by nations |
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| CAN | <p>Chap 1 Section 6 1.12 Resilience & 1.13 Resilience through civil preparedness –</p> <p>Reservations: CAF CIMIC is not yet integrated into our Emergency Management Offices and subsequently not presently reporting on Canada Resilience through Civil Preparedness. This remains a Public Safety Canada responsibility. This should not constitute a barrier to Interoperability with NATO CIMIC. Further CAF is presently working to implement this function through a Regional Liaison Officer network, but this capability is in the early stages of implementation.</p> <p>Chap 3 Section 2 3.2 e. - "CIMIC functional specialists provides specialist support to any level of command as required." Reservation. The current CAF CIMIC FG model trains and employs CIMIC personnel as liaison and staff CIMIC generalists. However, since CAF CIMIC are primarily drawn from the CA Primary Reserve Force, there is a reasonable opportunity to attract, train, and employ CIMIC operators with functional specialties based on their civilian experience and qualifications. The CA CIMIC CoE recognizes significant potential value in aligning with NATO by incorporating CIMIC Functional Specialists within CAF CIMIC. However, generating personnel with the necessary prerequisites (e.g., medical backgrounds, engineering capabilities, agricultural knowledge and experience) could be a substantial endeavor for the CAF.</p> |
| ITA | <p>Annex A, Section 4, Para A.12: Italy regards the text as inconsistent with NATO-agreed terminology. Specifically, the term “military police”, including gendarmerie-type forces, is non-existent within NATO terminology. NATO distinguishes between two separate definitions: one for military police (MP) and another for gendarmerie-type force (GTF). Not all GTFs perform MP functions. Both entities – MP and GTF – are capable of facilitating police liaison with CIMIC personnel.</p> <p>Given that law enforcement agencies play a critical role as partners and specialists contributing to security and governance, it is inappropriate for liaison activities to be exclusively managed by personnel under the direction of the provost marshal (PM). According to NATO’s definition of the PM role, the provost marshal does not inherently exercise direct command authority – may be in addition afforded a command function – and serves as an advisor rather than a commander in the execution of military police and stability policing activities (refer to the MP Chair Guidance to Military Police Panel, dated 12 June 2024, paragraph 17).</p> <p>Instead, and most importantly, these activities should be carried out by personnel engaged in stability policing duties (including members of the armed forces, civil police, contractors, GTF, international organizations, MP, NGOs, etc.) under the supervision of the SPU Commander, who</p> |

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| | reports directly to the JFC and provides a specialized perspective on local police forces and the population. |
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| Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Documents Database for the complete list of existing reservations. | |

Summary of changes

| Record of summary of changes for Allied Joint Publication (AJP)3.19 (B) |
|--|
| Generalizes civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) purpose, aim and application to enable its contribution to all NATO core tasks. |
| Reflects changes in the strategic environment from a CIMIC perspective. |
| Introduces new definitions for CIMIC and civil-military interaction (CMI). |
| Introduces the term human security and military contribution to human security. |
| Explains joint function CIMIC's contribution to key tenets of NATO doctrine. |
| Reduces redundancies and improves consistency with NATO key and capstone doctrine. |
| Describes CIMIC as a joint function in relation to the other joint functions. |
| Clarifies the distinction between joint function CIMIC and staff function CIMIC. |
| Removes CIMIC core functions. |
| Introduces CIMIC core activities. |
| References the revised CIMIC capability statements. |
| Updates annex on non-military actors. |

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Related documents

Policy and Military Committee documents

| | |
|---------------|--|
| | <i>The North Atlantic Treaty</i> |
| PO(2022)0200 | <i>NATO Strategic Concept 2022</i> |
| PO(2000)0030 | <i>Role of Civil Emergency Planning in NATO</i> |
| PO(2017)0094 | <i>Evaluation Criteria on Resilience</i> |
| PO(2020)0189 | <i>Updated Baseline Requirements, Resilience Guidelines and Evaluation Criteria</i> |
| PO(2021)0192 | <i>Proposals for Enhancing Societal Resilience</i> |
| PO(2021)0221 | <i>Strengthened Resilience Commitment by NATO Heads of State and Government</i> |
| PO(2021)0372 | <i>Revised Baseline Requirements, Resilience Guidelines and Evaluation Criteria</i> |
| PO(2021)0264 | <i>(CEPC) Policy Guidelines for Enhanced Civil Military Engagement in Support of Resilience</i> |
| PO(2022)0037 | <i>Establishing Objectives and Nationally-Developed Goals</i> |
| PO(2022)0280 | <i>Human Security, Approach and Guiding Principles</i> |
| PO(2023)0333 | <i>NATO Air Traffic Management Policy</i> |
| C-M(2001)0063 | <i>NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS): Policy Guidelines</i> |
| C-M(2002)49 | <i>Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization</i> |
| C-M(2002)60 | <i>The Management of Non-Classified NATO Information</i> |
| MC 0133 | <i>NATO's Operations Planning</i> |
| MC 0324 | <i>The NATO Military Command Structure</i> |
| MC 0327 | <i>NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations</i> |
| MC 0343 | <i>NATO Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief Operations</i> |
| MC 0376 | <i>Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS)</i> |
| MC 0400 | <i>MC Guidance on Military Implementation of NATO's Strategic Concept</i> |
| MC 0402 | <i>NATO Military Policy on Psychological Operations</i> |
| MC 0411 | <i>NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)</i> |
| MC 0668 | <i>Concept for the Protection of Civilians</i> |

Allied publications

| | |
|---------|--|
| AJP-01 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine</i> |
| AJP-2 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security</i> |
| AJP-3 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations</i> |
| AJP-3.1 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Maritime Operations</i> |
| AJP-3.2 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations</i> |

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| AJP-3.3 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations</i> |
| AJP-3.4.1 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support</i> |
| AJP-3.4.2 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations</i> |
| AJP-3.26 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance</i> |
| AJP-3.28 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization</i> |
| AJP-3.9 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting</i> |
| AJP-3.10 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations</i> |
| AJP-3.14 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection</i> |
| AJP-3.20 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations</i> |
| AJP-4 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Sustainment</i> |
| AJP-4.3 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Host Nation Support</i> |
| AJP-4.6 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for the Joint Logistic Support Group</i> |
| AJP-4.10 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support</i> |
| AJP-5 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations</i> |
| AJP-10 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Strategic Communications</i> |
| AJMedP-6 | <i>Allied Joint Medical Publication: The Civil-Military Medical Interface</i> |

Allied administrative publications

| | |
|----------|--|
| AAP-47 | <i>Allied Joint Doctrine Development</i> |
| AAP-31 | <i>NATO Communication and Information Systems Glossary</i> |
| NATOTerm | <i>The Official NATO Terminology Database</i> |

Directives

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| AC/35-D/1040-REV6 | <i>Supporting Document on Information and Intelligence Sharing with Non-NATO Entities</i> |
| Bi-SCD 086-003 | <i>Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)</i> |
| Bi-SCD 080-006 | <i>Lessons Learned</i> |
| Bi-SCD 086-006 | <i>Implementing Protection of Civilians in NATO Operations, Missions and Activities</i> |
| Bi-SC | <i>Capability Codes and Capability Statements</i> |
| AM 86-1-1 | <i>ACO manual CIMIC Tactics, Techniques and Procedures</i> |
| SHAPE | <i>SACEUR Strategic Direction (SSD)</i> |
| ACO COPD | <i>ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive</i> |
| ACO CFPD | <i>ACO CIMIC Functional Planning Guide</i> |
| HQ SACT | <i>ACT Alliance Concept for Multi-Domain Operations</i> |

Other related publications

- SHAPE J9 (2019) *Draft J9 Initial Guidance for Operationalization of Resilience through Civil Preparedness in ACO.*
- UN-CMCoord United Nations *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination – Guide for the Military*

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Preface

Context

1. NATO is facing increasingly complex threats within the continuum of competition. Addressing these threats requires a comprehensive approach using all instruments of power. The military contribution to a comprehensive approach is enhanced through the execution of the joint function civil-military cooperation.

Scope

2. NATO's activities and operations are influenced by the civil factors of the operating environment and vice versa. Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.19, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation* explains NATO processes and principles with regard to civil-military cooperation and its contribution to a comprehensive approach.

Purpose

3. AJP-3.19 provides commanders and their staff with the principles and guidance necessary to plan and conduct civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in operations and activities throughout all NATO core tasks within the whole continuum of competition. It can help non-military actors to understand and interact with NATO forces and staffs.

Application

4. AJP-3.19 focuses on the operational level, although it also has utility at the strategic and tactical levels. It is intended as guidance for joint NATO staffs; however, it may provide a useful framework for activities and operations conducted by NATO members and partner nations. The publication also provides a reference for non-military actors.

Structure

5. This publication consists of four chapters and one supporting annex. Chapter 1 provides the context of the evolving environment for activities and operations. It explains NATO's behaviour centric approach and the NATO contribution to a comprehensive approach, as the two most relevant key tenets for CIMIC. It also addresses non-military actors as essential counterparts. Annex A complements this chapter, categorizing non-military actors and their fields of activity. Chapter 2 describes the fundamentals and principles related to CIMIC. Chapter 3 explains CIMIC as a joint function, its role within the joint function framework and describes the CIMIC core activities. Chapter 4 focuses on the staff function CIMIC and its relation with the other staff functions. It addresses practical staff activities, which support commanders' decision-making.

Linkages

6. The principle guiding document for NATO CIMIC is Military Committee (MC) 411, *Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation and Civil-Military Interaction*. AJP-3.19 builds on the principles described in the capstone publication AJP-01 *Allied Joint Doctrine* – which should be read in conjunction with the *NATO Military Strategy*, the *Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area* (DDA), the *NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept* (NWCC) and concept development tasks as directed by the Allied Command Operations CIMIC and CMI Steering Committee.

AJP-3.19 is linked to all keystone publications but specifically to Allied Joint Publication AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*. AJP-3.19 includes recommendations from doctrine validations and lessons identified and best practices derived from practical application. AJP-3.19 is a guiding document for subordinate CIMIC publications, down to the tactical level.




Figure P.1 – Linkages

Chapter 1 - Context

Section 1 Introduction

1.1 Guided by the developments in NATO policy and the Alliance's capstone doctrine, Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*, and Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3 *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*, Chapter 1 references the strategic context in relation to the new definition of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). CIMIC supports the doctrinal key tenets behaviour-centric approach and comprehensive approach in ensuring the synchronization of military and non-military capabilities, capacities and resources in order to reach converging effects. In particular CIMIC contributes to the understanding of the operating environment and synchronizes military and non-military action through its core activities civil factor integration and civil–military interaction. AJP-01 offers commanders and their staffs the following doctrinal frameworks: analytical framework, operations framework, functional framework, geographic framework, and joint function framework. This publication focuses on CIMIC as part of the joint function framework. Chapter 3 develops its meaning as a joint function whilst Chapter 4 describes CIMIC as a staff function.

Section 2 - Strategic context and definition of CIMIC

1.2 Continuum of competition.¹ The spectrum of international relations is articulated as a 'continuum of competition'. It depicts four types of relationships between states/groups of people: cooperation, rivalry, confrontation and armed conflict. The boundaries between these individual categories have a dynamic and evolutionary nature. The transition across the continuum is neither necessarily linear nor easily defined. It is also possible for actors to experience multiple types of relationship simultaneously in different policy areas.

1.3 Instruments of power.² Nations seek to achieve their national and sectorial aims through the coordinated use of the four instruments of power: diplomatic, information, military and economic. These instruments are used to interact with other nations, but they also play a key role in supporting a nation's internal stability, cohesion and resilience. A nation does not necessarily need to excel in every instrument but might draw strength from managing them concurrently to maximize its strategic advantage. The selected, balanced and synchronized use of instruments of power in NATO contributes to prevent, manage and resolve challenges

¹ See AJP-01(F), *Allied Joint Doctrine* paragraph 1.10 for more detail

² See AJP-01(F), *Allied Joint Doctrine* paragraph 1.23 for more detail.

across the continuum of competition. To maximize this efficiency, it is necessary that the capabilities and actions of instruments of power are integrated not only in the national perspective, but within the Alliance, with partner nations and with non-military actors.

1.4 Civil-military cooperation. At the military-strategic, operational and tactical level, the Alliance ensures the efficient synchronization between the instruments of power by applying a comprehensive approach in which CIMIC plays a key role in synchronizing military and non-military activities by establishing liaison with relevant non-military actors. CIMIC is defined as: ‘A military joint function that integrates the understanding of the civil factors of the operating environment and that enables, facilitates and conducts civil-military interaction to support the accomplishment of missions and military strategic objectives in peacetime, crisis and conflict.’³ CIMIC is an integral part of all NATO core tasks. Its principles and core activities apply in all campaign themes, types of operations, vigilance activities, and at all levels of command. The extent and quality of applying the CIMIC activities may vary in different situations along the continuum of competition.

1.5 NATO Crisis Response Process.⁴ NATO’s ability to sense, understand and respond quickly and to initiate or transition between campaign themes is a vital requirement of the continuum of competition mind-set. The NATO Crisis Response Process (NCRP) enables the Alliance to respond effectively. The military operations planning process is synchronized with the NCRP, and ensures integration of civil emergency planning and liaison with relevant NATO agencies and non-NATO organizations. CIMIC plays a key role within the NCRP in order to sense and understand the civil factors of the operating environment, and it enables, facilitates and conducts the interaction with non-military actors to prevent, manage and resolve crises and conflicts.

Section 3 Operating environment

1.6 Understanding of the operating environment. The operating environment comprises the context of a mission, incorporating all the elements, conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect a commander’s decision-making. The operating environment can be seen as a global set of complex, dynamic and interrelated networks, comprising of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information (PMESII) systems, each exerting pressure and influence on the others. Understanding the nature and interaction of these systems as part of mission analysis providing a comprehensive understanding of the operating environment helps commanders to define their engagement space⁵ and affects how they plan

³ NATO Agreed

⁴ See *NATO Crisis Response System Manual* (NCRSM) 2021 for more detail.

⁵ Engagement space: the part of the operating environment where actions and activities are planned and conducted (NATO Agreed, 2022-03-02).

and conduct joint actions within this space. CIMIC contributes to the comprehensive understanding of the operating environment by identifying, assessing and analyzing its civil factors.

1.7 Effect dimensions⁶ highlight the interdependencies within the engagement space, thereby gaining a better prediction and understanding of the consequences of actions. The elements that constitute dimensions are as follows:

- a. The **physical dimension** relates to the consequence on the audiences, the sub-surface, surface, airspace and space areas where all physical activities take place, and where audiences live, including all physical objects and infrastructure that support them.
- b. The **cognitive dimension** relates to the consequence on the audiences' perceptions, beliefs, interests, aims, decisions and behaviours. It encompasses all forms of interaction between them (such as economic and social).
- c. The **virtual dimension** relates to the consequences of activity on the storage, content, transmission of analogue and digital data, information, supporting communication, and information systems and processes.

Effect dimensions provide a framework for the political, military and civilian partners to coordinate and synchronize their activities in time and space to create mutually supporting desired effects, whilst respecting the autonomy of actors. These networks provide effects at the time and place the commander desires to support ongoing operations. All of these entities working together builds synergy and efficiency during the execution of operations. A better understanding of potential second and third order effects will support deliberate exploitation and maintenance of initiative. CIMIC contributes to the assessment of civil factors (including non-military audiences) and plans and executes actions that create physical, virtual and cognitive effects, contributing to the desired outcome.

Section 4 Key tenets of doctrine

1.8 Introduction. The key tenets⁷ (principles) of NATO doctrine are: behaviour-centric approach; manoeuvrist approach; the comprehensive approach; and mission command, which together guide commanders' thinking across the continuum of competition. CIMIC is fundamental in applying the comprehensive approach and a behaviour-centric approach.

⁶ Effect dimensions: an analytical construct that translates actions in the engagement space into the physical, virtual and cognitive consequences that these actions may have (NATO Agreed, 2022-03-02).

⁷ See AJP01(F), *Allied Joint Doctrine* paragraph 4.2 for more detail.

1.9 Behaviour-centric approach. The behaviour-centric approach recognizes that people, with their behaviour and attitude are central for attaining the end state. For this reason, the behaviour-centric approach focuses on changing people's attitude and behaviour. It categorizes people and groups within **audiences** into:

- **actors**, who perform actions affecting the end state;
- **stakeholders**, who can affect or are affected by the attainment of the end state, and,
- the **public**, which is aware of activities which may affect the end state.

All audiences have attitudes ranging from friendly through supportive, neutral, unsupportive to hostile. In addition, actors can be categorized as Alliance, partner, neutral, rival, adversary and enemy (see Figure 1.1)




Figure 1.1 - Audiences in the operating environment⁸

For CIMIC it is crucial to analyze the behaviour and attitude of non-military audiences (actors, stakeholders and public) and to assess their potential to affect (positively and negatively) own (military) capabilities, actions, effects and objectives. CIMIC identifies relevant non-military actors and stakeholders and assesses how far they can be motivated to integrate or

⁸ See AJP-01(F), Chapter 4 and AJP-10(A), *Allied Joint Doctrine for Strategic Communications*, Figure 1.5 for more detail.

synchronize their capabilities, capacities and resources with own military operations and activities. Vice versa, it has to be assessed if military capabilities can contribute to objectives of non-military actors relevant for the comprehensive approach. CIMIC aims to develop or maintain non-military actors' supportive attitude towards NATO, ideally creating partnerships.

1.10 Comprehensive approach. NATO's member nations' instruments of power include military, diplomacy, information and economic. A comprehensive approach combines all available political, military and civilian capabilities, in a concerted effort to attain the desired end state. The military instrument, upon tasking, will work towards the end state by pursuing military strategic objectives. However, the military instrument of power (MloP) alone cannot achieve the end state.. Neither is the military capable of achieving its military objectives only by military means and by only employing military capabilities. The comprehensive approach provides for how the commander, with partners, coordinates military activity(ies), with political and civilian actions, through all levels of command, to influence audiences and attain a unified end state. Through this cooperative relation, a common analysis and collective strategy, mutual coordination, tasks, roles and responsibilities are established. The comprehensive approach strives to optimize the synchronization of capabilities⁹ within the remit of political military and civilian actors and serving their tasks. High levels of interaction non-military action will be integrated as 'complementary non-military actions' into comprehensive planning and execution.

Section 5 Non-military actors

1.11 Non-military actors are increasingly relevant for Alliance operations, ranging from governmental authorities, civil organizations, international and non-governmental organizations to the private sector, including commercial actors working in support of the mission and in integrated civil-military partnerships. All these civilian partners have unique and valuable experience, a distinctive culture and unique aim. CIMIC is key to effective communication and coordination with the broad spectrum of non-military actors. The goal is to establish networks, with the purpose of creating mutual understanding between military and non-military actors to foster cooperation during activities and operations. Ideally, mutual understanding and good working relationships are developed through training, education and other initiatives prior to any crisis. A commander is required to work with non-military actors and must retain a high level of flexibility to involve those non-military actors required during specific phases of a campaign to achieve the military objectives. Non-military actors have their own motivation, legal status, mandate, mission, principles, processes and policies. It is essential to understand the origin, ownership, principles and goals of non-military actors, and

3_Library\\Cross%20Cutting%20Topics\\PoC\\20180418_NATO_MC0668_Concept-PoC.pdf" *Civilians* for more detail.

how their activities affect the military and vice versa. Annex A *Non-military actors* provides an overview of the most relevant categories of non-military actors and their areas of activity.

Section 6 Topics and considerations related to CIMIC

1.12 Resilience is the ability of an entity to continue to perform specified functions during and after an attack or an incident. It describes the system's spectrum of holistic prevention, preparedness and readiness. In NATO it encompasses military resilience and civil preparedness throughout peacetime, crisis and conflict. CIMIC primarily focuses on resilience through civil preparedness and its potential impact to military activities and operations.

1.13 Resilience through civil preparedness. Anchored in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, resilience is a national responsibility but a collective commitment. Threat agnostic, Resilience through civil preparedness (RtCP) is a critical enabler of deterrence and defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area and focuses on three core functions: continuity of government, continuity of essential services to the population, and civil support to military operations. This is sub-divided into the seven agreed baseline requirements (7BLR) through which nations biannually report to the Resilience Committee. Employed correctly, RtCP should enhance military effectiveness by allowing Allied Nations' territorial defence forces to focus on homeland security and rear-area tasks, thereby allowing NATO forces to focus on combat missions. CIMIC, acting as a gatekeeper for RtCP, facilitates the identification and analysis of potential impacts to NATO activities and operations through the lens of the BLR.

1.14 Civil emergency planning. The focus of civil emergency planning (CEP) is the protection of societies against the effects of emergencies (crisis, armed conflict or peacetime emergencies). CEP is a national responsibility and civil assets remain under national control at all times. The aim of CEP in NATO is to share information on national planning activities to ensure the most effective use of civil resources during emergencies. NATO concentrates on those planning activities that cannot be executed at a national level. It enables Allies and partner nations to assist each other in preparing for, and dealing with, the consequences of crisis, disaster or conflict.

1.15 Human security.¹⁰ NATO's human security approach is drawn from that of the United Nations. The Alliance is committed to integrating human security principles into all of the Alliance's core tasks. It is also acknowledged that promoting human security will increase stability and reduce the drivers of conflict, making human security a potentially key component of conflict resolution. The military contribution to human security (MC2HS)¹¹ includes: protection of civilians (PoC), combating trafficking in human beings (CTHB), building integrity

¹⁰ For more detail see PO(2022)0280 – *Human Security Approach and Guiding Principles*, 24 June 2022.

¹¹ See ACO, *Human Security Guidance*, 01 June 2023 for more detail.

in operations (BIIO), children in armed conflict (CAAC), cultural property protection (CPP), and conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). The NATO approach is people centered, protection and prevention oriented, accounts for local customs, consistent with international law, respects the humanitarian space, respects sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, and engages with relevant actors. Consideration of the comprehensive safety and security of populations will be embedded into all stages and levels of NATO operations, missions, and activities.

1.16 Cross-cutting topics¹². NATO adopted the following cross-cutting topics (CCT): protection of civilians¹³ (PoC); children and armed conflict (CAAC); cultural property protection (CPP); women, peace and security (WPS); conflict related sexual violence (CRSV); combating trafficking in human beings (CTHB); sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA); and building integrity (BI). NATO and NATO forces apply a cross functional assessment to include the related issues into planning and decision-making. Commanders at all levels have the responsibility to operationalize and integrate CCTs in planning and execution of activities and operations. CIMIC has an inherent responsibility to consider CCTs in contributing to the commander's decision-making process.

1.17 Gender.¹⁴ The term 'gender' refers to the social differences and relations between women and men, which were learned through socialization and determine a person's position and value in a given context. Gender perspective is the consideration of gender-based differences between women and men as reflected in their social roles and interactions. Different gender groups are affected differently by armed conflict and have a differing influence on NATO activities and operations. Integrating a gender perspective is a cross-cutting function and an Alliance-wide effort that requires a systemic approach from all functions.

¹² See AJP-01(F), *Allied Joint Doctrine*, paragraph 3.43, and Annex A for more detail.

¹³ See MC 0668, *Concept for the Protection of Civilians* for more detail.

¹⁴ See Allied Joint Publication AJP-01(F), *Allied Joint Doctrine*, Annex B for more detail.

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Chapter 2 – Fundamentals

Section 1 Introduction

2.1 This chapter explains the principles for CIMIC that are indispensable for trustful and transparent interaction with friendly to neutral non-military actors. It describes the different levels of interaction between military and non-military actors. Furthermore, it delineates the responsibilities between the political level and subsequent levels of command related to CIMIC.

Section 2 CIMIC principles

2.2 Applying a comprehensive approach requires commanders, their headquarters, and forces to understand friendly, neutral, adverse, and potentially hostile non-military actors' motivations, culture, and principles. In order to promote unity of purpose, they have to invest in building trust and relationships with friendly and neutral non-military actors based on cultural awareness, attempting to find common goals, being transparent, open, and consistent with their communication. Leading principles for CIMIC are:

- a. **Sovereignty** of host nations.
- b. **Civil primacy** for non-military tasks.
- c. **Understanding** of non-military actors and respect for their autonomy in decision-making. This understanding should include both informal and formal actors.
- d. **Clear distinction** between the role and function of military actors and non-military actors, especially those operating under the humanitarian principles.
- e. **Proactive interaction** with all relevant non-military actors, activities and operations active in the JOA and theatre of operation is key to identifying capabilities contributing to accomplishment of the mission. Commanders in particular must maintain continuous and effective communication with their correspondent non-military counterparts at local, regional, national and international levels.
- f. **Interaction based upon mutual respect**, knowledge of respective roles, trust and transparency. Institutional understanding, credibility and reliability are key.

- g. **Promotion of cooperation**, mutual information sharing in accordance NATO policies and procedures, including MCM-0162-2023¹⁵ to achieve overall aims, objectives and, end state.

Section 3 Levels of interaction with non-military actors

2.3 General. Relationships between military and non-military actors are formed and influenced by the autonomy of each actor, and cannot be compared to military command and control authority, therefore different levels of interaction apply. There is no common agreement on these terms; non-military actors may use them interchangeably or with different meanings. However, these descriptions are provided as a baseline for common understanding. The levels of interaction range from integration to coexistence:

- a. **Integration** can be described as the process of operating together to attain a unified end state. Integration represents the maximum level of interaction between two actors, which implies collaborative working to plan and execute mutual actions within a common engagement space.
- b. **Cooperation** is the process of acting together for mutual benefit. It involves working in harmony, side by side, and implies an association between actors. Cooperation is a concept of interaction in which planning and activities are carried out jointly and/or in support of each other. Cooperation with other actors does not mean giving up authority, autonomy, or becoming subordinated to the direction of others.
- c. **Coordination** is the process of bringing together different elements of a complex activity or organization into an efficient relationship. Clearly defined relationships may foster harmony and reduce friction among the participants. Coordination activities include exchanging information, agreeing on joint policies and actions, and harmonizing individual activities.
- d. **Deconfliction** is the process of avoiding undesirable interference among actors, especially where they perform the same function or occupy the same physical space.
- e. **Consultation** seeks the opinion or advice of other actors, which may include exchange of information and discussion.
- f. **Coexistence** is the state or condition of existing at the same time or in the same place. Two or more actors may be aware of each other's presence but will not directly interact.

¹⁵ MCM-0162-2023 (INV) *Military Committee decision on the operational requirement statement for civil-military cooperation analysis and assessment capability*, dated 18 July 2023.

Section 4 Responsibilities

2.4 Political level. Provides direction and guidance for the application of CIMIC through the development of policy. Nations will provide their assessments based on the seven baseline requirements to help assess civil resilience.

2.5 Strategic level. The Strategic Headquarters is responsible for translating CIMIC policy into CIMIC doctrine, organization training, material and functional areas systems and personnel to support activities and operations. The Strategic Headquarters will establish, maintain and delegate relationships, including liaison authority with non-military actors.

2.6 Operational level. The commander will be advised by the assistant chief of staff (ACOS) J9 on CIMIC issues related to planning and execution through civil factor integration. Priorities concerning CIMIC application and associated allocation of resources will be determined at the operational level planning process/decision-making processes supported by civil-military interaction (CMI). The ACOS J9 acts as the coordinating authority over CIMIC assets across all components. CIMIC J9 is responsible for training and education of their staff and others contributing to CIMIC. J9 CIMIC enables and facilitates CMI of forces within the operating area. The operational level ensures horizontal and vertical coordination of all CIMIC activities in its area of responsibility.

2.7 Tactical level. CIMIC conducts and facilitates interaction with regional and local military and non-military actors and ensures civil factor integration to support the commander's mission.

Section 5 CIMIC application across operational domains and environments

2.8 General. The Alliance's approach to multi-domain operations enables the military instrument of power to prepare, plan, orchestrate, and execute synchronized activities, across all operational domains and environments, in collaboration with the other instruments of power to deliver converging effects. CIMIC facilitates and enables synchronization of military and non-military activities and can be best described using the environmental framework.

2.9 CIMIC and the land environment. The land operating environment is where people predominantly live and consequently where rivalry, conflicts and humanitarian crisis have their roots and main impact. The increasing urbanization presents significant challenges, notably in terms of understanding the complex operating environment. Interaction between the military and civilians is inevitable in the land environment. A military force will always affect the land operating environment, including its civil factors and vice versa. Thereby, it creates desired and undesired effects by its sheer presence and by the execution of activities and operations. Understanding immediate, second, and third order effects is key with respect to human security

and protection of civilians considerations. The land domain comprises capabilities and activities primarily related to operating on and directly above the earth's land mass, which in a comprehensive approach require synchronization with non-military actors capabilities and activities. Non-military actors' personnel and capabilities are largely organized on different levels of hierarchy and along administrative divisions of the land surface with its boundaries and borders. Governance is structured in administrative bodies of nations, states, provinces, counties and communities. To apply the comprehensive approach, CIMIC considers the political, administrative, social, or cultural boundaries as a basis for effective civil-military liaison and interaction, and adapts liaison authorities accordingly. A clear, dedicated and effective outreach, liaison and coordination mechanism must be authorized and established. CIMIC may leverage existing liaison and coordination mechanisms of host-nation governments and administrations in order to gain efficiencies.

2.10 CIMIC and the maritime environment. The interconnectedness of the oceans through economic, social and political relationships underlines the importance of maintaining the rules-based international order. The maintenance of the freedom of navigation, sea lines of communications, key infrastructure, energy flow, protection of marine resources and environmental safety, are all in the interests of both national and international security. CIMIC encompasses CMI activities and the integration of civil factors of the maritime operating environment. This is accomplished essentially through the interaction with non-military actors ashore, aimed at facilitating the full range of activities at sea performed by maritime forces across warfare and combat, maritime security, and security cooperation. Maritime specific actors are national shipping authorities, shipping industry, jurisdiction and other departments responsible for the coastal areas and adjacent sea areas and specific governmental organizations (GOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IOs). The shipping industry is one of the most significant actors in the maritime environment, which is likely to be present in the theatre/joint area of operations. Through Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) and the Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System (AWNIS) disciplines, a NATO force will interact effectively with merchant shipping by coordinating the operations plan with non-military activities, so that the commander's mission can be fulfilled with minimal interference with merchant shipping. The NATO Shipping Centre (NSC) is the integral and permanent element of the Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) and the primary point of contact between NATO and the merchant shipping community. Within operations, the NSC coordinates the NATO and national NCAGS/AWNIS organizations to ensure the use of NCAGS and AWNIS as force multipliers, facilitating the most effective use of military resources in support of operational objectives.

- a. **NCAGS** provides naval cooperation, guidance, advice and assistance and supervision to merchant shipping in support of the commander's mission and to enhance the safety and security of merchant ships.

- b. **AWNIS** contributes to freedom of navigation by the provision of safety and security of navigation information for military and merchant ships in support of maritime operations. Additionally, the NSC contributes to the global maritime situational awareness by providing a non-military shipping picture and maritime pattern of life.

2.11 CIMIC and the air environment. The air environment overlays the land and sea. Air power has decisive impact when orchestrated along with land, maritime, space and cyberspace forces. Air power exploits the nature of the third dimension via the three core air power attributes: speed, reach and height. An additional characteristic of air power is the required support footprint (air bases and their surroundings). For CIMIC, the concept of reach and the support footprint are the most relevant considerations.

- a. **Reach.** All of the earth's surface is covered by air, providing aircraft with unique reach. Reach requires understanding of civil factors in the operating environment over a large area with or without maintaining a physical presence. Therefore, CIMIC is incorporated in all air operations and activities, to assure synchronization of activities and effects with non-military actors, in line with the joint CIMIC plans and guidance.
- b. **Support footprint.** Setting up and maintaining air bases and their surroundings substantially relies on coordination with national and international agencies and other non-military actors. The impact to the operating environment caused by such air bases (safety, posture, mobility, access, pollution, etc.) should be considered. CIMIC contributes to the situational understanding to minimize negative consequences.
- c. **Passive air defence** measures are taken for the physical defence and protection of personnel, essential installations and equipment in order to minimize the effectiveness of air and/or missile attack. Passive air defence within a joint operations area will also apply to non-military assets and therefore requires coordination with government departments and agencies, civil emergency planning and international and non-governmental organizations.

2.12 CIMIC and the space environment. Space support to operations includes all activities that provide capabilities through space to support NATO operations. 'Space-based capabilities' include services such as positioning, navigation and timing, imagery, communications, and environmental monitoring satellites. Military, civil and commercial sectors are increasingly dependent on these capabilities. Commanders should be aware that some space-based capabilities supporting NATO operations may be under military, governmental, or even commercial control. Space-based capabilities are vulnerable to both human-made threats and natural hazards influences. Adversaries may seek to exploit this dependence on space capabilities. Therefore, attacks on space systems become increasingly likely. Commanders must anticipate adversary or third party attempts to interfere with, disrupt or deny friendly force or partner's access to space-based capabilities. Effective relationships are needed to

coordinate between NATO and non-military actors to mitigate related threats and risks. CIMIC can support in building these relationships by facilitating civil-military interaction.

2.13 CIMIC and cyberspace. Cyberspace comprises capabilities and activities primarily related to operating within the interdependent networks of information, technology infrastructures and resident data, including the internet, telecommunications, networks, computer systems and embedded processors. There are a broad spectrum of users and usage of cyberspace: military (friendly, adversary), governmental, non-governmental (commercial and non-commercial). It is therefore crucial to establish an early situational awareness of the relevant portions of cyberspace and maintain a strategic view of cyberspace, as part of preparation of the operating environment, including a sound understanding of the critical connections and dependencies in the networks as well as an assessment of potential impact on civilians and civilian infrastructures. Parts of the cyberspace are key infrastructure, therefore there is a requirement to manage and coordinate joint task force activities in cyberspace with various non-military actors to avoid or minimize undesired effects.

Chapter 3 - Joint function CIMIC

Section 1 Joint function framework

3.1 General. The joint function framework assists commanders to integrate political, military and civilian actions through the operational domains. In all NATO activities and operations these joint functions are to be considered, although the individual functions' contributions, significance and demands will vary. The joint function framework uses a combination of manoeuvre, fires, information and CIMIC to create effects. It is informed and directed by the joint functions of command and control and intelligence, and supported by the joint functions of sustainment and force protection.




Figure 3.1 Joint function framework

Section 2 Capabilities and CIMIC core activities

3.2 The joint function CIMIC comprises two core activities, delivered by specific CIMIC capabilities and CIMIC-related capabilities.

a. Capabilities

(1) **CIMIC capabilities** include personnel, formations, and organizations specifically designated and trained to conduct CIMIC core activities. NATO's CIMIC capabilities exist at all levels of command. In the BiSC capability codes and capability statements¹⁶ the following CIMIC capabilities are described:

- (a) **CIMIC theatre element (CIMIC TE)**: supports the operational-level headquarters (HQ) and may also be employed at the tactical level. It plans, organizes, commands, and controls CIMIC activities throughout the full range of activities and operations.
- (b) **CIMIC staff element** supports the operational-level HQ and coordinates the CIMIC liaison detachment.
- (c) **CIMIC liaison detachment** establishes and maintains the network through outreach, engagement and liaison at the operational level with the host nation and relevant non-military actors.
- (d) **CIMIC units** conduct and coordinate CIMIC activities and provide support to tactical level HQs.
 - **CIMIC battalion** conducts CIMIC activities at the land component command, corps level or as part of the CIMIC TE.
 - **CIMIC company** conducts CIMIC activities at the division level or as part of the CIMIC TE.
 - **CIMIC platoon** conducts CIMIC activities at the brigade level or as part of the CIMIC TE.
- (e) **CIMIC functional specialist** provides specialist support to any level of command as required.

(2) **CIMIC-related capabilities** are any other military capabilities contributing to CIMIC activities and can vary operationally. Forces and assets are not characterized by the joint function which they support and can support more than one joint function.¹⁷

¹⁶ Bi-SC Capability Codes and Capability Statements.

¹⁷ See AJP-3 (C), *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*, Annex B for more details.

b. Core activities

(1) **Civil factor integration** (CFI) encompasses the identification, analysis, and assessment of civil factors of the operating environment in order to contribute to the decision-making process (DMP).

(2) **Civil-military interaction** (CMI) is defined as: ‘activities between military NATO bodies and non-military actors to foster mutual understanding that enhance effectiveness and efficiency in crisis management and conflict prevention and resolution’.¹⁸




Figure 3.2 - CIMIC core activities

Section 3 Joint function CIMIC and other joint functions

3.3 General. The combination of all joint functions' capabilities and activities enhances joint actions to create converging effects. CIMIC's core activities CFI and CMI support joint action through synchronizing military with non-military activities.

a. **CIMIC and Manoeuvre.** The principal purpose of manoeuvre is to gain positional advantage in respect to an adversary from which force can be threatened or applied. CIMIC

¹⁸ NATO Agreed.

aims to exploit opportunities and minimize impact of civil factors on military manoeuvre and vice versa, and exploit positive effects. Through CIMIC, the force will maintain operational tempo, conserve combat power, preserve or gain freedom of action, and improve joint action and civil actions' synchronization.

b. **CIMIC and Fires.** Fires creates effects on targets. They may be applied directly or indirectly to create a wide range of physical and psychological effects by degrading capabilities and/or shattering cohesion. CIMIC supports Fires through civil factor analysis and assessment, leading to better understanding of potential impact of inclusion on target lists. Through legal, discriminate and proportionate use of fires the force minimizes collateral damage and its impact on daily civilian life. CIMIC has a key role in ensuring the integration of protection of civilians in the planning and conduct of operations; it builds population trust and supports mission legitimacy.

c. **CIMIC and Information.** The information function helps commanders and staff applying (or using) information, while integrating with other functions, to positively influence relevant actors' perceptions, behavior, action or inaction and decision-making. Civil factor integration and the information environment assessment complement each other. CIMIC contributes to the understanding of the human environment and to mitigating civilian harm resulting from information operations. CIMIC through CMI activities can facilitate communication of the NATO narrative and enhance mutual credibility and confidence amongst the audience.

d. **CIMIC and Command and Control.** Command and control (C2) directs joint actions to create effects. CIMIC can enhance C2 planning and execution by identification of relationships with relevant non-military actors, in order to support the commander's engagement plan and activities.

e. **CIMIC and Intelligence.** The role of intelligence is to ensure a continuous, coordinated and comprehensive understanding of the operating environment (CUOE), to support the commanders decision making process. CIMIC contributes to the CUOE through civil factor integration.

f. **CIMIC and Sustainment:** Forces and their fighting power need to be sustained throughout all activities and operations. Sustainment encompasses the provision of personnel, logistics, medical, military engineering, finance and contract support required to maintain combat power. CIMIC supports the understanding of civil factors related to sustainment, focused on external and host nation support to the force. Interaction with non-military actors aims to create efficient and effective access to civilian resources whilst striving to minimize adverse effects to the civilian population.

g. **CIMIC and Force Protection.** Force protection is a function aimed at minimizing the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment, materiel, operations and activities from threats and hazards to preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness thereby contributing to mission success¹⁹. CIMIC contributes to risk assessment by analyzing and assessing civil factors related to threats to the force. The conduct of civil outreach, engagement and liaison aims to reduce threats and strives to enhance force acceptance.

¹⁹ See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations* and Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.14 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection* for more detail.

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Chapter 4 - Staff function CIMIC

Section 1 - CIMIC staff activities

4.1 General. CIMIC staff activities are directed and coordinated through the J9 branch,²⁰ categorized under the CIMIC core activities.

Section 2 Civil factor integration staff activities

4.2 Introduction. Civil factor integration staff activities contribute to the comprehensive understanding of the operating environment through integration of the understanding of the civil factors into the decision-making process.

4.3 Civil factor integration uses frameworks, such as the PMESII/ASCOPE, to collate collected data on the civil factors of the operating environment. CIMIC analysis is the process of that data being subjected to review by CIMIC experts in order to derive descriptive and predictive assessments of their likely impact on the operating environment and audiences: CIMIC assessments. CIMIC advice is the use of those assessments and the underpinning analysis to inform planning and decision-making activities.²¹




Figure 4.1 Civil factor integration terminology

²⁰ For more detail on the overview of staff functions see AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*.

²¹ Political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure (PMESII); areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events (ASCOPE): see AJP-2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security* for more detail.

The **CIMIC estimate** is a continuous process executed by CIMIC staff. It creates the basis for contribution to staff processes and products and serves as a repository of data, information, and products concerning the civil factors of the operating environment.

4.4 Civil factor integration staff activities include:

- a. Identify and facilitate(support) complementary non-military actions (CNMA).
- b. Identify, analyze and assess civil factors having a critical impact on the planning and conduct of activities and operations, creating the necessary understanding as contribution to CUOE.
- c. Identify and assess the impact of military activities and operations on non-military audiences.
- d. Identify, analyze and assess civil factors relevant to MC2HS and CCTs.
- e. Identify, analyze and assess the impact of non-military activities on own activities and operations.
- f. Identify shortfalls in resilience requirements²² to anticipate potential negative impact on military activities and operations.
- g. Advise on synchronizing military and non-military activities in order to create converging effects and on mitigating negative consequences of military activities.
- h. Develop the CIMIC concept of operation (typically Annex W to plans).
- i. Establish mechanisms to share information with non-military actors.
- j. Assess non-military actors' requests for military support.

Section 3 Civil-military interaction activities and staff activities

4.5 General. CMI includes the activities outreach, engagement with non-military actors and stakeholders, civil-military liaison as well as consultation and collaboration with non-military actors and stakeholders.

²² As described by the seven baseline requirements (7BLR).

Civil-military Interaction




Figure 4.2 Civil-military interaction

4.6 Outreach activities establish communication with individuals, organizations or communities, with the aim of creating opportunities for engagement and civil-military liaison.

4.7 Engagement²³ with non-military actors constitutes a CMI activity under the scope and direction of the staff function information.

4.8 Consultation and collaboration²⁴ with non-military actors and stakeholders are conducted to complement military and non-military capabilities and synchronize activities.

4.9 Civil-military liaison²⁵ is based on unity of purpose, continuity, and strives for synchronization of actions at all levels to ensure efficient use of resources. It is a specialized form of CMI that requires training and education to interact appropriately with non-military actors.

²³ Engagement, for the purpose of this publication ‘any form of human interaction aimed at delivering influential messages in support of the overall campaign objectives.’ (Bi-SC NATO Engagement Handbook, Version 1.0, September 17)

²⁴ Consultation: The functions and responsibilities of civilian and military authorities at political, strategic, operational and tactical levels for making decisions, planning, coordinating and directing resources, and conducting actions or operations for the accomplishment of an organization’s missions and objectives. (AAP-31). For details on consultation and collaboration see the *Initial Alliance Multi-Domain Operations Concept*.

²⁵ Liaison: the contact, intercommunication and coordination maintained between elements of the military and/or other non-military actors to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and actions. (NATO Agreed)

4.10 Civil-military liaison principles:

- Right level and competence;
- Continuity;
- Mutual exchange of information;
- Avoidance of duplication.

4.11 Types of civil-military liaison:

- Institutionalized, sustained relationships,²⁶
- Interaction for education, training, exercises and evaluation;
- Liaison in the context of operations and activities.

4.12 Civil-military liaison arrangements are based on several considerations such as the intended or agreed level of interaction, the availability of liaison capabilities and capacities, geographical settings, and the security situation, the security risks that exist for non-military actors if they are perceived as being too closely associated with NATO.




Figure 4.3 Civil-military liaison arrangements

- Co-location** of military and non-military actors' staff elements facilitates high levels of interaction.

²⁶ Based on formal agreements (e.g. with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations).

- b. **Liaison exchange** through the exchange of liaison staff enables a near real time exchange of information and coordination.
- c. **Liaison visits** may be scheduled regularly or conducted on an ad-hoc basis.
- d. **Third-party** interlocutors facilitate the exchange of information in cases where political or security considerations demand physical distance or clear distinction.
- e. **Mechanisms and platforms** that facilitate liaison encompass regular meeting formats, coordination mechanisms, permanent or temporary fora, platforms, boards or coordination centres.²⁷
- f. **National systems** may be required where sovereignty considerations do not allow direct liaison between NATO forces and non-military actors. In such cases, necessary interaction will be channeled through a host nation military actor.

4.13 CIMIC staff activities that enable CMI include:

- a. Identification of non-military actors;
- b. Development and maintenance of a liaison network;
- c. Establishment of communication mechanisms;
- d. Education and training on CMI;
- e. Advising on the appropriate level of interaction and CMI arrangements;
- f. Advising staff specialists to interact with non-military actors.

4.14 CIMIC staff activities that facilitate CMI include:

- a. Introduction of non-military actors to military counterparts;
- b. Initiation of first access/contact to non-military actors;
- c. Creation of platforms and mechanisms supporting conduct of CMI – if required;
- d. Assisting in negotiations in sensitive areas of CMI conducted by commander and their staff.

²⁷ An example of permanent centres within NATO is the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC). Examples for regional platforms/centres outside NATO are On-Site Operational Coordination Centres (OSOCC), the UN-Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (UN-OCHA) Civil-Military Coordination (UNCMCoord) framework, and the European Union's Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC).

4.15 CIMIC staff activities during conduct of CMI include:

- a. Sharing of information;
- b. Collection of civil factor data and information;
- c. Contribution to developing procedures to process civil requests for support;
- d. Civil-military planning and synchronization of activities, actions and operations, applying defined measures of performance and measures of effectiveness;
- e. Integration and synchronization of CNMA in peacetime vigilance activities and operations;
- f. Monitoring and assessment of impacts and effects of civil and civil-military activities;
- g. Promotion of force acceptance and transparency;
- h. Contribution to strategic communications.

Section 4 Staff function CIMIC and other staff functions

4.16 Commanders are often the most suitable to conduct CMI with high-level non-military actors.

4.17 Related staff functions. All staff functions contribute to CIMIC core activities based on their subject matter expertise and responsibility under the lead of J9/CIMIC.²⁸

4.18 Civil factor integration. The staff functions intelligence (J2), CIMIC (J9), strategic communications (J10) and the principal advisors complement and support each other by analyzing and assessing civil factors through their respective perspectives. The gender advisor (GENAD) contributes to the analysis, assessment and understanding of civil factors by applying the gender perspective to understand how men, women, boys and girls are differently affected by military operations and activities. J9 can support the GENAD by collecting and collating sex and age disaggregated data. The staff functions personnel and administration (J1), logistics (J4), budget and finance (J8), as well as the medical advisor and military engineering advisor integrate civil factors relevant for the employment and sustainment of the military. Further they contribute to the assessment of effects of the military use of non-military resources. The staff functions plans (J5), operations (J3), training (J7) in conjunction with

²⁸ See Allied Joint Publication AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*, Annex A for more detail.

CIMIC (J9) integrate civil factors in order to synchronize military with non-military actions to reach converging effects and mitigate negative effects.

4.19 Civil-military interaction. J9 staff enable and facilitate the CMI of the other staff functions through their outreach and civil-military liaison. Whilst the J9 staff function conducts outreach and civil-military liaison to non-military actors in order to synchronize military and non-military action, J2 intelligence capabilities interact with the whole spectrum of audiences to collect information, and J10 strategic communication engages audiences in order to influence their attitudes and behaviour. Non-military support to the employment and sustainment of the military requires CMI by all supporting staff functions. As some non-military actors will be relevant to several staff functions CMI needs to be coordinated to deconflict, avoid duplication, and maximize synergies.

Section 5 Decision-making

4.20 Applying CIMIC. CIMIC is an integral part of any military operation the staff function CIMIC is essential to the decisionmaking process in all phases of planning and execution. A force's battle rhythm supports inclusion of CIMIC in decisionmaking. CIMIC staff will coordinate CIMIC activities through horizontal and vertical functional communication, active participation in CIMIC-related battle rhythm events, through meetings, reports and returns, and the CIMIC estimate process. CIMIC liaison and CMI are important tools in support of the application of the staff function CIMIC in order to synchronize and harmonize military and civil decision-making processes, striving for unity of purpose and achievement of the end state.

4.21 Planning. CIMIC contribution to planning is twofold: firstly to integrate understanding of civil factors into planning and decision making, and secondly to develop the CIMIC concept to unify and synchronize all CIMIC activities in support of joint effects.

4.22 Execution. During the execution phase CIMIC staff conducts CMI in order to contribute to integration, coordination or synchronization of actions. Further CIMIC provides the commander with continuous assessments and advice on how the civil factors of the operating environment are affected by and are affecting the operation.

4.23 Assessments. CIMIC personnel will be involved in two different types of assessment: the CIMIC estimate and the operations assessment. The purpose of the first is to provide a picture of the civil factors of the operating environment to enable all command levels in NATO to understand the situation and better inform future decisions and coherent planning. A common operational picture including the civil dimension will support this understanding. The purpose of the second is to contribute to the operations assessments on the progress of the mission during the conduct of operations. CIMIC will contribute by providing assessments on achieved effects through CNMA and military actions executed and the related effects achieved.

Section 6 Lessons learned

4.24 Lessons learned describes activities relating to learning from experience to achieve improvements. In a NATO military context, lessons learned (LL) is an essential part of being credible, capable, and adaptive in warfighting and warfare development. Lessons can be derived from any activity: operations, exercises, training, and daily events. NATO has its own LL capability, managed by the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC), with every HQ having its own LL procedures to gather observations that once analyzed can be transformed in lessons identified/learned or best practice. CIMIC personnel within an organization need to be involved and contribute to the learning lessons process by submitting observations for organizational learning to be effective complemented with comments derived from non-military actors interaction.

Section 7 Joint targeting

4.25 CIMIC staff should be integrated into all aspects of planning and execution in the joint targeting cycle through participation and contribution to the working groups and boards. CIMIC advice can be given throughout the process of selection and prioritization of targets, taking into account any operational requirements in accordance with the commander's objectives. CIMIC staff contribution to joint targeting include advise on precautions to be taken, on possible measures to mitigate impact on civilians and civilian objects, on second and third order effects and on proportionality considering the implications of lethal and non-lethal actions with respect to HS and CCTs. The principle of proportionality requires combatants to take feasible precautions in planning and conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and other persons and objects protected from being made the object of attack and requires refraining from attacks in which the expected loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. CIMIC assists in identifying civilian key infrastructure within the joint area of operations, and supports the development of the no-strike list.

Annex A – Non-military actors

Section 1 Non-military actors relevance across NATO core tasks

A.1 **General.** Throughout all NATO core tasks the principle of civilian primacy with respect to civilian tasks applies. The primary authority and responsibility for civil governance and provision of public services always lies with the local national government / host nation government and its public administration and governmental organizations (GO). International organizations (IO) and non-governmental organizations (NGO) as well as the private sector will complement the public administration within the legal framework set by the government. In crisis management, when a national government is manifestly not willing or able to fulfil its responsibilities, IO and NGO may step in to support or substitute the provision of services.

Section 2 Categories of non-military actors

A.2 Government and public administration

National governments hold the responsibility for the governance of their states and to safeguard the conditions for the functioning of society and economy in a way that ensures the provision of livelihood and welfare of their population. Their agencies and public administration ensure the execution of laws and regulations for the functioning of their societies and economy. They provide security, key infrastructure and public services as far as these are not provided by the private sector. Government and public services are generally structured according to functional areas (e.g. ministries, departments) and often subdivided on geographical levels (e.g. national, regional, municipal).

A.3 **Governmental organizations** are, depending on their specific area of expertise, dependent on their sponsoring nations to support their efforts in the joint operations area. They can have an expertise in governance, health care services and support, economic development, infrastructural reconstruction and development, education and political capacity building. Their main focus varies from granting humanitarian assistance to long term development projects.

A.4 The **private sector** resides outside of direct state control and encompasses any privately owned group or person involved in profitable activities. Their 'for-profit' orientation distinguishes them from the other categories of non-military actors. In many countries the private sector actors own large parts of the national key infrastructure. The private sector might only coordinate if it supports their business model or due to legal obligations.

A.5 International organizations. The term international organizations refers to inter-governmental organizations, or organizations whose membership is open to sovereign states. IOs are established by treaties, which provide their legal status. They are subject to international law and are capable of entering into agreements between member states and themselves. The most prominent IOs are the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). Other examples include the African Union (AU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Their missions are highly political by nature.

A.6 Non-governmental organizations. NGOs are predominantly private, self-governing, non-profit organizations dedicated to specific aspects of humanitarian and development activity. NGOs exist at the local, national and international level. They pursue different missions and motivations and are accountable to their trustees, donors and beneficiaries. In recent decades there has been a vast increase in the number and scale of NGOs. NGOs vary in size and financial capacity from small associations with a view members up to internationally operating professional organizations.

Section 3 International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

A.7 General. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is composed of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and of the 190 individual National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The mission of the Movement is to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found, to protect life and health and ensure respect for the human being, in particular in times of armed conflict and other emergencies, and to work for the prevention of disease and for the promotion of health and social welfare. Each component of the movement has its own legal identity and role, while their fundamental principles oblige them all to the mission to alleviate human suffering, protect life, health, and human dignity.

- a. **International Committee of the Red Cross.** The ICRC defines its mission as: ‘The ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance’. The ICRC also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. The ICRC therefore deals directly with governments and armed forces, as well as armed opposition groups, to promote compliance with and respect for the law of armed conflict. During conflicts, the ICRC directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the Movement. The ICRC is neither an international organization nor a non-governmental organization. It is a private association under Swiss law which was given an international mandate by the states party to the Geneva Conventions to help victims of armed conflict. It is worth mentioning five key characteristics of the ICRC:

- (1) The ICRC, as well as the other components of the Movement, strictly adhere to fundamental principles such as humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. These principles provide an ethical, operational and institutional framework. Those principles are concrete elements of ICRC humanitarian action, and the perception, by the parties to the armed conflict and by the victims themselves, are essential elements for ICRC acceptance in the field.
 - (2) By virtue of its purely neutral approach, the ICRC seeks and maintains a dialogue with all parties to a conflict.
 - (3) The ICRC favors a confidential approach. The ICRC's practice of confidentiality is reinforced by the organization's immunity from the obligation to testify in a court of law.
 - (4) The ICRC is able to play the role of neutral intermediary and to offer its mediation and good offices whenever required. However, the role of neutral intermediary does not involve negotiating the terms of an agreement.
 - (5) The ICRC action cannot be part of any integrated or comprehensive mechanism. The ICRC is limited by its fundamental principles, which exclude close/formal cooperation with military forces. The ICRC must maintain its independence of decision-making and action while consulting closely with military actors.
- b. **International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).** The IFRC carries out relief operations to assist victims of natural and technological disasters, epidemic outbreak, etc. and combines this with development work to strengthen the capacities of its member national societies. The IFRC's work focuses on four core areas: promoting humanitarian values, disaster response, disaster preparedness, and health and community care.
- c. **National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.** The 190 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies constitute a vital field presence of the Movement in nearly all countries. National Societies act as auxiliaries to their national authorities in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services including disaster relief, and health- and social programmes. In times of armed conflict, they may assist the civilian population and support the medical services of the armed forces making them a substantial contributor to civil defence and civil and military resilience.

Section 4 Fields of activities of non-military actors

A.8 **General.** Non-military actors provide capabilities, goods and services of all kinds and across all operational domains and environments. The following description of fields of

activities is non-exclusive and focuses on those most relevant for the synchronization with military activities.

A.9 Civil protection and civil defence. Civil protection is defined as activities undertaken by emergency services to protect populations, properties, infrastructure and the environment from the consequences of natural and technological disasters and other emergencies.

Civil defence is defined as the mobilization, organization and direction of the civil population designed to minimize by passive measures the effects of hostile action against all aspects of civil life.

Both civil protection and civil defence are critical to ensure civil resilience. They lie in the responsibility of NATO member states' or host nations' governments. Under legislation and administrative lead of the states' governments the core tasks are often covered by governmental agencies. In many countries these are partly staffed by voluntary personnel (as e.g. voluntary fire fighters) and often tasks are supported by non-governmental organizations and contracted private sector companies (as e.g. medical rescue or ambulance services).

A.10 Development aid is the financial and technical assistance provided by governments and other organizations to support the long-term development of developing countries. It aims to contribute to stabilization and development of weak states with respect to governance, civil society, economy and welfare. It is important not to confuse development aid with the provision of disaster relief or humanitarian aid.

A.11 Humanitarian aid. NATO defines humanitarian aid as the resources needed to directly alleviate human suffering. Humanitarian assistance in the sense of delivering life-saving assistance and ensuring the provision of basic needs may be provided by governmental organizations and supported by military (in accordance with established humanitarian guidelines). Humanitarian organizations strictly operate under the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence to provide humanitarian aid in form of in-kind assistance and essential services, including protection. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) with its civil-military coordination (UN-CMCoord) function facilitates and enables interaction with such humanitarian organizations. OCHA is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for coordinating humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. While OCHA may be playing an important role in terms of coordinating humanitarian efforts among UN agencies and various NGOs, several neutral and independent humanitarian organizations (such as ICRC or MSF) will not get coordinated by OCHA (in light of their fundamental principles) and will therefore seek to have their respective channel of interaction and coordination mechanism with the military

A.12 Law enforcement agencies²⁹ are important non-military actors. Examples include: police, border police, customs, correction facilities authorities. Depending on host nation legislation, police forces can have civil or military status, e.g. gendarmeries often have military status but are policing the population. Law enforcement agencies are important counterparts and specialists who contribute to security and governance. Police liaison is normally conducted by military police (including gendarmerie type forces) personnel under the direction of the provost marshal. CIMIC personnel must maintain a close relationship with the office of the provost marshal to consider law enforcement agencies, their roles, mandates, limitations, and risks and opportunities they present.

A.13 Defence and dual-use capabilities and services. The production of defence goods relies on the defence industrial base which is partly controlled by governments but to a large extent owned by private sector actors and not under direct control of governments. Recently the importance of dual-use capabilities is rising. New technological developments are largely driven by private sector actors. Especially in space and cyber space the relevance of privately owned enterprises is growing. Outreach and civil-military liaison with non-military actors who can provide emerging and disruptive technologies is a critical component of developing and maintaining operational advantage and freedom of manoeuvre.

²⁹ In case they (e.g. police) have no military status.

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Lexicon

Part 1 – Acronyms and abbreviations

| | |
|----------|--|
| 7BLR | seven baseline requirements |
| ACO | Allied Command Operations |
| ACOS | assistant Chief of Staff |
| ACT | Allied Command Transformation |
| AJP | Allied joint publication |
| ASCOPE | areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events |
| AWNIS | Allied worldwide navigational information system |
| BI | building integrity |
| Bi-SC | of the Strategic Commands |
| CAAC | children and armed conflict |
| CEP | civil emergency planning |
| CIMIC | civil-military cooperation |
| CMI | civil-military interaction |
| C2 | command and control |
| CNMA | complementary non-military actions |
| CULAD | cultural advisor |
| CUOE | comprehensive understanding of the operating environment |
| DDA | Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area |
| CCT | cross-cutting topics |
| CPP | cultural property protection |
| DIRLAUTH | direct liaison authority |
| GENAD | gender advisor |
| HS | human security |
| HQ | headquarters |

| | |
|---------|--|
| HNS | host nation support |
| InfoOps | information operations |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IFRC | International Federation of the Red Cross |
| IO | international organization |
| JALLC | Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre |
| JOA | joint operations area |
| LEGAD | legal advisor |
| LI | lessons identified |
| LL | lessons learned |
| LOAC | law of armed conflict |
| MC | Military Committee |
| MC2HS | Military Contribution to Human Security |
| MloP | military instrument of power |
| NCMP | NATO Crisis Management Process |
| NCS | NATO Command Structure |
| NFS | NATO Force Structure |
| NSC | NATO Shipping Centre |
| NWCC | NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept |
| NCAGS | naval cooperation and guidance for shipping |
| NGO | non-Governmental Organization |
| NAC | North Atlantic Council |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NSO | NATO Standardization Office |
| PoC | protection of civilians |
| PMESII | political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information |
| POLAD | political advisor |

| | |
|------------|---|
| PsyOps | psychological operations |
| RC | Resilience Committee |
| RtCP | resilience through civil preparedness |
| SASE | safe and secure environment |
| StratCom | strategic communications |
| SACT | Supreme Allied Commander Transformation |
| SHAPE | Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe |
| STANAG | standardization agreement |
| UN | United Nations |
| UN-CMCoord | United Nations civil military coordination |
| UNOCHA | United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance |
| WPS | women, peace, and security |

Part 2 - Terms and definitions

civil-military engagement

Civil-military engagement is CMI at the political military level between NATO HQ representatives and nations in support of resilience.

[PO(2021)0264 (CEPC) Policy Guidelines for Enhanced Civil Military Engagement in Support of Resilience (not NATO Agreed)]

comprehensive approach

Combining all available political, military and civilian capabilities, in a concerted effort to attain the desired end state.

(NATO Agreed)

host nation

A country that, by agreement:

- a. receives forces and materiel of NATO member states or other countries operating on/from or transiting through its territory;
- b. allows materiel and/or NATO and other organizations to be located on its territory; and/or
- c. provides support for these purposes.

(NATO Agreed)

host-nation support

Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organizations that are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation's territory.

(NATO Agreed)

humanitarian aid

The resources needed to directly alleviate human suffering.

(NATO Agreed)

humanitarian assistance

As part of an operation, the use of available military resources to assist or complement the efforts of responsible civil actors in the operational area or specialized civil humanitarian organizations in fulfilling their primary responsibility to alleviate human suffering.

(NATO Agreed)

Note: The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs describes humanitarian assistance as aid that seeks to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality, as stated in General Assembly Resolution 46/182. *AJP-4.26 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance* provides further detail on the Alliance's approach.

joint

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations in which elements of at least two services participate.

(NATO Agreed)

joint operations area

A temporary area within a theatre of operations defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint force commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level.

(NATO Agreed)

liaison

The contact, intercommunication and coordination maintained between elements of the military and/or other non-military actors to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.

(NATO Agreed)

multi-domain operations

The orchestration of military activities across all operational domains and environments, synchronized with non-military activities to enable the Alliance to create converging effects at the speed of relevance.

(NATO Agreed)

multinational

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations, in which elements of more than one nation participate.

(NATO Agreed)

operating environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.

(NATO Agreed).

operation

A sequence of coordinated actions with a defined purpose.

(NATO Agreed)

operation plan

A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession.

Notes:

1. It is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders.
2. The designation 'plan' is usually used instead of 'order' in preparing for operations well in advance.
3. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order.

(NATO Agreed)

outreach

An action to establish communication with a community, organization or individuals with the aim of creating opportunities for engagement and/or liaison.

(NATO Agreed)

protection of civilians

All efforts taken to avoid, minimize and mitigate the negative effects that might arise from military operations on the civilian population and, when applicable, to protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence or threats of physical violence by other actors, including through the establishment of a safe and secure environment.

(NATO Agreed)

resilience

The ability of an entity to continue to perform specified functions during and after an attack or an incident.

(NATO Agreed)

safe and secure environment

The surroundings and conditions that are sufficiently protective for long-term security and stability to develop and where the population is served by a functional, legitimate, self-sustaining and resilient government.

(NATO Agreed)

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AJP-3.19(B)(1)