



CIMIC Handbook



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Dear CIMIC Handbook users,

The CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE) has launched the fully revised CIMIC Handbook (CHB) in a convenient online format that you can access from your computer, tablet, or smartphone wherever you are. You can easily access the CHB, keep up to date with the latest information and best practice in CIMIC, and use it online as usual.

We value and welcome your feedback and suggestions to help us improve the CHB. If you have any constructive recommendations, best practices, or new templates that may be useful to others, please contact us at handbook@cimic-coe.org.

Our website, www.cimic-coe.org, contains the latest version of this handbook. You are welcome to use it online or print it as a hard copy.

The purpose of the CHB is to provide guidance on tactical and operational command levels for all personnel involved in CIMIC. It is especially useful for those at the tactical echelon across the entire mission spectrum. The content of the handbook has been adjusted to the rapidly changing operational environment and is grounded in NATO doctrine and the procedural foundations of NATO Command and Force Structure.

Attention has been given to CIMIC's contribution to decision making, planning, and execution. The CHB focuses on the Tactical Planning Process and the role of CIMIC in every step of it. It also briefly introduces CIMIC contribution to the Operational Planning Process.

The CCOE has thoroughly reviewed, updated, and designed all the chapters of the CHB, with direct input from field experience, doctrine, and publications. It is important to note that the CHB is a one-of-a-kind product of the CCOE and not a NATO publication.

I. Introduction

As a member of the CIMIC Staff, whether you are a staff member or a fieldworker, you may be required to undertake missions that involve different types of relationships ranging from cooperation to armed conflict. In such circumstances, you may need to perform specific CIMIC tasks and interact with various military and non-military actors, such as the host nation's (HN) armed forces, public administration, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), the private sector, or the local population. Additionally, you may be tasked with representing your unit at civil-military conferences or as a liaison at multinational and national HQs or crisis response assemblages. This ensures an unrestricted link to the civil sector in support of NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach.

The Handbook includes vignettes that help illustrate the practical application of the concepts and principles outlined in the respective chapter.

Chapter 2 of this handbook provides you with the fundamentals of NATO CIMIC. It is designed to support your doctrinal knowledge and to make you aware of the context in which CIMIC, as a Joint Function must be understood. The comprehensive approach is described as one of the key tenets of NATO CIMIC, and the Joint Function Framework is introduced to

ensure your understanding of all Joint Functions and the role of CIMIC within this framework. This chapter also clarifies the distinction between the Joint Function CIMIC and the staff function CIMIC by explaining their core activities. While this chapter may be seen as high-level doctrine, CIMIC operators need to understand that CIMIC as a joint function is crucial for their task, even at the lowest tactical level. Therefore, this chapter also highlights cooperation with the staff and HQ and the integration and interaction with other internal branches. Furthermore, this chapter points out the CIMIC contribution to non-NATO military organisations such as UN forces and CIMIC relationships with US Civil Affairs (CA). It will help you figure out distinctions and similarities, different approaches, divergences, and different ambitions.

The CIMIC contribution to operations across all domains and tactical activities is covered in Chapter 3.

Chapter 4 describes the various relevant actors and their principles. It identifies the responsibilities of (non-military) actors within their areas of expertise.

Chapter 5 describes the step-by-step contribution of the operational and tactical planning process, highlighting the role of the CIMIC Staff. This chapter focuses on the proactive contribution of the CIMIC Staff in the tactical planning process and the key outcomes of each step.

Chapter 6 covers the military's role in human security and the Cross-Cutting Topics (CCT). The CCTs cover various topics that could impact the mission in different ways but are not the military's main responsibilities. Consideration of the CCT is an HQ-wide responsibility. However, you may often be responsible for it.

Chapter 7 deals with resilience. It focuses on layered resilience, resilience through civil preparedness, and the seven baseline requirements.

Chapters 8 contain templates, sketches, and reports that can be helpful in your daily work, training, exercises and missions.

The CIMIC Handbook is an ever-evolving resource. It is guided by practicality, aiming to closing accessibility and availability gaps where they appear. Its doctrinal underpinnings currently undergo significant changes: the document landscape is expected to bridge several gaps in 2027. Also, the role of civil-military synchronisation in a Multi-Domain Operations context will be a focus. The next update of the Handbook will reflect these key developments. This will ensure that the Handbook will continue to serve its purpose: providing a carefully designed guide to help fill those gaps that require immediate attention with actionable content.

II. Fundamentals

Executive Summary

This chapter outlines the **fundamental concepts, principles, and organizational integration of NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)** within military operations. CIMIC is a joint military function that enables effective coordination between military forces and civilian actors to support mission objectives across peacetime, crises, and conflict environments. By integrating civil factors into military planning and decision-making, CIMIC enhances the Alliance's ability to operate within complex operating environments and achieve strategic objectives.

Purpose and Role of CIMIC

CIMIC supports NATO's comprehensive approach by synchronizing military and non-military actions. It focuses on understanding the **civil dimension of the operating environment**, which includes political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information systems (PMESII). Through analysis of these systems and engagement with civilian actors, CIMIC contributes to a comprehensive understanding of the operating environment and helps commanders plan and conduct operations more effectively.

Behaviour-Centric and Comprehensive Approaches

NATO doctrine emphasizes a **behaviour-centric approach**, recognizing that the attitudes and behaviours of individuals, groups, and institutions influence mission outcomes. CIMIC analyses the behaviour of actors, stakeholders, and the public to understand their potential impact on operations and to promote supportive attitudes toward NATO activities.

The **comprehensive approach** integrates military, diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power. Since military power alone cannot achieve the desired end state, CIMIC facilitates cooperation with civilian institutions and organizations to align efforts and maximize the effectiveness of all available capabilities.

Key CIMIC Principles

CIMIC activities are guided by several fundamental principles:

- **Respect for Host Nation sovereignty** and adherence to local authority.
- **Civil primacy in non-military tasks**, ensuring civilian authorities lead where appropriate.
- **Understanding and respecting the autonomy of non-military actors**, including NGOs and international organizations.
- **Maintaining a clear distinction between military and humanitarian actors** to protect neutrality.
- **Proactive interaction and relationship-building** with relevant civilian stakeholders based on transparency, trust, and mutual respect.

Interaction with non-military actors may occur at different levels ranging from **integration and cooperation to coordination, deconfliction, consultation, and coexistence**, depending on operational requirements and relationships.

CIMIC within the Joint Function Framework

Within NATO's operational framework, CIMIC functions alongside other joint functions such as manoeuvre, fires, information, intelligence, sustainment, and force protection. It contributes to operational success by:

- Improving understanding of the **civil factors of the operating environment**
- Supporting communication and credibility with non-military actors
- Integrating civil considerations into planning and execution of operations

Core CIMIC Activities

CIMIC consists of two primary core activities:

1. **Civil Factor Integration (CFI)**
 - Identifies, analyses, and assesses civil factors within the operating environment.
 - Supports the decision-making process and operational planning through the CIMIC estimate process.
 - Evaluates the impact of military operations on civilian populations and vice versa.
2. **Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)**
 - Facilitates engagement and communication between NATO forces and non-military actors.
 - Includes outreach, liaison, consultation, collaboration, and coordination.
 - Supports synchronization of military and civilian activities and promotes mutual understanding.

Integration within Headquarters and Staff Processes

CIMIC is fully integrated within NATO headquarters structures, particularly through the **J9 branch**, and participates in cross-functional planning and operational processes. It collaborates closely with other staff branches (J1–J10), contributing civil insights to intelligence, operations, planning, logistics, communications, and training functions.

Conclusion

CIMIC is a critical enabler of NATO operations, bridging the military and civilian domains. By integrating civil factors, fostering relationships with non-military actors, and supporting a comprehensive approach to security, CIMIC enhances operational effectiveness and contributes to achieving sustainable strategic outcomes.

2.1. NATO CIMIC

Civil-military cooperation. At the military-strategic, operational and tactical level, the Alliance ensures the efficient synchronization between the instruments of power by applying a comprehensive approach in which CIMIC plays a key role in synchronizing military and non-military activities by establishing liaison with relevant non-military actors and integrating the civil factors into the military understanding. CIMIC is defined as: “**A military joint function that integrates the understanding of the civil factors of the operating environment, and that enables, facilitates and conducts civil-military interaction to support the accomplishment of missions and military strategic objectives in peacetime, crisis and conflict.**”^[1] CIMIC is an integral part of all NATO core tasks. Its principles and core activities apply to all campaign themes, types of operations, vigilance activities, and command levels.

Understanding of the operating environment. The operating environment is the context of a mission and includes all the elements, conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect a commander’s decision making. The operating environment can be seen as a global set of complex, dynamic and interrelated networks comprising political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information (PMESII) systems, each exerting pressure and influence on the others. Understanding the nature and interaction of these systems as part of mission analysis - providing a comprehensive understanding of the operating environment - helps commanders to define their engagement space^[2] and affects how they plan and conduct joint actions within this space. CIMIC contributes to a comprehensive understanding of the operating environment (CUOE) by identifying, analysing, and assessing civil factors.

2.1.1. Behaviour-centric approach and Comprehensive Approach

Introduction. The key tenets (principles) of NATO doctrine are: behaviour-centric approach; manoeuvrist approach; the comprehensive approach; and mission command, which together guide commanders’ thinking. CIMIC is fundamental in applying the comprehensive approach and the behaviour-centric approach.

These two approaches are defined as follows:

Behaviour-centric approach^[3]. The behaviour-centric approach recognises that people, with their behaviour and attitudes are central for achieving the end state. For this reason, the behaviour-centric approach focuses on changing people’s attitudes and behaviour. It categorizes people and groups within **audiences** into:

- 1) **Actors**, who perform actions affecting the end state,
- 2) **Stakeholders**, who can affect or are affected by the attainment of the end state, and,
- 3) The **public**, which is aware of activities which may affect the end state.

All audiences have attitudes ranging from friendly through supportive, neutral, unsupportive to hostile. In addition, actors can be categorized as Alliance, partner, neutral, rival, adversary and enemy (see Fig. 2.1).




Figure 2.1 - Audiences in the operating environment^[4]

For CIMIC, it is crucial to analyse the behaviour and attitude of non-military audiences (actors, stakeholders, and public) and to assess their potential to affect (positively and negatively) their own capabilities, actions, effects, and objectives. CIMIC identifies relevant non-military actors and stakeholders and assesses how far they can be motivated to integrate or synchronize their capabilities, capacities and resources with own military operations and activities. Vice versa, it has to be assessed if military capabilities can contribute to the objectives of non-military actors relevant to the comprehensive approach. CIMIC aims to develop or maintain non-military actors' supportive attitudes towards NATO, ideally creating partnerships.

Comprehensive approach. NATO's member nations' instruments of power include military, diplomacy, information and economic. A comprehensive approach combines all available political, military and civilian capabilities, in a concerted effort to attain the desired end state. The military instrument, upon tasking, will work towards the end state by pursuing military strategic objectives. However, the military instrument of power (MIOp) alone cannot achieve the end state. The comprehensive approach strives to optimize the synchronization of political, military and civilian capabilities.^[5]

2.1.2. NATO CIMIC principles

Applying a comprehensive approach requires commanders, their headquarters, and forces to understand the motivations, culture, and principles of friendly, neutral, adverse, and potentially hostile non-military actors. In order to promote unity of purpose, they have to invest in building trust and relationships with friendly and neutral non-military actors based on cultural awareness, seeking common goals, and being transparent, open and consistent in their communication.

Leading principles for CIMIC are:

Sovereignty of HNs. Sovereignty is the right of a government to have complete control over its area. Foreign forces in NATO HNs must adhere to local guidelines and directions given by (local) government and military institutions. For example, before planning a staging area for a unit, the local government institutions should be consulted and asked for permission, usually through military-to-military liaison.

Civil primacy for non-military tasks. Civil primacy means that the civil government or civil services are first responsible for non-military tasks. For example, when a public road is unusable for military use, it is the responsibility of the authorities to do something about it. In case of a lack of road maintenance capability, the military might facilitate, support or completely make the road usable for military means after consultation with civil authorities.

Understanding of non-military actors and respecting their autonomy in decision-making. Especially knowing about their objectives and strategies as a part of accomplishing the mission is crucial. This understanding should include the objectives structures and mindset of both informal and formal actors.

Clear distinction between the role and function of military actors and non-military actors, especially those operating under humanitarian principles.

To prevent non-military actors from becoming targets, it is important to ensure a clear distinction between military and non-military actors. IOs and NGOs working under humanitarian principles, which are explained in the chapter relevant actors.

Proactive interaction with all relevant non-military actors, activities and operations active in the AOR is key to identifying capabilities contributing to the accomplishment of the mission. Commanders in particular must maintain continuous and effective communication with their correspondent non-military counterparts at local, regional, national and international levels.

Interaction based upon mutual respect, knowledge of respective roles, trust and transparency. Institutional understanding, credibility and reliability are key.

Levels of interaction with non-military actors

Relationships between military and non-military actors are formed and influenced by the autonomy of each actor and cannot be compared to military command and control authority; therefore, different levels of interaction apply. There is no common agreement on these terms; non-military actors may use them interchangeably or with different meanings. However, these descriptions are provided as a baseline for common understanding. Levels of interaction range from integration to coexistence:




Figure 2.1.1 – Level of Interaction

Integration can be described as the process of operating together to achieve a unified end state. Integration represents the maximum level of interaction between two actors, which implies working to plan and execute mutual actions within a common engagement space. For example, civil and military authorities form an integrated staff to plan and synchronize military and non-military activities to plan a military operation and mitigate the impact on civil society.

Cooperation is the process of acting together for mutual benefit. It involves working in harmony, side by side and implies an association between actors. Cooperation is a concept of interaction in which planning and activities are carried out jointly and/or in support of each other. Cooperation with other actors does not mean giving up authority and autonomy or becoming subordinated to the direction of others. For example, where Civil Defence staff personnel and Military Staff plan to work together through a form of liaison arrangements and plan a military operation and the evacuation of civilians together in one (or two simultaneous) planning processes so the activities.

Coordination is the process of bringing together different elements of a complex activity or organisation into an efficient relationship. Defined relationships may foster harmony and reduce friction among the participants. Coordination activities include exchanging information, agreeing on joint policies and actions, and harmonizing individual activities. An example of coordination is the UN Cluster Approach, in which stakeholders on different humanitarian topics come together to coordinate.

De-confliction is the process of avoiding undesirable interference among actors, especially where they perform the same function or occupy the same physical space. This could be done through liaison exchange or setting up meetings when an interfering actor is identified during the planning process. For example, a deconfliction with a non-military actor when freedom of movement is hindered through rerouting internally displaced person (IDP) movements.

Consultation seeks the opinion or advice of other actors, which may include the exchange of information and discussion.

Coexistence is the state or condition of existing at the same time or place. Two or more actors may be aware of each other's presence but will not directly interact because there is no need to.

[1] NATO Agreed, 2022-08-04

[2] Engagement space: the part of the operating environment where actions and activities are planned and conducted (NATO Agreed, 2022-03-02).

[3] See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(F) *Allied Joint Doctrine* 4.4 for more detail.

[4] See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(F), *Allied Joint Doctrine*, Chapter 4.

[5] See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(F) *Allied Joint Doctrine* 4.22- 4.24 for more detail.

2.2. CIMIC within the Joint Function Framework

General. To be successful, commanders and their staff should develop and maintain situational awareness, balance ends and means, determine ways, and orchestrate and direct actions and capabilities using conceptual frameworks to aid understanding and design operations. They include Analytical (uses PMESII), Operations (uses Shape, Decisive and Support), Functional (uses Find, Fix and Strike) and Geographical (uses Deep, Close and Rear) frameworks.

The joint function framework assists commanders in integrating political, military and civilian actions through the operational domains. In all NATO activities and operations, these joint functions are to be considered, although the individual functions' contributions, significance and demands will vary. The joint function framework combines manoeuvre, fires, information and CIMIC to create effects. It is informed and directed by the joint functions of command and control and intelligence, and supported by the joint functions of sustainment and force protection.




Figure 2.2 - The Joint Function Framework

All Joint Actions are enhanced by combining the Joint Functions to create converging effects. The CIMIC core activities Civil Factor integration (CFI) and Civil-military interaction (CMI) support joint action by synchronizing military and non-military actions. The interdependencies of CIMIC and the other Joint Functions can be found in AJP 3.19.

The Joint Function CIMIC plays a crucial role in understanding the human environment and the overall operating environment. Through civil-military interaction (CMI), CIMIC can improve communication with non-military actors and build mutual credibility. Additionally, by integrating civil factors (CFI), the Joint Function CIMIC, together with the Joint Functions of Intelligence and Information, further contributes to a comprehensive understanding of the operating environment. See Figure 2.3.




Figure 2.3 - Joint Functions contributions to CUOE

2.3. CIMIC core activities

The joint function CIMIC comprises two core activities, both **Civil Factor integration (CFI)** and **Civil-Military interaction (CMI)** support the accomplishment of missions and military objectives.

The CIMIC core activities are defined as follows:

-CFI encompasses the identification, analysis, and assessment of civil factors of the operating environment in order to contribute to the decision-making process (DMP).

-CMI is defined as “activities between military NATO bodies and non-military actors to foster mutual understanding that enhance effectiveness and efficiency in crisis management and conflict prevention and resolution.”

Figure 2.4 CIMIC core activities shows the independencies of the two core activities and their relation to the joint function CIMIC.




Figure 2.4 - CIMIC core activities

2.3.1. Civil factor integration

CFI utilizes frameworks such as the PMESII/ ASCOPE to organize collected data on the civil factors of the operating environment. CFI plays a fundamental role in the CUOE and aims to display, integrate, and analyse civil factors that influence the development of the OPLAN and the conduct of the operation. Conversely, it is applicable to nearly all phases in the tactical and operational planning processes. It is crucial to understand that there are preconditions necessary to enable CFI through planning and operation. All available data (facts) must be analysed and assessed, and conclusions must be drawn from the assessment. This is ensured through the CIMIC estimate process.




Figure 2.4.1. - Civil factor integration terminology

The **CIMIC estimate** is a continuous process executed by CIMIC Staff. It creates the basis for contribution to staff processes and products and serves as a fundamental repository of data, information, and products concerning the civil factors of the operating environment. Tools for this estimate can be found in Chapter 8.4.5.

Civil factor integration Staff activities include:

Identify and facilitate (support) complementary non-military actions (CNMA), e.g. facilitate the access to basic needs (FABN) or mine clearance conducted by the private sector.

Identify, analyse, and assess civil factors having a critical impact on the planning and conduct of activities and operations, creating the necessary understanding as a contribution to CUOE.

Identify and assess the impact of military activities and operations on non-military audiences. Identify, analyse, and assess civil factors relevant to MC2HS and CCTs.

Identify, analyse, and assess the impact of non-military activities on own activities and operations.

Identify shortfalls in resilience requirements^[1] to anticipate potential negative impacts on military activities and operations.

Advise on synchronizing military and non-military activities to create converging effects and on mitigating the negative consequences of military activities.

Develop the CIMIC concept of operation (typically Annex W to plans).

Establish mechanisms to share information with non-military actors.
Assess requests from non-military actors for military support.

2.3.2. Civil-military interaction

General. CMI includes the activities of outreach, engagement with non-military actors and stakeholders, civil-military liaison, and consultation and collaboration with non-military actors and stakeholders. None of the activities is isolated; they are connected to each other and represent a certain stage of interaction with actors.




Figure 2.3-CMI

Outreach activities establish communication with individuals, organisations or communities, with the aim of creating opportunities for engagement and civil-military liaison.

Engagement with non-military actors: This activity reflects any form of (human) interaction aimed at delivering influential messages in support of the overall campaign objectives. Be aware that Engagement with non-military actors constitutes a CIMIC activity under the scope and direction of the joint function information and, therefore, has to be coordinated within the staff.

Consultation and collaboration^[2] with non-military actors and stakeholders are conducted to complement military and non-military capabilities and synchronize activities.

Civil-military liaison

Civil-military liaison is based on unity of purpose and continuity and strives for synchronization of actions at all levels to ensure efficient use of resources. It is a specialized form of CMI that requires training and education to interact appropriately with non-military actors.

Types of civil-military liaison:

- 1) Institutionalized, sustained relationships^[3];
- 2) Interaction for education, training, exercises and evaluation;
- 3) Liaison in the context of operations and activities.

Civil-military liaison arrangements are based on several considerations such as the intended or agreed level of interaction, the availability of liaison capabilities and capacities, geographical settings, and the security situation, the security risks that exist for non-military actors if they are perceived as being too closely associated with NATO.




Figure 4.3 - Civil-military liaison arrangements

- 1) **Co-location** of military and non-military actors' staff elements facilitates high levels of interaction.
- 2) **Liaison exchange** through the exchange of liaison staff enables a near real time exchange of information and coordination.
- 3) **Liaison visits** may be scheduled regularly or conducted on an ad-hoc basis.
- 4) **National Systems** may be required where sovereignty considerations do not allow direct liaison between NATO forces and non-military actors (e.g., in sovereign NATO-countries during a NATO Art.5 operation). In such cases, necessary interaction will be channelled through a HN military actor.
- 5) **Mechanisms and platforms** that facilitate liaison encompass regular meeting formats, coordination mechanisms, permanent or temporary fora, platforms, boards or coordination centres^[4].
- 6) **Third party interlocutors** facilitate the exchange of information in cases where political or security considerations demand physical distance or clear distinction.

CIMIC Staff activities that enable CMI include:

- 1) Identification of non-military actors;
- 2) Development and maintenance of a liaison network;
- 3) Establishment of communication mechanisms;
- 4) Education and training on CMI;

- 5) Advising on the appropriate level of interaction and CMI arrangements;
- 6) Advising staff specialists to interact with non-military actors.

CIMIC Staff activities that facilitate CMI include:

- 1) Introduction of non-military actors to military counterparts at the appropriate level;
- 2) Initiation of first access/contact to non-military actors;
- 3) Creation of platforms and mechanisms supporting conduct of CMI – if required;
- 4) Assisting in negotiations in sensitive areas of CMI conducted by commander and their staff.

CIMIC Staff activities during conduct of CMI include:

- 1) Sharing of information;
- 2) Collection of civil factor data and information;
- 3) Contribution to developing procedures to process civil requests for support;
- 4) Civil-military planning and synchronization of activities, actions and operations, applying defined measures of performance and measures of effectiveness;
- 5) Integration and synchronization of CNMA in peacetime vigilance activities and operations;
- 6) Monitoring and assessment of impacts and effects of civil and civil-military activities;
- 7) Promotion of force acceptance and transparency;
- 8) Contribution to strategic communications (STRATCOM).

[1] As described by the seven baseline requirements (7BLR), see chapter 7

[2] Consultation: The functions and responsibilities of civilian and military authorities at political, strategic, operational and tactical levels for making decisions, planning, coordinating and directing resources, and conducting actions or operations for the accomplishment of an organization's missions and objectives. (AAP-31). For details on consultation and collaboration see the *Initial Alliance Multi-Domain Operations Concept*.

[3] Based on formal agreements (e.g. with ICRC and the UN).

[4] Examples for permanent centres are NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), the European Union's Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC). An example for a temporary regional platforms are On-Site Operational

Coordination Centres (OSOCC) or the UN-Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (UN-OCHA) Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) framework.

2.4. Integration in the HQ

CIMIC is fully integrated into the respective HQ's operations; this includes representation in key multi-disciplinary/ cross-functional groups as part of the overall battle rhythm and through normal inter-relationships for managing/dealing with operational working. Figure "CIMIC Branch working structure" shows the broad interaction in a higher tactical (joint) staff between the J9 branch and internal working groups within the battle rhythm.




Figure 2.4 - CIMIC Branch Working Structure (Example Joint HQ)

2.4.1. Cooperation with the Staff/ HQ

Strategic communications

StratCom effects must be integrated into planning and execution of CIMIC activities at all levels because they influence the perceptions and decision-making of key audiences and leaders, thereby assisting mission accomplishment. To ensure coherence of messaging, CIMIC Staff should participate in the communication planning cycle, including the StratCom working group (only at the operational or strategic level) and the information activities coordination board, alongside more routine public affairs and StratCom coordination meetings.

Information operations

CIMIC is not in charge of these activities but assists the commander in shaping the information environment and perceptions. In addition to civil-military liaison, CIMIC Staff will establish relationships with various non-military actors and thereby establish a valuable source of information to support Info Ops planning. To secure the desired influence, planned and regular key leader engagement will be essential.

Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence

Local civilian authorities are responsible for dealing with (CBRN) incidents within their jurisdiction, but they may request military assistance if their resources are inadequate. CIMIC should facilitate the coordination between its own forces and the stakeholders involved.

Electronic warfare

The broad and increasing usage of the electromagnetic environment (EME) by different types of actors affects critical infrastructure. Examples of electronic warfare include the detection and jamming of drones, improvised explosive device jammers and the use of jamming systems for cellular and Wi-Fi communications. It is, therefore, critical to coordinate one's own activities with various actors, friendly or neutral, to avoid or minimise undesired effects. CIMIC can have a facilitating function.

2.4.2. CIMIC integration and interaction with internal branches

The list below reflects other possible staff functions related to the branches J1 – J 10, and is not exhaustive.

J/X1: Terms and conditions of service for locally employed civilians. Identification and provision of specialist staffing (e.g. linguists). Responsible for organizing functional specialists.

J/X2: Input to developing ICP: J2 may use information derived from the CIMIC process. Cooperation between J2 and J9 is crucial to enhancing Situational Awareness and achieving Situational Understanding according to the CUOE.

J/X3: Active involvement in the conduct of current operations. Accounting for the effect of current operations on the civil environment, particularly the population. Awareness of the impact of the civil environment on own operations. Inclusion of civil factors in short-term planning.

J/X4: Usage of lines of communication and de-confliction with civil usage. HN support/ civil-military resource management.

J/X5: Integration of CIMIC into long-term plans, both before an operation and in the execution phase (e.g. branch/ sequel plans, transition planning).

J/X6: Involvement in planning external (civilian) telecommunication networks and infrastructure usage and for example, establishing first contacts with non-military net providers. Assessment of the impacts on the civil environment caused by military communication means.

J/X7: CIMIC Staff should facilitate the training interaction between military and relevant non-military actors. The commander must balance the requirements for training efforts in support of operations and assistance to non-military actors.

J/X10: CIMIC Staff must ensure Coordination on Engagement with non-military actors and coordinate effects to achieve in the cognitive dimension and integrate the informational narrative.

Staff Advisory Group

The Staff Advisory Group (SAG) contributes to a comprehensive approach, conducting civil-military interaction routinely and having direct or indirect links, relationships and need for coordination with CIMIC Staff. Close relations are essential to get a deep Situational Understanding. Members of a SAG can include but are not limited to:

- political advisor
- legal advisor
- gender advisor
- medical advisor
- provost marshal
- special operations forces advisor
- StratCom advisor
- public affairs advisor
- cultural advisor

2.4.3. Battle Management Systems & Use of Artificial Intelligence

Battle management systems (BMS) are advanced software applications that facilitate the planning, coordinating, and executing military operations. These systems integrate various data sources, such as sensor inputs, intelligence reports, and communication networks, to provide commanders with comprehensive situational awareness and decision-making support. BMS enable real-time tracking of friendly and enemy forces, enables communication and information sharing among units, and assists in allocating and managing resources. They are crucial in enhancing operational efficiency, command and control, and overall mission effectiveness.




Figure 2.4.3 - BMS SITAWARE (S2/ S3 Layer)

CIMIC personnel must be familiar with the specific type of BMS used by the supported unit. This system isn't only utilized in the TOC/ JOC and facilitates the preparation and execution of briefings and working groups. To save time, CIMIC Staff should conduct their own training on the BMS before being deployed to a tactical or operational HQ. All team members must be well versed in using the system. Ensure that your products, particularly those generated from the CIMIC Estimate, are compatible with the structure of the BMS. Any PowerPoint slides that do not conform to this structure will be useless. To ensure that the correct formats are being used, refer to the HQ's Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

2.5. Other Actors

2.5.1. United Nations

The United Nations (UN) is an international organisation (IO). The UN is involved in peacekeeping and political missions and may, therefore, operate in theatres similar to those of NATO. The UN System comprises a multitude of principal organs, programs and funds, specialised independent agencies, departments and offices. The primary responsibility of the UN Security Council is to maintain international peace and security. The General Assembly and the Secretary-General, along with other UN offices and bodies, play important and complementary roles.

DEPARTMENTS OF POLITICAL AND PEACEBUILDING AFFAIRS AND PEACE OPERATIONS



Figure 2.5 - UN Framework for the UN Peace Building and Peace Keeping

2.5.2. UN CIMIC

UN CIMIC personnel are responsible for conducting the following core tasks:

- Development of a current and accurate comprehensive civilian operational picture.
- UN-CIMIC supports the establishment and maintenance of a coherent, real-time, operational understanding of the civilian situation in the mission area to support the mission's planning and operations efforts.
- Provide analysis, early warning, risk, and threat assessment of the civil operating environment.
- Contribute to the overall planning effort in close collaboration with the relevant military branches, UN Police(UNPOL), mission components, and integrated mission partners.
- Identify risks and opportunities. Provide mission leadership with an enhanced understanding of trends and changes in the civilian operational landscape and associated risks and opportunities with respect to the safety and security of HN civilians. Furthermore, related in-mission training requirements can be developed based on identified gaps and needs.
- Coordinate and liaise to share, gather, verify and analyse information on the civilian operational environment

UN CIMIC is a military staff function, primarily operated by the UN CIMIC military staff. Its purpose is to facilitate communication and coordination between all the UN parties involved in the mission, including civilian and military components, to achieve the aims set forth. While some tasks may differ between the UN military and civilian entities of the UN mission, coordination is crucial to increase the effectiveness of the separated areas of responsibilities. Interaction is also open to non-UN bodies.

2.5.3. UN-CMCoord

The UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) is a civilian function, led by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) and operated by the UN civilian staff, of establishing dialogue to achieve all the aims described below. The interaction is more focused on external UN bodies (non-UN bodies), such as local Governmental authorities, national and international humanitarian organizations, and international and national military and security forces parties. Coordination is crucial to always increase the effectiveness of the separated area of responsibilities and to increase the effectiveness of the separated area of responsibilities, to reach common stability in the area. Please note that some tasks to protect and promote humanitarian principles are belonging to the UN civilians but also to the military, specifically if we are operating in the same UN mission and/or working in the CIMIC domain approaching the civil dimension.

UN-CMCoord aims to protect and promote humanitarian principles.

Humanitarian organisations, State security forces and non-state armed groups increasingly operate in the same space in emergencies, whether caused by conflict, extreme weather events or other human-made disasters.

Effective dialogue between these entities is critical to obtaining and maintaining humanitarian access to people in need and ensure their protection.

UN-CMCoord formalizes this essential dialogue and interaction to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals.

This interaction ranges from coexistence to cooperation. Good coordination between the humanitarian community and the military requires information sharing and a clear sense of the division of tasks.

UN-CMCoord can also help to reduce the risk of misunderstanding or conflict between military and civilian personnel and ensure that humanitarian assistance is provided in a way that is coordinated and consistent with international humanitarian law.

Documents/ websites available:

–[Humanitarian//Military Dialogue website](#).

–[Recommended Practices for Effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination of Foreign Military Assets \(FMA\) in Natural and Man-Made Disasters](#).

–UN-CMCoord [Guide for the Military 2.0](#).

–[IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the “Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys.”](#)

–[Guidelines On the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies](#).

–[Oslo Guidelines on The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief](#).

–[OCHA on Message: Civil-Military Coordination](#).

–United Nations [Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination \(UN-CMCoord\) eCourse](#).

–<https://auth.humanitarian.id/>

–<https://reliefweb.int/>

–<https://data.humdata.org/>

–<https://gdacs.org/>

–<https://www.acaps.org/en/>

–<https://www.kobotoolbox.org/>

The Cluster Approach is used for coordinating in humanitarian emergencies. NGOs may be unwilling to interact with the military, but they are still required to communicate with the UN cluster. This makes it easier for CIMIC personnel to identify those who may not be willing to work with them. Humanitarian organisations have agreed to lead certain clusters at the global level and have defined a cluster structure for humanitarian responses at the country level, where cluster leadership should ideally mirror global arrangements. Clusters are often co-led with the government and/or co-chaired with NGO partners.

The cluster system spreads accountability for the delivery of services (health, shelter, etc.) across different cluster lead agencies so that no single agency is accountable for the entire response. In each country’s situation, overall accountability for coordination and delivery rests with the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC).

Clusters are groups of humanitarian UN and non-UN organisations in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action (water, health, shelter, logistics, etc.). The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) designates them and have clear responsibilities for coordination; they are time-bound bodies that are meant to fill a temporary gap. They aim to build the capacity of the national systems to respond to humanitarian situations with a protection and accountability lens and progressively hand over coordination to national and local entities.

Global Cluster Lead Agencies




Figure 2.5 – UN Cluster Approach

All clusters have lead organisations, known as Cluster Lead Agencies, which operate at the global and country levels.

At the country level, the HC leads inter-agency cluster-based responses through the Cluster Lead Agencies.

2.6. US Civil Affairs

US Civil Affairs (CA) are designated active component and reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct CA Operations (CAO) and to support Civil-Military Operations (CMO). US Civil Affairs forces conduct missions worldwide in support of their role in the Combatant Commander's interface to the civil component of the operational environment. The role of CA is to engage and leverage the civil component of the operational environment while enhancing, enabling, or providing governance throughout the spectrum of competition. CA forces are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to plan and execute Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). Across a range of military operations, CA forces conduct CAO to engage and leverage people, organizations, and capabilities to enhance, enable, or provide governance, increase situational understanding, identify and defeat threats within the civil component, and consolidate gains. Senior-level CA planning and policy representation across the army and DOD agencies promote proper integration of civil considerations into the planning process and early determination of requirements.

2.6.1. US Civil Affairs Fundamentals

Civil Affairs Operations are those planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of and manage interaction with the civil component of the operational environment, identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society, and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. US Army CA executes Civil Affairs Operations through four core competencies: (1) Civil Knowledge Integration, (2) Civil-Military Integration, (3) Civil Network Development and Engagement, and (4) Civil-Military Integration. For core competencies, refer to the diagram.




Figure 2.6 – Civil Affairs Operations

Civil Affairs Missions

Civil Affairs formations are trained to conduct missions in Civil Reconnaissance, Civil Engagement, Civil Network Development, Civil Information Evaluation, Establish a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), Support to Civil Administration, and Transitional Military Authority.

Civil Affairs products

CA personnel are trained to source and prepare civil information products to inform the planning process and enhance understanding of civil considerations. CA personnel prepare area studies, conduct assessments, conduct civil reconnaissance, and create and maintain running estimates to assist in the planning and updating mission plans across the range of military operations. These products develop and update the understanding of the civil component for the commander's common operational picture. Through Civil Knowledge Integration, CA personnel develop the understanding of civil considerations relevant to the Warfighting Functions. The information and material contained within these products are critical for the commander's and staff's situational understanding and the formation of the commander's vision for the operational environment, including:

1. impacts of the populace on military operations,
2. impacts of military operations on the populace,
3. development of courses of action,
4. development of branches and sequels,
5. completion of objectives, goals, and milestones,
6. facilitation of the transition of army operations,
7. identification and reinforcement efforts to consolidate gains and
8. information requirements that drive and focus the civil information collection plan.

Civil Affairs assessments

CA assessments provide a precise means to gather meaningful and significant information. CA soldiers perform three basic types of assessments – the initial assessment, the deliberate assessment, and the survey. Gathering information should not be a haphazard process. Each type of assessment is based on the information and analysis of the previous type. In addition, each type of assessment in the progression becomes more focused, specific, and detailed with an ultimate goal of identifying civil vulnerabilities that pose a threat to the successful and timely completion of the mission. This task must have a well-formed, practical plan as with all military missions.

2.6.2. US Civil Affairs and NATO CIMIC

US Civil Affairs and NATO CIMIC both address the civil-military interface and the civil component of the operational environment as a military capability. CA and CIMIC forces perform a number of common tasks, including:

1. Open source information collection and analysis
2. Civil Reconnaissance
3. Civil Engagements
4. Reporting

NATO CIMIC and US CA have a long history of cooperation and mutual support. CIMIC and US CA both serve as the eyes and ears of the supported command to understand the civil factors of the operating environment. Both CA and CIMIC share common activities:

- Assessing and understanding civil dynamics and the operational environment
- Interacting with civilian stakeholders
- Advising and facilitating military commanders and decision-making

US CA and NATO CIMIC comparison

US CIVIL AFFAIRS

Civil reconnaissance

Civil engagement

Civil information evaluation

Civil-military operations centre

Military staff support

Support to civil administration

NATO CIMIC

Civil reconnaissance

Civil engagement

Civil factor analysis

CIMIC centre

Military staff support

CIMIC functional specialists

During Counterinsurgency and Crisis Response operations, CIMIC and CA mutually focused winning and maintaining legitimacy within the civilian population to contribute to promote stability and influence successful mission outcomes. In a threat landscape dominated by peer and near-peer threats, CIMIC and CA are focus on analysing and assessing the influence of the civil environment on military operations and the civil considerations that influence mission success. In each case, CIMIC and CA are military capabilities responsive to military commanders. CIMIC and CA make crucial contributions to battlespace management and the civil considerations influential to the supported commanders' area of responsibility, to the Preparation of the Operational Environment, and the Common Operating Picture (COP). Both perform Civil Reconnaissance and Civil Engagements. At higher echelons, S/G/J9 personnel attend and contribute to key boards and working groups within the headquarters' battle rhythm.

III. CIMIC in Operations

Executive Summary Chapter III CIMIC in Operations

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is a joint function within NATO operations and is applied across all types of missions, ranging from peacetime engagement to high-intensity warfare. Its main purpose is to coordinate military forces with civilian actors in order to support mission objectives as a main effort and minimize negative impacts on the civilian environment.

1. Operational Context and Key Factors

Operations are divided into different themes: warfighting (high intensity), security (below the threshold of armed conflict), and peace support (low levels of violence). CIMIC must adapt to each context. Its effectiveness is shaped by several factors:

Level and lethality of force

Operational tempo (speed of operations)

Capacity and capability of civilian actors (e.g., host nation)

Availability of military resources

Complexity of battlespace management

These factors determine how CIMIC can operate in different environments.

2. CIMIC in the Battlespace

The battlespace is divided into three areas:

Deep: difficult to access; focus on gathering information (e.g., population, infrastructure)

Close: main operational area; focus on stabilizing the environment and protecting civilians

Rear: more secure area; focus on coordination, logistics, and support

CIMIC units mainly operate in rear areas but must consider information from all areas. Coordination with civilian authorities and organizations in all areas is essential to achieve the mission objective.

3. Support in Offensive and Defensive Operations

Offensive operations (attack):

Highly dynamic with limited time. CIMIC primarily provides information to support freedom of manoeuvre and reduce harm to civilians. Major challenges include uncontrolled population movements and weak or absent civilian structures.

Defensive operations (defence):

More structured and predictable. There is usually strong involvement of the host nation. Key tasks include support of evacuation planning, protection of critical infrastructure, cultural property and heritage and population control.

4. Stability Operations

Stability Operations aims to establish a safe and secure environment in the Area of Operation it often requires a direct communication with NGOs, IOs and civilian authorities. CIMIC facilitate this communication and facilitate military support as a last resort these actors lack capacity. A key framework is the 7 Baseline Requirements (7BLR) which is described in Chapter 7.

In practice, the focus is often on the most urgent needs such as food, water, medical care, shelter, and protection.

Key Takeaway

CIMIC is an essential link between military forces and the civilian environment. It enhances operational effectiveness, reduces harm to civilians, and supports long-term stability, especially in complex and multi-domain operations

3.1. Operation themes

The joint function CIMIC is applied across all NATO core tasks, campaign/operations themes, operational domains, and tactical operations and activities. To support the CIMIC joint function, any NATO force is doctrinally enabled with CIMIC capabilities.

This chapter focuses on land tactical activities in warfighting. The tactical principles and procedures can then be adjusted and applied in less violent, less lethal, less kinetic, and more stable environments.

3.1.1. Operation themes, types of land operations and land tactical activities

Figure 3.1 provides an overview of operations themes, types of land tactical operations and land tactical activities, and how they are linked. The intensity of the use of force can distinguish Operation Themes. Warfighting is always related to armed conflict^[1], while security themes are used in confrontation scenarios below the threshold of armed conflict. Peace support includes the lowest level of violence during rivalry and cooperation, e.g., peacekeeping or peacebuilding operations. Peacetime military engagements (PME), can take place in parallel to peace support and security themes, hence during cooperation, rivalry or confrontation. Operations themes are important to understand the overall strategic and

operational situation and its variables. Figure 3.2 from AJP-01 illustrates the connection between operations themes and the continuum of competition.




Figure 3.1 - Operation themes, land tactical operations and tactical activities.

On the tactical level, the types of operations and tactical activities have a great impact on CIMIC activities and will, therefore, guide the structure of the chapter. Figure 3.1. stems from ATP-3.2.1 and depicts a schematic overview of the different types of operations and the respective proportion of tactical activities within the operations themes. While the description of all four operations themes, all types of operations and all tactical activities would exceed the scope of this chapter by far, it is still relevant for CIMIC personnel to understand in which kind of activity and operation the supported commander currently is operating. The main lesson drawn from the graphic is that all three types of land operations appear in all operations themes – and all four types of tactical activities appear in each type of operation. For more information, it is recommended to peruse ATP-3.2.1 in order to fully understand the basic tactical principles of the supported formations.




Figure 3.2 - Operational themes within the continuum of competition

To complete the doctrinal terms in operations, Figure 3.3. from ATP-3.2.1 depicts the full list of land tactical activities. Those activities requiring a significant CIMIC contribution are

marked with a red frame. It will be immediately recognisable that the main contribution of CIMIC comes with stability activities. However, all kinetic activities (offense, defence) also need CIMIC support in terms of freedom of maneuver (FoM), freedom of action (FoA), and stability in the rear (see below).

This includes (non-exclusive):

-Coordination between the tactical boundaries and the local administration areas.

-Deconfliction of military and civilian movements, e.g. Attack avenues of approach and counterattack routes, target discrimination, possible staging areas and fire support areas etc.

-Coordination and deconfliction of actions with civil logistics and other civil partners like police forces, fire brigades etc.

-Coordination of BSM especially in the rear.

| TACTICAL ACTIVITIES | OFFENSIVE | DEFENSIVE | STABILITY (SECURITY/CONTROL) | ENABLING |
|---------------------|------------------------------|-----------|--|----------------------------------|
| LAND LIST | ATTACK | DEFENCE | PROTECTION OF ESSENTIAL LOCATIONS/ PERSONS/OBJECTS | SECURITY |
| | EXPLOITATION | DELAY | EMERGENCY DEMINING | RECONNAISSANCE |
| | PURSUIT | | ROUTE CONTROL | ADVANCE TO CONTACT |
| | RAID | | CONTROL OF MOVEMENT | MEETING ENGAGEMENT |
| | AMBUSH | | CORDON AND SEARCH | MARCH |
| | BREAKOUT OF ENCIRCLED FORCES | | DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION | CROSSING AND BREACHING OBSTACLES |
| | | | MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE | LINK UP |
| | | | EVACUATION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS | RELIEF OF TROOPS |
| | | | | WITHDRAWAL |
| | | | | RETIREMENT |
| | | | | DEMONSTRATION AND FEINT |

Figure 3.3 - tactical activities

The relevance of themes, types of operations, and tactical activities come with some particular factors that have to be considered by CIMIC personnel.

- 1) **Use of force and its lethality** – Considering its impacts on the civil environment and the ability of CIMIC personnel to operate under force protection measures; e.g. impact is significantly higher in offensive operations than in stability operations.
- 2) **Tempo of operations** (friendly or enemy driven) – Considering the time available to interact with non-military actors, establish networks, collect information, analyse, assess and

react, to cooperate, coordinate or de-conflict. E.g. in general, significantly more time will be available in stability operations/ activities than in offensive operations/ activities.

3) **Capability and capacity of non-military actors (in particular HN)** – Considering their capability and capacity to manage the respective civil environment situation in the different geographic and administrative areas – grades can range from fully capable to non-existent; e.g. a long time in warfighting might degrade a HN capacity and intense warfighting might restrict humanitarian access of IOs/ NGOs.

4) **Capacity of own troops** – Considering support to the civil environment in terms of medical, transport, engineering, administrative, security support or even water, food and energy if other actors are not capable or unwilling. E.g. in warfighting, own troops routinely require available capacities for themselves and even rely on non-military support (e.g. host nation support, HNS) more heavily than in peace support, when a force can be tailored for its mission, including capacities to support civilians.

5) **Battle Space Management (BSM)** – Considering moving boundaries and possible rifts with civil environment administrative areas, plus the need for coordination between units. E.g. the BSM in warfighting (offensive/ defensive) is much more dynamic and more complex than in peace support/ stability type of operations.

These factors need to be considered throughout all themes, types of operations and tactical activities. It is of importance to understand that all these factors range from high to low, from fully capable to non-existent, from one end to the other.

[1] Using the terms of the continuum of competition.

3.2. CIMIC integration in the Battle Space, command levels and geographic dimensions

While the battle space in previous NATO crisis response operations was often organised in a non-linear way (see Figure 3.5), warfighting, in particular kinetic combat operations, is characterised by linear battle space management. Figure 3.4 depicts a schematic extract of a warfighting corps' battle space. Visible is approximately one third of a corps ("northern") AO. The levels of command are indicated by the respective command posts' military symbols and by the military symbol of the respective supporting CIMIC unit. To reduce complexity, the figure lacks a lot of other significant information. Several other coordination lines, units, activities, civil administrative boundaries and other information of the civil environment would overcrowd the sketch but are usually included on tactical maps. However, this figure serves as a basic sketch to better visualize CIMIC in the battle space and serves throughout this chapter for better orientation:

“where we are” and “what we talk about”.




Figure 3.4 - Linear BSM




Figure 3.5 - Non-linear battle space management

There are five principal complementing comments about the type of BSM shown in Figure 3.4:

First observation: Obviously, CIMIC units are employed in the rear areas of corps, divisions and brigades. The mission of such CIMIC units depends on the tactical activity of the supported unit (offensive/ defensive/ stability or enabling activity).

Second observation: The deep is a challenge for CIMIC units since they cannot physically reach there but need to gain information about it, in particular for CIMIC contributions to targeting, for information on possible DPRE movements, and in particular to support offensive operations with information (CIMIC sites of significance, civil situation, etc.).

Third observation: The higher the level of supported command, the deeper reaches the deep into enemy-controlled territory. This means that CIMIC units and HQ personnel of divisions and corps need to identify ways to gain information on the civil environment of these deep

areas. (e.g. indirect access through liaison networks, recce elements, special operations forces and information of the higher command level).

Fourth observation: Stability activities and enabling activities are the predominant tactical activities in the rear area for each level of tactical command, while offensive and defensive activities are conducted in the close area. Tempo, as one of the critical factors in kinetic combat operations (see above), determines the time for conducting stability activities in the respective rear areas. The time available will gradually decrease from corps to division to brigade – depending on the tempo of the respective tactical activity.

Fifth observation: In stability operations and during defence (block), the battlespace and AO boundaries remain relatively stable. However, in offensive operations and in dynamic defence (delay), rear areas increase or shrink and eventually boundaries and coordination lines will shift. This might trigger a handover/takeover of the “civil environment factors and actors” from one to another HQ. The CIMIC Staff of the respective units has to take care of that. This happens faster from brigade to division than from division to corps. Division and corps supporting CIMIC units have to expect a significantly extending rear area in offense and a significant shrink during delay operations before adjusting boundaries.

CIMIC support during offense activities (attack)

VIGNETTE: BRIGADE ATTACK

Situation:

A brigade (BDE), as part of a division, conducts an offensive operation to recapture an urban area previously occupied by enemy forces for several months. The operation is characterised by high intensity, rapid tempo, and limited time for interaction with non-military actors.

1. Initial Situation (Pre-Assault / Deep Area)

The BDE prepares for the attack. The CIMIC element supports the staff through CFI:

Analysis of:

Population centers and density, Critical Infrastructure (energy, water, hospitals), Potential displacement movements (Displaced Persons, Refugees and Evacuees, DPRE) and identification of CIMIC sites of significance.

Assessment of:

Population attitude (supportive, neutral, hostile), for which the BDE uses information from higher headquarters (DIV/CORPS), existing liaison networks, intelligence and reconnaissance assets.

CIMIC Main contribution:

Enhancing targeting processes and minimizing civilian harm.

2. Start of the Attack, with the start of the attack, the previously analysed area becomes the close area.

Challenges:

High tempo and time pressure, potential uncontrolled civilian movement, dynamic security situation

CIMIC Tasks:

Supporting Freedom of Manoeuvre (FoM) by:

Deconflicting military movements with civilian traffic, identifying and establishing civilian rally points and advising the commander on risks to civilians (“civilians in harm’s way”); compare cross-cutting topic Protection of Civilians, PoC).

CIMIC main contribution: Protection of civilians and immediate stabilization of the battlespace. Support Freedom of manoeuvre and Freedom of Action.

3. 3. Rear Area Management

As the offensive progresses, the rear area expands.

Challenges:

Increasing displacement of civilians, overburdened or non-functional Host Nation (HN) structures, need for coordination between military and civilian actors

CIMIC Measures:

Establishment of civilian rally points, basic support structures and coordination with Host Nation authorities, IO and NGOs.

4. 4. Key Takeaways

CIMIC is critical to Freedom of Manoeuvre (FoM) and Freedom of Action (FoA), even in high-intensity combat.

The focus shifts throughout the operation:

Deep Area: Information and analysis

Close Area: Protection and deconfliction

Rear Area: Stabilization and support

Time, tempo, and security constraints significantly limit CIMIC activities.

Attack implies the advance into the Deep, uncontrolled territory that has been controlled by the enemy before. While this has implications for all CIMIC levels of command, the BDE

supporting CIMIC unit is the first CIMIC asset that is physically confronted with it. At the same time, it is the one that faces the most challenging operating environment along all critical factors: tempo, time available, lethality, intensity, and HN capability. Ont, the Rear will be extending during attack as long the boundaries of the BSM are not adjusted; this typically happens when a tactical objective is reached.




Figure 3.6 – Scheme of considerations for a CIMIC unit in support of a BDE during attack.

In the Deep:

Despite the challenge of not reaching physically into the deep, it is necessary to acquire as much information as possible to support the attack. Information requirements which cannot be answered by own sources through existing liaison networks, need to be sent as a Request for Information (RFI) to higher levels of command. CIMIC personnel on these levels might have better access to information about the Deep due to liaison networks on a higher level and more time available.

Critical information requirements for the Deep include (non-exclusive):

1. Population centres and numbers of residents?
2. CIMIC sites of significance?
3. Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)?
4. Population movements?
5. Attitude of population? Particularly at regained territory which was controlled by the enemy.
6. Unfriendly elements within the civil environment/resistance

Most of these requirements are provided by the higher command level.

CIMIC’s main contributions to the deep are informing manoeuvres and fires to support FoM/ FoA and mitigate harm. The information pertinent to items 1 through 6 also paves the ground for the Close as soon as the territory has been taken.

In the Close:

The Deep will eventually become the Close. The exact location of the CIMIC Units might greatly depend on the situation in the operating environment. However, it can reasonably be assumed that they are able to operate in the same area and under the same protection as supply elements of the BGs. Thus, they can follow the assault forces between the echelon forces and the reserve. Regarding CFI, the CIMIC personnel of higher echelons eventually need to support the BDE CIMIC units with confirmation of information and further A&A.

Aside from FoM/ FoA, stabilising the taken area and keeping it stable is of utmost importance. There are several factors that are relevant for the Close (formerly Deep) during attack:

1. Uncontrolled population movement
2. Territory/ population:
 - a. Liberated occupied territory
 - i. HN presence and capability
 - ii. Posture of population
 - iii. Duration of occupation
 - iv. Enemy actions during occupation
 - v. Extent of replaced authorities
 - b. Enemy core territory
 - i. Attitude of population
 - ii. Security
 - iii. Resistance
 - iv. Cooperation authorities
 - v. Coordination of authorities for the purpose of FABN and services
3. Civil Situation
 - a. 7BLR
 - i. Minimum:
 1. Food
 2. Water
 3. Medical
 - a. Immediate responsibility for “life, limbs, eyesight”
 4. Shelter
 5. Basic services
 - a. Security
 - b. Governance
 6. Mitigate harm
 - a. Get people out of harms way
 - i. DPRE/ POW/ Captured Persons (CPERS)/ endangered persons
 - ii. Rally Points
 7. Facilitate access to basic needs (FABN)
 8. Populace control

Population movements within the BDE Care the most significant risk to FoM/ FoA during attack. In particular, since they are likely uncontrolled at the last minute. Further, it is difficult to inform the population beyond the FEBA on how to behave during the attack, and it is not sure that the enemy will evacuate the civilian population upfront.

In the worst case, the enemy will do the opposite, as examples from recent warfighting have demonstrated. Civilians may find themselves caught between the lines. In any case, soldiers

on the frontline have to expect the sudden appearance of civilians in harm's way. Making them aware of the next rally point in the Rear that they can reach relatively safely is important.

For this purpose, the CIMIC unit needs to contribute to the identification and communication of rally points in coordination with other stakeholders – if applicable, primarily with the HN or any other non-military organisation – or, if none are available at all, with the G3 and G5 only. Rally points are the first step in getting people out of harm's way.

All the factors listed above need to be reconnoitered if the information is not available by other means or provided by a higher level of command. For the latter, the information still needs to be confirmed as feasible. The time factor during an attack does not allow deep reconnaissance. However, if timely information is required, CIMIC teams might conduct it as well and comprehensively as possible – even if not complete. Therefore, objectives of CIMIC-related reconnaissance have to be prioritised: Population centres (if feasible, considering force protection concerns) are of primary interest. Those that pose information gaps and/ or are most critical for decisions come first.

In the Rear:

The Rear must be stabilized and kept stable. During attack, the BDE rear area quickly extends since the BDE BGs are focused on the fight and cannot deal with an extending AO. The DIV rear area will only be adjusted step by step in intervals.

As it is further away from the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA), the security situation is more favourable than on the BDE AO; DPRE rally, and collection points must be established here, preferably with the HN. If HN authorities are not available or capable, the force needs to identify if there are IOs/ NGOs available and capable of establishing collection points. If not, the force needs to take care of it.

One main task for the CIMIC unit during attack is to prepare in coordination with HN or other organisations for the controlled and uncontrolled population movements, from the FEBA through the DIV AO into the more stable corps rear area.

Information provided needs to be confirmed, preliminarily processed and handled by rear elements.

However, the CIMIC team's availability, tempo, and available time might restrict the feasibility of what can be done and what cannot. During high-tempo and deep attacks, the BDE CIMIC units will likely not be able to do much more than receive and report.

Subsequently, CIMIC units of higher echelons will have to follow up on the situation and react to it.

Detailed coordination of these tasks is highly situation-dependent and will be part of the DIV planning and guidance by the DIV G9.

CIMIC support during defence (block and delay)

VIGNETTE: BRIGADE DEFENSE

A multinational BDE is tasked to conduct defensive operations in order to delay and disrupt an advancing enemy force along a key axis. The area of operations includes rural terrain with several towns and critical national infrastructure, as well as a significant civilian population. The BDE must prepare for prolonged defensive engagement while maintaining stability in its rear areas.

1. Preparation Phase (Deep Area/ Shaping the Defence)

Prior to enemy contact, the BDE prepares defensive positions. CIMIC elements support planning through CFI:

Identification and analysis of:

Civilian population distribution in defensive sectors, Key infrastructure (bridges, roads, energy supply) relevant for defence, likely civilian movement routes (evacuation or spontaneous displacement), civilian infrastructure within engagement areas (risk of collateral damage), CIMIC Sites of Significance, population attitude and potential influence on operations

CIMIC Tasks (not exhaustive):

Advising on civil considerations in obstacle planning (e.g. roadblocks, demolitions), supporting the development of civil evacuation plans (in coordination with HN), contributing to targeting processes to minimize civilian impact

CIMIC main contribution:

Enabling the commander to integrate civil factors into defensive planning to reduce tactical friction.

2. Preparation of the Defensive Area (Close Area)

Challenges:

Civilians remaining within defensive sectors, restrictions caused by military obstacles (minefields, barriers), risk of civilian interference with defensive operations

CIMIC Tasks:

Supporting Freedom of Manoeuvre (FoM), coordinate civilian movement around defensive positions Preventing interference with obstacle systems

Advising on civilian risks within engagement areas and implications of infrastructure use/destruction

Facilitating communication with local authorities

Civilian awareness of danger areas (as far as feasible)

CIMIC Focus: Deconfliction between civilian presence and defensive preparations.

3. Enemy Contact and Defensive Engagement

Challenges:

Sudden displacement of civilians due to combat and damage to infrastructure and disruption of basic services, limited freedom of movement for CIMIC elements

CIMIC Tasks:

Providing continuous advice on:

Civilian presence in engagement areas, risks of escalation due to civilian harm, identification of safe routes for civilian movement.

CIMIC Focus: Mitigating civilian impact while supporting the defensive fight.

As combat continues, the rear area becomes increasingly important.

Challenges:

Growing number of displaced persons, strain on local resources and services, potential breakdown of Host Nation structures

CIMIC Measures:

Collection and coordination points for civilians, coordination with Host Nation authorities

IOs and NGOs

Support to:

Basic needs provision (FABN – Facilitate Access to Basic Needs)

If civilian systems collapse, military forces may need to temporarily support essential functions.

CIMIC Focus: Maintaining stability in the rear to sustain defensive operations.

4. 4. Transition and Continuity

Depending on the outcome, the BDE may be tasked to counterattack, or continue area defence / delay operations.

CIMIC Role:

Reassessment of civil situation and infrastructure status and preparation for follow-on operations.

5. 5. Key Takeaways

CIMIC is essential for integrating civilian factors into defensive planning and execution

Defensive operations require:

Early consideration of civilian movement and infrastructure

The main CIMIC effort shifts:

Preparation: Analysis and planning

Engagement: Risk mitigation and advisory

Rear: Stability and support

Ideally, defence activities happen after thorough preparation. Notwithstanding that defensive activities and operations can happen without prior proper preparation when tactical activities change from offensive to defensive (e.g. after the culmination of an attack or after seizing the objective in an offensive operation), defensive activities still provide the advantage that own forces know the terrain. Thus, CIMIC personnel know at least parts of the civil environment. In a prepared defence, the presence of the HN can also be expected to have almost full capability to control the populace, including evacuation and movements, and fulfill its obligations for basic needs and services.




Figure 3.7 – CIMIC support to defence operations

In the Deep:

Critical information requirements (non-exclusive) for the Deep are:

1. Population Centres?
2. CIMIC sites of significance?
3. Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)?
4. Population movements?

One of the main tasks of CIMIC to activities in the deep during defense is informing fires/targeting by considering the mentioned information requirements.

If defensive operations change from block to delay, the previous Close gradually becomes the Deep. Hence, all required knowledge and understanding should be developed upfront, before the start of the delay.

In the Close:

Defence offers the advantage of relatively stable boundaries in the BSM and proper presence of the HN with likely enough capabilities to manage the civil environment challenges. However, it must be considered that HN capabilities could be stressed and/ or partially be overstretched due to enemy hybrid activities in the AO. This risk will increase with the duration of the conflict. However, in principle, preparing for a defence operation offers the best circumstances for CIMIC to support shaping the civil environment. Nevertheless, this also depends on the time available – meaning early deployment will contribute to a higher level of preparedness.

In preparation for a planned or unplanned delay activity/ operation, all knowledge development and coordination requirements must be met prior to execution.

The following civil environment factors are critical for the defence:

1. HN plans to control population movements
 - a. Planned evacuations (including cattle and removable infrastructure)
 - b. Planned evacuation routes and means
 - c. Planned hosting facilities for DPRE?
 - d. Plans to control spontaneous/ ad hoc/ last minute movements/ “self evacuations”
 - i. Rally points
 - ii. Collection points
2. Protection of CNI
3. CIMIC sites of significance
4. Resistance plans of HN
5. Plans to withdraw HN authorities and capabilities
6. Road conditions

The CIMIC Staff needs to facilitate the answers to these information requirements through their liaison network. Eventually, higher echelons can deliver some responses.

In the Rear:

During defensive operations, the rear has the same information requirements, roles, and tasks as those close to the front line. In the event of a delay, CIMIC Staff must prepare for the transfer of the civil environment due to the reorganisation of the BSM.

3.3. CIMIC support in offensive and defensive land tactical operations

CIMIC support during offense activities (attack)

Attack implies the advance into the Deep, uncontrolled territory that has been controlled by the enemy before. While this has implications for all CIMIC levels of command, the BDE supporting CIMIC unit is the first CIMIC asset that is physically confronted with it. At the same time, it is the one that faces the most challenging operating environment along all critical factors: tempo, time available, lethality, intensity, and HN capability. On Top, the Rear will be extending during attack as long the boundaries of the BSM are not adjusted; this typically happens when a tactical objective is reached.




Figure 3.6 - Scheme of considerations for a CIMIC unit in support of a brigade during attack.

In the Deep:

Despite the challenge of not reaching physically into the deep, it is necessary to acquire as much information as possible to support the attack. Information requirements which cannot be answered by own sources through existing liaison networks, need to be sent as a Request for Information (RFI) to higher levels of command. CIMIC personnel on these levels might have better access to information about the Deep due to liaison networks on a higher level and more time available.

Critical information requirements (non-exclusive) for the Deep are (most of these requirements are provided by the higher command level):

1. Population centres and numbers of residents?
2. CIMIC sites of significance?
3. Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)?
4. Population movements?
5. Attitude of population?
6. Unfriendly elements within the civil environment/ Resistance?

CIMIC's main contributions to the deep are informing manoeuvres and fires to support FoM/ FoA and mitigate harm. The information mentioned in point 1 to 6 also paves the ground for the Close as soon as the territory has been taken.

In the Close:

The deep will eventually become the close. The exact location of the CIMIC Units might greatly depend on the particular situation in the operating environment. However, it appears reasonable that they can operate in the same area and under the same protection as supply elements of the BGs. Thus, they can follow the assault forces between the echelon forces and the reserve. Regarding CFI, the CIMIC personnel of higher echelons eventually need to support the BDE CIMIC units with confirmation of information and further A&A.

Besides and FoM/ FoA, stabilising the taken area and keeping it stable is of utmost importance. There are several factors that are relevant for the Close (formerly Deep) during attack:

1. Uncontrolled population movement
2. Territory/ population:
 - a. Liberated occupied territory
 - i. HN presence and capability
 - ii. Posture of population
 - iii. Duration of occupation
 - iv. Enemy actions during occupation
 - v. Extent of replaced authorities
 - b. Enemy core territory
 - i. Attitude of population
 - ii. Security
 - iii. Resistance
 - iv. Cooperation authorities
 - v. Coordination of authorities for the purpose of FABN and services
3. Civil Situation
 - a. 7BLR
 - i. Minimum:
 1. Food
 2. Water
 3. Medical
 - a. Immediate responsibility for “life, limbs, eyesight”
 4. Shelter
 4. Basic services
 - a. Security
 - b. Governance
 5. Mitigate harm
 - a. Get people out of harms way
 - i. DPRE/ POW/ Captured Persons (CPERS)/ endangered persons
 - ii. Rally Points
 6. Facilitate access to basic needs (FABN)
 7. Populace control

Population movements within the BDE close are the most significant risk to FoM/ FoA during attack. In particular, since they are likely uncontrolled at the last minute. Further, it is difficult to inform the population beyond the FEBA on how to behave during the attack, and it is not sure that the enemy will evacuate the civilian population upfront.

In the worst case, the enemy will do the opposite, as examples from recent warfighting have demonstrated. One should assume that people do not run towards fighting but away from it. However, some might fail to do so and find themselves caught between the lines. Anyway, soldiers on the frontline have to expect the sudden appearance of civilians in harm's way. As the situation allows, they have to make them aware of the next rally point in the Rear, which they can reach relatively safely.

For this purpose, the CIMIC unit needs to contribute to the identification of rally points in coordination with other stakeholders—if applicable, primarily with the HN or any other non-military organization—or, if none at all, with the G3 and G5 only. Rally points are the first step in getting people out of harm's way.

All the factors listed above need to be reconnoitered if the information is not available by other means or provided by a higher level of command. For the latter, the information still needs to be confirmed as feasible. The time factor during an attack does not allow a deep reconnaissance. However, if timely information is required, CIMIC teams might conduct it as well and comprehensively as possible – even if not complete. Therefore, objectives of CIMIC-related reconnaissance have to be prioritized: Population centres (as feasible within force protection) are prime. Those with information gaps and/ or are most critical for decisions come first.

In the Rear:

The Rear must be stabilized and kept stable. During attack, the BDE rear area quickly extends since the BDE BGs are focused on the fight and cannot deal with an extending AO, and the DIV rear area will only be adjusted step by step in intervals.

As it is further away from the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA), the security situation is more favourable than on the BDE AO; DPRE rally, and collection points must be established here, preferably with the HN. If HN authorities are not available or capable, the force needs to identify if there are IOs/ NGOs available and capable of establishing collection points. If not, the force needs to take care of it.

One main task for the CIMIC unit during attack is to prepare in coordination with HN or other organisations for the controlled and uncontrolled population movements, from the FEBA through the DIV AO into the more stable corps rear area.

Provided information needs to be confirmed, preliminarily processed and handled by rear elements.

However, the CIMIC team's availability, tempo, and available time might restrict the feasibility of what can be done and what cannot. During high-tempo and deep attacks, the BDE CIMIC units will likely not be able to do much more than recce and report.

Subsequently, CIMIC units of higher echelons will have to follow up on the situation and react to it.

Detailed coordination of these tasks is highly situation-dependent and will be part of the DIV planning and guidance by the DIV G9.

CIMIC support during defence (block and delay)

Ideally, defence activities happen after thorough preparation. Notwithstanding that defensive activities and operations can happen without prior proper preparation when tactical activities change from offensive to defensive (e.g. after the culmination of an attack or after seizing the objective in an offensive operation), defensive activities still provide the advantage that own forces know the terrain and as such CIMIC personnel know at least parts of the civil environment. In a prepared defence, the presence of the HN can also be expected to have almost full capability to control the populace, including evacuation and movements, and fulfill its obligations for basic needs and services.




Figure 3.7 - CIMIC support to defence operations

In the Deep:

Critical information requirements (non-exclusive) for the Deep are:

1. Population Centres?
2. CIMIC sites of significance?
3. Critical national infrastructure (CNI)?
4. Population movements?

One of the main tasks of CIMIC to activities in the deep during defense is informing fires/targeting by considering the mentioned information requirements.

If defensive operations change from block to delay, the previous Close gradually becomes the Deep. Hence, all required knowledge and understanding should be developed upfront, before the start of the delay.

In the Close:

Defence offers the advantage of relatively stable boundaries in the BSM and proper presence of the HN with likely enough capabilities to manage the civil environment challenges. Although, it must be considered that HN capabilities could be stressed and/ or partially be overstretched, due to enemy hybrid activities in the AO. This risk will increase with the duration of the conflict. However, in principle, preparing for a defence operation offers the best circumstances for CIMIC to support shaping the civil environment. Nevertheless, this also depends on the time available – meaning early deployment will contribute to more preparedness.

In preparation for a planned or unplanned delay activity/ operation, all knowledge development and coordination requirements must be met upfront of the execution.

The following civil environment factors are critical for the defence:

1. HN plans to control population movements
 - a. Planned evacuations (including cattle and removable infrastructure)
 - b. Planned evacuation routes and means
 - c. Planned hosting facilities for DPRE?
 - d. Plans to control spontaneous/ ad hoc/ last minute movements/ “self evacuations”
 - i. Rally points
 - ii. Collection points
2. Protection of CNI
3. CIMIC sites of significance
4. Resistance plans of HN
5. Plans to withdraw HN authorities and capabilities
6. Road conditions

The CIMIC Staff needs to facilitate the answers to these information requirements through their liaison network. Eventually, higher echelons can deliver some responses.

In the Rear:

During defensive operations, the rear has the same information requirements, roles, and tasks as those close to the front line. In the event of a delay, the CIMIC Staff must prepare for the transfer of the civil environment due to the reorganisation of the BSM

3.4. CIMIC support to land tactical stability operations

CIMIC support to BDE during stability activities

Within a BDE AO, stability activities or even operations are usually conducted before and after offensive and defensive operations. However, stability activities can also be conducted in parts of the BDE AO during offensive and defensive operations, usually in the Rear.

Providing stability is a responsibility and privilege of the HN. For a stable operating environment, the following civil factors are important:

- 1) Provision of government services
- 2) Provision of basic needs (water, food, health, energy, shelter)
- 3) Security & Protection
- 4) Populace control (including attitude and posture of minorities)

On the tactical level, the categories of the seven baseline requirements (7BLR, known from the resilience through civil preparedness concept/ RtCP)^[1] serve as a suitable framework that includes all categories needed for a stable civil environment.

- 1) Continuity of (local) government (including government services, security, protection and populace control)
- 2) Resilient energy supplies
- 3) Ability to deal effectively with large population movements (including controlled evacuation)
- 4) Resilient food and water supplies
- 5) Ability to deal effectively with mass casualties
- 6) Resilient communication network
- 7) Resilient transportation network

For Warfighting scenarios, the 7BLR provide a useful framework along which the capability of a HN to project stability can be assessed.^[2] Considering the time-factor on BDE level, analysis on the full spectrum of 7BLR might be too comprehensive to assess stability in the BDE's AO. However, assessments can be reduced to the most critical factors: food, water, health (in particular: life, limbs, eyesight), shelter, protection from harm (MH). MH and FABN play an important role here.

CIMIC Staff would ideally receive all required information from a HN authority and could focus on other areas and activities. However, as described above, there is a risk that HN cannot be fully capable of providing all critical services and goods. CIMIC needs to identify if and how support to the HN can be provided. In the worst case, the force will have to manage the most critical issues by itself or accept calculated risks.

[1] See Chapter 7 for more information

[2] This framework of 7BLR is another one besides PMESII/ ASCOPE. It has to be decided according to which framework, information has to be collected and processed. PMESII/ ASCOPE is more comprehensive but 7BLR quickly provide the status and capability of a HN within a specified AO. Considering the limited time factor on the tactical level, 7BLR appear more efficient in kinetic operations, at least on the brigade level.

3.5. CIMIC in Multi Domain Operations

The aim of MDO is to orchestrate military activities across all operational domains (Land, Air, Maritime, Cyberspace, and Space) synchronized with non-military activities to enable the Alliance to create converging effects at the speed of relevance.

In NATO, MDO is primarily a concept, a mindset, and an attitude that needs to be operationalized by creating plans at all levels. To integrate this mindset into the respective plans, the CIMIC Staff needs people who are aware of it and can apply it in all planning phases or the execution of operations. This affects the timing of decisions, the integration of non-military partners into processes, and the derivation of conclusions for future operations. Since non-military stakeholders can also be involved in planning processes, civil factor integration (CFI) must begin as early as possible as a prerequisite for civil-military interaction.

Viewing CIMIC's role in MDO in terms of domains rather than individual capabilities is essential. This means considering the domains from the perspective of non-military stakeholders. For instance, what is the effect of a satellite system used for military purposes but operated by civilians on military operations? What is the goal of a protest by a non-military group in a NATO country, and who or what is in control? How strong is the societal resilience in a NATO country, and what impact does it have in the event of an attack on NATO territory? As demonstrated by the experience of Ukraine, a well-informed analysis of these non-military factors is crucial. To achieve this, CIMIC Staff must think creatively and use the expertise of those they analyse, not relying on military stakeholders only.

3.5.1. CIMIC in the Land Domain

CIMIC is land-heavy. The Land Domain is where people live and, consequently, where rivalry, conflicts, and humanitarian crises have their roots and main impacts. Military forces will always affect this environment, including its civil factors, and vice versa. Therefore, CIMIC considers the political, administrative, social, or cultural boundaries as a basis for effective civil-military liaison and interaction and adapts liaison authorities accordingly. A

clear, dedicated and effective outreach, liaison and coordination mechanism must be authorized and established

3.5.2. CIMIC in the Maritime Domain

The interconnectedness of the oceans through economic, social and political relationships underlines the importance of the maritime domain. The maintenance of the freedom of navigation, sea lines of communications, key infrastructure, energy flow, protection of marine resources, and environmental safety are all in the interests of both national and international security. CIMIC encompasses CMI activities and the integration of civil factors into the maritime operating environment. Maritime-specific actors are national shipping authorities, the shipping industry, jurisdiction, and other departments responsible for the coastal areas and adjacent sea areas and specific governmental organisations (GO), non-governmental organisations (NGO), and intergovernmental organisations (IO). The shipping industry is one of the most significant actors in the maritime environment. Through Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) and the Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System (AWNIS) disciplines, a NATO force will interact effectively with merchant shipping by coordinating the operations plan with non-military activities so that the commander's mission can be fulfilled with minimal interference with merchant shipping. The NATO Shipping Centre (NSC) is the integral and permanent element of the Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) and the primary point of contact between NATO and the merchant shipping community. Within operations, the NSC coordinates the NATO and national NCAGS/ AWNIS organisations to ensure the use of NCAGS and AWNIS as force multipliers, facilitating the most effective use of military resources to support operational objectives.

3.5.3. CIMIC in the Air Domain

CIMIC enables the coordination between military and non-military air activities in joint and air operations e.g. by EUROCONTROL^[1] and assesses the impacts on the civil operating environment caused by the military and non-military assets of air power by contributing to the targeting process and establishing situational awareness of the civil situation in the vicinity of airfields.

3.5.4. CIMIC in the Cyberspace Domain

Cyberspace comprises the capabilities and activities of interdependent networks of information, technology infrastructures, and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications, networks, and computer systems. The spectrum of users and usage of this domain is very broad. (Every individual with a cell phone contributes to cyberspace.)

Therefore, enhancing information sharing and mutual assistance in preventing, mitigating and recovering from attacks in or through cyberspace is important. This requires civil-military interaction facilitated by CIMIC. A positive result from CIMIC is enhanced support for Cyberoperations (CO) through maintaining freedom of access to cyberspace and cyber assets and strengthened resilience.

3.5.5. CIMIC in the Space Domain

Space underpins NATO's ability to navigate and track forces, have robust communications, detect missile launches, and ensure effective command and control. Up to 85% of the overall space assets are non-military. Military, civil and commercial sectors are increasingly dependent on these capabilities. Effective relationships and partnerships are needed to coordinate between non-military actors and the military forces to coordinate in order to mitigate threats and risks and synchronize actions

By facilitating CMI with non-military actors in the space domain, CIMIC will enhance the freedom of access to space assets and their respective services (e.g., STARLINK etc).

[1] Eurocontrol is a pan-European civil-military organization dedicated to supported European aviation.

IV. Relevant actors

Executive Summary Chapter IV Relevant Actors

In all NATO core tasks, the principle of civilian primacy applies to civilian responsibilities. In crisis management, if a national government is unable or unwilling to fulfil its responsibilities, International organisations (IO) and Non-governmental Organisations (NGO) may step in to support the provision of services.

IO are inter-governmental organisations open to sovereign states. Treaties establish them and are subject to international law. NGO are private, non-profit organisations dedicated to humanitarian and development activities. They operate at local, national, and international levels, pursue different missions, and are accountable to their trustees, donors, and beneficiaries.

The shifting security environment increasingly puts emphasis on the role of CIMIC personnel in collaboration with allied nations. The key factor here is effective military-to-military liaison with the respective host nation's domestic CIMIC structure. Host nation primacy, either by the government or its GOs, is the guiding principle of these efforts. Understanding how these different domestic CIMIC structures operate is key for CIMIC personnel.

4.1. Introduction

CIMIC is essential for the preparation and conduct of military operations; thus, being deployed on the territory of sovereign NATO member nations with functioning civilian infrastructure and government services requires militaries to liaise with other military actors and civilians. CIMIC will be evaluated based on its ability to facilitate consultations and integration with the HN authorities (CMI) and its capability to collect data on the civil environment (CFI).

NATO has adapted in response to shifts in the security environment. As a result, CIMIC operations have also evolved. The alliance will focus primarily on operations within allied nations instead of in failed states. While core tasks remain unchanged, there is a significant shift in how operations are carried out in a fully functioning country.

In the context of allied nations, the role of CIMIC personnel is to collaborate with the host nation's domestic CIMIC, comprehend the nation's laws and legalities, and establish conditions that enable manoeuvre elements well before any conflict. CIMIC personnel need to shift their focus to military-to-military liaison, a key aspect of their role.

CIMIC personnel possess unique and competent skills that are crucial in effectively managing potential conflicts between non-military actors of the host nation and military representatives of the allied force. This unique capability within the force allows CIMIC personnel to handle CMI situations even under difficult circumstances, making you an invaluable asset to the operations. Subsequently, your ability to pave the ground with relevant

and robust liaison to key interlocutors for other military functions and their personnel to effectively collaborate and consult with their respective non-military counterparts further underscores your importance in the operations.

Understanding the laws and legal restrictions within the AO is crucial for credibility and defining responsibilities. Conducting meetings or assessments without host nation's approval can lead to issues and reduce confidence and credibility within the communities and country.

In warfighting the majority of the engagements are done MIL to MIL, HN CIMIC to CIMIC. In stability operations, during peacetime, military engagement, and peace support activities with the civilian populace, it is essential to involve the host nation's counterparts as they have a vested interest in our actions and conduct within their country.

4.2. The HN and domestic CIMIC

The HN is a critical factor in the civil environment as part of the operating environment and, as such, for CIMIC.

A HN is, by NATO definition, "a country that, by agreement:

- 1) receives forces and materiel from NATO member states or other countries operating on/from or transiting through its territory;
- 2) allows materiel and/ or NATO and other organisations to be located on its territory; and/or
- 3) provides support for these purposes."

The HN does not necessarily need to be an Allied Nation. It can also be a partner or any other nation which has agreed to host the NATO force.

Allied Nations have their own military, governmental, and administrative structures, as well as their own liaison arrangements and responsibilities. They will therefore conduct their CIMIC tasks in their unique way. In other words, 32 nations, 32 systems. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show two examples of national systems.

German point of view

32 Nations => 32 Systems

EXAMPLE: Germany





Figure 4.1 - The German System

32 Nations => 32 Systems

EXAMPLE:



POLAND

GENERIC

NATIONAL

Nation
Country
Republic

REGIONAL

Province
State

LOCAL

County
District

Municipality

Figure 4.2 - The Polish System

The NATO and domestic tasks responsibilities within the NATO Command and Force Structure often overlap. Domestic tasks, being a national responsibility, are grounded in national sovereignties, and the nation’s expertise in national defence plans and national civil/military liaison structures is invaluable in this context.

Aligning NATO-CIMIC procedures with domestic procedures is imperative to ensure effective civil/military cooperation through military-military cooperation. This necessitates establishing a common understanding of Domestic CIMIC versus NATO CIMIC.

Therefore, Domestic CIMIC can be seen as a nation’s military function that conducts CFI and CMI to support the accomplishment and synchronisation of national and NATO missions and military strategic objectives in peacetime, crisis, and conflict.

4.3. Non-military actor's relevance across NATO core tasks

In all NATO core tasks, the principle of civilian primacy applies to civilian responsibilities. The main authority and responsibility for civil governance and public services always belong to the local national government or HN GOs. IOs, NGOs, and the private sector will support the public administration within the legal framework set by the government. In crisis management, if a national government is unable or unwilling to fulfil its responsibilities IOs and NGOs may step in to support the provision of services.

Government and public administration

National governments are responsible for governing their states and ensuring the functioning of society and the economy to provide for the livelihood and welfare of the population. Their government agencies and public administration enforce laws and regulations to maintain the functioning of their societies and economies. They provide security, essential infrastructure, and public services if not provided by the private sector. Government and public services are generally structured according to functional areas (e.g. ministries, departments) and often subdivided on geographical levels (e.g. national, regional, municipal).

Public safety and security institutions include police, border police, customs, and correction facilities authorities. Depending on the HNs legislation, police forces can have civil or military status. Law enforcement agencies are important for security and governance. Police liaison is normally conducted by military police personnel, and CIMIC personnel must maintain a close relationship with law enforcement agencies.

Civil protection and civil defence. Civil protection is the activity of emergency services to protect populations, properties, infrastructure and the environment from the consequences of natural and technological disasters and other emergencies. Civil defence is the mobilization, organization and direction of the civil population designed to minimize by passive measures the effects of hostile action against all aspects of civil life.

Both civil protection and civil defence are key for civil resilience and are the responsibility of NATO member states or HN governments. Governmental agencies, sometimes staffed by volunteers, are often responsible for these core tasks, with supported from NGOs and contracted private sector companies.

Governmental Organisations

GOs other than the HN become relevant based on their specific areas of expertise, efforts, and objectives. These areas of expertise could include good governance, security sector reform, healthcare services, economic infrastructure reconstruction, development, education, or political capacity building. GOs can be involved in humanitarian or development projects or both, but they may struggle to adhere fully to humanitarian principles. GOs may operate as part of an international organisation mandate or through bilateral agreements between the sending government and the HN. In any case, it's important to know and understand the presence of all GOs in the area of operations.

Actors, such as GOs, can be classified based on their behaviour toward the audience as friendly, supportive, neutral, unsupportive, and hostile.

Examples of friendly GOs include the UK Department for International Development ([DFID](#)) and the German Agency for International Cooperation/Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit ([GIZ](#)). However, being aware of GOs that are unsupportive of or even hostile to NATO operations is also important.

In allied territory, the HN will work with external GOs invited by NATO nations. Interactions with these GOs will be coordinated through the HN. Outside of allied territory, the situation may vary depending on the specific operation and circumstances. If a NATO member state sends the GO, it is likely to be cooperative and supportive. Ultimately, these factors will determine the level of interaction between the NATO force and the GO.

The private sector is independent of direct state control and includes any privately owned individual or group engaged in profit-seeking activities. Its “for-profit” focus sets it apart from other non-military entities, and in many countries, private sector entities own significant portions of the national critical infrastructure. They may only coordinate if it aligns with their business model or is legally required.

Defence and dual-use capabilities and services. The production of defence goods relies on a defence industrial base, partly controlled by governments but mostly owned by the private sector. Dual-use capabilities are becoming more important, and the private sector largely drives new technological developments. A prominent example of a dual-use capability and service is the global positioning System (GPS).

International organisations (IO) are inter-governmental organisations open to sovereign states. Treaties establish them and are subject to international law. Prominent examples include the UN, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Their missions are highly political.

Non-governmental Organisations (NGO) are private, non-profit organisations dedicated to humanitarian and development activities. They operate at local, national, and international levels, pursue different missions, and are accountable to their trustees, donors, and beneficiaries.

Significant IOs and NGOs include:

[United Nations \(UN\)](#)

[European Union \(EU\)](#)

[African Union \(AU\)](#)

[European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations \(ECHO\)](#)

[United Nations Childrens Fund \(UNICEF\)](#)

[World Health Organisation \(WHO\)](#)

[International Organization for Migration](#)

[United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization \(UNESCO\)](#)

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[United Nations Development Program \(UNDP\)](#)

[The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(OCHA\)](#)

[United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees \(UNHCR\)](#)

[Medecins Sans Frontieres \(Doctors without Borders\)](#)

[Amnesty International](#)

Fields of activities of IOs/ NGOs:

Development Aid refers to financial and technical assistance for the long-term development of developing countries. Its goal is to stabilize and develop weaker states regarding governance, civil society, economy, and welfare.

Humanitarian Aid directly alleviates human suffering and is provided by GOs, NGOs and supported by the military. Humanitarian organisations operate under principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. UN OCHA coordinates humanitarian efforts, but some organisations have their own coordination mechanisms due to their fundamental principles.

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement consists of the ICRC, the IFRC, and 190 National Societies. Its mission is to prevent and alleviate human suffering, protect life and health, ensure respect for the human being, particularly in times of conflict and emergencies, and work on disease prevention.

1) **International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)**. The ICRC's mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other violence. It also works to prevent suffering by promoting humanitarian law and principles. The organisation collaborates with governments, armed forces, and opposition groups to ensure compliance with the law of armed conflict and coordinates international relief activities. The ICRC is a private association under Swiss law mandated by states party to the Geneva Conventions to assist victims of armed conflict. It is neither an IO nor an NGO.

2) **International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)**. The IFRC carries out relief operations to assist victims of natural and technological disasters, epidemic outbreaks, etc., and combines this with development work to strengthen the capacities of its member national societies. The IFRC's work focuses on four core areas: promoting humanitarian values, disaster response, disaster preparedness, and health and community care.

3) **National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.** The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement consists of 190 National Societies, which provide vital humanitarian assistance and support to national authorities. They offer services such as disaster relief, health programs, and aid during armed conflicts, contributing significantly to civil and military resilience.

In all NATO core tasks, the principle of civilian primacy applies to civilian responsibilities. The main authority and responsibility for civil governance and public services always belong to the local national government or HN GOs. IOs, NGOs, and the private sector will support the public administration within the legal framework set by the government. In crisis management, if a national government is unable or unwilling to fulfil its responsibilities IOs and NGOs may step in to support the provision of services.

Government and public administration

National governments are responsible for governing their states and ensuring the functioning of society and the economy to provide for the livelihood and welfare of the population. Their government agencies and public administration enforce laws and regulations to maintain the functioning of their societies and economies. They provide security, essential infrastructure, and public services if not provided by the private sector. Government and public services are generally structured according to functional areas (e.g. ministries, departments) and often subdivided on geographical levels (e.g. national, regional, municipal).

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V. CIMIC contribution to the planning processes

The purpose of planning is to synchronize the actions of forces in time, space and purpose while assessing the vast amount of information provided to achieve objectives. Effective planning incorporates the philosophy of mission command and the manoeuvrist approach^[1].

To plan effectively, CIMIC Staff must be aware of the limited time available and use it judiciously. Therefore, they must ensure that all processed information related to the civil factors of the operating environment is available at all times at their respective levels.

As the capabilities for CIMIC analysis and assessment are limited at both the brigade and division level, it is essential to ensure close coordination with CIMIC subordinates and higher-level CIMIC counterparts (e.g., via VTC or BMS). Therefore, functional area coordination with the CIMIC Staff of different levels will be ensured. This will help to coordinate, synchronize and deconflict CIMIC efforts while facilitating parallel planning at the respective levels.

Although the main role in integrating civil factors into the planning process lies with the CIMIC Staff, civil-military interaction is not limited to CIMIC personnel alone. Therefore, it is crucial for the CIMIC Staff to establish proper cooperation with other staff elements (in particular, but not limited to, staff branches 2 and 3) and staff advisers such as InfoOps/PsyOps, PAO, LEGAD, POLAD, GENAD, MEDAD, PM, Targeting, and StratCom, at their respective levels. A collaborative contribution to a comprehensive approach with non-military actors also has to be considered at all times in order to have access to the assessment of non-military actors and their priorities.

Planning Principles

There are some principles for planning to be highlighted. For experienced planners and practitioners, they might be trivial, but for others, they are important to consider in the process of planning:

1) CIMIC planning does not happen in isolation. The CIMIC Staff is always part of a broader planning team of the respective HQ. At the operational level, planning groups are usually called joint operations planning groups (JOPG). At the land tactical level, they are called land operations planning groups (LOPG). Each HQ does have its standard operating procedures/ instructions (SOP/ SOI) for operations planning groups (OPG) which detail the respective steps, activities and products to be delivered.

2) Planning does not start with “planners” only. A frequent misperception is that upon receipt of a planning task, the plans section starts working (e.g. searching and collecting information) and other sections of the division “wait” for the execution. Upon receiving a planning task, the whole X9 division is activated for the tasks. Like the X5 (Plans) does not do all the planning on its own, the X9 “planner” is supported by the X9 analysts (usually in the operations or knowledge development branches) and liaison elements to provide

information, analysis, and assessment and to use their network to respond to information requirements.

3) Planning does not stop with the execution phase. In fact, an operations plan (OPLAN) is finalised at the end of the OPLAN development. This plan will be executed in phase execution. During execution, planners develop branch plans or sequels for the OPLAN which serve as contingency plans for risks or follow-on-plans for subsequent phases (e.g. a restore phase for liberating occupied territory or a transition phase). Also, a subsequent campaign/change in the campaign theme might trigger follow-up planning.

4) For effective planning, the planner needs to understand operations. A planner mentally conducts an operation in the future. This is why a planner not only needs to master the steps and phases of the planning process, but fully understand CIMIC in operations, see also Chapter 3.

5) Tactical level planning starts with a (warning) order and a clear mission for the tactical commander: The main difference between political, strategic, operational and tactical planning is that ends, ways and means to attain the end state have already been identified. The tactical commander provides the domain-specific military means to contribute to military strategic and operational objectives. He does so by accomplishing an identified mission with assigned capabilities and assets. Tactical planning identifies how to employ these capabilities to accomplish the commander's mission. Consequently, CIMIC tactical planning (and execution) focuses on how to support the commander's mission accomplishment.

Role of the CIMIC Estimate

The CIMIC Estimate^[2] is often misunderstood as a document that covers all aspects of the civil situation. However, due to the complexity of the operating environment and the opaque nature of some of its features, it is impossible to provide a comprehensive description of every aspect. Therefore, the CIMIC estimate is a continuous process executed by CIMIC Staff. It creates the basis for contribution to staff processes and products and serves as a repository of data, information and products concerning the civil factors of the operating environment.

The CIMIC estimate serves as the foundation for the entire CIMIC Staff work. It gives the required context to provide an accurate and detailed CIMIC assessment and advice at all times.

Depending on the scenario, planning may begin well before a potential deployment, and thus the CIMIC estimate must be prepared immediately and requires constant updates.

5.1. CIMIC contribution to operational Planning

The Operational Planning Process (OPP) at operational level follows the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD). The planning process at tactical level follows APP-28 “Tactical Planning for Land Forces”.

The CIMIC Functional Planning Guide (CFPG) applies these processes from the X9/CIMIC personnel perspective. The COPD is usually applied above corps and component command (CC) levels. Under certain conditions, a corps HQ might also choose to use the COPD. However, the COPD is usually applied by joint HQs of the NATO Command Structure (NCS), such as the Joint Force Commands Brunssum, Naples, and Norfolk on the operational level, and by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) for strategic level planning. The CFPG is the reference and prime document for CIMIC contributions to the NATO Response Planning (NRP) and OPP. CIMIC planners must familiarise themselves with the COPD and read the CFPG in conjunction with it.

This chapter is limited to an overview chart of the NRP/ OPP from the political down to operational level to illustrate the complexity of the planning processes from political down to operational level.

5.2. Tactical Planning Process

Different planning processes are utilized at the tactical level. It is important to distinguish between the higher and lower tactical levels, even though there are national planning processes. While the Multi Corps Land Component Command (MCLCC) and above typically use the COPD for planning, units up to corps level routinely use the APP-28.

This chapter aims to offer a standardised approach to planning of operations for units up to the corps level despite the varying sizes and capabilities of different CIMIC Staff due to national planning. As a result, the roles, positions, inputs, activities, and outputs of the CIMIC Staff may also differ.

Tactical Planning

Planning tactical operations for land forces involves an iterative approach that comprises 3 phases and 7 steps, as shown in Figure 5.2. Typically, commanders and staff perform these steps sequentially, but they may need to revisit them as they learn more about the situation before producing a final plan and/ or order. The CIMIC Staff plays a crucial role in this process by updating the CIMIC estimate as a repository throughout the tactical planning phase. This contributes to the CUOE and to the Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (IPOE) with facts, assumptions, conclusions, and recommendations to the commander.




Figure 5.2 - Tactical Planning for Land Forces – Overview

Tactical planning is a dynamic process that involves interrelated activities such as IPOE, targeting, risk management, and more. It integrates the 8 joint functions into a synchronised plan that includes time, space, forces, and information, in order to develop orders for execution. CIMIC plays a crucial role in most of these functions and has to be incorporated into the planning efforts, working groups, and boards to provide appropriate input.

To achieve effective tactical planning, commanders and their staff need to hold regular formal meetings and briefings to discuss, assess, and approve or alter planning efforts as they progress. However, informal interactions between the commander and staff at frequent intervals can also improve understanding of the situation and ensure that the staff's planning efforts adequately reflect the commander's visualisation of the operation. CIMIC Staff should participate in such meetings with the commander to develop a CIMIC mindset and positively influence the commander's intent and the visualisation of the operation in line with a CUOE.

Role of CIMIC Staff

During tactical planning, the CIMIC Staff's focus is on supporting the commander to understand the civil factors of the operating environment, make decisions, and synchronise those decisions with plans and orders. Plans and orders will be issued in many forms and vary in the scope, complexity, time horizon they address. The Operation Order (OPORD) is the means by which planning is directed for execution. At the same time, information releasable to non-military actors should be prepared by CIMIC Staff to inform about the decision taken, if non-military actors need to know or if they reported the topic discussed.

Phases and steps in the tactical planning process

The following section will be divided into the phases and steps. To assure readability the sections will follow the scheme below:

- brief description of the phases and steps
- CIMIC key inputs
- CIMIC key activities
- CIMIC key outputs

5.2.1. Phase 1 – Understanding the Situation and Problem

Step 1 – Receipt of Mission

Description

The primary objective of step 1 is to inform the staff and subordinate formations/units to begin preparing for the planning process, determine which information is already available, and what additional information still needs to be obtained. It also involves preparing for mission analysis.

CIMIC key inputs

- CIMIC relevant aspects in higher HQ's plan or (warning) order, new mission or new tasks anticipated by the commander. **(e.g. assigned tasks and implied tasks [input to other staff functions])**
- CIMIC input, which has an impact on the mission/task in updated CUOE products' own unit and higher HQ. **(sources for own estimate)**
- (start) CIMIC estimate IOT update, de-conflict and synchronise with other staff products and estimates **(possible sources for own estimate)**
- Appropriate NATO(CIMIC) Doctrine Publications, field manuals, SOP's/SOI's, TTPs, Handbooks, **(up to date)**
- Previous Lessons Learned, including Best Practices, from (non-military) partners that have recent experience in the area of operations

CIMIC key activities

- Alert CIMIC Staff and key (civil) participants
- CIMIC Staff to prepare for planning (being part of HQ staff planning group)
- CIMIC Staff (planners) contribute to CUOE **(providing CIMIC Contribution to the Common understanding of the Operational Environment)^[3]**
- Open source information gathering, using also Reach Back (RB) institutions (will continue during whole planning process)
- CIMIC Staff update CIMIC estimate **(repository of all available data, information, etc., concerning the civil environment)** and prepare conclusions based on the Information requirements **(CCIRs, assigned/ implied tasks)**
- CIMIC Staff to initiate and/or contribute to tasks **(own CIMIC elements)** and RFIs when/ where applicable (is part of the whole planning process) **(does another branch or a civil entity can provide information/ can CIMIC support requests of other staff branches)**
- CIMIC Staff (when/ where applicable) contribute to:
 - start on mission timelines and estimate staff planning timelines
 - preparation and execution of receipt of mission briefing
 - preparation of the commander's initial planning guidance
 - initial WNGO
- CMI to respective contributors to the planning, taking into account the responsibility and laws of non-military actors
 - Stability ops: direct liaison of the force with non-military actors
 - On Allied territory CIMIC liaison via HN CIMIC/governmental and public administration to relevant non-military actors (international, national, HN) **(Extended Liaison Matrix), DIRLAUTH**
- Coordination with higher HQ IOT be able to conduct parallel planning efforts

- in case OLRT/ ICE^[4] will be deployed, CIMIC personnel to be included under the principle: “first in – last out”

CIMIC key outputs

- CIMIC contribution (when/ where applicable) to planning group outputs (**CIMIC assessment/ CIMIC advice^[5]**):
 - commander’s initial planning guidance, including approved mission timelines and planning timelines
 - receipt of mission briefing
 - updated actors diagram (social network analysis)
 - tasks and RFI’s (if required)
 - Issue a warning order
- CIMIC estimate (to be continued)

5.2.2. Step 2 – Mission Analysis

Description

There are two sub-steps to mission analysis: order analysis and factor analysis.

CIMIC key Inputs

Sub-step 2A: Order Analysis. Order analysis helps commanders identify *what* the command must accomplish, *when* and *where* the (CIMIC) tasks must be performed, and most importantly *why* (the purpose of the operation). In parallel, the CIMIC Staff will start with sub-step 2B – *Factor Analysis* to assess the influence of these factors on accomplishment of the mission.

- CIMIC Staff retrieve any CIMIC relevant details from higher HQ’s plan, (warning) order, or changed situation that has not been received so far. (**e.g. assigned tasks and implied tasks [input to other staff functions]**)
- CIMIC Staff identify/explore CIMIC-related knowledge products from other organisations or any new information from other relevant non-military actors (e.g. civil conditions to be identified).
- Finally, the CIMIC Staff synchronise and de-conflict with other continuously updated staff estimates IOT its own CIMIC estimate current. (**Meeting Boards^[6]**)

Sub-step 2B: Factor Analysis. In sub-step 2B, the (CIMIC) staff analyses the situation in relation to the formation’s/unit’s mission.

- CIMIC Staff to collect higher HQ’s intelligence and knowledge products to retrieve CIMIC relevant details.
- CIMIC Staff to gather all aspects (factors) with importance for the specific military operation^[7] in part 2a, Order Analysis.

CIMIC (key) Activities

Sub-step 2A: Order Analysis. Order analysis determines the focus for the next sub-step (2B) – *Factor Analysis*. All conclusions or review questions drawn from the order analysis must be addressed during the factor analysis.

CIMIC Staff (when/where applicable) contribute to:

- Analysis of higher commander's plan or order/annexes on CIMIC-specific parts. A key aspect of *Mission Analysis* is identifying what the (CIMIC) formation/unit must do to meet the higher commander's intent. CIMIC staff analyse the following to help determine how to accomplish the mission:
 - Superior commander's intent (two echelons up [**OpOrder/ OPlan**]) and own commanders' (CIMIC) formation's/unit's role in the overall plan
 - Role/Mission of the adjacent (CIMIC) formations/units (if any) and their relationship to the higher headquarters' plan (**assigned tasks**)
 - Determine specified and implied CIMIC tasks (**implied tasks [input to other staff functions]**)
 - Determine any constraints and restraints from a CIMIC perspective (**What needs to be avoided/proclaimed**)
 - Identify critical facts and develop assumptions from a CIMIC perspective (**based on the CIMIC Estimate**)
 - Identify risks, opportunities and critical points from a CIMIC perspective (**Risk analysis/ SWOT analysis**)
 - Support/contribute to establishing the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFIs), tasks (own CIMIC elements), etc. and other requests for information (RFIs) and clarifications. (**CIMIC Assessment and Advice based on the evolving CIMIC Estimate**)
- Contribute to the development of a (restated) mission statement^[8]. This becomes the formation's/unit's mission statement which is a short sentence describing the organisation's essential task and purpose. This will be a guiding statement for CIMIC elements in support to their tasks.
- Contribute to the wording of the commander's initial intent. Commander's initial intent captures the objective and purpose to forces, space, time and other non-military actors.
(**based on the CIMIC Staff activities until this point**)
- Develop additional Commander's Planning Guidance (CPG). This mainly includes support to the development of selection criteria. Selection criteria are 'standards' the commander and staff will later use to measure one COA's relative effectiveness and efficiency compared to others. CIMIC Staff has to include selection criteria which influence the civil environment. These selection criteria can change from mission to mission and must be clearly defined and understood by all staff members before starting the analysis method of the COAs. CIMIC Staff members, focusing on specific functional areas (e.g. fires and force protection), score each COA by using those criteria.
- Prepare the Order Analysis briefing. The Order Analysis briefing should consist of the following for CIMIC Staff to contribute where/when applicable from a CIMIC perspective:
 - The superior commander's intent (2 echelons up) (**OPOrder/ OPLAN**)
 - The higher commander's mission, intent and concept of operations (1 echelon up) (**assigned tasks**)

- The formation's/unit's role/mission in the overall plan (**assigned tasks**)
- Tasks of other formations (**implied tasks [input to other staff functions]**)
- Constraints and restraints (**What needs to be avoided/proclaimed**)
- Facts and assumptions (**based on the CIMIC Estimate**)
- Risks, opportunities and critical points (**Risk and factor analysis/ SWOT analysis**)
- Initial CCIRs
- How the changing situation might affect the commanders' mission
- CIMIC input to the restated Mission statement
- CIMIC input to the commander's initial intent (**based on the CIMIC Staff activities until this point**)
- CIMIC input to the additional commander's guidance

Sub-step 2B. Factor Analysis. In this step, the staff analyses the situation about the formation's/unit's mission.

CIMIC staff (when/ where applicable) contribute to:

- Staff analysis on specific parts of the order and annexes (when it has CIMIC relevance). The CIMIC Staff conducts an order analysis from a CIMIC perspective on the main text and relevant annexes (e.g. Annex W) of the higher HQ order, mainly regarding:
 - Assigned and implied CIMIC tasks
 - Constraints and restraints
 - Facts and assumptions
 - Risks, opportunities, and critical points
 - CCIRs
- Review of other non-military actors' capacities and capabilities. Review civil environment (based on the Seven Baseline Requirements [7BLR] or politic, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure from PMESII). Review civil considerations such as areas, structures, capabilities, organisations, people, and events (ASCOPE) to identify critical vulnerabilities to protect. This has a direct link to Cross-Cutting Topics.
- Review troops and support available to identify capability shortfalls and vulnerabilities to protect. This analysis should include capabilities of civilian and military organisations (joint, special operations, and multinational) that operate within the formation's/unit's AOO/AOI^[9]. CIMIC Staff focus on the non-military actors. CIMIC Staff may also contribute to a Centre of Gravity (COG) analysis of own troops to identify critical friendly vulnerabilities when time and personnel are available. In COA development, measures should be developed to protect any vulnerabilities identified.
- Identify risks and begin risk assessment. CIMIC Staff to develop specific measures to mitigate risks from a CIMIC perspective, occurring in COA development, but may be optional depending on time and personnel available. (**Risk analysis**)
- Develop/assist CCIRs. CCIRs cover all aspects of the commander's concern, including EEFI^[10]. (**CIMIC Assessment and Advice based on the evolving CIMIC Estimate**)
- Support the development of the initial Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP) IOT deconflict with S/G/J2 which topics will be described by CIMIC. The ICP details collection priorities and resources to be tasked and sets in motion in addition to CIMIC reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations. It may be issued as

part of a WNGO, FRAGO, or an OPORD. **(information gaps/ needs of the civil environment)**

- Prepare the Mission Analysis Brief (MAB). CIMIC Staff Officer presents a summary of the running CIMIC estimates for their specific functional area (including civil environment considerations) and how their findings impact, or are impacted, by other functional areas. **(comprises CIMIC Assessment and Advice on the most relevant points)**
- Develop additional CPG. As more information becomes available, the commander and staff refine their initial plan for using available time. From this, they determine windows of opportunity for exploitation, times when the formation/unit will be especially at risk of enemy activity, or “when action to arrest deterioration in the local civilian environment may be required”.
- Contribute to the development of a WNGO, depending on the situation, the WNGO may contain:
 - The approved restated mission statement. **(check for CIMIC implications)**
 - The commander’s initial intent. **(check for implications from a CIMIC perspective)**
 - Changes to the task organisation . **(check for implications for CIMIC elements)**
 - The formation/ unit AOO (sketch, overlay, or some other description). **(check for implications on CIMIC elements and CIMIC tasks)**
 - IPOE planning products and overlays, including CCIRs. **(check for CIMIC input/contribution when delivered)**
 - Risk mitigation guidance. **(check implications for CIMIC risk assessment)**
 - Initial information collection plan. **(check implications for CIMIC elements)**
 - Movements/actions to initiate. **(check implications for CIMIC elements)**
- Commander’s initial Back-Brief^[11]. Phase 1 concludes with the lower commander (subordinate) providing a back brief to his higher commander to ensure they have a shared understanding of both the mission and intent. The CIMIC subordinated units/elements can utilise this tool to, e.g., forward respective requests, seek clarification, and express major concerns.

Valid for whole step 2.

- CIMIC Staff will provide additional input to the Liaison and Coordination Matrix.
- CIMIC Staff should initiate their own tasks (CIMIC Elements) and RFIs when/where applicable and contribute, if needed, to other RFIs.
- CIMIC Staff should conduct functional area coordination (CICOM format via VTC) IOT coordinate, synchronise and de-conflict CIMIC contributions with the MAB, the CIMIC estimate and other CIMIC parallel planning efforts.
- CIMIC Staff has to facilitate consultation with relevant non-military actors in order to advise the planning group and incorporate relevant civil input into the planning process where needed (to be coordinated with higher HQ).

CIMIC (key) outputs

- Updated CIMIC estimate **(Main Effort)**
- Other efforts are the CIMIC contribution (when/where applicable) to planning group outputs:
 - issue commander’s initial intent
 - deliver order analysis briefing

- deliver MAB, including conclusions from order analysis, evaluation of factors – including key CIMIC-related factor analysis (civil environment considerations) that is part of CIMIC estimate
- issue revised CPG: can include selection criteria for COA development and guidance on COA development
- deliver commander's initial back brief to higher commander
- issue tasks and RFI's (if required)

Phase 2 – Consider and develop Courses of Action (COA)

5.2.3. Step 3 – COA Development

Description

In the process of developing a CIMIC plan, the planners use several inputs, including the mission statement, commander's intent, planning guidance, conclusions of the CUOE and the evaluation of CIMIC factors analysis.^[12] These inputs are used to create various options for the commander to choose from. The purpose of this step is to provide the commander with options for accomplishing the mission.

CIMIC Key Inputs

- CIMIC relevance of:
 - steps 1 and 2 outputs: Mission Statement and Commander's Initial Intent
 - other staff running estimates (IOT update CIMIC estimate)
 - updated facts assumptions and CCIRs
 - any new information from the higher HQ, adjacent units, own and attached units
 - any new information from any other relevant non-military actors
 - revised CPG: Selection criteria for COA development and Commander's COA development guidance
 - assigned and implied tasks and essential tasks
 - updated CUOE
 - COG analysis (optional)

CIMIC (key) Activities

- CIMIC Staff (when applicable) contribute to choosing a COA development method that can include:
 - assess relative combat power
 - generate options: brainstorming, movie-method or war-gaming
 - establish a CIMIC CONOPS once COAs has been formulated (optional depending on time and personnel available)
 - array forces
 - assign tasks (and, as required, headquarters), e.g. linked to required CIMIC task organisation (assets, units)
 - develop CIMIC contribution to COA Statements and Sketches (will lead to development of adversary COA's including most likely and most dangerous)
 - create mitigation factors, e.g. collective efforts to minimize collateral damage and enhance Protection of Civilians (PoC) and look into other CCTs

- prepare CIMIC contribution to the COA briefing
- COA validation
- CIMIC staff to continuously contribute to the Liaison and Coordination Matrix
- CIMIC staff to initiate tasks and RFIs when/ where applicable
- CIMIC Staff to direct/ guide CIMIC elements
- CIMIC Staff to support planning group in identifying and analyse effects of relevant complementary non-military actors' actions, including NATO, on the operating environment
- CIMIC Staff to conduct and participate in functional area coordination IOT coordinate the CIMIC input for each COA and further synchronise CIMIC parallel planning efforts.

CIMIC (key) Outputs

- CIMIC contribution (when/ where applicable) to planning group outputs:
 - COA briefing
 - friendly COAs including sketches
 - adversary (enemy) ACOAs including sketches
 - COA comparison products
 - updated assumptions and CCIRs
 - revised CPG
 - tasks and RFI's (if required)
 - Force Generation Process
 - Updated CIMIC estimate

5.2.4. Step 4 – COA Analysis

Description

The purpose of COA analysis is to enable commanders and staffs to identify difficulties, coordination issues, or probable consequences of planned actions for each COA being considered.^[13]

CIMIC key Inputs

- CIMIC relevance from:
 - steps 1, 2 and 3 outputs: Revised planning guidance, accepted COA's for further analysis, COA statements and sketches
 - refined ACOA's
 - updated assumptions
 - updated other staff running estimates (IOT update own CIMIC estimate)
 - any new information from higher HQ, adjacent units, own, and attached units
 - any new information from any other relevant non-military actors

CIMIC (key) Activities

- CIMIC Staff (when/ where applicable) contribute to:
 - select analysis technique
 - select adversary courses of action (ACOA) to compare

- select critical events and decision points to analyse
- select analysis method
- list assumptions and CCIRs
- conduct COA analysis – define if CIMIC can support and what the CIMIC preferred option is (including mitigation factors, see step 3)
- summarize what is recorded and assess the results
- refine selected COAs – is this the CIMIC preferred COA as the best option, and are mitigation factors included to minimize collateral damage and maximize PoC?
- CIMIC Staff to initiate RFIs when/where needed
- CIMIC Staff to direct/ guide CIMIC elements

CIMIC (key) Outputs

- CIMIC contribution (when/where applicable) to planning group outputs:
 - refined COAs
 - updated potential DPs
 - COA analysis results
 - updated assumptions and CCIRs
 - revised CPG
 - deliver COA analysis briefing (optional)
 - tasks and RFIs (if required)
- Updated CIMIC estimate

5.2.5. Step 5 – COA Comparison

Description

The purpose of conducting a COA comparison is to compare friendly COAs against adversary COAs in an objective manner, using criteria approved by the commander. The aim is to evaluate all COAs independently and identify their strengths and weaknesses. The CIMIC Staff must ensure that they can support all possible COAs and respond to possible ACOAs.

CIMIC key Inputs

- CIMIC relevance from:
 - steps 1-4 outputs
 - updated other staff running estimates (IOT update own CIMIC estimate)
 - refined COAs
 - evaluation criteria
 - COA's analysis results
 - updated assumptions and CCIRs
 - any new information from higher HQ, adjacent units, own, and attached units
 - any new information from any other relevant non-military actors
 - revised CPG

CIMIC (key) Activities

- CIMIC Staff (when/ where applicable) contribute to:
 - determine COA advantages and disadvantages analysis
 - compare and rate friendly COA's in different contexts
 - compare COA's performance/risk against ACOA's
 - compare COA's against the commander's COA selection criteria
 - identify the staff's preferred COA (e.g. including providing the most secure and stable environment for civilians in the area of operations)
 - prepare a COA decision brief
- CIMIC Staff to provide CIMIC relevant information to be known to the whole staff reflected in CONOPS (continue drafting Annex W and certain Appendices)
- CIMIC Staff to direct/ guide CIMIC elements
- CIMIC Staff to initiate RFIs when/where applicable
- CIMIC Staff to facilitate consultation with relevant civil organisations in preparation for the development of the appendices (app) to Annex W – to include, but not limited to App 3 and 4 (need to be coordinated with higher HQ). Be prepared to structure according to the 7BLR.

CIMIC (key) Outputs

- CIMIC estimate (to be continued)
- CIMIC contribution (when/where applicable) to planning group outputs:
 - COA decision brief
 - General:
 - intent, including one up in the chain of command (2-up approach)
 - mission, intent and CONOPS 1-up
 - conclusions and results updated IPOE
 - a (restated) Mission Statement Who, What, Where, When, Why
 - constraints and restraints
 - facts and assumptions
 - risks, opportunities and critical points
 - list of CCIRs
 - For each COA:
 - commander's intent
 - CONOPS (including CIMIC part)
 - TASKORG (including CIMIC Task organisation)
 - summary of COA analysis
 - residual risks which are associated with the COA – If existing or tasked by higher command and contribute to the Assessment Measuring (G10)
 - Recommended COA by the staff:
 - tasks and RFIs (if required)

Phase 3 – Communication

5.2.6. Step 6 – Commander's Decision

Description

In Step 6, the commander selects a COA for the staff to develop into a plan. After the COA Decision Briefing (see previous step), the commander selects the COA that (in his judgment and experience) will best accomplish the mission.^[14]

CIMIC key Inputs

- CIMIC relevance from:
 - steps 1-5 outputs:
 - àevaluated COAs
 - àrecommended COA
 - àupdated CUOE
 - updated other staff running estimates (IOT update own CIMIC estimate)
 - assumptions and CCIRs
 - any new information from higher HQ, adjacent units, own, and attached units
 - any new information from any other relevant non-military actors
 - revised CPG

CIMIC (key) Activities

- CIMIC Staff (when/ where applicable) contribute to:
 - commander's decision on COA
 - commander's preparation of his final planning guidance (including which contingencies still needs to be planned and developed – branches and sequels and how the OPLAN/OPORD needs to be processed and issued
 - develop WNGO
- CIMIC Staff to initiate tasks and RFIs when/where applicable
- CIMIC Staff to direct/guide CIMIC elements
- Although CCTs are a HQ-wide responsibility CIMIC Staff, as the HQ coordinator for CCT, to assure that for the CONOPS all CCT relevant information is covered on the same way as described for CIMIC and to produce (if needed) an appropriate Annex
- CIMIC Staff to conduct/participate in functional area coordination IOT coordinate the CIMIC input in the approved COA/ CONOPS and final CPG

CIMIC (key) Outputs

- CIMIC contribution (when/where applicable) to planning group outputs:
 - commander-approved COA and any modifications
 - refined commander's final intent and CCIR's
 - issue final CPG
 - back brief decision to higher commander (if time or ordered)
 - RFI's (if required)
- Issue a Warning Order

5.2.7. Step 7 – Transition

Description

The purpose of Step 7 is to produce and transition the plan from the planning cell to the current operations cell, issue the order, and ensure subordinates' understanding of the

upcoming operation. The staff prepares plans and orders by turning the selected COA into a clear, concise CONOPS with the required supporting information. The selected COA sketch becomes the basis for the operation overlay.

CIMIC key Inputs

- CMI/CIMIC relevance from:
 - steps 1-6 outputs, including updated IPOE, commander-approved COA and any modifications,
 - refined commander's final intent and CCIRs
 - updated other staff running estimates (IOT update own CIMIC Estimate)
 - updated assumptions and CCIRs
 - any new information from higher HQ, adjacent units, own, and attached units
 - any new information from any other relevant (civil) actors
 - final CPG

CIMIC (key) Activities

- CIMIC Staff (when/ where applicable) contribute to:
 - plans and orders reconciliation
 - approving the plan and/or orders
 - transition the operations plan or OPORD from the planning cell to the operations cell
 - prepare and issue the order
 - prepare back briefs and conduct rehearsals (optional)
 - prepare FRAGOs as required^[15]
- CIMIC Staff to transfer direction & guidance from HQ G9 (from plans to ops) to CIMIC elements
- CIMIC Staff to conduct functional area coordination IOT finalizing the contribution to the Main Body of the OPLAN, the CIMIC relevant Annexes of the OPLAN and the final draft of Annex W.

CIMIC (key) Outputs

- CIMIC contribution (when/ where applicable) to planning group outputs:
 - ANNEX W and an approved operations plan or OPORD
 - FRAGO's (as required)
 - deliver back briefs (optional)

[1] see APP-28 page 1-1 to 1-3

[2] See Annex 8.5 CIMIC Estimate repository

[3] For more information see AM-86-1-1, p.17-p.19

[4] Operational liaison and reconnaissance team/ Initial command element

[5] For definition see Lexicon

[6] See SOP Battle Rhythm respective unit

[7] For more information see AM-86-1-1, p.17-p.19

[8] When restated it needs to be approved by the higher echelon.

[9] See NATO Term for AOO and AOI. Thus, AOI covers the area of potential upcoming AOO.

[10] Essential elements of friendly information

[11] See SOP for briefing of the respective unit (e.g. Battle Management Systems, like SitaWare HQ or ELIAS and others)

[12] The branches in charge of for this are X2 (Intelligence), X3 (Operations) and X5 (Plans)

[13] The branches in charge for this step are G/J2 (Intelligence), G/J3 (Operations) and G/J5 (Plans).

[14] The branches in charge for this step are X/J2 (Intelligence), X3 (Operations) and X5 (Plans).

[15] If applicable CIMIC staff can initiate a CIMIC related FRAGO, staffed and authorized by respective staff authority (G3 or COS).

VI. Cross-Cutting Topics and Human Security

Executive Summary

This chapter outlines the importance of Cross-Cutting Topics (CCTs) and Human Security in NATO operations, emphasising the role of CIMIC (J9). CCTs encompass themes outside traditional military tasks but are essential for mission success and legitimacy, such as Protection of Civilians (PoC), Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), Cultural Property Protection (CPP), Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (CTHB), and Building Integrity (BI). Human Security acts as the overall framework, focusing on protecting individuals' dignity and basic needs in mission areas. NATO takes a more population-centric approach to security, where minimising negative impacts on civilians is crucial. CIMIC plays a vital role by gathering, analysing, and sharing information about the civilian environment at both tactical and operational levels. Through observations, reporting, and planning, fieldworkers and staff improve understanding, reduce risks, and ensure adherence to international law. Integrating CCTs into every stage of planning and execution enhances operational effectiveness, legitimacy, and supports sustainable stability.

6.1. Cross-Cutting Topics and Human Security

Introduction

The term Cross-Cutting Topics (CCT) refers to a range of different topics that could affect the mission in a number of ways, but which fall outside of the military's primary responsibilities. Different military disciplines, branches, and command levels may have to consider and address a variety of CCTs. As described in the NATO AJP 01 (Ed F, vs.1), the current CCTs are comprised of Protection of Civilians (PoC), Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), Cultural Property Protection (CPP), Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (CTHB) and Building Integrity (BI).

Human Security is a development topic within NATO. According to NATO's current Human Security Guiding Principles, the focus is on areas where the Alliance can be most effective: PoC, CAAC, CPP, CRSV, and CTHB.[1]


Although the planning and execution of activities related to the CCTs are the responsibility of the commander and all subordinate branches and units, CIMIC (J9) has a strong link with CCTs. Integrating Civil Factors is one of CIMIC's core activities. During all phases of the Comprehensive Operational Planning process, CIMIC representatives should ensure that these aspects are part of the planning, plans, and execution. Information exchange through Civil Military Interaction, CIMIC's other core function, will be done with HNs, IOs, GOs and NGOs. By collecting all information related to the CCTs, CIMIC branches and units can build a picture of the civil environment in support of the decisions of the commander.

The Cross-Cutting Topics

In this chapter, we examine each cross-cutting topic. We will explain them in general terms and provide a vignette of how they are used in operational practice.

PoC: Protection of Civilians

PoC is an overarching principle guiding both military personnel and aid workers. It closely aligns with the Responsibility to Protect. The most effective way to protect civilians is to bring an end to violent conflicts, build trust and confidence among parties in peaceful solutions, and advance peace processes and national reconciliation. PoC focuses on three Lenses: 1: Mitigate Harm (MH)^[2], 2: Facilitate Access to Basic Needs, 3: Contribute to a Safe and Secure environment.



All efforts taken to avoid, minimize and mitigate the negative effects on persons, objects and services by own and adversary actions and to protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence.

Although MH is the lens through which the military can make a difference by its own actions, CIMIC also observes, analyses, and reports on the two other elements of PoC (“Facilitate access to Basic needs” and “contribute to a safe and secure environment”) to support understanding of the relevant Civil Factors.

To operationalise protection of civilians, operators should take their own behaviour into account. All activities that could put civilians in danger should be considered. That could include a threat as a secondary effect of our own activities on our own territory, a threat from adversaries against civilians and critical infrastructure.

Vignette: Platoon-leader Jones is about to establish her command post in the parking lot of a water treatment plant. Although this location provides all the necessities for her platoon, it also poses a risk of being targeted and causing collateral damage to the vital civilian infrastructure, the plant. She should reconsider the location to reduce harm to civilians.

CAAC: Children and Armed Conflict

Protection of children affected by armed conflict.

Children are involved in and affected by conflicts in different ways. They are always victims and need to be protected, even when they may be perpetrators of crimes.

In order to advance the goal of protecting children during armed conflict and ending the impunity of perpetrators, the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) #1612 identifies six categories of grave violations – known as the six grave violations, which form the basis of evidence-gathering and monitoring. These are: killing and maiming of children; abduction of children; forced association of children by armed forces or armed groups; sexual violence; Attacks on schools and hospitals and staff; denial of humanitarian access to children.

Killing and maiming of children; Recruitment or use of children as soldiers; Sexual violence against children; Abduction of children; Attacks against schools or hospitals; Denial of humanitarian access for children.

A child means “every human being below the age of 18 years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”.

In many conflicts, children forced into service by armed groups directly take part in combat. However, their role is often not limited to fighting. Many children are also used in support functions that also involve great risk and hardship. Moreover, the use of children in acts of terrorism, including as suicide bombers, has emerged.

Understanding who is affected and how they are affected can lead to better addressing the specific needs of children. Therefore, sound analysis of children’s involvement, their needs, and rights, as well as information and knowledge exchange with other units and non-military actors, is indispensable for a comprehensive understanding of those Civil Factors.

To operationalise Children and Armed Conflict, operators must ensure that CAAC-related items are included in the planning, plans and execution of the mission. Meanwhile operators should diligently observe violations of the six grave violations. If observed, they should report them through appropriate channels and present them to current non-military actors in the JOA, such as local authorities, UNICEF, ICRC, or War Child.

Vignette: During a conversation between a CIMIC staff member and a teacher at the city's secondary school, it emerged that there had recently been a high dropout rate among young girls. He also mentioned rumours circulating that a criminal organisation was recruiting these young girls for prostitution. This CIMIC staff member filed a report and discussed the incident with the local police commander and UNICEF representative. This case constitutes one of the six grave violations.

CPP: Cultural Property Protection

To protect and respect cultural property by own actions and to avoid, as much as possible, the risks to cultural property caused by others.

Based upon the Hague conventions of 1954 and its additional protocols, NATO embraced the protection of Cultural Property during armed conflict

Cultural property (CP) is an integral part of a people's identity. It can reflect their heritage, their values, or their religion. At the same time, it is fragile and, if damaged, might be irreparable. Therefore, it requires constant and careful consideration and protection during a mission. Protection of Cultural Property should also pay attention to intangible cultural heritage, such as performing arts, rituals, festive events, etc. Intangible cultural heritage is important in maintaining cultural diversity in the face of growing globalisation. An understanding of the intangible cultural heritage of different communities helps with intercultural dialogue and encourages mutual respect for other ways of life.

CPP refers to all measures to protect cultural property against damage, destruction, theft, embezzlement, or other loss. In the context of immovable cultural property, the term "monument protection" is used. Bound by international law and its positive contribution to a safe and secure environment, the military, and especially CIMIC, must take both a support position and a proactive stand regarding CPP.

Illicit trade in all kinds of art can be a source of income for (illegal) armed actors and, as such, is directly connected to the duration of an armed conflict.

CIMIC analysis and assessment of CP factors are integral aspects of the understanding of the operating environment and, therefore, indispensable for the protection of CP and, eventually, mission success.^[3]

To operationalise CPP, operators should begin preparations in Peacetime. Identification and listing of CP in the JOA are important for understanding the civil environment. Preferably, this should be in cooperation with local museums and authorities. During the planning of kinetic operations the CIMIC/J9 representative must monitor and advise the commander to ensure that CP remains as safe as possible from damage or destruction.

Vignette: Aircraft next to the City of Ur/ Iraq 1991

During the First Gulf War, the Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein placed two military aircraft next to the heritage site of Ur. Although aircraft are a legitimate military target, coalition commanders decided not to attack them in this case. As no runway was nearby, the aircraft were effectively put out of action. Therefore, the damage to the ancient temple would be disproportionate to the value of the destruction of the aircraft.

Source: UNESCO Military Manual (2016).

WPS: Women, Peace and Security

Promotes a gender perspective, the protection of women and their equal and meaningful participation in peace processes, peacebuilding and security.

The WPS agenda of today is the product of more than a century of international women's peace activism. The agenda, which integrates gender perspectives and gender mainstreaming, started with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 in 2000, followed by several related Resolutions.^[4]

The foundation of the WPS agenda builds on two separate but equal concepts: protection from sexual violence and increasing participation of women in all areas (political, social, military and economic). If integrated, implemented and interconnected, these concepts provide the baseline for gender equality.

Special attention to the role women play in society might be an igniter for the peace process and provide additional essential information.

The latest NATO Policy on WPS, adopted in 2024, continues to make gender-responsive leadership and accountability cornerstones of implementation. It requires commanders and senior staff to integrate gender perspectives into operational planning and to link leadership evaluation with ethical and inclusive behaviour. The policy also addresses emerging challenges, such as Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV). Online harassment, sexualised disinformation, and cyber manipulation pose threats to both personnel and civilians, weakening morale, trust, and collective well-being. By addressing these risks, the 2024 WPS policy ensures that inclusion and accountability extend into the digital domain, keeping WPS relevant to modern security challenges.

To operationalise WPS, operators must ensure that WPS-related items are included in the planning, plans and execution of the mission. Observe the roles of women in society, cases of sexual violence in the JOA, and assess gender-based differences in the community. Identify and Liaise with WPS-related non-military actors in the JOA. Report cases of sexual violence with appropriate authorities. Understand the demography in the JOA.

Vignette: During the mission, it emerged that the enemy was posting doctored, sexually suggestive videos of NATO's female military leaders, intended to portray these officers, the mission, and NATO in a negative light. This form of technology-facilitated gender-based violence is intolerable, punishable, and reprehensible. The units involved are working together with non-military authorities to stop this form of sexual violence and to launch a campaign promoting the quality of our female leaders and the value of gender balance.

CRSV: Conflict-Related Sexual Violence

CRSV is frequently, deliberately and strategically used to target civilians.

CRSV is defined by NATO as rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, forced sterilisation, forced marriage, and any other form of sexual violence of comparable severity perpetrated against women, men, girls, or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict.[5]

In conflict and post-conflict contexts, sexual violence is employed as a weapon of war, torture, terror, and political repression. Certain groups are particularly vulnerable to CRSV, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), widows, migrants, sexual and gender minorities (LGBTQI+ individuals), homosexuals, female-headed households, detainees (including prisoners of war), persons with disabilities, and specific ethnic and minority groups. While CRSV is often discussed in relation to civilians, it can also target military personnel, including POWs, impacting morale, cohesion, and operational effectiveness.

CRSV is not merely a gross violation of human rights but also a significant security threat. Wartime rape causes displacement, undermines governance, and destabilises communities, hampering peace negotiations, preventing post-conflict reconciliation, and endangering long-term stability.

CIMIC could enhance further data collection and awareness-raising on the links between gender inequalities, levels of violence against women, men, boys, and girls, and the potential for violent conflict, including CRSV. This may impact both civilians and military personnel and aims to better inform protection, prevention, and operational planning.

To operationalise CRSV, operators must ensure that CRSV-related items are included in the planning, plans and execution of the mission. Identify and liaise with CRSV-related non-military actors (Host Nation, UN Women, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNHCR, etc.) in the JOA. Understand links between conflict and Sexual violence, protection risks, gender dynamics and social attitudes. Collect sex-disaggregated data. Report violations of IH and LOAC, potential war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity.

Vignette: During a routine CIMIC key leader engagement (KLE) with local community representatives in an IDP camp, a female community leader privately informs the CIMIC team that several women in the camp were raped at night. The alleged perpetrators are members of a local partner security force that NATO is mentoring. Victims are afraid to report the crimes due to fear of retaliation and lack of trust in local police. She asks for protection but insists the information remain confidential.

CIMIC must immediately report via: Chain of Command, Gender Advisor (GENAD), Legal Advisor (LEGAD) and Human Rights Advisor (if present)


SEA: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

Focuses on own behaviour – NATO prohibited its own personnel from engaging in or facilitating any form of SEA.

Sexual harassment and exploitation have been longstanding challenges for militaries worldwide, including NATO. In recent years, NATO has made a concerted effort to reduce gender disparities and tackle/ prevent from sexual exploitation and harassment.

Sexual Exploitation is defined by NATO as any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.

Sexual Abuse is any actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.



The SEA policy clearly sets out NATO's zero-tolerance approach, defines unacceptable behaviours, measures for prevention, and how allies will work collectively to ensure accountability. Member states are responsible for all investigations of sexual misconduct complaints and for follow-up actions, including any penalties, with NATO itself providing only preliminary investigations.

The policy emphasises that sexual harassment and exploitation are against the inherent principles and values of NATO and put the organisation and its missions at risk. Thus, the policy requires that potential risks be identified, assessed, and addressed during mission planning, and that all reasonable efforts be made to mitigate the danger and, therefore, make it subject to CIMIC as well.

To operationalise SEA, operators must ensure that SEA-related items are included in the planning, plans and execution of the mission. Report cases of Sexual Exploitation or Abuse to the commander. Observe the behaviour of own forces. Identify the need for training and liaise with leadership.

CTHB: Combating Trafficking in Human Beings

All efforts taken to prevent, mitigate, counter and respond to trafficking in human beings.

Trafficking in human beings means the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of people by force, fraud, or deception, with the aim of exploiting them for profit.^[6]

Human trafficking is not the same as people smuggling. Smugglers bring migrants across borders for payment and with the migrants' consent. In practice, the distinction between victims of human trafficking and smuggled individuals is often difficult to make. Despite the initial voluntary nature of the trafficked, this often leads to slavery. To repay the costs of trafficking to their smugglers, the trafficked persons are usually forced into slavery or servitude. Similarly, many victims of human trafficking can be refugees, and vice versa.

Human trafficking has far-reaching consequences for a person's safety and dignity. Fragile states, forced or irregular migration, poverty, discrimination, and a lack of rule of law are just some of the factors that act as a fertile breeding ground for human trafficking. However, human trafficking is also a source of financing for armed conflicts and violent extremism, which in turn can increase conflict and fragility.

Human trafficking can also negatively impact a mission's credibility and legitimacy, the integrity and safety of soldiers, the achievement of long-term stability, peace, and overall mission success. Therefore, NATO must consider the various aspects of CTHB in the planning and execution of its missions, including the efforts and commitments of other international organisations to prevent and combat it.

A sound, concerted analysis and assessment of CTHB by CIMIC will contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the civil environment and thus support the prevention and combating of it. Moreover, it may prevent the accidental involvement or facilitation of NATO members in human trafficking.

To operationalise CTHB, operators must ensure that CTHB-related items are included in the planning, plans and execution of the mission. Create a map of agencies and organisations that can respond in cases of human trafficking. Liaise with local authorities and non-military actors to identify and understand the presence of human trafficking in the JOA. Report observations of violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) to the appropriate authorities.

Vignette: During a CIMIC engagement with a mayor in a liberated town, the mayor reports that civilians (mainly foreign seasonal workers and displaced persons) are being rounded up in nearby villages. He claims that they are transported toward the frontline and forced to dig anti-tank trenches, load ammunition, and repair damaged defensive positions. Some are placed near military assets to deter NATO strikes. Families are threatened if they refuse.

Satellite imagery later confirms increased civilian presence near enemy logistics hubs.

BI: Building Integrity

Promote good governance and implement the principles of integrity, transparency and accountability.

BI is a measure to fight corruption without reducing the efficiency of the security apparatus. It focuses on motivation rather than punishment. The NATO BI programme provides practical tools to reduce the risk of corruption in the defence and security sectors. It promotes good practices, processes and methodologies and provides countries with tailored support to make defence and security institutions more effective and efficient.

Corruption in the joint operation area is not only a risk for the mission personnel but also undermines all stabilisation efforts due to its strong link to terrorism, criminal organisations and armed opposition groups. Corruption provides resources (e.g. financial and human) for these groups and affects the efficiency of local security forces and governmental institutions. Fighting corruption helps to establish a safe and secure environment. Moreover, supporting a BI programme could increase public trust in the mission through higher legitimacy. This means that the local population will be more likely to accept and support the mission. These aspects will contribute to force security and more sustainable mission results. Corruption is a major source of social unrest, fuels regional conflict and acts as a key source of instability. There is a clear correlation between corruption, violence and instability. The most corrupt countries in the world often are the scene of insurgencies, extremist activity, or other threats to international security.

BI requires analysis capacities and progress to be assessed. Most of the BI-related factors are situated outside the military realm and become subject to CIMIC. Therefore, CIMIC supports the inclusion of integrity concerns, which might be particularly relevant when interacting with the civil environment and have to be considered during assessment.^[7]

Vignette: A CIMIC team receives complaints from local business owners and municipal officials that one contractor supplying fuel to NATO is owned by a relative of a local defence official. Prices are inflated 40% above market value. Fuel deliveries are irregular. There are rumours that part of the fuel is diverted and sold on the black market. The contractor operates near critical military infrastructure.

Human Security

Human Security has been around in the UN context since 1994, but mainly in a development context. It began as an effort to move away from the dominant “national security” approach of competing states and geopolitical blocs and to present a framework for understanding what security might mean for individuals. It aimed to promote well-being as much as provide protection by reshaping and redirecting security practices and resources. It is based on the idea that humans should have freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity.

Human Security places the human being at the centre, considering that the primary foundation of peace and security rests on satisfying the basic needs of all persons, enabling them to fully exercise their social, cultural, political and economic rights, and being governed by legitimate authorities. Accordingly, it includes economic, nutritional, health, environmental, personal, community and political dimensions.



For NATO, the term human security refers to risks and threats to populations where NATO has operations, missions or activities and how to mitigate and respond to them.^[1] Human Security stems from NATO’s PoCs concept and the idea that everything we do needs to be population-centric. It means that NATO takes a proactive approach to protection and that the affected people have to be at the heart of all that we do. NATO recognises the importance of

reducing the impact of its actions on civilians in conflict zones and elsewhere where it is conducting activities.

In 2022, NATO adopted a framing document outlining its approach to human security, bringing together the CCTs: PoCs, CAAC, CRSV, CPP and CRSV, as well as an overarching gender perspective.

Fieldworker: CCT and understanding the civil environment

Field workers have an important role in building an understanding of the Civil Factors of the Operating Environment. The main role is collecting information from the local population and relevant military and non-military partners. Focusing on CCTs will provide you with a wide range of topics necessary for creating an understanding of the operating environment. The CCTs explicitly mentioned in the mandate of the exercise or in the orders should be given extra attention. Reporting forms for this purpose may be own, nationally developed, or the forms available in the CIMIC Handbook.

To build an understanding of the Civil Factors, PMESII/ASCOPE should be used. Tactical units may also consider creating a soldier card for CCT-related observations to enable more structured mapping of environment-specific and mission-related aspects.

The reporting of observations by the field worker serves three important purposes. Firstly, the observations supplement and strengthen the Comprehensive Understanding of the Operating Environment (CUOE). Secondly, the observations can be used to inform HNs, IOs, NGOs, and other humanitarian players in the mission area about CCT-related aspects that require attention. Finally, the reports of the observations may serve as battlefield evidence for possible future prosecutions under IHL, international criminal law, or domestic law.

A field worker does not play a direct role in the unit's planning. However, they can also participate in the development of a Cultural Property List, Critical National Infrastructure List, and Partners/Contacts (IO/ GO/ NGO) list. To understand the mission's tasks and objectives, the fieldworker should be familiar with the Ops order and/or Joint Coordination Order (JCO) as well as additional FRAGOs. This knowledge includes not only the CCT-related assignments but also the unit's general mission. The main Annex for CIMIC-related tasks and information is Annex W.

Background documents: See the overview under the Staff Workers Chapter.

Staff worker: CCT in plan development and execution

In general, J9 is responsible for ensuring that CCTs, although a whole-HQ responsibility, are duly considered throughout the planning process. This includes identifying and assessing all possible impacts the emerging crisis, its actors, as the HQ's own operations may have on CCTs.

Strategic Plan Development: J9 staff must facilitate the consideration of CCTs in all stages and products of planning, ensuring that CCTs are covered by all OAs and OEs. If required, dedicated Annexes for CCTs might be developed on an exception basis.

Operations Plan Development (Phase 4A): The focus should be on ensuring CCT requirements are considered in operational actions and covered by the achievement of defined operational effects. If additional information is required, the JOPG should evaluate the by the CIMIC Staff developed Annexes/appendices. The Staff worker is participating in the development of Annexe W and additional appendices focusing on CCT-related content.

Execution (Phase 5): Staff continue developing the Understanding of the Civil environment. The Staff worker participates in relevant Working Groups and boards (e.g., Joint Targeting Coordination Board, Joint Defended Assets Working Group, Force Protection Working Group, and others, as required), with special attention to information relevant to the CCTs. If required, the Staff worker will participate in the Crisis Action Team during a crisis and time-sensitive action.

For details about planning, see Chapter 5 of this handbook

Relevant documents

PoC

- PO(2016) 0407 NATO Policy for POC dated 9 July 2016
- PO(2017) 0055 Action plan for the implementation of the NATO policy for the protection of civilians dated 6 Feb 2017
- MC 0668 Concept for the Protection of Civilians dated 25 April 2018
- BI-SC Dir 086-006: Implementing protection of Civilians in NATO operations, missions and activities dated 14 Sept 2022
- PoC Handbook dated 2019

CAAC

- NATO Policy on Children and Armed Conflict dated 12 July 2023
- PO (2015) 0165 Final Approval of prot. CAAC Way Forward dated 27 May 2015
- MCM-0104-2015 action plan
- MCM-0016-2012, Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), dated 10 July 2012
- BI-SC Dir 086-004 Children And Armed Conflict dated 10 June 2016

CPP

- BI-SC Dir 086-005, Implementing Cultural Property Protection in NATO Operations and Missions dated 01 April 2019
- N.b. Own policy for CPP is expected in mid-2025. Until then the PoC policy, Action plan and Concept are the placeholders.

WPS

- NATO Policy on Women, Peace and Security 2024 dated 11 July 2024
- PO(2021) 0336 NATO/EAPC Action plan for the implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policy on Women, Peace and Security 2021 – 2025 dated 21 Oct 2021
- BI-SC DIR 040-001(Rev.3), Integrating Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure dated 20 Oct 2021

CRSV

- PO(2021) 0190 NATO Policy on Preventing and Responding to CRSV dated 31 May 2021
- MCM 0009-2015, Military guidelines on the prevention of, and response to conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence
- BI-SC DIR 040-001 (Rev.3), Integrating Gender Perspective into NATO Command Structure dated 20 Oct 2021

CTHB

- NATO Policy on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings dated 12 July 2023

SEA

- PO(2019) 0459(INV) NATO Policy on Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse dated 20 November 2019

BI

- PO(2016) 0310 NATO Building Integrity Policy dated 19 May 2016
- IMSM-0122-2021 NATO Building Integrity action plan for 2021 – 2025 dated 25 May 2021
- PO(2021) 0050 Action plan 2021 – 2025
- MC 0697 Mil Concept for BI in operations dated 12 Feb 2021
- ACO directive 086-005 Implementing BI in Operations dated 01 Feb 2019

[1] Figure 6.1 displays the CCTs under the human security umbrella as yellow hexagons.

[2] Mitigate Harm is the military's primary focus. It is to avoid collateral damage to civilians by own actions, avoid urban battles, improve targeting and also try to stop the adversary from committing hostile actions against civilians.

[3] E. Pandolfi, et al., (2020). 'Safeguarding Cultural Property. Creating a NATO Information and Knowledge Management System for Cultural Property' NATO NEDP, pp. 21, 29 and 34.

[4]The Security Council has adopted 10 resolutions on Women, Peace and Security (WPS): Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2008), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019), and 2493 (2019).

[5] NATO Policy on Preventing and Responding to CRSV (2021)

[6] Guidelines for NATO staff on preventing the promotion and facilitation of trafficking in human beings (2004)

[7] Building Integrity (BI): A CCOE fact sheet. (n.d.). www.cimic-coe.org. p. 2. Retrieved 20 April 2022, from <https://www.handbook.www.cimic-coe.org/8.-annex/8.2-factsheets/final-ccoe-factsheet-building-integrity.pdf>

[8] NATO Human Security- Approach and Guiding Principles, (2022)

VII. Resilience

Executive Summary

Resilience refers to the ability of a society to withstand strategic shocks and to recover easily and quickly from them. Resilience combines civil and societal emergency preparedness as well as military capabilities.

To generate a holistic understanding of the whole-of-government and whole-of-society nature of Resilience, the Layered Resilience Concept breaks down Resilience into three layers: Societal, Civil, and Military. The Societal layer includes the population as a whole, while the Civil layer refers to public and private sector actors. The Military layer's task is to deter and defend. It also provides support to the civil environment when requested to do so. Alliance resilience is built on these interdependent layers.

NATO has agreed on viewing national resilience through the lens of the seven baseline requirements (7BLR). They reflect the three core functions of civil preparedness that must be maintained even under the most demanding conditions: continuity of government, essential services to the population, and civil support to the military.

- 1 – Assured continuity of government and critical government services
- 2 – Resilient energy supply
- 3 – Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people
- 4 – Resilient food and water resources
- 5 – Resilience to deal with mass casualties
- 6 – Resilient civil communications systems
- 7 – Resilient civil transportation systems


7.1. Layered Resilience

Definition of Resilience

Resilience is commonly understood as the underlying ability to withstand or overcome (abrupt) crises and shocks and thus maintain essential functions. Resilience is an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence [1]. NATO considers strong societies as the first line of defence, and as a necessity for a successful military operation. As today's societies are highly complex systems based on the functioning of critical infrastructures, societal resilience, as a cross-cutting aspect of all elements of resilience, became the new focus of NATO's resilience agenda.

Currently, within NATO, there are two generally accepted definitions of resilience: according to the AJP 3.19, resilience is “[...] the ability of an entity to continue to perform specified functions during and after an attack or an incident.” (AJP 3.19/1.12), while the second defines it as “The ability of a functional unit to continue to perform a required function in the presence of faults or errors”. Both definitions provide a broad, overarching description, yet there remains a need for a more system-oriented definition.

The following figure reflects one of the key messages of NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept regarding the function of resilience systems.. Resilience in this context is an adaptive process in which the system's performance is defined by absorbing strategic shocks with minimal impact (Capacity Gap). At the same time, essential functions of the system are maintained at a sufficient level to restore functionality in a reasonable time (t_1) and at a reasonable cost. While preparation for strategic shocks is integral, these shocks are usually unpredictable and unavoidable. Therefore, a resilient system focuses specifically on managing the consequences of a shock and isolating the event from the function of the overall system. In the final phase, the recovery phase, the system focuses on increasing its capacity to withstand similar strategic shocks in the future. A key element of this phase is adaptation: by integrating the lessons learned and newly acquired knowledge from managing the crisis back into the system, its effectiveness and resilience against future shocks are improved, thereby reducing their potential impact. In several speeches, articles and lectures, the final phase described above is strikingly formulated as the “bounce back” effect. [2] This term is taken from the general resilience literature. [3]



Therefore, the working definition is: “**Resilience refers to the ability of a society to withstand strategic shocks and to recover easily and quickly from them. Resilience combines civil and societal emergency preparedness as well as military capabilities**”.

[1] Allied Command Operations, 2019, p. 7


[2] Roepke, Thankey, 2019, pp. 2-8.; [Stoltenberg](#), 2020, p. 3; CCOE, 2018, p. 5

[3] Smith et al., 2010, p. 194

[1] <https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2021/06/14/strengthened-resilience-commitment>

7.1.1. The Layered Resilience Concept

The Layered Resilience Concept’s (LRC) central aim is to contribute to the Alliance’s maturing perspective on resilience by filling in the gap of understanding on military resilience: providing descriptions of both layered resilience and military resilience; offering a framework for decision- makers to factor in resilience when developing their Military Instrument of Power (MIoP); and providing a military lens for Alliance Resilience while highlighting the interdependencies between the military layer and all other Alliance resilience layers.



7.1.2. Layers of resilience

- To generate a holistic understanding of the whole-of-government and whole-of-society nature of Resilience, the LRC breaks down Resilience into three layers: Societal, Civil, and Military.

The **Societal layer** refers to the citizens and the wider civil society of Allied nations. Its resilience relies mainly on the population's level of preparedness, their awareness of information-related threats, and their overall support for national defence efforts. Within this layer, the focus is on the capabilities of civil society and how the population contributes to national resilience.

The **Civil layer** includes both public and private sector actors and is centred on ensuring the continuity of government, the provision of essential services, and civil support to military activities. From a NATO point of view, this is the most mature layer, largely due to the work carried out under the Resilience through Civil Preparedness strand. This layer assesses the capabilities and national inputs to resilience coming from public and private stakeholders. It also incorporates the seven baseline requirements for national resilience, agreed at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, which serve as benchmarks for Allies to evaluate their level of preparedness.

The final layer is the **Military layer**, which focuses on building military resilience through adequate military capacity and capability, ensuring that Allies can continue to deter and defend. When requested, they provide support to the civil environment. This layer considers the military's capabilities and its national contributions to overall resilience.

Alliance resilience is built on the interdependent and mutually reinforcing relationship between the Civil, Military, and Societal layers. This **interdependency** underscores the need for continuous coordination to maximise strengths and reduce vulnerabilities. Military resilience within the MIOp is guided by the Military Resilience Framework, where deterrence, defence, and support to the civil environment are enabled through key military activities. A resilient MIOp must anticipate, adapt, and prepare for threats capable of creating strategic shocks or prolonged crises, while also being able to withstand, respond to, and recover from adversarial actions. When required, it must additionally support the civil environment, coordinating with non-military actors to contribute to broader Alliance objectives and a comprehensive approach to operations.

7.2. Seven baseline requirements

NATO helps Allies build resilience. At the [2016 Warsaw Summit](#), allied leaders agreed to boost NATO's resilience to the full spectrum of threats and further develop their countries' individual capacity in conjunction with NATO's collective capacity to resist any form of armed attack. They agreed on the 7BLRs for national resilience against which allies can measure their level of preparedness.

These baseline requirements reflect the three core functions of civil preparedness that must be maintained even under the most demanding conditions: continuity of government, essential services to the population, and civil support to the military. These three core functions and the 7BLRs are all connected. This means, that if one area is impacted, another may be affected as a result. For example impact on the energy supply may affect ability to deal with mass casualties and other disruptive health crises.

BLR 1 – Assured continuity of government and critical government services

The essential purpose is to ensure the ability to make decisions, communicate them, and enforce them in a crisis *and provide the full range of governmental services (judicial, legislative, and executive)*. This requirement combines several key objectives.

- 1) A formalised plan for the continuation of government operations including the succession of political leadership, delegation of powers and the prioritization of key government institutions to maintain essential functions (military, food, water, transportation, infrastructure, medical, industrial, etc.).
- 2) Effective and trustworthy public crisis communication. National crisis management measures need the population's support to be effective. Crisis communication is crucial to achieve this public acceptance, but to do so 'trust' of the people is crucial.
- 3) Educated and trained civilian and military personnel, able to operate critical infrastructure and restore it when damaged by enemy attacks. Permanent disabling of critical infrastructures could lead to public demoralisation and loss of support for the government. Ultimately, this will hinder an effective defence.
- 4) A robust and self-sufficiently operating crisis management centre to ensure a civilian command and control capability. The facility needs to be protected against a range of threats (kinetic strikes, CBRN or cyber-attacks).

BLR 2 – Resilient energy supply

Energy is a fundamental enabler of military capability, and therefore a critical factor in the military operations. The ability of NATO to protect and sustain the power necessary for its operations, depends on the assured delivery of energy no matter the distance, terrain or adversarial actions.

To minimise the negative effects of an energy supply crisis, five objectives must be met.

- 1) *Secure access* to reliable energy sources. Spreading risks by diversifying of routes, suppliers, and resources increases reliability in times of crisis.
- 2) The existence of robust and sustainable *redundancy systems* helps to minimise the damage in the event of a failure. This includes crisis management plans and trained staff to operate them.
- 3) Knowledge of *critical points* in supply chains, the *dependencies* on (possible foreign) energy suppliers, and the *interdependencies* between the energy sector and other sectors are essential to plan and prioritize crisis measures effectively.
- 4) Rapid access to *secure information* is critical for obtaining a shared overview of the developing crisis and the measures taken by all stakeholders involved. Information sharing processes should be in place, authorizations managed, protocols should be clear to all involved, and information systems should be accessible on a need-to-know basis.
- 5) Identification of *the risks and opportunities* that emerging technologies^[1] may have on the resilient energy systems. Older systems can get disrupted by new technologies, but the development of new technological solutions can also really take off during longer-lasting crisis situations (e.g. autonomously operating micro grids).

BLR 3 – Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people

Mass movement management is important for the military. Military forces may be involved in assisting to refugees and managing their safe passage to areas where they can receive aid and protection. Effective management of the people's mass movement can help prevent the spread of disease, alleviate suffering, and reduce the risk of violence or conflict. Maintaining stability in affected regions also contributes to the safety and freedom of movement of military personnel and the civilians.

Two goals are central.

- 1) The existence of a national plan that enables the responsible civilian authorities to ensure the ability to anticipate, monitor, de-conflict, and effectively deal with sudden and/ or protracted uncontrolled movement of people, from within and from outside the national territory. This includes a mass influx of people exceeding 2% of the national population, through civil and military contingency arrangements, capabilities and surge capacity. This plan should contain the provision of food, water, shelter, transportation, medical facilities, security, etc.
- 2) Civilian-military coordination and planning allowing safe transit of refugees along relevant transport routes, not impeding military forces or being subjected to military violence.

The people's mass movement can be influenced by a number of factors:

- 1) the motivation for the mass movement (e.g. natural hazards, conflict, economic disparities, political instability, lack of safety);
- 2) the situations people encounter while being on the move (e.g. availability of safe routes, food and water, risk of exploitation, spread of extremism);

3) the involvement of external actors (e.g. the policies of neighbouring countries, or the support of international organisations).

BLR 4 – Resilient food and water resources

In order to ensure the supply of water and food, three objectives should be met:

- 1) a system to identify and report contamination of water and food;
- 2) a plan to ensure that food and water supplies are available from alternative sources;
- 3) a comprehensive contingency plan that takes into account the loss of some of the required manpower, expert capacity, and necessary resources to produce water and food to maintain supplies. Sectoral interdependencies with the energy supply and transport, as well as the control of central functions of the supply system by foreign owners, should also be included in the planning.

BLR 5 – Resilience to deal with mass casualties

In order to be prepared for mass casualty incidents, NATO nations should observe five core objectives.

- 1) Building resilience through civil preparedness to deal effectively with mass casualties, i.e., sufficient personnel and surgical capacity, availability of transportation, taking into account religious aspects of burials, etc.
- 2) An early warning and reporting system should be operational to alert the population, national service providers in the field, critical infrastructure operators, and the military.
- 3) A database should be created to monitor civilian medical capabilities (number of hospital beds, personnel, medical equipment, isolation units, laboratories, transport and evacuation capabilities, etc.). If available, military capabilities can be added. This database should be updated frequently and contain real-time, reliable information about healthcare capabilities throughout the crisis.
- 4) Civil-military plans must be in place to allow for the continued operation of all medically relevant services.
- 5) Each state should have robust national supply lines for medical supplies. In this context, existing supply chain vulnerabilities should be included in the analysis to ensure the best possible preparedness.

In addition to the physical aspects other factors may have a direct impact on the military operation. There may be emotional and mental health consequences, for example, if people can't bury their lost loved ones or don't want to confirm their deaths. These secondary effects can delay the recovery process and undermine community resilience to return to a state of normalcy and be resilient.

In the CIMIC estimate not only the mass casualties need to be addressed, but also the effects on the population and on societal resilience. The impact on the military operation (not only from J9!) is to be taken into account when advising the commander.

BLR 6 – Resilient civil communications systems

A central component in supporting of resilience is the access to and maintenance of communications. The aim is to ensure that telecommunications and cyber networks function even under crisis conditions, with **sufficient backup capacity**. For this, the communications infrastructure must be protected against intrusion, disruption, degradation, or interference IOT provide NATO C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance).

- 1) Access to secure, reliable communications infrastructure is of paramount importance both in times of peace, crisis and conflict under all possible threats. Access to the communications infrastructure needs to be prioritised in order to ensure command and control capability.
- 2) Robust redundancies are essential in order to be able to respond quickly to failures in telecommunications technology. Particular attention will be paid to the risks posed by new technologies, especially where any critical components of the system are under foreign or private control.

BLR 7 – Resilient civil transportation systems

Civil transportation infrastructures and systems are crucial to both civilian use and the military's ability to manoeuvre through its area of operations.

- 1) National regulation needs to set priorities in the area of transport in the event of a crisis or conflict. This needs to ensure that NATO forces can cross the borders of Alliance member states and transit its territory quickly and effectively. It also ensures the necessary movements to realise other BLRs (e.g. food and water supply).
- 2) National regulations need legal enforcement.
- 3) Military use of civil transportation infrastructure and systems requires planning for. CIMIC-planners should coordinate with other staff SMEs (a.o. MOVE, ENGR, MED), taking into account general operational factors (available personnel, strategic lift capacity, multimodal transportation connections, etc.) and factors specific to the type of transportation used.
- 4) Civil-military planning is needed to establish HNS and ensure the military use of civil transportation systems.

[1] New emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous weapons systems, big data, biotechnologies and quantum technologies are changing the world and the way NATO and its member states operate. NATO, 2021, p. 1

Regarding the 7 BLRs, it is important to note that since their approval and initial implementation, a considerable amount of experience has been gained — including the

identification of existing gaps and vulnerabilities — and several best practices have also been recognised. These useful lessons and guidelines are captured in the **Alliance Resilience Objectives (AROs)**. The AROs were developed based on the 2022 Resilience Assessment and aim to guide national resilience goals and implementation plans. These objectives address vulnerabilities affecting government continuity, essential services, and military operations, ensuring NATO's support to national authorities when needed.

The objectives align with the seven Baseline Requirements, forming a framework for assessing national and collective resilience. Allies will develop national goals based on these objectives, utilizing a four-year planning and review cycle. A non-binding reporting mechanism will facilitate the exchange of best practices. The 2026 Resilience Assessment will evaluate the implementation of these objectives, considering national self-assessments and voluntary presentations.

Key objectives include ensuring timely government service delivery, reliable energy supply, effective management of population movements, and robust food and water supply chains.

Additional objectives focus on addressing medical planning gaps, maintaining secure communication services, and ensuring transport infrastructure availability to support military operations.

7.3. Resilience in CIMIC

In order to meet these basic requirements, it is vital that the nation has a strong societal resilience. The three most critical basic conditions are:

- 1) a strong democratic basis combined with a high level of trust in the government;
- 2) well-informed and resilient citizens;
- 3) increased critical thinking in order not to be vulnerable to political and economic pressure, or even coercive manipulation.

Although NATO's role in building societal resilience is limited, NATO can support the member states with the help of the means at its disposal. CIMIC's role in promoting societal resilience is primarily of a supportive nature.

7.3.1 Perspectives

- Strategic level perspective
Ensure information on the allied states' ability to resist and recover from a major shock, and advise on the impact on SACEURs AOR and on the military operation.
- Operational level perspective
Focus on civil preparedness against armed and hybrid attacks, disruption of national critical infrastructure, economic shocks and

natural disasters and its implications on the military mission.

J9 is in lead on coordination in the Headquarters through the RtCP community of Interest and normally leads the Resilience Impact Coordination Meeting (RICM) other J-Codes are in support.

- Tactical level perspective
Focus on in space and time limited impacts in your Area of Interest (AOI) due to shortfalls in one or more BLR. Provide ‘real-time’ information on selected aspects of the civil environment and be alert on the lack of resilience resources.”

7.3.2 Stakeholders

There are three important civil stakeholders[1] in NATO resilience.

Government and public administration

The primary responsibility for building resilience lies with a nation’s government.

- 1) To constitute a legal and institutional framework for crisis management;
- 2) To provide and coordinate the distribution of all resources needed for crisis preparedness and direct crisis response.^[2]
- 3) Active communication is essential to ensure that citizens receive accurate information to prepare themselves for risks and know what to do during a crisis. Crisis communication increases trust in the government and its actions and inhibits disinformation campaigns.^[3]

Private sector

Resilience also depends on the private sector. Private sector companies operate the vast majority of critical infrastructures in society and produce the goods that keep daily life running. NATO relies on both in support of its deployments in various countries.

Society

Most of today’s threats are aimed at damaging or destabilising our societies. A resilient population is the first line of defence against these threats. Even with plans and policies in place, the nation’s resilience will be low if the population is not informed or prepared to deal with crises. It is important to assess whether the population has been involved in promoting national resilience through information campaigns, civilian training, or educating children in schools. Effective crisis communication during an event should align with previous information for maximum effectiveness

[1] See Chapter 4 for the description of the relevant actors.

[2] Garriaud-Maylam, 2021, p. 4

[3] Garriaud-Maylam, 2021, pp. 4

